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Global Financial Development Report 2013 is the first in a new World Bank series. It provides a unique contribution to financial 
sector policy debates, building on novel data, surveys, research, and wide-ranging country experience, with emphasis on 
emerging-market and developing economies. 
The global financial crisis has challenged conventional thinking on financial sector policies. Launched on the fourth  
anniversary of the Lehman Brothers collapse—a turning point in the crisis—this volume re-examines a basic question: what is 
the proper role of the state in financial development? To address the question, this report synthesizes new and existing evidence 
on the state’s performance as financial sector regulator, overseer, promoter, and owner. It calls on state agencies to provide 
strong regulation and supervision and ensure healthy competition in the sector, and to support financial infrastructure, such as 
the quality and availability of credit information. It warns that direct interventions—such as lending by state-owned  
banks, used in many countries to counteract the crisis—may end up being harmful.
The report also tracks financial systems in more than 200 economies before and during the global financial crisis. Accompany-
ing the publication is a website (http://www.worldbank.org/financialdevelopment) that contains extensive datasets, research 
papers, and other background materials, as well as interactive features.
The report’s findings and policy recommendations are relevant for policy makers; staff of central banks, ministries of finance,  
and financial regulation agencies; nongovernmental organizations and donors; academics and other researchers and analysts;  
and members of the development community.
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The Global Financial Development Report comes at a time when the worldwide financial crisis has starkly 
highlighted the importance of financial sys-
tems and their role in supporting economic 
development, ensuring stability, and reducing 
poverty. 
Finance matters, both when it functions 
well and when it functions poorly. Sup-
ported by robust policies and systems, finance 
works quietly in the background, contribut-
ing to economic growth and poverty reduc-
tion. However, impaired by poor sector 
policies, unsound markets, and imprudent 
institutions, finance can lay the foundation 
for financial crises, destabilizing economies, 
hindering economic growth, and jeopardizing 
hard-won development gains among the most 
vulnerable. 
Fostering sustainable financial develop-
ment and improving the performance of 
financial systems depends on numerous insti-
tutional factors and stakeholders. The policy 
maker, the regulator, the banker, and the 
financial consumer must all play their part.  
The World Bank Group has been actively 
engaged in financial sector work for some 
time, aiming to help various parts of the insti-
tutional mosaic—including regulation and 
supervision, corporate governance, and finan-
cial infrastructure—ensure that the financial 
sector contributes meaningfully to strong and 
inclusive growth. This report seeks to advance 
the global financial sector policy debate, 
highlighting the important perspective of 
emerging markets and developing economies. 
It contains a rich array of new financial sector 
data that are also publicly available as part of 
our Open Data Agenda. 
Sharpening the focus on the central role of 
finance in socioeconomic development and 
understanding how financial systems can be 
strengthened are crucial if we are to realize 
our goal of boosting prosperity and eradi-
cating poverty. The Global Financial Devel-
opment Report is an important step in this 
process. 
Jim Yong Kim 
President 
The World Bank Group
Foreword
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The goal of this inaugural Global Finan-cial Development Report is to contrib-ute to the evolving debate on the role 
of the state in the financial sector, highlighted 
from the perspective of development. The 
report is aimed at a broad range of stakehold-
ers, including governments, international 
financial institutions, nongovernmental orga-
nizations, think tanks, academics, private sec-
tor participants, donors, and the wider devel-
opment community. The report offers policy 
advice based on research and lessons from 
operational work. 
This marriage of research and operational 
work was possible thanks to the engagement 
of a diverse set of experts inside and outside 
the World Bank Group. The report reflects 
inputs from Bank staff in a broad range of 
units and collaboration with leading research-
ers on finance and development. Reflecting 
the close links between financial develop-
ment and stability, counterparts at the Inter-
national Monetary Fund have also provided 
valuable contributions. 
The report benchmarks financial institu-
tions and markets around the world, rec-
ognizing the diversity of modern financial 
systems. In its analysis of the state’s role in 
finance, the report seeks to avoid simplistic, 
ideological views, instead aiming to develop 
a more nuanced approach to financial sec-
tor policy based on a synthesis of new data, 
research, and operational experiences. 
The report emphasizes that the state has a 
crucial role in the financial sector—it needs to 
provide strong prudential supervision, ensure 
healthy competition, and enhance financial 
infrastructure. Regarding more direct inter-
ventions, such as state ownership of banks, 
the report presents new evidence that state 
involvement can help in mitigating adverse 
effects of a crisis. However, the report cau-
tions that over longer periods, direct state 
involvement can have important negative 
effects on the financial sector and the econ-
omy. Therefore, as crisis conditions recede, 
the evidence suggests that it is advisable for 
governments to shift from direct to indirect 
interventions.  
Because the financial system is dynamic 
and conditions are constantly changing, regu-
lar updates are essential. Hence, this report 
should be seen as part of an ongoing project 
aimed at supporting systematic evaluation, 
improving data, and fostering broader part-
nerships. Future reports might address finan-
cial inclusion, the development of local cur-
rency capital markets, the financial sector’s 
preface
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and sound financial systems for robust eco-
nomic performance. 
Mahmoud Mohieldin 
Managing Director 
The World Bank Group
role in long-term financing, and the state’s 
role in financing health care and pensions. 
We hope that this new series of analytical 
reports will prove useful to all stakeholders in 
promoting evidence-based decision making 
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ATP/TA after-tax profits to assets
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BTP/TA before-tax profits to assets
CCP central counterparty
CEF Caixa Econômica Federal 
CoCo contingent capital
CPSIPS Core Principles for Systemically 
Important Payment Systems
CPSS Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems
CR5 concentration ratio (share of 
the five largest banks in total 
banking system assets)
DB development bank 
DNS deferred net settlement
DTAs deferred tax assets
EAP  East Asia and Pacific
ECA  Europe and Central Asia
EMDEs emerging markets and 
developing economies
e-MID Electronic Market for Interbank 
Deposit
FIRA Fideicomisos Instituidos en 
Relación con la Agricultura, 
Mexico
FIRST  Financial Sector Reform and 
Strengthening Initiative
FOGAPE State-Owned Guarantee Fund 
for Small Entepreneurs, Chile 
FSA Financial Sector Assessment
FSAP Financial Sector Assessment 
Program
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSSA Financial System Stability 
Assessment
GCC  Gulf Cooperation Council 
GDP gross domestic product
GOB government-owned bank
GTS global trading system
HHI  Herfindahl-Hirschman index (of 
market concentration)
IDB Inter-American Development 
Bank
IFC International Finance 
Corporation
IFRS  International Financial 
Reporting Standards 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
IOSCO  International Organization of 
Securities Commissions
IRB international ratings-based
abbreviations and Glossary
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GloSSaRy oF key teRmS USeD thRoUGhoUt the RepoRt
The financial The financial system in a country is defined to include financial insti-
system  tutions (banks, insurance companies, and other nonbank financial 
institutions) and financial markets (such as those in stocks, bonds, 
and financial derivatives). It also includes the financial infrastructure 
(which includes, for example, credit information–sharing systems and 
payment and settlement systems).
Financial Conceptually, financial development is a process of reducing the costs
development of acquiring information, enforcing contracts, and making transac-
tions. Empirically, measuring financial development directly is chal-
lenging. Instead, the report measures four financial system character-
istics (depth, access, efficiency, and stability) for financial institutions 
and financial markets (“4x2 framework”).
The state The state is defined in a broad economic sense, to include not only the 
country’s government but also autonomous or semiautonomous agen-
cies such as a central bank or a financial supervision agency.
The roles of the The roles of the state in the financial sector include those of a pro-
state  moter, owner, regulator, and overseer. The report focuses on areas 
that were highlighted by the crisis and are of particular relevance for 
financial development.
Country A territorial entity for which statistical data are maintained and pro-
vided internationally on a separate and independent basis (not neces-
sarily a state as understood by international law and practice).
PKO BP PKO Bank Polski
PRISM Pakistan Real Time Interbank 
Settlement Mechanism
PSEFT Payment System and Electronic 
Fund Transfer
PwC Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
RCCP  Recommendations for Central 
Counterparties
ROA return on assets
RSSS Recommendations for Securities 
Settlement Systems
RTGS real-time gross settlement
RWA risk-weighted assets
SAR Special Administrative Region
SBP State Bank of Pakistan
SECO State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs, Switzerland
SELIC Sistema Especial de Liquidação 
e de Custódia
SIFIs systemically important financial 
institutions
SME small and medium enterprise
SSA  Sub-Saharan Africa
STR Sistema de Transferência de 
Reservas
TA/A taxes to assets 
KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, 
Germany
KOTEC Korean government guarantor
LAC Latin America and the 
Caribbean
LIBOR  London interbank offered rate
LLP loan loss provisioning
M2 M2 measure of money supply
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MFI  microfinance institution 
MIC Collateralized Interbank 
Market (Italy)
MSR mortgage servicing rights
NAFIN Nacional Financiera, Mexico
NBFI nonbank financial institution
NBP National Bank of Poland
NI net interest income
NII non-interest income
NPL nonperforming loan
NPS national payment system
NSFR net stable funding ratio
OECD Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 
OLS ordinary least squares
OTC over the counter
OV overhead costs
P/E price-to-earnings ratio
 
overview
Which lessons about the connections between 
finance and economic development should 
shape policies in coming decades? 
On the surface, the main contrast between 
this global crisis and those in recent decades is 
that developed economies were affected much 
more strongly and more directly than were 
developing economies. But some developed 
financial systems (such as those of Australia, 
Canada, and Singapore) have shown remark-
able resilience so far, while some developing 
ones have been brought to the brink of col-
lapse. The bigger point is that the quality of 
a state’s policy for the financial sector mat-
ters more than the economy’s level of devel-
opment. This report reassesses the role of the 
state in finance, based on updated data, ongo-
ing research, and World Bank Group experi-
ences from around the world.
Two building blocks underlie the report’s 
view of the role of the state in finance. First, 
there are sound economic reasons for the 
state to play an active role in financial sys-
tems. Second, there are practical reasons to 
be wary of the state playing too active a role 
in financial systems. The tensions inherent in 
these two building blocks emphasize the com-
plexity of financial policies. Though econom-
ics identifies the social welfare advantages of 
O n September 15, 2008, the failure of the U.S. investment banking giant 
Lehman Brothers marked the onset of the larg-
est global economic meltdown since the Great 
Depression. The aftershocks have severely 
affected the livelihoods of millions of people 
around the world. The crisis triggered policy 
steps and reforms designed to contain the cri-
sis and to prevent repetition of these events. 
Four years later, with banking woes ongo-
ing in various parts of the world (most nota-
bly in the euro area), it is a good time to 
evaluate these reforms and their likely con-
tribution to long-run financial development. 
The crisis experience is thus an important 
part of the motivation for this inaugural 
Global Financial Development Report. The 
crisis has prompted many people to reassess 
various official interventions in financial 
systems, from regulation and supervision of 
financial institutions and markets, to com-
petition policy, to state guarantees and state 
ownership of banks, and to enhancements in 
financial infrastructure. 
But the crisis does not necessarily negate 
the considerable body of evidence on these 
topics accumulated over the past few decades. 
It is important to use the crisis experience to 
examine what went wrong and how to fix it. 
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Nevertheless, with ample reservations and 
cautions, this report teases out broad lessons 
for policy makers from a variety of experi-
ences and analyses (see box O.1 for a sum-
mary of the main messages).
The state tends to play a major role in 
the modern financial sector, as promoter, 
certain government interventions, practical 
experience suggests that the state often does 
not intervene successfully. Furthermore, since 
economies and the state’s capacity to regu-
late differ across countries and over time, 
the appropriate involvement of the state in 
the financial system also varies case by case. 
BOX O.1 Main Messages of This Report 
The report’s overall message is cautionary. The global 
financial crisis has given greater credence to the idea 
that active state involvement in the financial sector 
can help maintain economic stability, drive growth, 
and create jobs. There is evidence that some interven-
tions may have had an impact, at least in the short 
run. But there is also evidence on potential longer-
term negative effects. The evidence also suggests that, 
as the crisis subsides, there may be a need to adjust 
the role of the state from direct interventions to less 
direct involvement. This does not mean that the state 
should withdraw from overseeing finance. To the con-
trary, the state has a very important role, especially in 
providing supervision, ensuring healthy competition, 
and strengthening financial infrastructure. 
Incentives are crucial in the financial sector. The 
main challenge of financial sector policies is to better 
align private incentives with public interest without 
taxing or subsidizing private risk-taking. Design of 
public policy needs to strike the right balance—pro-
moting development, yet in a sustainable way. This 
approach leads to challenges and trade-offs. 
In regulation and supervision, one of the crisis les-
sons is the importance of getting the “basics” right 
first. That means solid and transparent institutional 
frameworks to promote financial stability. Specifi-
cally, it means strong, timely, and anticipatory super-
visory action, complemented with market discipline. 
In many developing economies, that combination of 
basic ingredients implies a priority on building up 
supervisory capacity. Here, less can mean more: less 
complex regulations, for instance, can mean more 
effective enforcement by supervisors and better moni-
toring by stakeholders.
The evidence also suggests that the state needs to 
encourage contestability through healthy entry of 
well-capitalized institutions and timely exit of insol-
vent ones. The crisis fueled criticisms of “too much 
competition” in the financial sector, leading to insta-
bility. However, research presented in this report 
suggests that, for the most part, factors such as poor 
regulatory environment and distorted risk-taking 
incentives promote instability, rather than competi-
tion itself. With good regulation and supervision, 
bank competition can help improve efficiency and 
enhance access to financial services, without neces-
sarily undermining systemic stability. Rather than 
restricting competition, it is necessary to address 
distorted competition, improve the flow of informa-
tion, and strengthen the contractual environment.
Lending by state-owned banks can play a positive 
role in stabilizing aggregate credit in a downturn, but 
it also can lead to resource misallocation and dete-
rioration of the quality of intermediation. The report 
presents some evidence that lending by state-owned 
banks tends to be less procyclical and that some 
state-owned banks even played a countercyclical role 
during the global financial crisis. However, the track 
record of state banks in credit allocation remains gen-
erally unimpressive, undermining the benefits of using 
state banks as a countercyclical tool. Policy makers 
can limit the inefficiencies associated with state bank 
credit by paying special attention to the governance 
of these institutions and schemes and ensuring that 
adequate risk management processes are in place. 
However, this oversight is challenging, particularly in 
weak institutional environments. 
Experience points to a useful role for the state in 
promoting transparency of information and reducing 
counterparty risk. For example, the state can facili-
tate the inclusion of a broader set of lenders in credit 
reporting systems and promote the provision of high-
quality credit information, particularly when there 
are significant monopoly rents that discourage infor-
mation sharing. Also, to reduce the risk of freeze-ups 
in interbank markets, the state can create the condi-
tions for the evolution of markets in collateralized 
liabilities.
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that pay off, bank owners reap the profits. 
But when such gambles fail, the bank may 
not bear the full cost. For example, bail-
outs of troubled banks spread the cost of 
failed bets broadly among others in society 
who had no connection to the original risky 
investment decision. This potential for cas-
cading events can be a reason for the state to 
intervene by imposing “speed limits” on risk 
taking by banks. 
Third, limitations on the ability of people 
to process information, and the tendency of 
some people to follow the crowd, can moti-
vate governments to take an active role in 
financial markets. For example, when people 
have difficulty fully understanding complex 
investments or do not appreciate the possibil-
ity of rare but extreme events, this can lead 
investors to make systematic mistakes, which 
can jeopardize the stability of the economy, 
with potentially adverse ramifications for 
people who neither make those investments 
nor have any influence over those that do.
Governments can limit the adverse reper-
cussions of these market failures. For exam-
ple, regulation and supervision can limit risk 
taking by financial institutions to avoid the 
potential externalities associated with finan-
cial fragility. Also, authorities can regulate 
information disclosure to facilitate sound 
decisions, and even regulate financial prod-
ucts, similar to how governments regulate 
the sale of food and drugs. Thus, economics 
provides many reasons for an active role of 
the state in finance.
But just because the state can ameliorate 
market imperfections and improve the oper-
ation of financial systems does not mean that 
it will. Designing and enforcing appropriate 
policy can be tricky. Returning to the previ-
ous analogy with speed limits for cars and 
trucks, having a single speed limit may not 
seem very effective, because some vehicles 
have better safety features, such as braking 
systems, and therefore are less likely to end 
up in a crash. If vehicles with better brakes 
were allowed to go faster, they could spend 
less time on the road, and traffic could ease 
up. But brake quality is difficult to monitor 
in real time. So, differentiated speed lim-
its can be difficult to design and enforce, 
owner, regulator, and overseer. Indeed, eco-
nomics provides several good motivations 
for an active role for the state in finance. 
These motivations reflect the effects of “mar-
ket imperfections,” such as the costs and 
uncertainties associated with (a) acquiring 
and processing information, (b) writing and 
enforcing contracts, and (c) conducting trans-
actions. These market imperfections often 
create situations in which the actions of a few 
people or institutions can adversely influence 
many other people throughout society. These 
externalities provide the economic rationale 
for the government to intervene to improve 
the functioning of the financial system.
A few examples demonstrate how market 
imperfections motivate government action. 
First, when one bank fails, this can cause 
depositors and creditors of other banks to 
become nervous and start a run on these 
other banks. This “contagion”—whereby the 
weakness in one bank can cause stress for 
otherwise healthy financial institutions—can 
reverberate through the economy, causing 
problems for the individuals and firms that 
rely on those otherwise healthy institutions. 
This is the classic bank run.
A second example stresses the externali-
ties associated with risk taking, especially 
for large financial institutions. For the sake 
of this illustration, imagine a busy road with 
cars and trucks. If a car or truck goes faster, it 
can get to its destination sooner, but there is a 
chance that it will be involved in a crash. The 
likelihood of a crash is small but it increases 
with speed. Crashes involving large vehicles 
are particularly costly to others involved in 
the crash and very disruptive to traffic in gen-
eral. Nobody wants to be involved in a crash, 
of course. But when deciding on how fast to 
go, a car or truck driver may not fully con-
sider the costs that a crash might have on oth-
ers in terms of injuries, damages, time lost in 
traffic jams, and so on. The state can play a 
role, for example by imposing and enforcing 
speed limits, and perhaps imposing stricter 
regulation of vehicles that pose bigger risks, 
such as large trucks.
Similarly, financial institutions often do 
not bear the full risks of their portfolios. 
When a large bank makes risky investments 
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objectives, including less altruistic ones, such 
as helping friends, family, cronies, and politi-
cal constituents. When this happens, the gov-
ernment can do serious harm in the financial 
system. These arguments suggest a sober 
wariness concerning the role of the state in 
finance that will vary according to confidence 
in the political system’s ability to promote the 
public good. 
Determining the proper role of the state in 
finance is thus as complex as it is important: 
one size does not fit all when it comes to pol-
icy intervention. In less developed economies, 
there may seem to be more scope for the gov-
ernment’s involvement in spearheading finan-
cial development. However, less development 
is often accompanied by a less effective insti-
tutional framework, which in turn increases 
the risk of inappropriate interventions. And 
the role of the state naturally changes as the 
financial system creates new products, some 
of which obviate the need for particular poli-
cies while others motivate new government 
interventions. Reflecting this complexity, 
country officials and other financial sector 
experts often hold opposing views and opin-
ions on the pros and cons of various state 
interventions—a point illustrated by a recent 
informal global opinion poll carried out by 
the Global Financial Development Report 
team (box O.2).
The Global Financial Development 
Report provides new insights on financial 
development and the role of the state in finan-
cial systems, building on the experience from 
the global financial crisis. Varying economic 
and political circumstances across countries 
imply that financial sector policies require 
customization: appropriate policies will dif-
fer across countries and over time. But there 
are common lessons and guidelines. While 
recognizing the complexity of the issue and 
the limits of existing knowledge, this report 
contributes new data and analysis to the pol-
icy discussion.
benchmaRkinG Financial 
SyStemS
A growing body of evidence shows that 
financial institutions and financial markets 
resulting in more speeding and crashes. The 
state could also intervene directly by pro-
viding government-approved drivers for all 
cars and trucks. That way, the state can have 
more control over safety and soundness, but 
it can become quite expensive for taxpay-
ers. Alternatively, the state could build large 
speed bumps on the road, so that there are 
almost no crashes; however, traffic would 
slow down to a crawl. 
The analogy underscores that correct-
ing market imperfections is a complicated 
task, requiring considerable information and 
expertise to design, implement, and enforce 
sound policies. State interventions in finance 
need to be risk-sensitive, but measuring risk 
properly and enforcing risk-based regulations 
is far from straightforward. The state can try 
to run parts of the financial system directly, 
but evidence shows that approach to be very 
costly. And if the state required banks to hold 
capital as large as their loans, the risk of fail-
ures would be minimal, but financial inter-
mediation would grind to a halt since banks 
would not be able to lend. 
An important complicating factor is that 
the same government policies that ameliorate 
one market imperfection can create other—
sometimes even more problematic—distor-
tions. For example, when the government 
insures the liabilities of banks to reduce the 
possibility of bank runs, the insured credi-
tors of the bank may not diligently monitor 
the bank and scrutinize its management. 
This can facilitate excessive risk taking by 
banks. The state can try to limit risk tak-
ing by large, interconnected financial insti-
tutions. However, such interventions might 
reduce the incentives of private shareholders 
to exert strong corporate control over these 
institutions, because they think the govern-
ment is already doing it. Thus, state interven-
tions can create even more reliance on the 
state. 
An even deeper issue is whether the state 
always has sufficient incentives to correct for 
market imperfections. Governments do not 
always use their powers to address market 
imperfections and promote the public inter-
est. Sometimes, government officials use 
the power of the state to achieve different 
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the banking industry as a proxy for financial 
development. However, size is not a measure 
of quality, efficiency, or stability. Moreover, 
the banking sector is only one component 
of financial systems. This report, along with 
the accompanying public database, assembles 
and improves cross-country data that can be 
exert a powerful influence on economic 
development, poverty alleviation, and the 
stability of economies around the world. Yet 
measuring the functioning of the financial 
system has important shortcomings. Indeed, 
empirical work has largely—though not 
exclusively—relied on measures of the size of 
BOX O.2 Views from Some of the World Bank Clients
As part of its effort to find out more about client 
country views, the Global Financial Development 
Report team carried out an informal global poll—
the 2011/12 Financial Development Barometer. This 
poll, which covered country officials and financial 
sector experts from 78 countries (23 developed and 
55 developing), provides interesting insights into 
views about financial development and the role of 
the state in finance.
Despite the crisis experience, 90 percent of the 
country officials and experts surveyed in the poll 
perceive that positive effects of finance (in particular 
those on economic growth and poverty reduction) 
outweigh its potential negative effects. A majority 
of the respondents therefore see that their country’s 
financial sector needs to grow, especially in terms 
of financial markets and nonbank financial institu-
tions, to better serve its clients and expand to new 
ones. 
As regards the role of the state in the financial 
sector, the Financial Development Barometer con-
firmed various areas of agreement. For example, 
there is a widespread notion that state-owned 
financial institutions and government-backed credit 
guarantees can in principle play a useful role. The 
poll also shows many respondents seeing potential 
benefits in more stringent supervision of new finan-
cial instruments in light of the crisis. A majority 
also see a scope for a more active role of the state 
in promoting technological innovations in financial 
infrastructure. 
Perhaps more interestingly, the poll also indi-
cated many key policy areas where the views for and 
against are almost evenly split. This split includes, 
for example, opinions on the need for stringency 
and greater scope of regulation and supervision, the 
pros and cons of greater competition in countries’ 
financial systems, the possible countercyclical role 
of state-owned financial institutions, and the role of 
the state in promoting information sharing—all top-
ics that are examined in the current Global Finan-
cial Development Report. 
Note: The Financial Development Barometer is an informal global poll covering country officials and financial 
sector experts from 78 economies (23 developed and 55 developing). The response rate was 65 percent. Results are 
percentages of total responses received.
Selected Responses from the 2011/12 Financial Development Barometer
Views were split on important aspects of the state’s role . . . Agree? (%)
“In view of the global financial crisis, more stringent financial sector regulation and 
supervision is needed.” 49
“In view of the global financial crisis, there is a need for broadening the scope of financial 
sector regulation and supervision.” 54
“More financial sector competition would help financial stability in my home country.” 58
“State-owned financial institutions played an effective countercyclical role during the recent 
global financial crisis.” 48
“Government-backed credit guarantee schemes do play an important role in promoting 
financial stability.” 64
“The development of collateral registries can be left, fully or mostly, to the private sector.” 42
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less deep and also somewhat less efficient and 
to provide less access, their stability has been 
comparable to developed-country financial 
systems. These measures are then used to 
characterize and compare financial systems 
across countries and over time, highlight-
ing the multidimensional nature of financial 
development. Country-by-country informa-
tion on the key financial system characteris-
tics is presented in the Statistical Appendix, 
with more data available through the report’s 
website.
RethinkinG the Role oF 
the State in the Financial 
SectoR
The report addresses the following key pol-
icy questions: (a) What is the early postcrisis 
thinking on transforming regulatory prac-
tices around the world? (b) How should gov-
ernments promote competition in the finan-
cial sector without planting the seeds of the 
next crisis? (c) When do direct government 
interventions—such as state ownership and 
guarantees—help in developing the financial 
sector, and when do they fail? and (d) What 
should states do to support robust financial 
used to benchmark financial systems. Chap-
ter 1 addresses questions such as: How can 
one empirically describe different charac-
teristics of financial systems? How can one 
compare financial systems across countries 
and regions and through time? How have 
financial systems been affected by the global 
financial crisis, and what are the key recent 
trends? 
To measure and benchmark financial sys-
tems, the report develops several measures 
of four characteristics of financial institu-
tions (banks, insurance companies, and so 
on) and financial markets (stock markets and 
bond markets): (a) the size of financial insti-
tutions and markets (financial depth), (b) the 
degree to which individuals can and do use 
financial institutions and markets (access), 
(c) the efficiency of financial institutions 
and markets in providing financial services 
(efficiency), and (d) the stability of financial 
institutions and markets (stability). These 
four characteristics are measured both for 
financial institutions and financial markets, 
leading to a 4x2 matrix of the characteristics 
of financial systems. A basic comparison (fig-
ure O.1) confirms that although developing-
economy financial systems tend to be much 
Depth 
a.  Financial institutions b.  Financial markets
Access 
Efficiency 
Stability 
Depth 
Access 
Efficiency 
Stability 
Developed economies (%)
Developing economies (%)
100 
75 
50 
25 
0 
100 
75 
50 
25 
0 
FiguRe O.1 Benchmarking Financial Development, 2008–10
Source: calculations based on cˇihák, demirgüç-kunt, feyen, and levine 2012.
Note: average values are shown for 2008–10 with simple (unweighted) averages across country groups. the 0 corresponds to a historical low of the proxy 
variable, and 100 corresponds to a historical high calculated for all countries over the period 1960–2010. for the explanation of individual proxy variables 
for financial depth, access, stability, and efficiency, see chapter 1. 
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factors, including a country’s level of devel-
opment and the government’s capacity. Two 
themes emerge throughout this report.
The first relates to direct and indirect 
interventions. During the recent crisis, direct 
state interventions have increased, and early 
evidence reveals that some of these inter-
ventions worked, at least in the short run. 
infrastructure? Box O.3 provides an over-
view of the report’s chapters.
How should public policy be designed 
to address these four key questions? The 
issue of concern in this report is how best 
to balance the various roles of the state as 
promoter, owner, regulator, and overseer. 
The right balance depends on a number of 
BOX O.3 Navigating This Report
In addition to this Overview, the report has two 
main parts. The first part (chapter 1) introduces 
measures of different characteristics of financial sys-
tems that are useful in benchmarking financial sys-
tems around the world. The second part (chapters 2 
through 5) examines various aspects of the state’s 
role in finance.
Chapter 1 describes financial depth, access, effi-
ciency, and stability across countries and regions, 
especially in developing economies. Chapter 1 intro-
duces a major new database, the Global Financial 
Development Database, and discusses how subse-
quent editions of the report will revisit the analysis 
and benchmarking of financial systems with updated 
and expanded data. 
Chapter 2 examines the role of the state as reg-
ulator and supervisor. It presents results from a 
recently updated and substantially expanded World 
Bank survey of regulation and supervision around 
the world, explores how crisis countries were differ-
ent from noncrisis countries, and tracks changes that 
governments made after the crisis. The chapter also 
reviews international regulatory and supervisory 
reforms and discusses proposals for further reforms. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the role of the state in com-
petition policy. After discussing various measures of 
competition, and presenting trends across countries 
and over time based on a new worldwide data set, it 
reviews the evidence on the implications of banking 
competition for bank efficiency, access to finance, 
and financial stability. The chapter then analyzes the 
policy drivers of competition and highlights the role 
of the state in (a) promoting a contestable banking 
system and (b) enabling a market-friendly informa-
tional and institutional environment. It also ana-
lyzes the impact of government actions during crises 
on bank competition. 
Chapter 4 examines direct state interventions, 
particularly the experience with state-owned banks 
during the financial crisis. It reviews existing and 
new research and reexamines the performance of 
state-owned banks during crises. A large part of 
the discussion focuses on state-owned commer-
cial banks as opposed to state-owned development 
banks; nonetheless, the chapter also presents a new 
data set based on a recent survey of development 
banks. It also examines the role of credit guarantees.
Chapter 5 relates to the role of the state in finan-
cial infrastructure, with a focus on two topics high-
lighted by the crisis: (a) information sharing in credit 
markets, and (b) the role of the state in reducing 
counterparty risk in payments and securities settle-
ment systems. 
The accompanying website (http://www.world 
bank.org/financialdevelopment) contains a wealth 
of underlying research, additional evidence includ-
ing country examples, and an extensive database on 
financial development, providing users with interac-
tive access to information on financial systems. The 
website is also a place where users participate in an 
online version of the Financial Development Barom-
eter, provide feedback on this  Global Financial 
Development Report, and submit their suggestions 
for future issues of the report.
The report concentrates on banks. There are 
some references to and data on financial markets 
and nonbank financial institutions (for example, in a 
discussion on the regulatory perimeter and on access 
by nonbank institutions to financial infrastructure). 
But to keep the report focused, much of the discus-
sion is devoted to banks. Future issues of the report 
will cover financial markets and nonbank financial 
institutions in more depth.
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Overall, there is broad agreement to 
address the “basics” first. This means hav-
ing in place a coherent institutional and legal 
framework that establishes market discipline 
complemented by strong, timely, and antici-
patory supervisory action. In many develop-
ing economies, this also means that building 
up supervisory capacity needs to be a top 
priority. Among the important lessons of 
the global financial crisis are renewed focus 
on systemic risk and the need to pay greater 
attention to incentives in the design of regula-
tion and supervision. 
Using a new survey of regulation and 
supervision around the world (figure O.2), 
chapter 2 confirms that countries where 
the global financial crisis originated had 
weaker regulation and supervisory practices 
(for example, less stringent definitions of 
capital, less stringent provisioning require-
ments, and greater reliance on banks’ own 
risk assessment), as well as less scope for 
market incentives (for example, lower qual-
ity of financial information made publicly 
available, more generous deposit insurance 
coverage). Tracking changes during the cri-
sis reveals that countries have stepped up 
efforts in the area of macroprudential pol-
icy, as well as on issues such as resolution 
regimes and consumer protection. However, 
it is not clear whether incentives for market 
discipline have improved. Some elements of 
disclosure and quality of information have 
improved, but deposit insurance coverage has 
increased during the crisis. This increased 
coverage, together with generous support for 
weak banks, did not improve incentives for 
monitoring. The survey suggests that there is 
further scope for improving disclosures and 
monitoring incentives.
Despite the progress made on regulatory 
reform, there are still important areas of dis-
agreement. Hence, chapter 2 also presents 
a number of reform proposals that call for 
greater emphasis on simplicity and transpar-
ency, as well as a focus on incentive-compat-
ible regulations. Importantly, these proposals 
warn against growing complexity of regula-
tion, which may reduce transparency and 
accountability, increase regulatory arbitrage 
However, there is also evidence on potential 
longer-term negative effects. Therefore, as the 
crisis subsides, there may be a need to rebal-
ance toward less direct state involvement.
The second important theme is the criti-
cal role that incentives play in the financial 
sector. The challenge for the state’s involve-
ment is to better align private incentives with 
public interest, without taxing or subsidizing 
private risk taking. The design of public pol-
icy needs to strike the right balance in order 
to promote sustainable development. This 
leads to different challenges and trade-offs in 
answering each of the four questions below.
What are the best ways to reform 
regulation and supervision?
The global financial crisis that intensified 
with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in Sep-
tember 2008 presented a major test of the 
international architecture developed over 
many years to safeguard the stability of the 
global financial system. Although the causes 
of the crisis are still being debated, there is 
agreement that the crisis revealed major 
shortcomings in market discipline, regula-
tion, and supervision. The financial crisis 
therefore has reopened important policy 
debates on financial regulation. After the 
onset of the meltdown, there was much talk 
about not wasting the crisis, and using it to 
push through necessary reforms. Indeed, 
many reforms have been enacted or are in 
process. Much has been done, but the system 
was tested further by the more recent euro 
area crisis, leading to the questions: Are the 
reforms adequate and will they be sufficient 
to reduce the likelihood and severity of future 
financial crises? 
Regulation and supervision represent one 
area in which the role of the state is not in 
dispute. The crucial role of the state is widely 
acknowledged and is well established in the 
economic and financial literature. Hence, the 
debate is not about whether the state should 
regulate and supervise the financial sector, 
but about how best to go about ensuring that 
regulation and supervision support sound 
financial development. 
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other risk-mitigating features. However, if 
the state does not have the capacity to moni-
tor and police such complex rules, the likely 
result is more speeding and more crashes. 
Similarly, complex approaches to calculat-
ing capital requirements are not appropriate 
if there is limited capacity to verify the cal-
culations, do robustness checks, and police 
implementation.
One of the positive developments triggered 
by the crisis is much greater debate and com-
munication among regulators, policy mak-
ers, and academics, who are striving to reach 
the common goal of designing regulations to 
minimize the occurrence and cost of future 
crises. The diverse views and multiple reform 
proposals in this debate (presented in chapter 
2) are likely to inform the regulatory reform 
process and improve future outcomes. 
How should the state promote 
competition in the financial sector?
The global financial crisis also reignited the 
interest of policy makers and academics in 
the impact of bank competition and the role 
opportunities, and significantly strain regu-
latory resources and capacity. The propos-
als suggest a regulatory approach that is 
more focused on proactively identifying and 
addressing incentive problems and making 
regulations incentive-compatible. This can 
help to end the continuous need to elimi-
nate deficiencies and close loopholes that are 
inevitably present in ever more complex sets 
of regulations. Other proposals address the 
incentives that the regulators face and either 
propose alternative institutional structures or 
suggest tools to identify incentive issues on an 
ongoing basis. 
In implementing supervisory best prac-
tices, emerging markets and developing econ-
omies should focus on establishing a basic 
robust supervisory framework that reflects 
local financial systems’ characteristics, and 
refraining from incorporating unnecessary 
(and in several cases inapplicable) complex 
elements. Referring back to the earlier anal-
ogy with speed limits for cars and trucks, 
it may be appealing to have a complex rule 
in which each car has its own speed limit, 
depending on the quality of its brakes and 
Lower standards for public data quality (Do laws or regulations require 
auditors to conduct their audits in accordance with international standards?)
1008060200 40
Less oversight of external auditors (Are external auditors subject to
independent oversight by the supervisor?)
Less strict provisioning II (Is there a regulatory requirement for
general provisions on loans and advances?)
Less strict provisioning I (Are minimum levels of specific
provisions for loans and advances set by the regulator?)
More sophisticated modeling (Is an advanced internal ratings-based
approach offered to banks?)
Broader capital definition (Is Tier 3 allowed in regulatory capital?)
Crisis Non-Crisis
FiguRe O.2 Selected Features That Distinguish Crisis-Hit Countries
Source: cˇihák, demirgüç-kunt, martínez pería, and mohseni 2012. 
Note: percentage of countries that responded “yes” to the question in parentheses. based on the world bank’s 2011 bank Regulation and supervision 
survey. “crisis” countries are defined as those that had a banking crisis between 2007 and 2011, as identified in laeven and valencia (2012).
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bank regulatory agencies: survey data reveal 
that the majority now have explicit responsi-
bilities in the areas of competition policy. 
The Global Financial Development 
Report’s analysis (chapter 3) provides guid-
ance on this important issue. Research sug-
gests that bank competition brings about 
improvements in efficiency across banks and 
enhances access to financial services, without 
necessarily undermining systemic stability. 
A cursory look at trends in average systemic 
risk and bank market power (figure O.3) 
indicates that greater market power (that is, 
less competition) is associated with more sys-
temic risk (chapter 3 examines this in more 
detail). Hence, the evidence of a real trade-off 
is weak at best. 
This analysis suggests that policies to 
address the causes of the recent crisis should 
not unduly restrict competition. The appro-
priate public policy is (a) to establish a regu-
latory framework that does not subsidize risk 
taking through poorly designed exit poli-
cies and too-big-to-fail subsidies and (b) to 
remove barriers to entry of “fit and proper” 
bankers with well-capitalized financial 
institutions. 
For competition to improve access to 
finance, the state has an important role to 
play in enabling a market-friendly informa-
tional and institutional environment. Policies 
that guarantee market contestability, timely 
flow of adequate credit information, and 
contract enforceability will enhance compe-
tition among banks and improve access. For 
instance, evidence across business line data in 
Brazil shows that competition in the corpo-
rate segment is higher than in the retail seg-
ment. This reflects the existence of a larger 
pool of credit providers and easier access to 
information for large corporations. Com-
petition in the retail sector can be fostered 
by promoting portability of bank accounts, 
expanding credit information sharing, and 
increasing payment system interconnection. 
In this context, consumer protection laws 
have been at the forefront of competition 
policies in many countries. One example 
is South Africa, where new legislation pro-
vided a framework to bolster competition by 
of the state in shaping competition policies. 
Some believe that increasing financial inno-
vation and competition in certain markets, 
such as subprime mortgage lending, con-
tributed to the global financial turmoil, and 
they are calling for policies to restrict com-
petition. Others worry that, as a result of 
the crisis and the actions of governments in 
support of the largest banks, concentration in 
banking increased, reducing the competitive-
ness of the sector and access to finance, and 
potentially also contributing to future insta-
bility as a result of moral hazard problems 
associated with “too big to fail” institutions. 
Hence, the design of competition policy is 
challenging because it again involves a pos-
sible trade-off between efficiency and growth 
on one hand and stability concerns on the 
other hand. Another reason why rethinking 
competition policies is important relates to 
the changing mandate of central banks and 
Source: calculations based on anginer, demirgüç-kunt, and Zhu 2012.
Note: the systemic risk measure follows anginer and demirgüç-kunt (2001) and builds on  
merton’s (1974) contingent claim pricing. systemic risk is defined as the correlation in the risk-
taking behavior of banks and is captured by the R-squared from a regression of a bank’s weekly 
change in distance to default on country average weekly change in distance to default (excluding 
the bank itself). Higher R-squared means higher systemic risk. lerner index is a proxy for profits 
that accrue to a bank as a result of its pricing power, so higher values mean less competition.  
the calculations cover 1,872 publicly traded banks in 63 economies (developed and developing).
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FiguRe O.3 Market Power and Systemic Risk
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often than not serving political interests 
instead. Nevertheless, the global financial 
crisis underscored the potential countercycli-
cal role of state-owned banks in offsetting 
the contraction of credit from private banks, 
leading to arguments that this is an impor-
tant function that can perhaps better justify 
their existence. 
The crisis and the actions adopted by 
different countries reignited the debate on 
the need for direct government intervention 
in the financial sector. Supporters of state-
owned banks argue that they provide the 
state an additional tool for crisis manage-
ment and, relative to central banks, may be 
more capable of providing a safe haven for 
retail and interbank deposits, creating a fire 
break in contagion, and stabilizing aggregate 
credit. On the other hand, those opposing 
government bank ownership point out that 
agency problems and politically motivated 
lending render state-owned banks inefficient 
and prone to cronyism. Furthermore, past 
experiences of numerous countries suggest 
that cronyism in lending may build up large 
fiscal liabilities and threaten public sector sol-
vency and financial stability, as well as mis-
allocate resources and retard development in 
the long run. 
During the recent crisis, several coun-
tries used their public bank infrastructure 
to prop up the financial sector. For instance, 
the Brazilian government injected capital 
into its state-owned development bank and 
authorized state-owned banks to acquire 
equity stakes from private banks and loan 
portfolios from financial institutions with 
liquidity problems. In China, state-owned 
banks were instructed to boost credit to 
specific sectors in order to promote growth. 
In the Russian Federation, Vnesheconom-
bank, the country’s state-owned develop-
ment bank, received new capital to assist 
troubled smaller financial institutions and 
to invest in Russian financial instruments. 
It also injected money into large state- 
controlled banks to increase their loans to 
Russian companies. In Mexico, state-owned 
development banks extended credit to large 
companies, participated in loan programs 
providing a sound information environment 
to customers and protecting consumers from 
unfair credit and credit marketing practices. 
It established a National Credit Regulator to 
act as a knowledge platform for credit prac-
tices and to ensure compliance with the law. 
Competition agencies also play a crucial 
advocacy role in promoting competition. 
One example in this regard is Romania’s 
Competition Council, which has extended 
the European Union Consumer Credit Direc-
tive of 2008. The directive establishes com-
mon rules on consumer credit over mort-
gage or real estate guaranteed loans and 
eliminates (or sets a low threshold for) early 
repayment fees.
Finally, state interventions during crises 
may constitute a barrier to exit that permits 
insolvent and inefficient banks to survive 
and generate unhealthy competition. Gov-
ernments should be aware that their inter-
ventions during crises may have potentially 
negative long-term consequences on bank 
competition and may distort risk-taking 
incentives. 
When do direct government 
interventions help? 
During the global financial crisis, countries 
pursued a variety of strategies to restart 
their financial and real sectors. As the bal-
ance sheets of private banks deteriorated and 
they curtailed their lending activities, many 
countries used state-owned banks to step up 
their financing to the private sector. Most 
countries relied heavily on the use of credit 
guarantee programs. Others adopted a num-
ber of unconventional monetary and fiscal 
measures to prop up credit markets. 
Historically, many state-owned banks 
were created to fulfill long-term develop-
ment roles by filling market gaps in long-
term credit, infrastructure, and agriculture 
finance, and to promote access to finance 
to underserved segments of the economy—
notably, small and medium enterprises. In 
practice, however, there is widespread evi-
dence that state banks have generally been 
very inefficient in allocating credit, more 
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The mitigating short-term effect of state-
owned banks is illustrated in figure O.4. The 
figure shows the relationship between lending 
patterns of banks with private and state own-
ership and economic growth, measured by 
real GDP per capita growth. Globally, bank 
lending is procyclical, growing during booms 
and falling during downturns. Yet the lend-
ing pattern of private banks is more procycli-
cal compared with their state-owned counter-
parts. In high-income countries, state-owned 
banks even behave in a clearly countercycli-
cal fashion, increasing in downturns.
However, because in many cases lend-
ing growth continued even after economic 
recovery was under way, and loans were not 
directed to the most constrained borrowers, 
the countercyclical benefits of state-owned 
banks came at the cost of resource misal-
location and worsened intermediation. This 
mixed view is supported by evidence from 
previous crises as well. In other words, a tem-
porary boom in state bank lending has long-
term adverse effects by creating a portfolio of 
for fragile sectors, and extended guarantees 
on commercial paper and credit instruments 
issued by specialized nonbank financial insti-
tutions. Similar actions were also taken by 
some developed economies. For example, 
Germany’s state-owned development bank, 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, increased 
lending to larger companies with short-
term liquidity problems, provided additional 
financing for infrastructure, and helped 
recapitalize regional state banks. And in 
Finland, the government raised the limits on 
domestic and export financing for the coun-
try’s state-owned bank to boost lending to 
small and medium enterprises.
Chapter 4 highlights that not all state-
owned banks are alike. They can be classified 
as state commercial banks, state development 
banks, and development financial institu-
tions, depending on whether they aim to 
maximize profits, are deposit takers, or have 
a clear developmental mandate. State-owned 
development banks and financial institutions, 
in turn, can lend to the public either directly 
or indirectly through private banks. Most 
of the evidence discussed on the short-term 
and long-term effects of state-owned banks 
focuses on commercial banks or does not dis-
tinguish between commercial and develop-
ment banks.
Chapter 4 reviews the historical and new 
research evidence and concludes that lending 
by state-owned banks tends to be less procy-
clical than that of their private counterparts. 
During the global financial crisis, some state-
owned banks have indeed played a counter-
cyclical role by expanding their lending port-
folio and restoring favorable conditions in 
key markets. For instance, the chapter high-
lights the expansion of the lending portfolio 
of state-owned commercial banks (for exam-
ple, PKO Bank Polski in Poland) and state-
owned development banks (for example, 
BNDES in Brazil) in mitigating the effects 
from the global credit crunch and filling the 
gap of lower credit from the private sector. 
Also, Mexican development banks supported 
the credit channel through the extension 
of credit guarantees and lending to private 
financial intermediaries. 
Source: bertay, demirgüç-kunt, and Huizinga 2012.
Note: the figure shows marginal effects from a regression of bank lend-
ing on gdp per capita growth and a number of control variables, esti-
mated using a sample of 1,633 banks from 111 countries for the period 
1999–2010.
significance level: ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent.
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FiguRe O.4 Change in Bank Lending Associated 
with a 1% increase in gDP Per Capita growth
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stable systems for large-value financial trans-
actions. Reflecting the focus on the aftermath 
of the financial crisis, the report does not 
examine other components of financial infra-
structure, such as retail payment systems and 
collateral regimes; it leaves these important 
issues to be covered in future editions. 
Chapter 5 emphasizes that the transpar-
ent exchange of credit information reduces 
information asymmetries between borrowers 
and lenders and is an essential requisite of a 
well-functioning credit market. However, the 
financial crisis has shown that there is much 
room for improvement in this area, especially 
in the use of existing credit reporting systems 
for prudential oversight and regulation. 
Information sharing in credit markets acts 
as a public good that improves credit market 
efficiency, access to finance, and financial 
stability. Nonetheless, for an individual com-
mercial bank, proprietary credit information 
is valuable, so it has incentives to collect the 
information and keep it away from others. 
Information sharing among private lend-
ers thus may not arise naturally, especially 
where banking systems are concentrated (fig-
ure O.5). This creates an important rationale 
for state involvement. In addition, the report 
highlights that information sharing in credit 
markets has increasing returns to scale: the 
benefits of credit reporting for financial access 
and stability are greatest when participation 
is as wide as possible and includes banks as 
well as nonbank financial institutions. There-
fore, another important role for the state is to 
create a level playing field for the provision 
and exchange of credit information, and to 
facilitate the inclusion of nonregulated lend-
ers into existing credit reporting systems. In 
many emerging markets, such as China and 
South Africa, major initiatives are under way 
to integrate the rapidly growing microfinance 
and consumer loan markets into the existing 
credit reporting infrastructure.
Liquidity provision by central banks dur-
ing the crisis helped prevent major payment 
system disruptions. However, stress emerged 
in interbank and over-the-counter derivatives 
markets. The state can play an important role 
in mitigating counterparty risks in interbank 
bad loans in crises that take a long time to 
sort out. 
Ideally, focusing on the governance of 
these institutions may help policy makers 
address the inefficiencies associated with 
state-owned banks. State banks need a clear 
mandate to complement (rather than sub-
stitute for) private banks, and adopt risk 
management practices that allow them to 
guarantee a financially sustainable business. 
However, these governance reforms are par-
ticularly challenging in weak institutional 
environments, further emphasizing that the 
trade-off is a serious one for policy makers. 
Credit guarantee schemes have also been 
a popular intervention tool during the recent 
crisis. However, given their limited scale, they 
are used not to stabilize aggregate credit but 
to alleviate the impact of the credit crunch on 
segments that are most severely affected, such 
as small and medium enterprises. Unfortu-
nately, rigorous evaluations of these schemes 
are very few, and existing studies suggest 
that the benefits of these programs tend to be 
rather modest, particularly in institutionally 
underdeveloped settings, and they tend to 
incur fiscal and economic costs. Nevertheless, 
best practices can be identified. These include 
leaving credit assessments and decision mak-
ing to the private sector; capping coverage 
ratios and delaying the payout of the guar-
antee until recovery actions are taken by the 
lender, so as to minimize moral hazard prob-
lems; having pricing guarantees that take into 
account the need for financial sustainability 
and risk minimization; and encouraging the 
use of risk management tools. Success again 
hinges on overcoming the challenges of get-
ting the design right, particularly in underde-
veloped institutional and legal settings.
What is the role for the state in 
promoting financial infrastructure?
The global financial crisis has highlighted the 
importance of a resilient financial infrastruc-
ture for financial stability. It also has led to 
a discussion about the role of the state, par-
ticularly in promoting the provision of high-
quality credit information and in ensuring 
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money markets by providing robust and 
secure infrastructure and, potentially, by 
promoting the development of collateralized 
interbank markets. The state can also con-
tribute in the development of a robust infra-
structure for security settlement systems and 
the oversight of securities transactions, par-
ticularly for over-the-counter transactions. 
Increased standardization and transparency 
of transactions is needed and can be achieved 
by (a) trading on exchanges or electronic 
trading platforms; (b) clearing transactions 
through central counterparties, that is, enti-
ties that interpose themselves as counterpart 
to each trade (examples include the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange’s CME Clearing in the 
United States, Eurex Clearing in Germany, 
and London Clearing House’s LCH.Clear-
net in the United Kingdom); and (c) report-
ing transactions to trade repositories, which 
are entities that store centralized records of 
transaction data. These policy prescriptions 
are especially important in many emerging 
markets, where the development of a modern 
settlement infrastructure has lagged behind 
the rapid growth of emerging equity and 
securities markets.
Credit 
registry 
Credit 
bureau 
Any credit 
reporting 
1.0 
0.56 
0.80 
0.92 
0.37 0.39 
0.53 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 
Probability of existence of a credit reporting system 
Low bank concentration High bank concentration 
Source: bruhn, farazi, and kanz 2012.
Note: the figure reports the percentage of countries with private (credit 
bureau), public (credit registry), or any credit reporting institutions for 
countries with high and low degrees of bank concentration (above and 
below the sample mean), respectively. it shows that bank concentration 
(the asset share of a country’s three largest banks) is negatively asso-
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FiguRe O.5 Credit Reporting vs. Banking System 
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benchmarking Financial Systems 
around the world
managerial performance, this boosts the effi-
ciency of corporations and reduces waste and 
fraud by corporate insiders. But that is not all. 
When equity, bond, and derivative markets 
enable the diversification of risk, this encour-
ages investment in higher-return projects 
that might otherwise be shunned. And, when 
financial systems lower transaction costs, 
this facilitates trade and specialization—fun-
damental inputs to technological innovation 
(Smith 1776). 
When financial systems perform these 
functions poorly, they hinder economic 
growth, curtail economic opportunities, and 
destabilize economies. For example, if finan-
cial systems collect funds and pass them along 
to cronies, the wealthy, and the politically 
A  growing body of evidence suggests that financial institutions—such as 
banks and insurance companies—and finan-
cial markets—stock markets, bond markets, 
derivative markets, and so on—exert a pow-
erful influence on economic development, 
poverty alleviation, and economic stability 
(Levine 2005). For example, when banks 
screen borrowers and identify firms with the 
most promising prospects, this is a key step 
that helps allocate resources, expand economic 
opportunities, and foster growth. When banks 
and securities markets mobilize savings from 
households to invest in promising projects, 
this is another crucial step in fostering eco-
nomic development. When financial institu-
tions monitor their investments and scrutinize 
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•   Financial systems are multidimensional. Four characteristics are of particular interest 
for benchmarking financial systems: financial depth, access, efficiency, and stability. 
These characteristics need to be measured for financial institutions and markets.
•   Financial systems come in all shapes and sizes, and differ widely in terms of the four 
characteristics. As economies develop, services provided by financial markets tend to 
become more important than those provided by banks.
•   The global financial crisis was not only about financial instability. In some economies, 
the crisis was associated with important changes in financial depth and access. 
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across countries and regions and through 
time; and how financial systems have been 
affected by the global financial crisis.
To benchmark financial systems, the 
report measures the following four charac-
teristics of financial institutions and mar-
kets: (a) the size of financial institutions and 
markets (financial depth), (b) the degree to 
which individuals can and do use financial 
institutions and markets (access), (c) the effi-
ciency of financial institutions and markets 
in providing financial services (efficiency), 
and (d) the stability of financial institutions 
and markets (stability). These characteristics 
are measured separately for financial institu-
tions and financial markets (both equity and 
bond markets), leading to a 4x2 matrix of 
financial system characteristics. The report 
uses these measures to characterize and 
compare financial systems across economies 
and over time and to assess the relationships 
between these measures and financial sector 
policies.
In focusing on these four characteristics of 
financial institutions and markets, the report 
gives empirical shape and substance to the 
complex, multifaceted, and sometimes amor-
phous concept of the functioning of financial 
systems. Financial depth, access, efficiency, 
and stability might not capture all features of 
financial systems, and the report does not try 
to construct a composite index of financial 
development. Instead, it uses these four char-
acteristics to describe, compare, and analyze 
financial systems and their evolution in recent 
decades.
This chapter, together with the underly-
ing data and analysis, highlights the multi-
dimensional nature of financial systems. 
Deep financial systems do not necessarily 
provide broad financial access, highly effi-
cient financial systems are not necessarily 
more stable than the less efficient ones, and 
so on. Each of these characteristics is asso-
ciated with socioeconomic development, 
financial sector policies, and other parts of 
the enabling environment for finance. Finan-
cial systems differ widely in terms of the 4x2 
characteristics, so it is crucial to measure and 
evaluate each one.
connected, it slows economic growth and 
blocks potential entrepreneurs. And if finan-
cial institutions fail to exert sound corporate 
governance over firms that they fund, that 
failure makes it easier for managers to pursue 
projects that benefit themselves rather than 
the firms and the economy. When financial 
institutions create complex financial instru-
ments and sell them to unsophisticated inves-
tors, it might generate more income for finan-
cial engineers and executives associated with 
marketing the new instruments, distorting 
the allocation of society’s savings and imped-
ing economic prosperity.
Evidence on the financial system’s role in 
shaping economic development is substantial 
and varied. But there are shortcomings asso-
ciated with assessing financial systems. There 
are no good cross-country, cross-time mea-
sures of how they (a) enhance information 
about firms and hence the efficiency of resource 
allocation; (b) exert sound corporate gover-
nance over firms to which they channel those 
resources; (c) manage, pool, and diversify risk; 
(d) mobilize savings from savers so that these 
resources can be allocated to the most prom-
ising projects in the economy; and (e) facili-
tate trade. Instead, researchers have largely 
focused on the size of the banking industry as 
a proxy for financial development. But size is 
not a measure of quality, efficiency, or stabil-
ity. And the banking sector is only one part of 
financial systems.
Accordingly, a key contribution of this 
chapter involves data. In recent years, substan-
tial efforts have been made to improve these 
data, which this chapter uses. This report is 
accompanied by the new Global Financial 
Development Database, an extensive world-
wide database that combines and updates 
several financial data sets (Čihák, Demirgüç-
Kunt, Feyen, and Levine 2012). The data-
base is available on the Global Financial 
Development Report Web page (http://www 
.worldbank.org/financialdevelopment).
But this chapter goes beyond compiling 
data. It answers some substantive questions 
using the data, such as how to empirically 
describe different characteristics of financial 
systems; how to compare financial systems 
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the background, contributing to economic 
growth and poverty reduction. But when 
things go wrong, the malfunctioning of the 
financial system can slow growth, throw 
more people into poverty, and destabilize 
entire economies. Indeed, financial crises 
hurt not only those who work in finance or 
those who access financial systems. When 
the government undertakes costly bailouts 
of bankrupt financial institutions, this can 
lead to increases in public indebtedness, thus 
undermining governments’ ability to support 
key social objectives, including the fund-
ing of education, health, and infrastructure 
programs. As a result, malfunctioning finan-
cial systems can also lay the foundations for 
enduring economic crises, as illustrated quite 
dramatically by recent events.
With so much attention focused on sta-
bility issues following the recent crisis, the 
powerful linkages between the functioning 
of the financial system and economic devel-
opment have been somewhat underempha-
sized. Although the focus on stability has 
been understandable, sound financial sector 
policies are not only about avoiding crises. 
Finance is also about the efficient allocation 
of capital, economic growth, and expanding 
economic horizons. Therefore, an impor-
tant goal is to raise awareness of policies to 
enhance the operation of financial systems, 
develop a better understanding, and foster 
debate. To help in framing the debate, this 
section clarifies the definition of financial 
development and provides a review of the 
literature on the linkages between financial 
sector development, economic growth, and 
poverty reduction.
What is financial development?
Financial markets are imperfect. Acquiring 
and processing information about poten-
tial investments is costly. There are costs 
and uncertainties associated with writing, 
interpreting, and enforcing contracts. And 
there are costs associated with transacting 
goods, services, and financial instruments. 
These market imperfections inhibit the flow 
of society’s savings to those with the best 
The chapter also suggests that the global 
financial crisis resulted in more than financial 
instability: in some countries, it also caused 
problems along the other dimensions, such as 
making people’s and firms’ access to financial 
services more difficult. Finance is about more 
than just stability. Having financial systems 
channel society’s savings to those with the 
most promising investment opportunities is 
essential for fostering economic growth, alle-
viating poverty, and enabling people to pur-
sue their economic goals.
Finally, this chapter is linked to future 
editions of the Global Financial Develop-
ment Report. The report is envisaged as 
part of a series, with future reports return-
ing to the analysis of financial systems using 
updated and extended data. They will use the 
measurement framework introduced here to 
examine new topics, such as financial inclu-
sion, capital market development, and oth-
ers. Future editions might expand or improve 
on the framework, which is designed to be 
flexible to accommodate such adjustments if 
needed—for example, if new types of finan-
cial data become available. 
the impoRtance oF 
Financial SyStemS 
to Development
Finance is central to development. This 
may seem obvious to financial development 
experts. It may also seem obvious to bank 
depositors who just had their entire life sav-
ings wiped out by a financial crisis. But finan-
cial crises get forgotten after a period of time. 
And when compared with other factors that 
are also important—health, the environ-
ment, and so on—the case for finance may 
appear less obvious. Indeed, when panels of 
the world’s leading economists tried to iden-
tify “the 10 great global challenges” in both 
2004 and 2008 as part of the Copenhagen 
Consensus Project, the list did not include 
any financial issues.1 
This section argues that finance indeed 
matters. It matters both when it functions 
well and when it malfunctions. When oper-
ating effectively, finance works quietly in 
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At a broader level, financial development 
can be defined as improvements in the quality 
of five key financial functions: (a) producing 
and processing information about possible 
investments and allocating capital based on 
these assessments; (b) monitoring individuals 
and firms and exerting corporate governance 
after allocating capital; (c) facilitating the 
trading, diversification, and management of 
risk; (d) mobilizing and pooling savings; and 
(e) easing the exchange of goods, services, 
and financial instruments. Financial insti-
tutions and markets around the world dif-
fer markedly in how well they provide these 
key services. Although this report sometimes 
focuses on the role of the financial systems in 
reducing information, contracting, and trans-
action costs, it primarily adopts a broader 
view of finance and stresses the key functions 
provided by the financial system to the over-
all economy. 
Financial development and  
economic growth
Economists have long debated the finan-
cial sector’s role in economic growth. Lucas 
(1988), for example, dismissed finance as 
an overstressed determinant of economic 
growth, and Robinson (1952, 86) quipped 
that “where enterprise leads finance follows.” 
From this perspective, finance responds to 
demands from the nonfinancial sector: it 
does not cause economic growth. At the 
other extreme, Miller (1998, 14) argued that 
the idea that financial markets contribute to 
economic growth “is a proposition too obvi-
ous for serious discussion.” Bagehot (1873) 
and others rejected the idea that the finance-
growth nexus can be ignored without limit-
ing understanding of economic growth.
Recent literature reviews (such as Levine 
2005) conclude that evidence suggests a posi-
tive, first-order relationship between finan-
cial development and economic growth. In 
other words, well-functioning financial sys-
tems play an independent role in promoting 
long-run economic growth: countries with 
better-developed financial systems tend to 
ideas and projects, thus curtailing economic 
development.
It is the existence of these costs—these 
market imperfections—that creates incen-
tives for the emergence of financial contracts, 
markets, and intermediaries. Motivated by 
profits, people create financial products and 
institutions to ameliorate the effects of these 
market imperfections. And governments 
often provide an array of services—rang-
ing from legal and accounting systems to 
government-owned banks—with the stated 
goals of reducing these imperfections and 
enhancing resource allocation. Some econo-
mies are comparatively successful at develop-
ing financial systems that reduce these costs. 
Other economies are considerably less suc-
cessful, with potentially large effects on eco-
nomic development. 
At the most basic level, therefore, finan-
cial development occurs when financial 
instruments, markets, and intermediaries 
mitigate—though do not necessarily elimi-
nate—the effects of imperfect information, 
limited enforcement, and transaction costs. 
For example, the creation of credit registries 
tends to improve acquisition and dissemina-
tion of information about potential borrow-
ers, improving the allocation of resources 
with positive effects on economic develop-
ment. As another example, countries with 
effective legal and regulatory systems have 
facilitated the development of equity and 
bond markets that allow investors to hold 
more diversified portfolios than they could 
without efficient securities markets. This 
greater risk diversification can facilitate 
the flow of capital to higher return proj-
ects, boosting growth and enhancing living 
standards.
Defining financial development in terms 
of the degree to which the financial system 
eases market imperfections, however, is too 
narrow and does not provide much infor-
mation on the actual functions provided by 
the financial system to the overall economy. 
Thus, Levine (2005) and others have devel-
oped broader definitions that focus on what 
the financial system actually does.2
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business and who cannot, who can pay for 
education and who cannot, who can attempt 
to realize his or her economic aspirations and 
who cannot. Furthermore, by affecting the 
allocation of capital, finance can alter both 
the rate of economic growth and the demand 
for labor, with potentially profound implica-
tions for poverty and income distribution.
Potentially, finance can have rather com-
plex effects on the income distribution. It 
could boost returns to high-skilled work-
ers or to low-skilled workers. The mecha-
nisms are complex and could be good or bad 
for the poor and reduce or increase income 
inequality.
There is an emerging body of empirical 
research, however, suggesting that in prac-
tice, improvements in financial contracts, 
markets, and intermediaries actually do 
tend to expand economic opportunities and 
reduce persistent income inequality. Figure 
1.1 provides a basic empirical illustration 
of the link between financial development 
(approximated here in a simplified way by the 
ratio of private sector credit to gross domes-
tic product) and income inequality (approxi-
mated by changes in the Gini coefficient). The 
graph illustrates that higher levels of financial 
development are associated with declines in 
inequality.
More in-depth empirical research is con-
sistent with this basic observation. For exam-
ple, evidence suggests that access to credit 
markets increases parental investment in 
the education of their children and reduces 
the substitution of children out of schooling 
and into labor markets when adverse shocks 
reduce family income (Belley and Lochner 
2007). Better-functioning financial systems 
stimulate new firm formation and help small, 
promising firms expand as a wider array of 
firms gain access to the financial system. 
Moreover, better-functioning financial sys-
tems will identify and fund better projects, 
with less emphasis on collateral and incum-
bency. Not only do they allow new, efficient 
firms to enter, they also force old, inefficient 
firms to leave, as evidenced by data (Kerr and 
Nanda 2009). 
grow faster over long periods of time, and 
a large body of evidence suggests that this 
effect is causal (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
2008).3 
Moreover, research sheds light on the 
mechanisms through which finance affects 
growth. The financial system influences 
growth primarily by affecting the alloca-
tion of society’s savings, not by affecting the 
aggregate savings rate. Thus, when financial 
systems do a good job of identifying and 
funding those firms with the best prospects, 
not those firms simply with the strongest 
political connections, this improves the capi-
tal allocation and fosters economic growth. 
Such financial systems promote the entry of 
new, promising firms and force the exit of 
less efficient enterprises. Such financial sys-
tems also expand economic opportunities, 
so that the allocation of credit—and hence 
opportunity—is less closely tied to accumu-
lated wealth and more closely connected to 
the social value of the project. Furthermore, 
by improving the governance of firms, well-
functioning financial markets and institu-
tions reduce waste and fraud, boosting the 
efficient use of scarce resources. By facilitat-
ing risk management, financial systems can 
ease the financing of higher return endeavors 
with positive reverberations on living stan-
dards. And, by pooling society’s savings, 
financial systems make it possible to exploit 
economies of scale—getting the biggest 
development boost from available resources. 
Financial development and  
poverty reduction
Beyond long-run growth, finance can also 
shape the gap between the rich and the poor 
and the degree to which that gap persists 
across generations (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine 2009). Financial development may 
affect to what extent a person’s economic 
opportunities are determined by individual 
skill and initiative, or whether parental 
wealth, social status, and political connec-
tions largely shape economic horizons. The 
financial system influences who can start a 
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and accounting systems influence the costs 
associated with evaluating firms and writ-
ing and enforcing contracts and, hence, in 
identifying and financing an economy’s most 
promising endeavors. Regulatory, supervi-
sory, and tax systems all affect the incentives 
facing the executives of financial institutions 
and participants in securities markets. Thus, 
these components of the enabling environ-
ment for finance also shape the allocation 
and use of capital. And the state often plays 
a more direct role in shaping the operation 
of financial systems, running state-owned 
banks, subsidizing agriculture or housing, 
or issuing government securities. Thus, the 
entire legal, accounting, regulatory, and 
policy apparatus influences the operation of 
financial systems.
Given the importance of finance for eco-
nomic development and poverty alleviation, 
it is natural to ask: Why does this chapter 
focus on measuring the functioning of the 
financial system rather than on examining 
the direct impact of financial sector policy, 
regulations, and the rest of the enabling 
environment on economic growth, poverty 
alleviation, and the availability of economic 
opportunities?
The answer is that to provide guidance to 
policy makers, one needs a detailed under-
standing of the mechanisms through which 
the enabling environment for finance influ-
ence the functioning of financial systems. It is 
not enough to assess the associations between 
financial sector policies and development 
outcomes because these correlations might 
reflect reverse causality—in which economic 
development shapes the types of financial 
sector policies that a country adopts—or the 
correlations might simply reflect the impact 
of some other factor on both economic devel-
opment and financial sector policies. To pro-
vide more accurate assessments about the 
enabling environment for finance, it is vital 
to trace through the channels from particular 
policies and regulations to the operation of 
financial systems and on to particular eco-
nomic development outcomes.
This report contributes to this goal of pro-
viding more sound advice to policy makers by 
Besides the direct benefits of enhanced 
access to financial services, finance also 
reduces inequality, particularly through 
indirect labor market mechanisms. Spe-
cifically, accumulating evidence shows that 
financial development accelerates economic 
growth, intensifies competition, and boosts 
the demand for labor. Importantly, it usually 
brings relatively bigger benefits to those at the 
lower end of the income distribution (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2007; Beck, 
Levine, and Levkov 2010). Hence, finance, 
with good policies, can be both pro-growth 
and pro–poverty reduction.
Financial development and the enabling 
environment for finance
Many factors shape the functioning of finan-
cial systems and hence their impact on eco-
nomic growth and poverty alleviation. Legal 
Change in Gini coefficient
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
–0.01
–0.02
–0.03
–2 –1
Private credit to GDP
0 1 2–3
ARG
AUT
CHE
CHL
ECU
ETH
FIN
FRA
GHA
GTM
HKG
IND
IRL
ITA
JPN
LSO
MUS
NER
NGA
NLD
NOR
NPL
ROM
SEN
SLE
SWE
TURTZA
UGA
USA
ZMB
FiguRe 1.1 Financial Depth and income inequality
Source: update of beck, demirgüç-kunt, and levine 2007. 
Note: the gini coefficient is on a scale from 0 (total equality) to 1 (maximum inequality). the chart 
is a partial scatter plot, visually representing the regression of changes in the gini coefficient 
between 1960 and 2005 on the private sector credit–to-gdp ratio (logarithm, 1960–2005 aver-
age), controlling for the initial (1960) gini coefficient. variables on both axes are residuals. the 
abbreviations next to some of the observations are the three-letter country codes as defined by 
the international organization for standardization.
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the Global Financial 
Development DatabaSe 
anD the 4X2 meaSURement 
matRiX
introducing the global Financial 
Development Database
To measure the functioning of financial sys-
tems, country officials, researchers, and oth-
ers would ideally like to have direct measures 
of how well financial institutions and finan-
cial markets (a) produce information ex ante 
about possible investments and allocate capi-
tal; (b) monitor investments and exert cor-
porate governance after providing finance; 
(c) facilitate the trading, diversification, and 
management of risk; (d) mobilize and pool 
savings; and (e) ease the exchange of goods 
and services. So if data were not an issue, the 
ideal approach to measurement would involve 
the following determinations: in terms of 
producing information about possible invest-
ments and allocating capital, the financial 
(a) developing and analyzing measures of the 
functioning of financial institutions and mar-
kets (chapter 1) and (b) assembling databases 
on regulations, supervision, and institutional 
structures that shape financial system opera-
tions (chapters 2 to 5).
To summarize the discussion in this sec-
tion, figure 1.2 presents in a visual form the 
relationships between socioeconomic devel-
opment, financial development, and the 
enabling environment. It is important to care 
about the process of financial development 
because it has a well-documented association 
with economic and social development more 
generally. It improves sustainable long-term 
growth and reduces poverty, thereby improv-
ing social welfare. One can think about these 
as the ultimate developmental objectives. Fig-
ure 1.2 also highlights that financial systems 
do not exist in a vacuum. Financial system 
characteristics depend on the enabling envi-
ronment, which consists of financial sec-
tor policies and other relevant policies and 
features. 
FiguRe 1.2 Socioeconomic Development, Financial Development, and enabling environment
Source: based on the review of literature in cˇihák, demirgüç-kunt, feyen, and levine 2012.
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–  Legal framework, social capital, etc.
– Concentration in the system
– Internationalization, dollarization
Socioeconomic Development
Enabling Environment
financial Development
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figure 1.2). For completeness, the accompa-
nying database includes some variables that 
measure social welfare (the upper part of 
figure 1.2) as well as financial sector policies 
and the other factors that define the enabling 
environment for finance (the bottom of fig-
ure 1.2). The following subsections introduce 
each dimension of this measurement frame-
work. The annex to this chapter and Cˇihák, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen, and Levine (2012) 
provide more detailed information on each 
component of the measures of the four finan-
cial system traits in the matrix. 
To obtain a comprehensive characteriza-
tion of financial systems, one must measure 
the four categories for the two key compo-
nents of the financial sector, namely financial 
institutions (banks and nonbank financial 
institutions) and financial markets (stock 
market, bond market, and other markets). 
Therefore, to be comprehensive, one needs 
to assemble a 4x2 matrix: four characteris-
tics for two components. Table 1.1 provides 
a summary representation of such a 4x2 
matrix, with examples of variables that can 
be used to fill in each cell of the matrix. The 
same structure is used to organize the under-
lying database. The following subsections go 
through the individual characteristics in turn. 
Box 1.1 focuses on the selection of represen-
tative variables within the individual charac-
teristics. Box 1.2 discusses the challenges of 
aggregating across the four dimensions.
Critically, this chapter looks beyond the 
size of banks and stock markets. Many fac-
tors shape the mixture of financial interme-
diaries and markets operating in an economy. 
Different types and combinations of infor-
mation, enforcement, and transaction costs 
in conjunction with different legal, regula-
tory, and tax systems have motivated distinct 
financial contracts, markets, and intermedi-
aries across countries and throughout his-
tory. Thus, financial institutions and mar-
kets can and do look very different across 
countries and over time, but these structural 
differences do not necessarily translate into 
differences in the quality of the services pro-
vided by the financial system to the economy. 
To measure financial systems, this chapter 
digs deeper into the functioning of financial 
sector in Country A, for example, scores 60 
on a scale from 0 to 100, while Country B’s 
financial sector scores 75; in terms of moni-
toring investments and exerting corporate 
governance after providing finance, Country 
A scores 90, while Country B scores only 20 
on a scale from 0 to 100, and so on.
So, instead of the direct measures, empiri-
cal studies have focused on proxy variables, 
such as various measures of financial depth 
and access. And despite evidence of the cru-
cial role of finance for economic develop-
ment, there is a surprising lack of comprehen-
sive data on basic aspects of financial systems 
across countries and over time. For example, 
there are major gaps in data on trading vol-
umes in securities markets. Even data on 
financial institutions become rather patchy 
when one looks beyond the world’s major, 
publicly listed banks.
Against this background, one of the key 
contributions of the Global Financial Devel-
opment Report is the launch of a new, com-
prehensive online database on financial sys-
tems—the Global Financial Development 
Database, which is made available online 
together with the report. The database, 
which will be updated on a regular basis, 
compiles and disseminates data on the char-
acteristics of financial systems in 205 juris-
dictions around world. The database has 
data going back some 50 years (to 1960), 
although some measures of financial system 
traits do not go back that far.4 The data from 
the Global Financial Development Database 
are integrated with the World Bank’s Open 
Data initiative. Some of the data are new, and 
this is the first time such comprehensive data 
are available. The data are made available 
in a Web-friendly form, allowing the users 
of the database to interact with the data, for 
example, by creating their own country peer 
groups and their own tables and charts.
The 4x2 measurement framework
This chapter develops and presents four mea-
sures of the characteristics of financial sys-
tems: depth, access, efficiency, and stability. 
The focus here is on empirically character-
izing financial systems (the middle part of 
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literature on financial development is private 
credit, defined as credit to the private sector 
from deposit money banks, as a percentage 
of GDP.5 There is a wide literature demon-
strating the link between financial depth, 
approximated by private sector credit to 
GDP, on one hand, and long-term economic 
growth and poverty reduction on the other 
hand (for example, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine 2008). Private credit varies widely 
across countries. For example, averaged 
over 1980–2010, private credit was less than 
10 percent of GDP in Angola, Cambodia, 
and the Republic of Yemen, while exceeding 
systems and does not just look at the size of 
particular institutions and markets.
First characteristic: Financial depth
The most common way to characterize finan-
cial systems is by measuring the size of finan-
cial institutions or markets relative to the 
size of the economy. “Financial depth” is an 
analytically incomplete, though empirically 
ubiquitous, measure of the functioning of 
financial systems.
For financial institutions, the variable that 
has received much attention in the empirical 
Financial Institutions Financial Markets
D
E
P
T
H
Private sector credit to GDP
Financial institutions’ assets to GDP
Money (M2 aggregate) to GDP
Deposits to GDP
Value-added of the financial sector to GDP
Stock market capitalization plus outstanding domestic 
private debt securities to GDP
Private debt securities to GDP
Public debt securities to GDP 
International debt securities to GDP 
Stock market capitalization to GDP 
Stocks traded to GDP
A
c
c
E
S
S
Accounts per thousand adults (commercial banks)
Branches per 100,000 adults (commercial banks)
Percent of people with a bank account (from user survey)
Percent of firms with line of credit (all firms)
Percent of firms with line of credit (small firms)
Percent of market capitalization outside of top  
10 largest companies
Percent of value traded outside of top 10 traded companies 
Government bond yields (3 month and 10 year) 
Ratio of domestic to total debt securities 
Ratio of private to total debt securities (domestic) 
Ratio of new corporate bond issues to GDP
E
ff
ic
iE
n
c
Y
net interest margin
Lending-deposits spread
Noninterest income to total income 
Overhead costs (percent of total assets)
Profitability (return on assets, return on equity) 
Boone indicator (Herfindahl, or H-statistic)
Turnover ratio (turnover/capitalization) for stock market
Price synchronicity (co-movement) 
Price impact 
Liquidity/transaction costs 
Quoted bid-ask spread for government bonds 
Turnover of bonds (private, public) on securities exchange 
Settlement efficiency
S
TA
B
iL
iT
Y
z-score (or distance to default) 
Capital adequacy ratios
Asset quality ratios
Liquidity ratios
Other (net foreign exchange position to capital, etc.)
Volatility (standard deviation/average) of stock price index, 
 sovereign bond index
Skewness of the index (stock price, sovereign bond)
Price/earnings (P/E) ratio
Duration
Ratio of short-term to total bonds (domestic, international) 
Correlation with major bond returns (German, United States)
TABLe 1.1 Stylized 4x2 Matrix of Financial System Characteristics (with examples of candidate variables in each category)
Source: based on the review of literature in cˇihák, demirgüç-kunt, feyen, and levine 2012.
Note: this is a stylized matrix. for details, see cˇihák, demirgüç-kunt, feyen, and levine (2012). variables that are highlighted in bold are the ones suggested for the benchmarking 
exercise. private sector credit to gdp is domestic private credit to the real sector times deposit money banks to gdp. accounts per thousand adults (commercial banks) is the num-
ber of depositors with commercial banks per 1,000 adults. for each type of institution, this figure is calculated as the (reported number of depositors)*1,000/adult population in the 
reporting country. the net interest margin is the accounting value of the bank’s net interest revenue as a share of its average interest-bearing (total earning) assets. the z-score 
(or distance to default) is (Roa + equity)/assets)/sd(Roa), where Roa is average annual return on end-year assets and sd(Roa) is the standard deviation of Roa. stock market 
capitalization plus outstanding domestic private debt securities to gdp is defined as the value of listed shares to gdp plus amount of outstanding domestic private debt securities 
to gdp. percent of market capitalization outside of top 10 largest companies is the market capitalization out of the top 10 largest companies to total market capitalization. turnover 
ratio (turnover/capitalization) for stock market is the ratio of the value of total shares traded to market capitalization. volatility (standard deviation/average) of stock price index is 
the standard deviation of the sovereign bond index divided by the annual average of that index. 
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in the literature on financial development. In 
any case, the two variables are rather closely 
correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 
about 0.98 (figure 1.3), so private credit can 
provide a reasonably close approximation for 
total banking assets.6
Despite the literature’s focus on banks, the 
global financial crisis has highlighted issues in 
some nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs). 
Data coverage of NBFIs is less comprehensive 
than coverage of banks. Nonetheless, recog-
nizing the importance of NBFIs, the Global 
Financial Development Database includes 
total assets of NBFIs to GDP, which includes 
85 percent of GDP in Austria, China, and 
the United Kingdom. The annual average 
value of private credit across countries was 
39 percent, with a standard deviation of 36 
percent. 
An alternative to private credit is total 
banking assets to GDP, a variable that is also 
included in the Global Financial Develop-
ment Database. Compared to private credit, 
this variable also includes credit to govern-
ment and bank assets other than credit. It is 
arguably a more comprehensive measure of 
size, but it is available for a smaller number of 
countries and has been used less extensively 
BOX 1.1 Selecting the Representative Variables for individual Characteristics
For every category in the 4x2 matrix, several vari-
ables could be used as proxies. Which combination 
of these variables should one choose when trying to 
compare financial systems? 
In some cases, the variables in the same dimen-
sion are complementary, and some are even additive. 
For example, the total assets of banks to GDP and 
total assets of nonbank financial institutions to GDP 
are in the same units and complement each other, so 
they can be added up to obtain a proxy of total assets 
of financial institutions to GDP. The result will be 
a good proxy variable, provided that the underlying 
variables are comprehensive in their coverage and 
that no double counting occurs between them. Other 
examples include measures of volatility in the stock 
market and volatility in the bond market. If these are 
measured in a similar way (as standard deviations), 
they can actually be added, using the capitaliza-
tions of the two markets, as proxy for their relative 
weights (as well as the covariance between the two), 
to approximate the general volatility in the financial 
markets. 
In other cases, the variables “compete” to mea-
sure the similar things in slightly different ways. For 
example, private sector credit to GDP and total assets 
of financial institutions to GDP are both proxies for 
financial institutions’ size. The two variables differ 
in terms of their comprehensiveness and country cov-
erage, with private sector credit to GDP covering a 
smaller set of assets but being available for a large 
number of countries. 
How should one pick among such competing vari-
ables? For the purpose of presenting the raw data 
in the database, it is not necessary to pick. Indeed, 
the Global Financial Development Database shows 
the competing variables, so that users can examine 
the data for themselves. However, for the purpose of 
characterizing financial systems and for comparisons 
across the dimensions, it is useful to pick one of the 
competing variables. 
The general approach is to select indicators that 
are widely available and have a clearly documented 
link to long-term economic growth or poverty reduc-
tion in the literature. When two variables capture the 
same dimension, and both have a link to economic 
development, one would select the variable that—
even if it is perhaps less sophisticated—has greater 
country coverage. The more sophisticated variable 
is still included in the Global Financial Development 
Database, and relationships between some of these 
variables are explored in Cˇihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Feyen, and Levine (2012). For most of the variables, 
the competing indicators tend to be highly (although 
not perfectly) correlated. For example, the correla-
tion coefficient for private sector credit to GDP and 
total banking assets to GDP is 0.98 (figure 1.3). 
The chapter’s illustrative comparison of the 4x2 
characteristics across countries selects one variable 
from each dimension. The selected variables are 
highlighted in bold in table 1.1.
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on the mixture of financial institutions and 
markets operating in a financial system.7 The 
degree to which the financial system is rela-
tively bank based or market based has been 
an important topic in the financial develop-
ment literature. In a recent contribution to 
this literature, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen, and 
Levine (2012) find that as economies develop, 
services provided by financial markets tend 
to become relatively more important than 
those provided by banks.
Second characteristic: Financial access 
(inclusion)
But finance is not just about the size of finan-
cial institutions and securities; finance is also 
about the ability of individuals and firms in 
an economy to access financial services. Mea-
sures of financial access are indeed strongly 
associated with economic development, a 
relationship that is separate from the associa-
tion between financial depth and economic 
development. Besides the direct benefits of 
enhanced access to financial services, finance 
pension fund assets to GDP, mutual fund 
assets to GDP, insurance company assets to 
GDP, insurance premiums (life) to GDP, and 
insurance premiums (non-life) to GDP.
For financial markets, the two main seg-
ments for which consistent worldwide data 
can be collected are stock markets and bond 
markets (both sovereign and corporate). To 
approximate the size of stock markets, the 
most common choice in the literature is stock 
market capitalization to GDP. For the size of 
the bond markets, the mostly commonly used 
proxy for size is the outstanding volume of 
debt securities (private and public) to GDP. 
To measure the depth of stock markets, 
this report primarily uses the stock value 
traded indicator, which equals the value of 
stock market transactions as a share of GDP. 
This market development indicator incor-
porates information on the size and activity 
of the stock market, not simply on the value 
of listed shares. Earlier work by Levine and 
Zervos (1998) indicates that the trading of 
ownership claims on firms in an economy is 
closely tied to the rate of economic growth. 
There is substantial variation across coun-
tries. Although the mean value of stock value 
traded is about 29 percent of GDP, the stan-
dard deviation is about double this value. In 
Armenia, Tanzania, and Uruguay, stock value 
traded annually averaged less than 0.23 per-
cent over the 1980–2008 sample (10th per-
centile). In contrast, stock value traded aver-
aged over 75 percent in China (both mainland 
and Hong Kong SAR, China), Saudi Arabia, 
Switzerland, and the Unites States (90th per-
centile). Also, this report confirms Levine’s 
and Zervos’s results using other market devel-
opment indicators. In particular, it examines 
stock market capitalization, which simply 
measures the value of listed shares on a coun-
try’s stock exchanges as a share of GDP and 
securities market capitalization, which equals 
the capitalization of the stock market plus the 
capitalization of the private domestic bond 
markets, divided by GDP. 
The relative size of banks and markets—
called the financial structure ratio—mea-
sures the ratio of private credit to stock mar-
ket capitalization and provides information 
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FiguRe 1.3 Correlations between Characteristics in Same Category 
(example)
Source: calculations based on the global financial development database.
Note: correlation = 0.98. a significant correlation coefficient at the 5% level or better.
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financial systems, these individuals and 
enterprises with promising opportunities are 
limited to their own savings and earnings. 
Financial access has been overlooked in tra-
ditional literature on financial system char-
acteristics, mostly because of serious data 
gaps on who has access to which financial 
services and a lack of systematic information 
on the barriers to broader access. The Global 
Financial Development Database contains 
both variables that measure the use of finan-
cial services (which reflects both supply and 
demand) as well as variables that focus more 
closely on the supply of financial services.
The main proxy variable in the financial 
access category for financial institutions is the 
number of bank accounts per 1,000 adults. 
Other variables in this category include the 
number of bank branches per 100,000 adults 
(commercial banks), the percentage of firms 
with line of credit (all firms), and the percent-
age of firms with line of credit (small firms). 
When using these proxies, one needs to be 
mindful of their weaknesses. For example, 
the number of bank branches is becom-
ing increasingly misleading with the move 
toward branchless banking. The number of 
bank accounts does not suffer from the same 
issue, but it has its own limitations (in par-
ticular, it focuses on banks only).
The measure of access in financial markets 
relies on various measures of concentration in 
the market, the idea being that a high degree 
of concentration reflects difficulties for access 
for newer or smaller issuers. The variables in 
this category include the percentage of mar-
ket capitalization outside of the top 10 larg-
est companies, the percentage of value traded 
outside of the top 10 traded companies, gov-
ernment bond yields (3 month and 10 year), 
ratio of domestic to total debt securities, ratio 
of private to total debt securities (domestic), 
and ratio of new corporate bond issues to 
GDP.
The data for the financial access dimen-
sion of the Global Financial Development 
Database came largely from the IMF’s 
recently established Access to Finance data-
base, based on earlier work by Beck, Demir-
güç-Kunt, and Martínez Pería (2007).8 In 
also reduces inequality, particularly through 
indirect labor market mechanisms. Specifi-
cally, accumulated evidence shows that finan-
cial access accelerates economic growth, 
intensifies competition, and boosts the 
demand for labor—and it usually brings big-
ger benefits to those at the lower end of the 
income distribution (see, for instance, Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2007, and Beck, 
Levine, and Levkov 2010). It is important to 
emphasize that the issue is not only access to 
any form of finance, but also the quality of 
financial services available to people. In other 
words, having a bank account is nice, but it is 
also important to have a competitive interest 
rate, reliable payment services, and so on. 
A well-functioning financial system offers 
savings, payments, and risk-management 
products to as large a set of participants 
as possible. It seeks out and finances good 
growth opportunities wherever they may be. 
Without inclusive financial systems, poor 
individuals and small enterprises need to rely 
on their personal wealth or internal resources 
to invest in their education, become entre-
preneurs, or take advantage of promising 
growth opportunities. Though still far from 
conclusive, the existing body of evidence sug-
gests that developing the financial sector and 
improving access to finance are likely not 
only to accelerate economic growth but also 
to reduce income inequality and poverty.
Access to financial services—financial 
inclusion—implies an absence of obstacles to 
the use of these services, whether the obsta-
cles are price or nonprice barriers to finance. 
It is important to distinguish between access 
to—the possibility to use—and actual use of 
financial services. In some cases, a person or 
business has access to services but decides 
not to use them. But in other cases, price 
barriers or discrimination, for example, bar 
access. Failure to make this distinction can 
complicate efforts to define and measure 
access. Financial market imperfections, such 
as information asymmetries and transaction 
costs, are likely to be especially binding on 
the talented poor and on micro- and small 
enterprises that lack collateral, credit his-
tories, and connections. Without inclusive 
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analysis and other more sophisticated mea-
sures; for example, Angelidis and Lyroudi 
(2006) apply data envelopment analysis 
and neural networks to calculate efficiency 
indexes using bank-by-bank data for the Ital-
ian banking industry. But the data required 
for this type of analysis are available only for 
a small subsample of countries, and therefore 
much additional data-collection work would 
be needed to compile a comprehensive cross-
country database. The background paper by 
Cˇihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen, and Levine 
(2012) contains a discussion on data envel-
opment analysis and other examples of more 
sophisticated measures.
For financial markets, the basic measure 
of efficiency in the stock market is the turn-
over ratio, that is, the ratio of turnover to 
capitalization in the stock market. The ratio-
nale of using this variable is that the higher 
turnover relative to capitalization means rela-
tively higher volumes of trading in the market 
and more liquidity. This in turn means more 
scope for price discovery, better transmission 
of information in the price, and greater effi-
ciency of the market. In the bond market, the 
most commonly used variable is the tightness 
of the bid-ask spread (with the U.S. and West-
ern European markets showing low spreads, 
and the Dominican Republic, Pakistan, Peru, 
Qatar, and Vietnam reporting high spreads) 
and the turnover ratio (although the mea-
surement of the latter often suffers from 
incomplete data). 
A range of other proxies for efficiency in 
financial markets have been used in empiri-
cal literature (table 1.1). One of them is price 
synchronicity, calculated as a degree of co-
movement of individual stock returns in an 
equity market. The variable aims to capture 
the information content of daily stock prices. 
It is based on the notion that a market oper-
ates efficiently when prices are informative 
about the performance of individual firms. 
When their movements are highly synchro-
nized, they are less likely to provide such 
individualized information (although one 
also needs to control for common shocks to 
economywide fundamentals to establish a 
benchmark for this variable). Also, efficiency 
addition, a part of the financial access data is 
based on the Global Financial Inclusion Indi-
cators database (Global Findex) that is being 
built at the World Bank (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Klapper 2012). The Global Findex is the first 
public database of indicators that consistently 
measures individuals’ usage of financial prod-
ucts across countries and over time. It can be 
used to track the effect of financial inclu-
sion policies and facilitate a deeper and more 
nuanced understanding of how adults around 
the world save, borrow, and make payments. 
The data will be based on interviews with 
at least 1,000 people per country in up to 
150 countries about their financial behav-
ior through the Gallup World Poll survey. 
The survey was rolled out in January 2011. 
The first data set was made available to the 
public in April 2012, and the full database 
will be updated every three years, with head-
line indicators of the use of bank accounts 
and formal credit, which are collected on an 
annual basis.
Third characteristic: Financial efficiency
To perform its functions well, a financial sec-
tor should be efficient. It should perform its 
intermediating functions in the least costly 
way possible. If intermediation is costly, the 
higher costs may get passed on to households, 
firms, and governments. (In)efficiency mea-
sures for institutions include indicators such 
as overhead costs to total assets, net interest 
margin, lending-deposits spread, noninterest 
income to total income, and cost to income 
ratio (table 1.1). Closely related variables 
include measures such as return on assets 
and return on equity. While efficient finan-
cial institutions also tend to be more profit-
able, the relationship is not very close (for 
example, an inefficient financial system can 
post relatively high profitability if it operates 
in an economic upswing, while an otherwise 
efficient system hit by an adverse shock may 
generate losses).
As with the other dimensions, these are 
relatively crude measures of (in)efficiency. For 
a subset of countries, it is possible to calculate 
efficiency indices based on data envelopment 
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has been used extensively in the empirical 
literature. For other indicators, such as the 
regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets and 
nonperforming loans to total gross loans, 
the Global Financial Development Database 
cross-references the Financial Soundness 
Indicators database available on the IMF 
website (http://fsi.imf.org). Variables such as 
the nonperforming loan ratios may be bet-
ter known than the z-score, but they are also 
known to be lagging indicators of soundness 
Cˇihák and Schaeck 2010).
One of the few reliable forward-looking 
indicators of financial instability is excessive 
credit growth. The focus here is on excessive 
credit growth. A well-developing financial 
sector is likely to report expansion in credit 
growth. Without credit growth, financial 
sectors would lack depth or would not be 
able to provide good access to financial ser-
vices. Credit growth is important, and indeed 
may be necessary, even if it is connected with 
some instability.10 But a very rapid growth 
in credit is one of the most robust com-
mon factors associated with banking cri-
ses (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1997; 
Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999). IMF (2004), 
for example, estimated that about 75 percent 
of credit booms in emerging markets end in 
banking crises. Typically, credit expansions 
are fueled by overly optimistic expectations 
of future income and asset prices, often 
combined with capital inflows. Over time, 
households and firms accumulate substan-
tial debt while income does not keep pace. A 
decline in income or asset prices then leads 
to an increase in nonperforming loans and 
defaults. If the problem is severe, the coun-
try experiences a banking crisis. Drehmann, 
Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2011) examine the 
performance of different variables as anchors 
for setting the level of the countercyclical 
regulatory capital buffer requirements for 
banks, finding that the gap between the ratio 
of credit to GDP and its long-term backward-
looking trend performs best as an indicator 
for the accumulation of capital, because this 
variable captures the build-up of systemwide 
vulnerabilities that typically lead to banking 
crises. 
can be approximated by the real transaction 
cost. Based on daily return data of the listed 
stocks, this variable attempts to approximate 
the transaction costs associated with trad-
ing a particular security. This variable helps 
determine the barriers to efficiency in the 
market. All these indicators are constructed 
by compiling and statistically processing 
firm-level data from a variety of market 
sources.
Fourth characteristic: Financial stability
Last, but not least, the degree of financial sta-
bility is an important feature of the financial 
sector. There is a vast literature specifically 
on measuring systemic risk. Because of the 
importance of financial stability for broader 
macroeconomic stability, the topic is some-
times treated as separate from the other three 
dimensions.9 But financial stability is an 
important feature of financial systems, and it 
is closely interlinked with the broader process 
of financial development. To illustrate this, 
imagine a country where banks’ lending stan-
dards become very loose, with banks provid-
ing loans left and right, without proper risk 
management and loan monitoring. On the 
surface, one could observe the rapid growth 
as a sign of deepening and increased access 
to finance. Also on the surface, the financial 
sector can seem efficient, for some period of 
time: without the loan approval process, such 
banks would be able to lower their costs, at 
least until the loans turned bad. And this is 
the problem, of course: the system would 
be unstable and likely would end in a crisis. 
For more on the complex linkages between 
financial development, financial fragility, and 
growth, see, for example, Loayza and Ran-
ciere (2006).
The key variable used here to measure 
financial stability is the z-score, defined as the 
sum of capital to assets and return on assets, 
divided by the standard deviation of return 
on assets. This variable explicitly compares 
buffers (capitalization and returns) with the 
potential for risk (volatility of returns). The 
z-score has a direct link with the probabil-
ity of default, and for this reason the variable 
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For financial markets, the most commonly 
used proxy variable for (in)stability is mar-
ket volatility, although other proxies are also 
included in the database (table 1.1). One of 
these variables is the skewness, the reason 
being that a market with a more negative 
skewed distribution of stock returns is likely 
to deliver large negative returns, and likely to 
be prone to instability. 
Other variables approximating (in)stability 
in the stock market are the price-to-earnings 
ratio (P/E ratio) and duration (a refined ver-
sion of the P/E ratio that takes into account 
factors such as long-term growth and inter-
est rates). These variables are based on the 
empirical fact that market prices contain 
expectations of future cash flows and growth 
The advantage of the credit growth vari-
able is that it is relatively easy to observe and 
monitor. Also, unlike some of the other mea-
sures (for instance, those that include nonper-
forming loan ratios), it is a forward-looking 
measure of instability. A disadvantage is that 
the definition of “excessive” credit growth is 
not trivial. Also, this measure does not, by 
itself, capture situations where financial sec-
tor problems have already crystallized in a 
full-blown crisis. In such situations, credit is 
declining in real terms rather than growing. 
It is therefore important to amend the exces-
sive credit growth indicator, as an ex ante 
measure of financial instability, by including 
credit declines as ex post proxies for situa-
tions of financial instability.
BOX 1.2 To Aggregate or Not
To provide a rough sense of how financial systems 
stack up across the 4x2 dimensions, it is helpful to 
convert the individual characteristics to the same 
scale. To prepare for this, the 95th and 5th percentile 
for each variable for the entire pooled country-year 
data set are calculated, and the top and bottom 5 
percent of observations are truncated. Specifically, all 
observations from the 5th percentile to the minimum 
are replaced by the value corresponding to the 5th 
percentile, and all observations from the 95th percen-
tile to the maximum are replaced by the value corre-
sponding to the 95th percentile. In effect, the 5th and 
95th percentile become the minimum and maximum 
of the new (truncated) data set. The main reason 
for truncating the “tails” of the distribution is that 
sometimes the best and worst scores are very extreme 
and may reflect some peculiar (idiosyncratic) features 
of a single jurisdiction. However, the top and bot-
tom 5 percent of observations are not dropped from 
the sample completely. If they were dropped, the 
calculations would lose too much of the potentially 
valuable information. Replacing the top and bottom 
5 percent of observations with the 95th and 5th per-
centile value, respectively, ensures that much of the 
original information is still retained. This so-called 
winsorizing is consistent with approaches used in 
earlier literature.
To convert the representative indicator in each of 
the 4x2 characteristics to a 0–100 scale, each score is 
rescaled by the maximum for each indicator and the 
minimum for each indicator. The rescaled indicator 
can be interpreted as the percent distance between 
the worst (0) and the best (100) outcome, defined by 
the 5th and 95th percentile of the original distribu-
tion. These winsorized and rescaled variables are the 
core of much of the analysis presented in this chapter.
To arrive at a more condensed aggregate indica-
tor, it may be useful to examine the average across 
the various characteristics; however, a strong caveat 
applies. An ongoing and rather active debate on mul-
tidimensional indices (such as the Multidimensional 
Poverty Index, Human Development Index, and 
various Unsatisfied Basic Needs indices long used in 
many countries) has focused much criticism on the 
difficulty of the choice of weights for such an index 
(for example, Ravallion 2011). Mindful of the debate 
and the shortcomings associated with creating such 
mash-up indices, this report does not explicitly pres-
ent such a formal mash-up index. Nonetheless, the 
data made available on this report’s website allow 
interested users to assign different weights to the var-
ious characteristics and calculate their own aggregate 
indices.
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interventions. Finally, another group of indi-
cators relates to the features of the underly-
ing financial infrastructure. This includes 
basic indicators on information disclosure, 
contract enforcement, and other quantitative 
characteristics of financial infrastructure (for 
example, public registry coverage in percent 
of adults, private bureau coverage in percent 
of adults, procedures to enforce contracts, 
time to enforce contract, and cost to enforce 
contracts). Several other traits of the enabling 
environment for finance are included in the 
Global Financial Development Database and 
listed in this chapter’s annex.
But this is just a start. For policy evalua-
tion and policy design purposes, it is impor-
tant to start collecting more consistent and 
more comprehensive information on gov-
ernment policies in the financial sector (for 
example, on supervision of nonbank financial 
institutions and financial markets). This is an 
important gap in the globally available data; 
future reports hope to go in more depth into 
how this gap might be filled.
SelecteD FinDinGS
Financial system multidimensionality
One basic, yet important, observation 
derived from the Global Financial Develop-
ment Database is that the four characteris-
tics of financial systems are far from closely 
correlated across countries (figure 1.4). Each 
characteristic captures a different, separate 
facet of financial systems. Capturing only 
financial institutions and not financial mar-
kets would be insufficient. Also, looking only 
at financial depth as the only proxy would 
not be sufficient. And similarly, focusing 
only on financial stability or on access or on 
efficiency would be insufficient. Stability has 
particularly low correlation with the other 
three characteristics. 
important differences across regions 
and income groups
A regional comparison shows major differ-
ences in the four characteristics of financial 
instead of current fundamentals only, and 
therefore stock prices may be more volatile 
and negatively skewed in the future.
Measuring the enabling environment for 
finance: A start and an important area 
for further data work
The focus of the 4x2 matrix is on charac-
terizing financial systems (the middle part 
of figure 1.2). It does not explicitly include 
variables capturing financial sector policy, 
such as features of financial sector regula-
tion and supervision (the bottom of figure 
1.2). The reason for focusing on measures 
of the functioning of financial systems is 
that those indicators bridge the gap between 
policy measures and final objectives, such as 
growth, poverty alleviation, and the expan-
sion of economic opportunities. Financial 
depth, access, efficiency, and stability func-
tion as “intermediate” indicators and targets. 
To some extent, this is an analogy with mon-
etary policy, where intermediate targets have 
a relatively clear link to the policy variable 
(such as a central bank’s interest rate) and an 
impact on the policy target (such as future 
inflation rate).
This report, however, has started the pro-
cess of assembling comprehensive data on 
the enabling environment for finance: finan-
cial sector policies, regulations, supervisory 
practices, legal and accounting systems, 
and so forth. As part of the work underly-
ing chapter 2 of this report, a comprehen-
sive and updated data set on bank regula-
tion and supervision around the world was 
put together, building on earlier work by 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004). The data-
base also covers policies and issues that go 
beyond the narrow concept of banking regu-
lation and supervision, such as deposit pro-
tection systems and resolution issues. Also, 
the World Bank has recently published a 
comprehensive update on payment systems 
and the related policies around the world—
some of these results are featured in chapter 
5. As part of chapter 4, new data are pre-
sented on development financial institutions 
and some other forms of direct government 
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FiguRe 1.4 Correlations among Financial System Characteristics
(figure continues next page)
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FiguRe 1.4 Correlations among Financial System Characteristics (continued)
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systems across the key regions as of 2010 
(table 1.2). The results are by and large in 
line with what one would expect, with Sub-
Saharan Africa scoring the lowest on aver-
age on most of the characteristics, and high-
income countries scoring the highest on most 
dimensions. A remarkable number is the rela-
tively low score of Middle East and North 
(table continues next page)
FiguRe 1.4 Correlations among Financial System 
Characteristics (continued)
Source: calculations based on the global financial development database.
Note: see table 1.2.
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c. Financial Sector Depth: Institutions vs. Markets
Africa on access to finance (table 1.2). This 
number resonates with the complaints heard 
during the unrest in the region in 2011.11
Much of the differences among regions are 
correlated with differences in income levels. 
Countries that have lower income tend to 
also show lower values on the 0–100 scale 
in the 4x2 framework (table 1.2 and figure 
1.5). However, the stability indicator is not 
very correlated with income level—a point 
highlighted quite dramatically by the global 
financial crisis.
Large disparities in financial systems 
across countries 
Behind these regional and peer group aver-
ages are vast differences among individual 
countries, and in some cases also major 
differences among different parts of each 
country’s financial sector. The data from 
the Global Financial Development Database 
demonstrate rather strikingly the large differ-
ences in financial systems around the globe. 
For example, the largest financial system in 
the sample is more than 34,500 times the 
smallest one. Even if the financial systems 
are rescaled by the size of the corresponding 
economies (that is, by their GDP), the larg-
est (deepest) financial system is still some 
110 times the smallest (least deep) one. And 
even if the top and bottom 5 percent of this 
TABLe 1.2 Financial System Characteristics: Summary
 Financial
 Institutions  East Asia Europe and Latin America Middle East and  Sub-Saharan
 (Mean) High income and Pacific Central Asia and the Caribbean North Africa South Asia Africa
Depth 69 43 37 37 33 32 17
Access 43 23 35 30 14 16 10
Efficiency 80 70 65 62 83 81 51
Stability 42 52 20 35 57 38 32
 Financial
 Markets  East Asia Europe and Latin America Middle East and  Sub-Saharan
 (Mean) High income and Pacific Central Asia and the Caribbean North Africa South Asia Africa
Depth 43 38 12 21 24 17 20
Access 46 80 56 40 50 85 77
Efficiency 29 40 17  8 24 49  7
Stability 66 60 43 64 81 56 54
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examines country-level data, one finds vast 
differences in financial sector depth, as well 
as in the other characteristics.
The cross-country differentiation along 
the key characteristics of financial systems 
can be seen from the scatter plots in figure 
1.4 as well as from cartograms such as the 
distribution are taken out, the ratio of the 
largest to the smallest is about 28—a large 
degree of disparity, considering that these are 
not raw figures but ratios relative to the size 
of the economy. Similar orders of magnitude 
are obtained for the other characteristics of 
financial systems.12 In other words, when one 
TABLe 1.2 Financial System Characteristics: Summary (continued)
 Financial
 Institutions  Upper middle Lower middle 
 (Mean) High income income income Low income
Depth 84 44 28 13
Access 55 32 19  5
Efficiency 86 75 61 42
Stability 35 38 40 35
 Financial
 Markets  Upper middle Lower middle 
 (Mean) High income income income Low income
Depth 51 27 16 10
Access 53 58 69 29
Efficiency 45 19 20 21
Stability 53 60 53 44
Source: calculations based on the global financial development database.
Note: the summary statistics refer to the winsorized and rescaled variables (0–100), as described 
in the text. financial institutions—depth: private credit/gdp (%); access: number of accounts 
per 1,000 adults, commercial banks; efficiency: net interest margin; stability: z-score. under 
financial markets—depth: (stock market capitalization + outstanding domestic private debt 
securities)/gdp; access: percent market capitalization out of the top 10 largest companies (%); 
efficiency: stock market turnover Ratio (%); stability: asset price volatility.
FiguRe 1.5 Financial System Characteristics, by income group, 2010
Source: calculations based on the global financial development database.
Note: the summary statistics refer to the winsorized and rescaled variables (0–100), as described in the text. see also table 1.2.
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liquidity shocks. In addition, financial insti-
tutions on average rebounded faster than 
markets, showing improvements in depth 
and efficiency after the crisis. This improve-
ment seems to have been the case so far, for 
example, for Brazil and other Latin Ameri-
can countries (de la Torre, Ize, and Schmuk-
ler 2011), China (box 1.3), and many Sub-
Saharan African countries (see, for example, 
World Bank 2012). However, the medium-
term effect of the crisis on financial systems 
still remains to be seen, and will be examined 
further in future issues of the Global Finan-
cial Development Report.
increased importance of securities 
markets at higher income levels 
The Global Financial Development Database 
allows for an examination of the relative size 
of financial institutions and financial mar-
kets around the world. The issue of finan-
cial structure—usually approximated by the 
relative size of bank credit and stock market 
capitalization—has been an important topic 
in the policy debate. 
In a recent paper that used data that are 
part of the Global Financial Development 
one shown for illustration in figure 1.6. The 
scatter plots and the cartogram underscore 
the large cross-country differences. The mea-
surement framework underscores that finan-
cial sectors in jurisdictions such as the Repub-
lic of Korea and the United States exhibit a 
relatively great financial market depth, as 
one would expect. The United States has less 
deep financial institutions, reflecting the less 
bank-centric (and more market-based) nature 
of the U.S. financial system. Several Euro-
pean countries exhibit relatively great finan-
cial depth.
Financial systems have changed. As illus-
trated in figures 1.7 and 1.8, the most visible 
change is the observed declines in stability, 
which in turn reflects the increased volatility 
in returns by financial institutions in some 
countries and in most financial markets. 
Overall, the data from the Global Finan-
cial Development Database suggest that the 
key disparities among countries in terms of 
the nature of their financial systems have 
somewhat subsided in the aftermath of the 
recent crisis, as financial sectors in many 
medium- and low-income countries were 
relatively more isolated from the global tur-
moil, and therefore less affected by the global 
FiguRe 1.6 The uneven Nature of Financial Systems (illustration)
Source: calculations based on the global financial development database.
Note: the map is for illustration purposes only. country sizes are adjusted to reflect the volume of financial sector assets in the jurisdiction, measured in 
u.s. dollars at the end of 2010. the image was created with the help of the mapwindow 4 and scapetoad software.
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would need to find out if taxes, regulations, 
legal impediments, or other distortions are 
leading to excessive reliance on banks or 
markets. Using policy to facilitate a shift 
from a bank-centric system to a more market-
based system is never an easy task. Actively 
intervening to develop markets is likely to be 
problematic. Interventions should be more 
along the lines of fostering an enabling envi-
ronment and reducing impediments. Even 
in systems with a relatively strong state role 
in the economy, shifts in the financial sec-
tor structure do not occur overnight. China 
(box 1.3) is a case in point: despite policy 
intentions and reforms aimed at promot-
ing nonbank financial institutions and mar-
kets, the financial system remains very much 
Database, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen, and 
Levine (2012) examine empirically the issue 
of financial structure and find that, as econ-
omies develop, use of services provided by 
securities markets increases relative to those 
provided by banks. This work suggests that 
policies and institutions should adapt as 
countries develop in order to allow financial 
structure to evolve.
The existing research and policy work do 
not provide enough guidance to justify tar-
geting a particular financial structure for a 
particular country. However, if market or 
bank development is too skewed compared 
to what one could expect given their level of 
economic development, the above research 
findings provide a reason to dig deeper: one 
FiguRe 1.7 Financial Systems: 2008–10 versus 2000–07 (Financial institutions)
Source: calculations based on the global financial development database.
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in the fourth quarter of 2008, around the 
Lehman failure. On the surface, it may seem 
as if the U.K. financial sector underwent 
a “productivity miracle” from the 1980s 
onward, as finance appeared to rise as a 
share of GDP despite a declining labor and 
capital share. However, a decomposition of 
returns to banking suggests that much of 
the growth reflected the effects of higher 
risk taking (Haldane, Brennan, and Madou-
ros 2010). Leverage, higher trading profits, 
and investments in deep-out-of-the-money 
options were the risk-taking strategies that 
generated excess returns to bank sharehold-
ers and staff. Subsequently, as these risks 
materialized, the “miracle” turned into a 
mirage.
dominated by large banks, and in some ways 
has become even more bank-centric during 
the recent period of rapid credit growth. 
The “bright” and “dark” sides of 
financial systems
The data from the Global Financial Devel-
opment Database can be used to examine 
the notion that growth of financial systems 
may seem explosive. To some extent, this 
notion reflects the inadequacy of some of the 
available proxies for financial systems. For 
instance, in the case of the United Kingdom, 
the nominal value-added of the financial sec-
tor (as measured in the System of National 
Accounts) grew at the fastest pace on record 
FiguRe 1.8 Financial Systems: 2008–10 versus 2000–07 (Financial Markets)
Source: calculations based on the global financial development database.
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They observe that financial systems develop-
ment paths exhibit “convexities,” as rising 
participation and interconnectedness gener-
ate positive externalities that promote further 
participation and interconnectedness. Thus, 
More examples of the explosive growth 
of financial systems using the data from the 
Global Financial Development Database can 
be found in de la Torre, Ize, and Schmukler 
(2011) and de la Torre, Feyen, and Ize (2011). 
BOX 1.3 China Case Study: Large Banks and the Need to Diversify to Markets
The 4x2 measurement framework allows country 
officials and analysts to examine financial systems 
across borders and to put them in a broader interna-
tional perspective. The rapid and somewhat uneven 
development of China’s financial system provides for 
an interesting case study.
Over the past three decades, China’s economy 
has maintained high growth rates. Since the start of 
reforms in 1978, productivity growth has been rapid 
and capacity has been expanded by very high levels 
of investment. 
China has made progress in moving toward a more 
commercially oriented financial system and toward 
strengthening of its banks (World Bank 2011c). 
This progress has been underpinned by reforms that 
included recapitalizing the banking system, upgrad-
ing the prudential regulatory regime, opening the 
financial system following accession to the World 
Trade Organization, and taking steps to reform inter-
est rate and exchange rate policies. Reform of the 
joint-stock banks has boosted the commercial orien-
tation of the banking system, and reform of the rural 
credit cooperatives has yielded some initial results. 
The commercial banking sector has grown very 
rapidly in the past decade. In terms of the 4x2 frame-
work, the Chinese banking sector was already rather 
large, being close to or at the 100 score in terms of 
the depth indicator (see figure B1.3.1). In this sense, 
China may seem already “developed” in terms of the 
size of its financial institutions. However, the rapid 
credit growth of the 2000s may have been too rapid 
and contributed to a somewhat reduced stability 
score. Perhaps greater increase in depth of the finan-
cial markets may have been more warranted. 
The 4x2 framework underscores that one of 
the challenges for the Chinese financial sector is to 
increase its diversification. Banks, particularly the 
largest ones, still dominate financial intermediation. 
Recognizing this challenge, the country authorities 
have taken steps to diversify the financial sector. 
In the securities sector, key companies have been 
restructured, and a resolution mechanism and inves-
tor protection scheme have been set up. Pension sec-
tor reform has also progressed, with the establish-
ment of a National Social Security Fund in 2000. 
The fixed income market has grown as an alterna-
tive funding channel, but it remains heavily concen-
trated in public sector securities. The equity market 
mainly meets the needs of large enterprises, in spite 
of recent progress in establishing a multilayer equity 
market to facilitate funding to small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). Assets under management by 
the insurance sector corresponded to less than 11 
percent of household bank deposits. Trust, financial 
leasing, and finance companies have all been grow-
ing rapidly but remain small relative to banks. China 
also has a flourishing informal financial sector, parts 
of which provide funding to SMEs and small retail 
investors. Nonetheless, the large commercial banks 
make up almost two-thirds of commercial bank 
assets, with the assets of the four largest banks each 
exceeding 25 percent of GDP (and ranking among 
the largest banks in the world).
Source: calculations based on world bank 2011c. 
Note: for simplicity, the figure shows only four out of the eight variables 
in the 4x2 framework. see also the note to table 1.2.
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FiguRe B1.3.1 The Chinese Financial Sector
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to the crisis. For example, the financial stabil-
ity indicators for many countries show dete-
rioration several years prior to the crisis (see 
figure B1.3.1 in box 1.3 for an illustration 
for China). This finding is consistent with 
the observation by Anginer and Demirgüç-
Kunt (2011), who construct a default risk 
measure for publicly traded banks using the 
Merton contingent claim model, and exam-
ine the evolution of the correlation struc-
ture of default risk for some 1,800 banks in 
over 60 countries. Based on their measure, 
which is a more sophisticated analogue of 
the z-score used in this chapter, they find a 
significant increase in default risk codepen-
dence over the three-year period leading to 
the financial crisis. They also find that coun-
tries that are more integrated, and that have 
liberalized financial systems and weak bank-
ing supervision, have higher codependence in 
their banking sector. The results support an 
increase in scope for international supervi-
sory cooperation, as well as capital charges 
for “too-connected-to-fail” institutions that 
can impose significant externalities.
The 4x2 framework also allows examin-
ing the effects of the global financial crisis. 
Box 1.4 illustrates this in the case of Roma-
nia, a country whose financial sector seemed 
relatively sound based on conventional ratios 
(such as capital adequacy and nonperforming 
loan ratios) but that was subjected to rather 
large shocks during the crisis. Figures 1.7 and 
1.8 examine the crisis effect in a cross-section 
of countries.
conclUSion
The 4x2 framework presented in this chapter 
puts a spotlight on the multifaceted nature of 
modern financial systems. Focusing only on 
one dimension—say, financial depth or finan-
cial stability—would be shortsighted. Also, 
focusing only on financial institutions, or just 
on banks, is too much of a simplification and 
can lead to distorted results and biased policy 
conclusions.
This chapter illustrates that financial 
sectors come in different shapes and sizes, 
and they differ widely in terms of the 4x2 
much of financial system growth may be 
explosive. According to the authors, a counter-
part of such explosiveness is that the associa-
tion between financial development (approxi-
mated, for example, as private credit to GDP) 
and real development (output growth) exhibits 
decreasing returns. In other words, the asso-
ciation between finance and growth levels off 
at some point. This result is consistent with 
findings of recent papers that regress output 
growth against financial depth indicators.13 
A different aspect of this convexity has 
been brought up recently by Cˇihák, Muñoz, 
and Scuzzarella (2011). Using a subset of data 
from the Global Financial Development Data-
base, and building on an earlier theoretical 
paper by Nier and others (2007), they exam-
ine the “bright” and “dark” sides of cross- 
border financial interlinkages. They ask 
whether making a country’s banking sector 
more linked to the global banking network 
renders that country more or less prone to 
banking crises. Their answer, interestingly, is 
that it depends on how connected the coun-
try’s banking sector already is. For banking 
sectors that are not very connected to the 
global banking network, increases in inter-
connectedness are associated with a reduced 
probability of a banking crisis. Once intercon-
nectedness reaches a certain value (estimated 
to be at about the 95th percentile of the distri-
bution of countries in terms of interconnected-
ness), further increases in interconnectedness 
can increase the probability of a banking cri-
sis. Also, the analysis suggests that it is impor-
tant to distinguish whether the cross-border 
interlinkages are stemming primarily from 
banks’ asset side or from their liabilities side: 
increasing interconnectedness on the liabilities 
(borrowing) side is more likely to become det-
rimental to banking stability than increasing 
interconnectedness on the asset (creditor) side. 
Analysis of the crisis: increased 
instability in the run-up, decreased 
access in the aftermath
The rich data set in the Global Financial Devel- 
opment Database allows one to examine in 
more depth the developments in the run-up 
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with this report, should help country offi-
cials, researchers, and anybody else with 
interest in the matter to better benchmark 
financial systems. The Statistical Appendix 
to the report includes country tables with 
select indicators, as well as aggregates across 
regions and income groups. A pocket edi-
tion of the database is also made available as 
Little Data Book on Financial Development. 
Finally, readers are encouraged to go online 
and explore this large and interesting source 
of data by themselves.
dimensions. More specifically, the chap-
ter also documents developments during 
the global financial crisis, not only in terms 
of financial instability, but also in terms of 
financial depth, access, and efficiency.
Despite the remarkable progress in gather-
ing data and information on financial systems 
around the world in recent years, researchers’ 
and practitioners’ ability to properly mea-
sure financial systems has been constrained 
by lack of comprehensive data. The data that 
are being made publicly available, together 
BOX 1.4 Romania Case Study: Rapid growth enabled by Foreign Funding
In the run-up to the global financial crisis, Romania’s 
financial sector has gone through a period of rapid 
growth, reflected in an increase in the measured 
financial depth. Similarly to many other countries 
in the region, the rapid growth of domestic credit 
was fueled by ample funding provided by parents of 
foreign-owned banks to their subsidiaries in Roma-
nia. In terms of the 4x2 framework, Romania’s score 
for financial institutions’ depth grew from only 3 in 
2000 to 28 in 2007, and its score for financial mar-
kets’ depth grew from 1 to 13 over the same period. 
The Romanian banking system, which dominates 
the financial sector, entered the crisis with relatively 
high reported capitalization and liquidity ratios 
(IMF 2009). Also, the ratios of nonperforming loans 
to total loans reported before the crisis were rather 
low; however, this finding was mostly just a reflec-
tion of the high credit growth that masked to some 
extent the underlying weaknesses in the system. The 
z-score, that is, the proxy for stability used in the 
4x2 framework, suggested that the soundness of 
Romanian banks was far from perfect in the run-up 
to the crisis.
A rapid deterioration in market confidence in 
the Romanian economy has led to bouts of down-
ward pressure on the exchange rate, upward pres-
sure on interest rates, and a large decline in equity 
values (some 80 percent between 2008 and 2009). 
These effects led to sharp increases in nonperform-
ing loans, putting strains on bank capital positions. 
Stress-testing analysis performed during the recent 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) (IMF 
2009) suggested that some banks were at risk of 
becoming undercapitalized as the downturn contin-
ues. The FSAP therefore called for strengthening of 
capital positions of some banks and for maintain-
ing by parents of foreign-owned banks those lines of 
credit to their subsidiaries and corporate borrowers 
in Romania. In terms of the 4x2 framework, these 
stability challenges are reflected in major declines 
of the stability indicators, both for financial institu-
tions and financial markets, in 2008 and 2009. Also, 
the framework highlights that the crisis has halted, 
at least temporarily, Romania’s increases in financial 
depth.
Source: calculations based on world bank; imf 2009. 
Note: for simplicity, the figure shows only four of the eight variables 
in the 4x2 framework. see also the note to table 1.2
FiguRe B1.4.1 Romania’s Financial Sector
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new trends or observations, and they will 
focus on the relevant theme at hand, such as 
financial inclusion or capital market develop-
ment, or other issues of policy relevance.
Future versions of the Global Financial 
Development Report will revisit issues of 
measurement of financial systems around the 
world. They will also report on substantial 
chapter 1 annex: overview of the Data Sources 
Underlying the Global Financial Development 
Database
This annex is a summary. For more on the 
Global Financial Development Database, 
including the individual country data and 
metadata, see this report’s Statistical Appen-
dix and the Global Financial Development 
Report website at http://www.worldbank 
.org/financialdevelopment.
Database on Financial Development and 
Structure (updated November 2010). This 
database was used a starting point for many 
of the basic indicators of size, activity, and 
efficiency of financial intermediaries and 
markets. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 
(2010) describe the sources and construction 
of, and the intuition behind, different indica-
tors and present descriptive statistics. 
Bankscope (Bureau van Dijk, http:// 
www.bvdinfo.com/Products/Company-
Information/International/BANKSCOPE 
.aspx) was used to obtain and update data on 
banks. Bankscope combines widely sourced 
data with flexible software for searching and 
analyzing banks. Bankscope contains com-
prehensive information on banks across the 
globe. It can be used to research individual 
banks and find banks with specific profiles 
and analyze them. Bankscope has up to 16 
years of detailed accounts for each bank.
Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/), 
Dealogic (http://www.dealogic.com/), and 
Thomson Reuters Datastream (http://thom 
sonreuters.com/products_services/financial/
financial_products/a-z/datastream/) were 
used to obtain higher frequency data on 
stock exchange and bond markets that were 
aggregate on a country level.
 The Doing Business database (http://
www.doingbusiness.org/data), a part of the 
Doing Business project, offers an expansive 
array of economic data in 183 countries, 
covering the period from 2003 to the pres-
ent. The data cover various aspects of busi-
ness regulations, including those relevant to 
financial sector development issues, such as 
enforcing contracts and obtaining credit. 
IMF’s Access to Finance database (http://
fas.imf.org/) aims to systematically measure 
access to and use of financial services. Fol-
lowing Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martínez 
Pería (2007), the database measures the reach 
of financial services by bank branch network, 
and availability of automated teller machines, 
and does so by using four key financial 
instruments: deposits, loans, debt securities 
issued, and insurance. The website contains 
annual data from about 140 respondents for 
the six-year period, including data for all 
G-20 countries. 
The Global Financial Inclusion Index 
(Global Findex) is a new database of demand-
side data on financial inclusion, which docu-
ments financial usage across gender, age, 
education, geographic regions, and national 
income levels. The core set of indicators and 
subindicators of financial inclusion, based on 
the Global Findex database, includes Use of 
bank accounts (% of adults with an account 
at a formal financial institution, purpose of 
accounts, frequency of transactions; % of 
adults with an active account at a formal 
financial institution, mode of access); Savings 
(% of adults who saved in the past 12 months 
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Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
(http://www.bis.org/) statistics were used for 
the aggregate data on bond statistics, includ-
ing domestic debt securities by residence 
and type of instrument (bonds and notes vs. 
money market instruments, issued by finan-
cial and nonfinancial corporations; based on 
publicly available or country-reported data). 
Domestic debt securities (Quarterly Review 
Table 16) for a given country comprise issues 
by residents in domestic currency targeted at 
resident investors, whereas international debt 
securities (Quarterly Review Table 11) are the 
ones targeted at nonresidents (a) in domes-
tic currency on the domestic market, (b) in 
domestic and foreign currency on the inter-
national market, plus (c) the issues in foreign 
currency in the domestic market (further 
information can be found in the Guide to 
the International Financial Statistics, http://
www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap14.htm). 
Two different collection systems are used 
(s-b-s for international debt securities and 
aggregated data for domestic debt securities), 
resulting in some possible overlap (between 
domestic debt securities and international 
debt securities) and inconsistencies (classifi-
cation of issuers). 
Country authorities’ websites were used to 
reconfirm and fill in some of the gaps in the 
data.
noteS
 1. See http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com. 
Among the top 30 solutions, microfinance 
was considered as a way to improve liveli-
hoods of poor women, but this topic did not 
make it to the top 10.
 2. This is not the only approach to classifying the 
functions provided by the financial system, 
but it is not dramatically different from other 
approaches (such as Merton 1992; Merton 
and Bodie 2004), and it is an approach that 
fits rather well with the large finance litera-
ture, including recent research.
 3. In the empirical literature, identifying the 
impact of finance has sometimes proved 
challenging. Some of the early literature on 
the subject requires the problematic iden-
using a formal financial institution, % of 
adults who saved in the past 12 months using 
an informal savings club or a person outside 
the family, % of adults who otherwise saved 
in the past 12 months); Borrowing (% of 
adults who borrowed in the past 12 months 
from a formal financial institution, % of 
adults who borrowed in the past 12 months 
from informal sources, % of adults with an 
outstanding loan to purchase a home or an 
apartment); Payments (% of adults who used 
a formal account to receive wages or govern-
ment payments in the past 12 months, % of 
adults who used a formal account to receive 
or send money to family members living else-
where in the past 12 months, % of adults 
who used a mobile phone to pay bills or send 
or receive money in the past 12 months); 
Insurance (% of adults who personally pur-
chased private health insurance, % of adults 
who work in farming, forestry, or fishing and 
personally paid for crop, rainfall, or livestock 
insurance).
Financial Soundness Indicators database 
(http://fsi.imf.org/), hosted by the IMF, dis-
seminates data and metadata on selected 
financial soundness indicators provided by 
participating countries.
World Development Indicators (http://
data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators) is the primary World 
Bank collection of development indicators, 
compiled from officially recognized interna-
tional sources. It presents the most current 
and accurate global development data avail-
able, and includes national, regional, and 
global estimates.
International Financial Statistics (http://
elibrary-data.imf.org/FindDataReports. 
aspx?d=33061&e=169393), from the IMF, 
provides is a standard source of international 
statistics on all aspects of international and 
domestic finance. It reports, for most coun-
tries of the world, basic financial and eco-
nomic data on international banking, money 
and banking, interest rates, prices, produc-
tion, international transactions, international 
liquidity, government accounts, exchange 
rates, and national accounts.
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 8. See annex.
 9. For example, many central banks around the 
world publish reports focused almost exclu-
sively on financial stability (Čihák, Muñoz, 
Teh Sharifuddin, and Tintchev 2012). Simi-
larly, the IMF’s Global Financial Stability 
Report has a clear stability focus. There are, 
however, many complementarities between 
financial stability, depth, access, and effi-
ciency, as emphasized for instance in the 
World Bank–IMF’s Financial Sector Assess-
ment Program.
 10. Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2008), 
for example, find that countries that have 
experienced occasional financial crises have, 
on average, grown faster than countries with 
stable financial conditions. 
 11. In contrast, efficiency seems surprisingly 
relatively high in Middle East and North 
Africa, as well as in South Asia. This is in 
part because an important part of bank lend-
ing goes to large companies and to the public 
sector, leading to relatively lower reported 
margins.
 12. To put this in a more anthropomorphic per-
spective, the tallest adult person on earth is 
less than 5 times taller than the smallest per-
son (http://www.guinessworldrecords.com).
 13. For example, Rioja and Valev (2004) find 
(a) no statistically significant relationship 
between finance and growth at low levels of 
financial development, (b) a strong positive 
relationship at intermediate levels of financial 
development, and (c) a weaker but still posi-
tive effect at higher levels of financial devel-
opment. Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza (2011) 
find that finance actually starts having a nega-
tive effect on output growth when credit to 
the private sector exceeds 110 percent of GDP. 
Similarly, Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) 
find that the aggregate productivity growth 
in an economy increases with private sector 
credit to GDP, but only up to a point; after 
that point, increases in private sector credit 
to GDP are associated with lower aggregate 
productivity growth.
tifying assumption that legal origins matter 
for development only through their impacts 
on finance. But subsequent papers have 
tried more nuanced and more persuasive 
approaches to identification (such as Rajan 
and Zingales 1998).
 4. The database builds on previous work within 
the World Bank Group, in particular the rel-
evant papers by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Levine (2000, 2010) and Beck and others 
(2006). The database also builds on Finan-
cial Soundness Indicators database (http://
fsi.imf.org/) and the Financial Access Survey 
(http://fas.imf.org/). There are several major 
sets of data. Chapter 1 annex provides a basic 
description of the data sources. The Statisti-
cal Appendix at the end of the report shows 
country-by-country data for 2008–10.
 5. The data source is IMF’s International Finan-
cial Statistics (see annex). Private credit iso-
lates credit issued to the private sector and 
therefore excludes credit issued to govern-
ments, government agencies, and public 
enterprises. Private credit also excludes credit 
issued by central banks.
 6. This report includes other measures as well. 
Also relevant are indicators of structure 
within the individual financial segments, 
such as the concentration ratios (Herfindahl 
index, shares of various types of financial 
institutions in total assets and in GDP, and 
shares of individual markets in total market 
capitalization). Some of these measures (for 
example, the percentage of assets of the three 
or five largest financial institutions in GDP) 
are important for the stability dimension, 
because they provide a rough approximation 
for the potential for impact in the case of a 
major financial disruption.
 7. Financial structure differs markedly across 
economies. Over the full sample period, the 
annual average value of the financial struc-
ture ratio is 279. Countries such as Austra-
lia, India, Singapore, and Sweden have this 
ratio at or below 2.35 (10th percentile), while 
Bolivia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Uganda are 
examples of countries where this ratio is over 
356 (90th percentile).

2
the State as Regulator 
and Supervisor
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•   Financial sector regulation and supervision are areas where the role of the state is not 
in dispute; the debate is about how to ensure that the role is carried out well. 
•   A key challenge of regulation is to better align private incentives with public interest, 
without taxing or subsidizing private risk taking. Supervision is meant to ensure the 
implementation of rules and regulations. It needs to harness the power of market dis-
cipline and address its limitations.
•   The financial crisis underscored limitations in supervisory enforcement and market dis-
cipline. It emphasized the importance of combining strong, timely, anticipatory super-
visory enforcement with better use of market discipline. It also highlighted the impor-
tance of basics—solid and transparent legal and institutional frameworks to promote 
financial stability. In many developing economies that means that building supervisory 
capacity needs to be a priority.
•   Useful  lessons can be  learned by analyzing regulation and supervision in economies 
that were at the epicenter of the global financial crisis and those that were not. A new 
World Bank global survey, presented in this chapter, suggests that economies that suf-
fered from the crisis had weaker regulation and supervision practices as well as less 
scope for market incentives than the rest.
•   This chapter reviews progress on regulatory reforms at the global and national levels, 
and identifies advances made so far. Tracking changes during the crisis reveals that 
countries have stepped up efforts in the area of macroprudential policy, as well as on 
issues such as resolution regimes and consumer protection. However, the survey sug-
gests that there is further scope for improving market discipline, namely disclosures 
and monitoring incentives. 
•   The financial crisis has triggered a healthy debate on approaches to regulation and 
supervision among regulators, policy makers, and academics, leading to multiple pro-
posals for further reforms. These proposals aim to limit regulatory arbitrage and make 
better use of regulatory resources. Common themes of these proposals are calls for 
more transparency and simpler regulation to enhance accountability, as well as for 
more proactive efforts to identify and address incentive problems.
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analyses can provide insight to policy mak-
ers and regulators designing reforms aimed at 
making financial systems more resilient and 
efficient. 
After the onset of the crisis, there was 
much talk about using the crisis to push 
through needed reforms. At the global level, 
the G-20 has mandated the Financial Stabil-
ity Board (FSB), after its transformation in 
2009, to promote the coordinated develop-
ment and implementation of effective regula-
tory, supervisory, and other financial sector 
policies.2 As part of this regulatory reform 
agenda, the Basel Committee has prepared 
new capital and liquidity requirements for 
banks under the third Basel framework, 
Basel III. On the national level, many econ-
omies have enacted or are considering new 
laws and regulations in response to the les-
sons from the crisis. The crisis has also led 
to an active policy debate among regulators, 
policy makers, and academics, giving rise to 
multiple reform proposals. 
Much has been done, but is it appropri-
ate? And will it be sufficient to reduce the 
likelihood and severity of future financial 
crises? The key questions addressed in this 
chapter are: What is the early thinking on 
transforming regulatory practices around 
the world? What are the specific issues for 
emerging markets and developing economies 
(EMDEs)? What should be the role of the 
state as regulator and supervisor of the finan-
cial sector?3 This chapter reviews some of 
the lessons from the crisis and the responses 
proposed to address them, including those 
reflected in the World Bank’s updated survey 
of bank regulation and supervision practices 
around the globe. The chapter summarizes 
the progress made through recent regulatory 
reforms, as well as some promising new ideas 
and reform proposals.  
There is no major debate on whether the 
state should be in regulation and supervision. 
Though the benefits of, for example, direct 
state ownership of financial institutions are 
often disputed, the importance of the state 
regulating and supervising the financial sector 
is well established in the economic and finan-
cial literature. The case for financial sector 
For years, developed economies enjoyed stable macroeconomic conditions—often referred to as the Great Modera-
tion—where developments in the financial 
sector were often considered major contribu-
tors to financial stability and thus to economic 
growth.1 This has been followed by a phase 
of deep instability, in which major financial 
institutions collapsed and financial markets 
malfunctioned.
Because of the central role that financial 
sectors play in market economies, govern-
ments and major central banks intervened 
to avoid the collapse of the economic sys-
tem. Massive rescue packages and unortho-
dox monetary measures were used to lower 
market participants’ risk aversion to tolerable 
levels and to avert the worst scenarios. This 
frantic activity presented a striking contrast 
with the sanguine attitude of investors and 
supervisors in the years before the crisis, 
when the excesses of financial institutions 
were allowed to grow unhampered.
The global financial crisis that began in 
2007 and intensified with the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in 2008 presented a major 
test of the international architecture devel-
oped to safeguard the stability of the global 
financial system—and the architecture 
largely failed.
Although there is some consensus on 
attributing to financial markets an impor-
tant component of procyclicality, the reasons 
behind the absence of decisive preemptive 
supervisory action in the run–up to the cri-
sis are still a subject of debate. Some analysts 
emphasize the weaknesses in policy making. 
Others blame the trend toward deregulation. 
Yet others emphasize problems with incen-
tives in the financial markets and the regula-
tory and supervisory framework. 
Whatever the relative importance of these 
factors, the crisis has thrust into the spotlight 
major shortcomings in regulation and super-
vision, in the capacity of market discipline to 
promote financial stability, and in the sound-
ness of national and international arrange-
ments for crisis management and surveil-
lance, reopening debates and analyses in all 
these areas. The results of these debates and 
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supervision (Laffont and Tirole 1993; Stigler 
1971). According to some authors, that has 
contributed to the financial crisis (Johnson 
and Kwak 2010). So the real question is how 
best to ensure that regulation and supervision 
support sound financial development.  
Shortcomings in private and public institu-
tions have to be addressed in a comprehen-
sive way, focusing on the roots of the crisis, 
instead of its consequences. This approach 
entails correcting weaknesses prevalent before 
the crisis in many financial markets and insti-
tutions, including their supervisory bod-
ies (such as deep information asymmetries, 
distorted incentives, defective governance 
arrangements, and defective accountability). 
Doing so would improve market discipline by 
providing information to market participants 
and supervisory bodies if inefficient risk tak-
ing is sufficiently and timely penalized before 
the correction of excesses entails prohibitive 
costs for the whole economic system. But it 
also implies that, given the limits of market 
discipline (due to, for example, coordination 
problems, fallacy of composition, and herd 
behavior), a complementary and equally nec-
essary role is reserved for well-designed regu-
latory and supervisory action. 
Because of the crisis, much focus has been 
placed on regulating and monitoring sys-
temic risk. Indeed, using the latest round of 
the World Bank’s survey of regulatory and 
supervisory practices around the world, this 
chapter confirms that countries have stepped 
up efforts on macroprudential policy, as well 
as on resolution regimes and financial con-
sumer protection. All these efforts place more 
demands on supervisors, which introduces 
greater burden in smaller and lower-income 
economies where supervisory capacity is 
already constrained.
Breakdowns in incentives are a unify-
ing theme when discussing the roots of the 
crisis (see Calomiris 2011; Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Servén 2010; Levine 2010, 2011; Rajan 
2010). Misaligned incentives in the financial 
markets and in the regulatory and supervi-
sory framework were among the key factors 
contributing to the crisis. Incentive conflicts 
help explain how securitization went wrong, 
regulation has been built around the fol-
lowing market failures:4 (a) anticompetitive 
behavior, (b) market misconduct, (c) infor-
mation asymmetries, and (d) systemic insta-
bility. These failures can impair the capacity 
of financial markets to deliver efficient out-
comes and justify regulatory intervention if 
the benefits outweigh the costs. The first two 
market failures give rise to inefficiencies that 
need to be resolved through market regula-
tion, while the last two underpin the case for 
prudential regulation. Regulation aimed at 
curbing anticompetitive behavior is needed 
to foster an efficient allocation of resources 
and intermediation of funds. Market miscon-
duct regulation is needed to ensure that par-
ticipants act with integrity and that sufficient 
information is available to make informed 
decisions. Information asymmetries have tra-
ditionally served as the main justification for 
prudential regulation, but experiences in the 
financial crisis have raised the importance 
attributed to prudential regulation in pre-
venting systemic instability. 
States’ regulation and supervision (usually 
done via autonomous or semiautonomous 
agencies) can improve welfare by provid-
ing the monitoring functions that dispersed 
counterparts (in particular, depositors, 
shareholders, and bondholders) are unable 
or unwilling to perform (Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine 2006). For example, Dewatripont 
and Tirole (1994) develop a model of banks’ 
capital structure, showing how optimal 
regulation can be achieved using a combina-
tion of basic capital adequacy requirements 
with external intervention when those are 
violated, with elements of market discipline 
being an important complement (though not 
a substitute) to this regulation. Dewatripont 
and Tirole, as well as other authors, see the 
key challenge for regulation as providing 
the right incentives to managers of financial 
intermediaries. Regulation is seen as a “speed 
bump”—a term coined by Joseph Stiglitz—
mitigating managers’ incentives to gener-
ate profits by rapid growth. Politicians and 
regulators are often subject to intense pres-
sure from regulated firms to modify regula-
tions, resulting in suboptimal regulation and 
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and exit, healthy competition, and disclosure 
of quality information, combined with strong 
and timely supervisory action, are essential 
in getting this balance right. But by revealing 
limits of market and regulatory discipline, 
the crisis has led to a policy debate on the 
right approach to regulation and supervision. 
This ongoing debate continues to inform reg-
ulatory reforms. 
Some leSSonS FRom the 
Global Financial cRiSiS
The global financial crisis—which began 
in 2007 and intensified with the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008—pro-
vided a fundamental test of the international 
architecture, developed to safeguard the 
global financial system (Rajan 2010). Besides 
macroeconomic factors, the main contribut-
ing factors identified by scholars and policy 
makers include major regulatory and super-
visory failures, together with failures in other 
parts of the financial system, such as gover-
nance of private institutions, rating agencies, 
accounting practices, and transparency.6 
This section concentrates on the shortcom-
ings identified by the crisis in micropruden-
tial regulation and supervision and market 
discipline.
The chapter’s focus on shortcomings and 
areas for improvement does not mean that all 
precrisis regulation failed, or that all super-
visors performed uniformly badly. Supervi-
sion in many jurisdictions has actually per-
formed well. Within advanced economies, 
Australia, Canada, and Singapore have been 
mentioned among examples of countries 
that withstood the global crisis rather well, 
in part as a result of their prudent supervi-
sory approaches (Palmer and Cerrutti 2009). 
Also, many emerging markets and develop-
ing economies had limited exposure to the 
risky behaviors that precipitated the crisis, 
and most of these countries averted out-
right distress in the financial system partly 
because of their conservative prudential and 
supervisory practices. Malaysia and Peru are 
just two countries that have been praised for 
their prudential policies.7 Nonetheless, some 
why credit ratings proved inaccurate, and 
why the crisis cannot be blamed on mark-
to-market accounting or an unexpected loss 
of liquidity. Contradictory market, bureau-
cratic, and political incentives undermined 
financial regulation and supervision (Caprio, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Kane 2010). Insufficient 
incentives to enforce the existing rules (Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 2012a), combined with a 
lack of capacity, resulted in regulations that 
were not applied and supervisory powers that 
were not used in the years leading to the cri-
sis. Reducing the likelihood of future crises 
therefore requires addressing these incentive 
issues; along these lines the chapter discusses 
reform proposals that emphasize greater 
transparency and disclosure, importance of 
incentive compatibility in reforms, and sim-
ple regulation. 
Transparency and disclosure of good 
information, coupled with the right incen-
tives, help make market participants behave 
in ways consistent with the public interest. 
Complicated regulation is not desirable, since 
it is harder to implement and supervise, par-
ticularly in smaller and less developed econo-
mies with lower supervisory capacity. In most 
middle-income and nearly all low-income 
economies, basic regulations, combined with 
strong supervision and enforcement of trans-
parency, are a better approach. Market disci-
pline is not a panacea, but it is an important 
ingredient in the regulatory and supervisory 
mix. When regulation is ineffective, market 
discipline often breaks down, as illustrated in 
the recent crisis.
This chapter acknowledges the progress 
made by recent global regulatory reforms, 
which include measures to address moral 
hazard in too-big-to-fail institutions, abu-
sive compensation policies, undue activity 
with over-the-counter derivatives, and biased 
credit ratings. It also discusses reform pro-
posals that argue for taking these reforms 
further, as well as new approaches to regula-
tion and supervision.5
The challenge of financial sector regula-
tion is to align private incentives with the 
public interest without taxing or subsidizing 
private risk taking. Threats of market entry 
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management purposes. These risks were espe-
cially great in the case of large and intercon-
nected banks.8 Similarly, many of the credit 
ratings produced in the run-up to the crisis 
failed to properly reflect systemic risk, rais-
ing questions about the role for credit ratings 
in the regulatory framework. These examples 
underscore the broader point: supervising the 
safety and soundness of individual financial 
institutions, though very important, does not 
necessarily lead to a financial system that is 
robust and stable, thus demonstrating the 
importance of following the example of those 
supervisory bodies that have been tradition-
ally incorporating systemwide considerations 
in their supervisory evaluations.
The second weakness was that the pru-
dential approach suffered from regulatory 
“silos” along functional and national lines. 
The approach focused on the risks in individ-
ual institutions and in their legal form, with 
separate approaches for regulation and super-
vision of banks, insurance, and securities 
not complemented by strong oversight at the 
financial group level and systemic level. This 
approach allowed transactions to be chan-
neled through the entities that were subject to 
weaker regulation, and for transactions to be 
conducted in the gaps between the regulatory 
silos to avoid regulation altogether. The rapid 
growth of the shadow banking system was a 
case in point. The emergence of the shadow 
banking system in the United States needs 
to be seen against the background of differ-
ent regulatory approaches toward deposit- 
taking banks and other less-regulated seg-
ments of the financial system. By drawing 
a “line in the sand” and separating deposit-
taking banks from other entities (including 
investment banks), and by placing risky activ-
ities in separate legal entities such as special-
purpose vehicles, policy makers expected that 
the prudentially regulated segment—primar-
ily the deposit-taking banking sector—would 
be isolated from difficulties in the unregu-
lated segment of the financial system that 
was populated by well-informed professional 
investors. In addition to these functional 
silos, there are also national silos: whereas the 
regulated entities have become increasingly 
emerging market countries suffered direct 
impacts of the crisis, especially in Europe and 
Central Asia, which need to be seen against 
a background of a heavy reliance on par-
ent bank funding and a buildup of funding 
imbalances in the run-up to the crisis. 
Weaknesses in regulation 
and supervision
A major weakness in the precrisis approach 
to regulation and supervision was that it 
focused on risks to individual institutions and 
did not sufficiently take into account what a 
confluence of risks implies for the financial 
system as a whole (systemic risk). Thus the 
crisis raised questions about the effectiveness 
of narrowly focused microprudential policy 
in preventing systemic risk. Such approaches 
seek financial stability by focusing on the 
safety and soundness of individual financial 
institutions, with emphasis on institutions 
accepting retail deposits. Because questions 
have been raised on whether this amounts 
to financial stability, many supervisory bod-
ies, in their risk evaluations, take into con-
sideration systemwide developments to assess 
their potential repercussions for individual 
institutions and for the whole system. 
If an institution or market fails, the impact 
on the financial system and economy can 
exceed the losses sustained by individual 
institutions or markets. A microprudential 
approach that sets regulations and conducts 
supervision to limit the risk in an individual 
institution does not necessarily limit the risk 
to the financial system. For example, the 
push for Basel II implementation led in some 
jurisdictions to increased emphasis on banks’ 
internal models and on credit rating agencies 
to evaluate risk. But the implementation of 
banks’ internal models focused on the risks in 
the banks’ own balance sheets (private risks), 
and did not adequately take into account the 
risks posed by individual banks to the finan-
cial system as a whole (systemic risk, or pub-
lic risk). In addition to this regulatory issue, 
many financial institutions also suffered from 
poor risk management surrounding the mod-
els that they used for their own internal risk 
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adequately capture lending concentration, 
excessive maturity transformation, and—
especially in small, open developing econo-
mies—the indirect credit risk associated with 
foreign exchange exposures of unhedged bor-
rowers. Moreover, the rules encouraged risk 
transfers to entities that were legally separate 
but not separately capitalized. When market 
sentiment with regard to complex, structured 
products started to deteriorate, parent banks 
felt compelled for reputational reasons to 
shoulder the losses in those entities.10 Risk 
was also transferred in nontransparent ways 
owing to the rapidly increasing trade in com-
plex, structured financial products, which 
often underwent successive repackaging and 
sale. Because of these layers of opacity, the 
global, financial regulation is national, and 
cross-border regulatory cooperation—despite 
some progress—still faces serious incentive 
problems and broke down in the face of crisis 
pressures (box 2.1).
Third, some microprudential regulations 
were poorly designed, contributing to sys-
temic risk. The Basel capital adequacy mea-
sures considerably misrepresented the sol-
vency of banks. There were various reasons 
for this, including the use of risk weights that 
underestimated the riskiness of assets such 
as mortgages and sovereign debts, the differ-
ent treatment under the Basel rules of assets 
held in banking books and those in trading 
books, and the definition of capital.9 The 
regulatory framework has also struggled to 
BOX 2.1 Distorted incentives: Subprime Crisis and Cross-Border Supervision
Distorted incentives at various levels were a main 
cause of the financial crisis. For example, the poli-
cies to promote home ownership in the United 
States created perverse incentives within official and 
quasi-official agencies, contributing to the buildup 
of exposures in subprime mortgages, and to for-
bearance in regulation and supervisory oversight 
(Calomiris 2011; Wallison and Calomiris 2009). 
Regulation also played a role in distorting incen-
tives for rating organizations to conduct appropriate 
due diligence. Other issues included moral hazard 
associated with too-big-to-fail policies (Ötker-Robe 
and others 2011), adverse selection associated with 
the rules for assessing the creditworthiness of bor-
rowers, and the principle or agent problems within 
financial institutions, related to the nature of own-
ership and the structure of executive compensa-
tion that favored risk taking and higher short-term 
returns to the longer-term detriment of shareholders. 
Levine (2010) finds that the design, implementa-
tion, and maintenance of financial policies in 1996–
2006 were primary causes of the financial system’s 
demise. He rejects the view that the collapse was 
only due to the popping of the housing bubble and 
the herding behavior of financiers selling increas-
ingly complex and questionable financial products. 
Rather, the evidence indicates that regulatory agen-
cies were aware of the growing fragility of the finan-
cial system associated with their policies during the 
decade before the crisis, yet they chose (under pres-
sure from the industry and politicians) not to modify 
those policies. 
Distorted incentives have also played an impor-
tant role in regulation and supervision of financial 
institutions across several jurisdictions. Supervisory 
memorandums of understanding and supervisory 
colleges have been used to strengthen cross-border 
supervision. And some of the colleges have been 
useful in good times. But in times of crisis, cross-
border cooperation almost always breaks down, as 
during the Fortis failure in 2008. This and many 
other examples confirm that the supervisory task 
sharing anchored in the Basel Concordat of 1983 is 
not crisis-proof, reflecting misalignments in underly-
ing incentives (D’Hulster 2011). Without an agreed 
resolution and burden-sharing mechanism and with 
deteriorating health of the bank, incentive conflicts 
escalate and supervisory cooperation breaks down. 
Thus, good practices for cooperation among super-
visors are insufficient to address the incentive con-
flicts. D’Hulster (2011) calls for rigorous analysis 
and review of the supervisory task sharing, so that 
the right incentives are secured during all stages of 
supervision
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climate dampened incentives for analysts of 
financial stability to dig deeper and ques-
tion the adequacy of the information and 
the underlying benign assumptions on which 
their analysis was based. The crisis also 
revealed severe shortcomings in resolution 
frameworks, especially for large financial 
institutions active in multiple jurisdictions.
Capacity constraints in regulation 
and supervision
In many developing economies and emerg-
ing markets, weak supervisory capacity and 
a lack of regulatory independence are at 
least as important as gaps in the regulatory 
framework in explaining fragility. Nearly all 
assessments of developing economies under 
the Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP) find capacity constraints in regulation 
and supervision. In many of these economies, 
licensing and closure decisions are still vested 
with ministries of finance rather than bank 
regulators, which gives rise to a risk of politi-
cal interference in these critical decisions, as 
well as delays in early intervention in the case 
of fragile and weak banks. In many countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, supervi-
sory resources are limited, including qualified 
staff and the availability of analytical tools 
and skills. Supervisory processes focus on 
compliance with regulatory standards but are 
not set up to identify and manage the chang-
ing risks in banking systems. In addition, the 
ability to monitor risk at the institutional and 
systemic level is hampered by insufficient 
quality in data and reporting processes. 
The West African Economic and Mon-
etary Union Banking Commission, for exam-
ple, lacks sufficient power to enforce correc-
tive measures in cases of noncompliance with 
regulations, a situation that has only recently 
begun to be addressed by political authorities 
(Beck and others 2011). Ill-suited regulations, 
such as on preapproval of loan applications, 
are often ignored, undermining supervisory 
discipline. To ensure certainty and supervi-
sory discipline, such outdated regulations 
should be dropped and the focus shifted to 
enforcing meaningful ones. Suggestions to 
extent to which individual financial insti-
tutions were exposed to these toxic assets 
became increasingly nontransparent. So 
though individual banks’ regulatory capital 
positions appeared sound, some were not, 
and the capital adequacy of the financial sys-
tem was weakened, increasing systemic risk. 
Fourth, implementation of the rules was 
constrained by the capacity and incentives 
of regulators and supervisors. Supervisory 
resources became stressed as financial insti-
tutions, instruments, and regulation grew 
more complex. Information on exposure and 
risk became harder to compile as financial 
groups became more complex and intercon-
nected, with operations both locally and 
overseas, and spanned many business lines. 
The regulators also faced conflicts of interest, 
with some mandated to promote financial 
system development as well as supervise it.11 
Some regulators lacked independence, and 
even supervisors that were legally indepen-
dent found it difficult to withstand pressures 
from the industry.12 The “revolving door” 
moving staff between supervisory authorities 
and the financial industry—though hard to 
avoid completely because having an industry 
background and familiarity with financial 
instruments helps in understanding risks—
resulted in perceptions of conflicts of interest 
for some supervisors (Kane 2007). It has also 
been suggested that supervisors exercised 
regulatory forbearance on the treatment of 
subprime mortgages because of political con-
siderations. Across borders, misalignments in 
incentives between home and host supervi-
sors impede cross-border sharing of supervi-
sory information (box 2.1). 
Finally, shortcomings in crisis manage-
ment and surveillance compounded several of 
the problems identified above. In particular, 
information gaps and asymmetries limited 
the capacity of financial stability assessors to 
monitor exposures, risk transfers, and threats 
to systemic stability. It was difficult to know 
how the failure of one institution would 
affect others. Systemically important seg-
ments of the financial system were not cov-
ered by surveillance and crisis management 
arrangements. The political and economic 
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economy poses significant risks if steps are 
taken too fast or not sequenced appropriately, 
given “considerable capacity constraints for 
qualified personnel in financial institutions 
and in financial sector supervision.” (For 
additional examples, see table 2.1.)
These deficiencies weigh increasingly in 
a globalized world that is moving toward 
more complex regulations. The survey results 
show that a move toward Basel II and Basel 
III and the increased complexity of postcrisis 
regulations are adding pressures on resource 
requirements. In line with these observations, 
improve supervisory capacity are among the 
most common recommendations in FSAPs. 
For example, the 2011 FSAP assessment on 
El Salvador noted that, despite an ambitious 
project to move toward risk-based supervi-
sion, “it is essential to further upgrade super-
visory capacity, both in quantitative and in 
qualitative terms” and that “the existing 
regulatory framework has significant gaps.” 
In another recent example, the 2011 FSAP 
assessment on Rwanda warns that the ambi-
tious agenda to improve access to finance 
and provide more long-term financing to the 
TABLe 2.1 examples of Weak Supervisory Capacity identified in the FSAP
Bangladesh FSA 2010 “Although the government has improved the prudential regulatory and supervisory framework for banks, 
further improvement would be needed to bring the system up to international standards. Loan classifica-
tion, provisioning, rescheduling, and even capital in banks appears uneven and needs strengthening to be 
brought to international standards.”
Barbados FSA 2009 “To assure continued financial stability and competitiveness, important regulatory and remaining super-
visory weaknesses in the financial system also should be addressed. The prudential oversight of the 
banking sector could be strengthened by enhancing supervisory capabilities, accelerating the transition to 
risk-based banking supervision, tightening supervision of large exposures and exposures to related par-
ties, improving the criteria for asset classification and provisioning, improving consolidated supervision for 
banking groups and regional financial conglomerates, and establishing more active home-host supervisory 
cooperation arrangements.”
Burundi FSA 2009 “The supervisory approach adopted by the [central bank] BRB is still largely based on monitoring 
compliance with laws and regulations, despite the fact that the international trend favors the risk-based 
approach. The level of supervision could also be stepped up by developing closer surveillance methods so 
as to have greater visibility with respect to the major risk areas and fragilities of each establishment.”
Haiti FSSA 2008 “Supervisory procedures appear largely adequate, but the capacity of the supervisory function should be 
improved. Its operational autonomy can be strengthened in the context of greater central bank indepen-
dence. The current staffing of the DBS seems insufficient, and its budget needs to be increased in a 
sustained manner, while supervisory staff skills should be upgraded through training focused on banking 
and risk management.”
Lithuania FSA 2008 “Resolving these issues requires an urgent review of supervisory arrangements for Lithuanian financial 
markets. Future supervisory arrangements should be designed with the objectives to (i) strengthen  
capacity to supervise the interactions of banks with their related entities; . . .”
Mozambique FSA 
2009
“(ii) increase capacity of BM’s supervisory staff, especially in the areas of  
on-site inspections and risk management”
Papua New Guinea  
FSSA 2011
“Enhance the capacity of the supervisory staff through training, so that the BPNG can move to full 
risk-based supervision. The BPNG should assert itself more rigorously to ensure full compliance with 
the supervisory regime. It is good to seek consensus but less desirable to leave necessary prudential 
statements in draft for over five years (as has happened with the revised large exposures prudential 
standard). With new tools and the complete suite of regulations recommended above, the BPNG will be 
in a position to ensure good risk management practices are followed and move to risk-based supervision. 
It will need further assistance to build capacity to achieve this, so that its committed and professional 
staff can work in partnership with financial businesses to focus on identifying and managing the key risks 
in the sector.”
Source: world bank fsap website (http://worldbank.org/fsap).
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but also some emerging markets) relied on 
market discipline to safeguard financial 
soundness and stability. Market discipline 
requires that markets objectively assess the 
risks and value of financial instruments 
and financial institutions, and price them 
accordingly.
The crisis has made it clear that such 
objective market valuation does not always 
occur. For example, in the first half of 2007, 
the stock market valuation of Irish banks 
was at or close to their long-term maximum. 
Also, spreads between Greek debt and Ger-
man bund were very small for years, as were 
the spreads of other euro area countries, 
not providing much indication of what was 
to take place. Similarly, credit default swap 
spreads for southern European countries 
were negligible for many years compared 
to their peers in Northern Europe, which 
allowed some countries to go on a lending 
binge for many years. It was only through 
the economic slowdown during the crisis and 
escalation of events in Greece that market 
perceptions started to change substantially 
and credit default swap spreads on govern-
ment paper shot up (and became more closely 
correlated with bank risk measures).
These observations are reminders of the 
tendency of economic agents and the finan-
cial system to be overly tolerant of risk in 
credit cycle upswings and excessively risk 
averse in downswings. Put differently, the 
failure of market discipline needs to be seen 
against the collective tendency of financial 
markets to underestimate risks in boom times 
and overestimate it in times of bust. 
Still, the failures of market discipline in 
the run-up to and during the crisis do not 
mean that financial markets did not pro-
vide useful signals. As shown for example 
by Haldane (2011), equity markets were dif-
ferentiating between banks in trouble and 
those that were not several years before the 
financial crisis, when intervention could 
have vastly reduced the subsequent costs. 
Papers that examined previous crises find 
similar relationships. Markets can provide 
useful signals, but the real question is, when 
do they provide such signals? And how can 
a recent joint report by FSB, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank 
(2011), endorsed by G-20 leaders in the 
Cannes Summit, calls for countries that have 
less internationally integrated financial sys-
tems or substantial constraints in supervisory 
capacity to focus on reforms to ensure compli-
ance with the more basic principles of sound 
regulation before considering a move to the 
Basel II and Basel III standards. The same 
report also calls for further development of 
supervisory capacity in developing economies 
through targeted and well-coordinated tech-
nical assistance and other capacity-building 
activities. These efforts need to be part of a 
broader, sustainable strategy to overcome 
capacity constraints in regulation and super-
vision in developing economies. 
Strengthening of supervisory capacity 
and improvements in regulations are areas 
where donors can provide help. One of the 
tools in this regard is the Financial Sector 
Reform and Strengthening (FIRST) Initia-
tive, a multi donor grant facility managed by 
the World Bank. Strengthening supervisory 
capacity and improving regulations account 
for more than a half of FIRST’s recent proj-
ects. Individual donors have also provided 
support directly to various projects aimed at 
strengthening capacity in regulatory agencies. 
For example, the State Secretariat for Eco-
nomic Affairs (SECO) in Switzerland has an 
extensive program of banking sector training 
in Vietnam, which includes practical train-
ing for the regulatory body, complemented 
by a train-the-trainer project for Vietnam’s 
two largest universities, management train-
ing for bank managers, and technical assis-
tance in modernizing the central bank and its 
strategy to develop the banking sector. (For 
information on SECO’s programs in the area 
of capacity building, see the relevant back-
ground materials at http://www.worldbank 
.org/financialdevelopment.) 
Weaknesses in market discipline 
and the role of incentives
Before the crisis, financial systems in many 
jurisdictions (especially advanced economies, 
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ample evidence that large financial institu-
tions enjoyed an implicit market subsidy 
prior to the crisis, consistent with the moral 
hazard associated with too-big-to-fail poli-
cies (Goldstein and Véron 2011; Ötker-Robe 
and others 2011). They could take on more 
risk and expand their balance sheets rapidly 
to boost short-term profits without having 
to increase their capital. Indeed, one long-
known problem that came to the fore dur-
ing the crisis was the too-big-to-fail problem 
(Rajan 2010), in which institutions that are 
too large or too interconnected to be allowed 
to fail are given more favorable treatment 
during crises. This condition severely dis-
torts their risk-taking incentives during nor-
mal times by undermining market discipline 
to be exercised by their unsecured debtors 
and transaction counterparts. The implicit 
assumption is that given the prohibitive 
consequences of failure of these large and 
highly interconnected financial institutions, 
policy makers will do whatever it takes to 
prevent these institutions from collapsing. 
This expectation translates into a fund-
ing advantage and skews incentives toward 
leveraging and risk taking.14 The problems 
associated with the too-big-to-fail condition 
are often exacerbated by shortcomings in the 
resolution framework for failing financial 
institutions, especially when they operate 
across borders. In most cases, these weak-
nesses originate in insolvency frameworks 
that do not distinguish between financial 
companies—especially banks—and nonfi-
nancial corporations. Part of the answer is to 
strengthen bank resolution frameworks and 
to put greater emphasis on resolvability in 
the context of ongoing supervision, also by 
demanding that banks establish their resolu-
tion plans (also called living wills).15
Executive compensation is one aspect of 
these inadequate governance structures that 
attracted close attention during the crisis. 
Before the crisis, compensation was gener-
ally a no-go area for supervisors. Supervisors 
rarely had adequate powers to address issues 
related to risk and compensation structures. 
The collapse of banks with executives who 
were allegedly paid for performance clearly 
these signals be caught by market agents and 
supervisors?
The idea of market discipline rests on 
the notion that, given the right incentives 
and information, rational market par-
ticipants would penalize institutions that 
take on excessive risk. The Basel II capital 
framework sought to expand the role of 
market discipline in the regulatory frame-
work. Rating agencies were given a role in 
the evaluation of the risks in the portfolio 
under so-called Pillar I (Minimum Capi-
tal Requirements), and an explicit role for 
market discipline was introduced under 
so-called Pillar III (Market Discipline). 
Reliance on markets to safeguard financial 
stability was also evident well beyond the 
Basel rules. It was reflected, for example, in 
the limited attention by officials to the risks 
posed by unregulated entities in the shadow 
banking system or to the lack of informa-
tion on risk transfers.13 The assumption was 
that the regulated financial institutions have 
incentives to be prudent in managing expo-
sures to their counterparties. 
But market discipline in the run-up to the 
crisis did not work well—mainly because 
incentives of market players were distorted 
and they did not have access to the needed 
information. Many institutions and instru-
ments were allowed to grow highly com-
plex and nontransparent. Information on 
interconnections and exposures of finan-
cial institutions was lacking. The increasing 
use of over-the-counter financial derivatives 
enabled financial institutions to transfer or 
to take on risk in nontransparent ways, rap-
idly and without the necessary capital for 
ultimate risk-taking institutions to be able to 
withstand losses when they became appar-
ent. In many cases, assessment of the entities 
and instruments was outsourced to special-
ized institutions, such as rating agencies and 
auditing firms, while the incentives of these 
agencies to conduct due diligence were often 
compromised by conflicts of interest. As a 
result, effective market discipline could not 
function. 
The lack of effective market discipline 
also resulted from moral hazard. There is 
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study by Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) find that 
commercial banks with a strong commitment 
to risk management—as proxied by the ratio 
of the compensation of the chief risk officer 
relative to the compensation received by the 
chief executive officer—fared much better 
during the subprime crisis than those with 
weaker commitments to risk management. 
Although risk managers, acting in the inter-
est of their stockholders, are the first line of 
defense against imprudent investing, pruden-
tial regulation and supervision are the second 
line of defense.17
ReGUlation anD SUpeRviSion 
in cRiSiS veRSUS noncRiSiS 
coUntRieS
How do regulatory and supervisory practices 
in countries at the epicenter of the global 
financial crisis differ from the rest of the 
world? What can one learn from those dif-
ferences? And how have the actual national 
regulatory and supervisory practices changed 
in recent years as a result of Basel II and 
other initiatives and in response to the global 
financial crisis and its aftermath? To answer 
these questions, this section provides a status 
update and analysis of the regulatory and 
supervisory practices around the world. The 
section relies on the recently updated data 
from the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey (see box 2.2 for an intro-
duction to the survey; all the country-level 
data are publicly available at http://www 
.worldbank.org/financialdevelopment). 
To examine the regulatory and super- 
visory differences between crisis and noncri-
sis countries, this section and the paper by 
Čihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, Martínez Pería, and 
Mohseni (2012) compare country officials’ 
inputs from the World Bank’s Bank Regula-
tion and Supervision Survey and juxtapose 
them with the countries’ experience during 
the crisis. Specifically, to distinguish crisis 
and noncrisis countries, this chapter uses an 
existing and often-used database of bank-
ing sector crises, last updated in Laeven and 
Valencia (2012). Laeven and Valencia use a 
set of well-defined criteria to assess the 143 
raised many questions about the link between 
executive pay and risk taking. Philippon and 
Reshef (2009) show that, whereas in 1980 
bankers made no more than their counter-
parts in other parts of the economy, by 2000 
wages for employees in the financial sector 
were 40 percent higher than for those with 
the same formal qualifications in other sec-
tors. The last time such a discrepancy was 
observed was just prior to the Great Depres-
sion—an irony that has not been lost on crit-
ics of bank compensation, who range from 
regulators to the Occupy Wall Street protest-
ers. But the level of compensation alone may 
not be the real problem. Leading economists, 
such as Alan Blinder and Raghuram Rajan, 
have emphasized that a much more important 
(and difficult) question to answer is how the 
structure of performance pay may encourage 
excessive risk taking at all levels of the insti-
tution, from traders and underwriters right 
up to the firm’s chief executive officer and the 
board of directors.
But how exactly the structure of executive 
pay affects risk taking is still a topic of heated 
debate. Some have argued—even before the 
crisis—that executive compensation at banks 
must have several features to discourage 
short-term and excessive risk taking: pay-
ing bankers with equity or stock options, for 
instance, should ensure that if the firm’s mar-
ket value gets wiped out, the same fate awaits 
the paycheck of its senior management. But 
matters may be more complex. Incentive 
schemes may unduly emphasize immediate 
revenue generation over a prudent long-term 
assessment of credit risk (as was likely the case 
in mortgage lending); and bonuses awarded 
to managers today may entail risks for the 
institution that do not become apparent until 
much later. Both aspects of bank compensa-
tion have become the focus of increased regu-
lation intended to discourage bank executives 
from excessive risk taking. But policy mak-
ers’ understanding of how incentives at banks 
translated into actual risk-taking behavior is 
still limited, and regulators struggle to come 
up with rules that can rein in reckless risk 
taking without extinguishing banks’ abil-
ity to reward actual performance.16 A recent 
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BOX 2.2 What is in the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey?
An important input into this chapter was the update 
of the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervi-
sion Survey. The survey is a unique dataset of bank 
regulation and supervision around the world. In the 
early 2000s, the World Bank created a database of 
bank regulation and supervision around the globe 
(Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2001). The second, 
updated iteration of the database was issued in 2003, 
and the third version was issued in 2007. The survey 
has been widely used in research and policy work. 
The current round of the survey provides compre-
hensive information on the state of regulation and 
supervision around the world as of 2011. It is the 
first comprehensive look at regulation since 2007. 
Some of the questions have been kept unchanged 
from the 2007 survey, for reasons of comparability. 
Other questions have been reformulated to result in 
more precise answers. Several questions were added, 
in particular on consumer protection and macro-
prudential regulation. The survey involved a major 
effort to ensure the consistency of responses across 
countries. Its design involved expertise of both 
supervisors and researchers, and detailed guidelines 
were drafted by a senior banking regulator to make 
the questions more specific and clearer. 
Data for 143 jurisdictions (see map B2.2.1) for 
2010–11 allow comparisons across countries and 
with the previous three rounds. The survey consists 
of information from over 730 questions and sub-
questions in 14 sections. About half of the questions 
are the same as in the previous three survey rounds 
(for reasons of comparability), and about half are 
new (mostly on macroprudential issues, consumer 
protection, and Basel II implementation). 
The survey contains questions in the following 
14 sections: 1. Entry into banking; 2. Ownership; 
3. Capital; 4. Activities; 5. External auditing 
requirements; 6. Bank governance; 7. Liquidity and 
diversification requirements; 8. Depositor (savings) 
protection schemes; 9. Asset classification, provi-
sioning, and write-offs; 10. Accounting/information 
dis closure; 11. Discipline/problem institution exit; 
12. Supervision; 13. Banking sector characteristics; 
14. Consumer protection.
MAP B2.2.1 Coverage of the 2011 Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey
Source: world bank.
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•  The crisis countries allowed for less strin-
gent definitions of capital and had lower 
actual tier 1 capital. Whereas 80 percent 
of crisis countries allowed tier 3 in regula-
tory capital and 100 percent allowed tier 
2, only some 28 percent among noncrisis 
countries allowed tier 3 and 85 percent 
allowed tier 2. 
•  The median level of tier 1 capital to assets 
was 13 percent for noncrisis countries in 
2008, compared to 10 percent among cri-
sis countries.
•  The share of crisis countries that allow 
banks to calculate their capital require-
countries covered by the World Bank’s Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Survey. Of those, 
they identify 16 countries—mostly advanced 
economies, but also some EMDEs—that 
experienced a systemic banking crisis 
between 2007 and 2011 and 7 countries that 
experienced a borderline systemic crisis in the 
same period (see table 2.2 for a list). All the 
other countries in the database are treated as 
noncrisis countries. 
When one uses the data from the survey to 
compare regulation and supervision in crisis 
countries to the rest of the world (table 2.2), 
the following differences stand out:18
TABLe 2.2 Differences between Crisis and Noncrisis Countries
(percent, unless indicated otherwise)
Noncrisis Crisis Difference
Question (Yes/No) % Yes % Yes P-valuea
Is tier 2 allowed in regulatory capital? 85.3 100.0 0.07
Is tier 3 allowed in regulatory capital? 27.5 80.0 0.00
Was advanced internal ratings-based approach offered to banks in calculating capital 
 requirements for credit risk?
44.7 94.7 0.00
Are there minimum levels of specific provisions for loans and advances that are set 
 by the regulator?
78.8 30.0 0.00
Can the supervisory agency require commitment/action from controlling 
 shareholder(s) to support the bank with new equity?
83.2 65.0 0.06
Are asset/risk diversification requirements employed to oversee more closely and/or 
 limit the activities of large/interconnected institutions?
39.1 13.3 0.07
Is there a regulatory requirement for general provisions on loans and advances? 69.9 25.0 0.00
Do you have an asset classification system under which banks have to report the 
 quality of their loans and advances using a common regulatory scale?
89.3 65.0 0.00
Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the bank’s income statement 
 while the loan is classified as nonperforming?
23.9 50.0 0.02
Is there a regulatory limit on related party exposures? 97.3 84.2 0.01
Are external auditors subject to independent oversight by banking supervisory 
 agency?
25.9 9.5 0.10
In cases where the supervisor identifies that the bank has received an inadequate 
 audit, does the supervisor have the powers to take actions against the bank?
93.6 75.0 0.01
Question (Quantitative) Median Median P-valueb 
Risk-based capital ratio of banking system (end of 2008) 14.9 12.8 < .01
Risk-based capital ratio of banking system (end of 2009) 16.5 14.6 < .01
Risk-based capital ratio of banking system (end of 2010) 16.5 15.9 < .05
Tier 1 capital ratio of banking system (end of 2008) 12.9 9.8 < .01
Tier 1 capital ratio of banking system (end of 2009) 14.0 11.6 < .01
Tier 1 capital ratio of banking system (end of 2010) 14.6 12.0 < .01
Source: world bank’s bank Regulation and supervision survey (database), 2011 data. see also www.worldbank.org/financialdevelopment.
Note: the following countries included in the bank Regulation and supervision survey had a systemic banking crisis between 2007 and 2011 according to laeven and valencia 
(2012): austria, belgium, denmark, germany, greece, iceland, ireland, kazakhstan, latvia, luxembourg, netherlands, nigeria, spain, ukraine, united kingdom, and united states. 
the following countries had borderline systemic crises: france, Hungary, italy, portugal, the Russian federation, slovenia, and switzerland.
a. for questions with yes or/no responses, student’s t-test was used to test for the equality of the means (percentage of “yes” responses) between crisis and noncrisis.
b. for quantitative questions, stata’s cendif utility was used to test for the equality of the medians between crisis and noncrisis. see newson (2002) for more on this utility.
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efforts to coordinate and monitor progress in 
strengthening financial regulation.20 
The expansion of the Financial Stability 
Forum and its reestablishment as the FSB, 
with a broader mandate in the area of finan-
cial stability and the coordination of the 
global financial sector reform, is the most 
important development in the international 
architecture of financial regulation in recent 
years. 
As part of the regulatory reform package 
coordinated by the FSB, the Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) intro-
duced a new global regulatory framework 
for bank capital adequacy and liquidity. 
This new framework, called Basel III, aims 
to strengthen bank capital requirements and 
introduces new regulatory requirements on 
bank liquidity, while limiting bank leverage. 
This proposal (summarized in table 2.3) con-
tains many useful steps that help to address 
the problems highlighted by the crisis. For 
example, the elimination of tier 3 and most 
of tier 2 capital and other measures should 
help in raising the quality of banks’ capital, 
while the significantly more stringent regula-
tory treatment of securitizations would result 
in more capital to be held against the credit 
risk of these positions. 
In addition to the steps taken by the Basel 
Committee, the FSB has come up with a 
broad range of proposals that, in some cases, 
are meant to address certain failures in mar-
ket discipline that became strikingly apparent 
during the crisis. In particular, the FSB has 
specifically addressed issues relating to com-
pensation practices, credit rating agencies, 
filling of information gaps, and methods to 
deal with the too-big-to-fail issue. 
As regards compensation practices, com-
pensation at significant financial institu-
tions was recognized by FSB as one factor 
among many that contributed to the finan-
cial crisis that began in 2007. A part of the 
official response was the issuance of FSB’s 
Principles for Sound Compensation Practices 
(FSB 2009b) and the related Implementation 
Standards (FSB 2009c). The stated aim of 
these principles and standards is to enhance 
the stability and robustness of the financial 
ment for credit risk based on the banks’ 
internal ratings models is 95 percent, 
about twice as a large as in the rest of the 
world (45 percent). 
•  Regulators and supervisors in crisis coun-
tries were less able to require bank share-
holders to support the bank with new 
equity. Although the regulator had this 
power in 83 percent of noncrisis countries, 
this was true in only 65 percent of crisis 
countries.
•  Although almost 70 percent of noncrisis 
countries had a regulatory requirement for 
general provisions on loans and advances, 
only 25 percent of crisis countries had such 
provisions in place. Close to 90 percent 
of noncrisis countries had an asset clas-
sification system under which banks had 
to report the quality of their loans using 
a common regulatory scale, while 65 per-
cent of crisis countries had such systems 
in place. Half of crisis countries allowed 
accrued though unpaid interest and prin-
cipal to enter the bank income statement 
when loans are nonperforming, but only 
24 percent of noncrisis countries allowed 
this.
•  Crisis countries have relatively less strict 
limited party exposure limits and audit 
procedures. 
•  Finally, crisis countries also had less scope 
for market discipline, in terms both of pro-
viding incentives to monitor and of ensur-
ing quality of information to enable accu-
rate monitoring; for example, they had 
more generous deposit insurance coverage 
and lower quality of financial information 
made publicly available.
Global ReGUlatoRy 
ReFoRmS19
In response to the deficiencies in financial 
regulation revealed by the global financial 
crisis, leaders of the world’s major econo-
mies designated the G-20 to be the premier 
forum for international economic coopera-
tion. They also established the FSB to include 
major emerging economies and welcomed its 
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stability–threatening herding effects that cur-
rently arise from credit rating thresholds being 
hardwired into laws, regulations, and market 
practices, the FSB has drawn up principles 
to reduce reliance on credit ratings in stan-
dards, laws, and regulations (FSB 2010b). The 
system. They are not to be used as a pretext 
to prevent or impede market entry or market 
access.
The reform of credit rating agen-
cies is another important part of the FSB 
agenda. In an effort to reduce the financial 
TABLe 2.3 Summary of the Basel iii Framework
Proposed changes Specific steps
Raising quality, consistency, and 
transparency of the capital base 
The predominant form of tier 1 capital must be common shares and retained 
earnings.
Tier 2 capital instruments will be harmonized. 
Tier 3 capital will be eliminated.
Strengthening risk coverage of the 
capital framework 
Promote more integrated management of market and counterparty credit risk. 
Add the credit valuation adjustment risk due to deterioration in counterparty’s credit 
rating.
Strengthen the capital requirements for counterparty credit exposures arising from 
banks’ derivatives, repo and securities financing transactions. 
Raise the capital buffers backing these exposures. 
Reduce procyclicality. 
Provide additional incentives to move over-the-counter derivative contracts to central 
counterparties. 
Provide incentives to strengthen the risk management of counterparty credit 
exposures. 
Raise counterparty credit risk management standards by including wrong-way risk.
Introducing a leverage ratio as a 
supplementary measure to the Basel II 
risk-based framework
The committee therefore is introducing a leverage ratio requirement that is intended 
to put a floor under the buildup of leverage in the banking sector.
Introduce additional safeguards against model risk and measurement error by 
supplementing the risk-based measure with a simpler measure that is based on 
gross exposures.
Reducing procyclicality and promoting 
countercyclical buffers
Dampen any excess cyclicality of the minimum capital requirement. 
Promote more forward-looking provisions. 
Conserve capital to build buffers at individual banks and the banking sector that can 
be used in stress.
Protecting the banking sector from 
periods of excess credit growth.
Requirement to use long-term data horizons to estimate probabilities of default.
Downturn loss-given-default estimates, recommended in Basel II, to become 
mandatory. 
Improved calibration of the risk functions, which convert loss estimates into 
regulatory capital requirements. 
Banks must conduct stress tests that include widening credit spreads in 
recessionary scenarios.
Promoting stronger provisioning practices 
(forward looking provisioning)
Advocate a change in the accounting standards toward an expected loss approach.
Introducing a global minimum liquidity 
standard for internationally active banks
A 30-day liquidity coverage ratio requirement underpinned by a longer-term structural 
liquidity ratio called the net stable funding ratio.
Source: based on basel committee on banking supervision 2011a.
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risk assessment practices instead. They set out 
broad objectives for standard setters and reg-
ulators to follow by defining the more specific 
actions that will be needed to implement the 
principles aim to trigger a significant change 
in existing practices that would end mechanis-
tic reliance by market participants on credit 
ratings and establish stronger internal credit 
BOX 2.3 Reforming Credit Rating Agencies
Credit rating agencies have not met the expectations 
placed on them by investors and policy makers. For 
example, empirical evidence suggests that ratings 
have often been lagging indicators that show at best 
only information already known by the market (see, 
for example, Afonso, Furceri, and Gomes 2011; 
Arezki, Candelon, and Sy 2011).
Much of the postcrisis debate on credit rating 
agencies has revolved around conflicting interests 
because of the commingling of rating and advisory 
services. The issue is that many larger credit rating 
agencies offer “credit rating advisory services” that 
essentially advise an issuer on how to structure its 
bond offerings and “special purpose entities” so as 
to achieve a given credit rating for a certain debt 
tranche. This creates potential conflicts of interest, 
of course, because credit rating agencies may feel 
obligated to provide issuers with those ratings if issu-
ers followed their advice on structuring the offering. 
Some credit rating agencies avoid this conflict by 
refusing to rate debt offerings for which its advisory 
services were sought. This was an important reason 
why many of the risky, complex structured financial 
products had very favorable ratings.
Credit rating agencies derive some of their impor-
tance from the fact that the regulatory system relies 
on their assessments. This reliance is observed in 
bank regulation, which in some circumstances sets 
banks’ capital requirements in relation to asset risks 
as assessed by the rating agencies. Similar regula-
tions exist for insurance and other financial market 
participants. Following failures of ratings in the U.S. 
subprime mortgage-based securities market, work 
has been undertaken to reduce regulatory reliance 
on credit ratings. However, this is proving difficult at 
times, not least because it complicates the adoption of 
global supervisory standards that do refer to ratings. 
At the global level, a review of this issue by the Finan-
cial Stability Board has concluded that it may take a 
number of years for market participants to develop 
enhanced risk management capability to enable 
reduced reliance on credit rating agencies (FSB 2010b).
Though references to risk ratings in regulations 
are undesirable, the alternatives have drawbacks. 
In particular, bank models of risk assessment have 
proved even less reliable than credit ratings, includ-
ing in the largest banks where risk management 
was widely believed to be most advanced (see, for 
instance, UBS 2008). Replacing references to rat-
ings with references to market-based risk indicators 
could sharply increase procyclicality because such 
indicators are typically much more volatile than 
credit ratings. As a result, it is to be expected that 
ratings will be complemented with other measures 
of risk. But eliminating references to credit ratings in 
regulations is impractical and undesirable given the 
lack of proper alternatives. Moreover, contemplating 
such steps given the current period of market stress 
could increase short-term volatility.
Véron and Wolff (2012) argue that the role of 
credit ratings in regulation should be reduced—but 
that eliminating it entirely would have important 
downsides, at least in the short term. Transferring 
the responsibility for ratings to public authorities is 
unlikely to be a good alternative because of inherent 
conflicts of interest. Goodhart (2008) and Caprio, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Kane (2010) suggest that credit 
rating agencies need to bond the quality of their 
work by subjecting it to effective independent review 
and setting aside some of their fees in a fund from 
which third-party special masters of expedited civil 
judgments could indemnify investors for provable 
harm.
Reform of credit rating agencies is not just 
an issue for advanced economies. Many EMDEs 
have adopted or have been adopting regulatory 
frameworks that are similar to those of the ad-
vanced economies, including the reliance on credit 
ratings. For illustration, data from the 2011 Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Survey show that 17 
percent of EMDE regulators require their commer-
cial banks to have external credit ratings; the com-
parable number for advanced economy regulators is 
8 percent.
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gation capabilities, risk governance, and 
internal controls
The FSB, in coordination with the Basel 
Committee, has come up with a list of 29 
banks considered global SIFIs. These banks 
will need to meet the resolution planning 
requirements by the end of 2012. National 
authorities may decide to extend these 
requirements to other institutions in their 
jurisdictions. The group of global SIFIs will 
be updated annually and published by the 
FSB each November. The methodology and 
data used by the FSB will be publicly avail-
able so that markets and institutions can rep-
licate the authorities’ determination.23 
The FSB acknowledged that consis-
tent implementation will be critical to the 
effectiveness of these measures. Legislative 
changes will be required in many jurisdic-
tions to implement the FSB Key Attributes 
of Effective Resolution Regimes and to 
strengthen supervisory mandates and capa-
bilities. Other requirements will demand a 
high degree of cooperation among authori-
ties, and firms will have to review and change 
their structures and operations.
national ReGUlation anD 
SUpeRviSion in ReSponSe to 
the cRiSiS24
What is the effect of the global regulatory 
reforms so far at the national level? The 
World Bank survey of bank regulation and 
supervision is useful in answering this ques-
tion. The results from the survey underscore 
the evolutionary nature of the regulatory and 
supervisory changes at the national level. To 
illustrate this point, for the qualitative ques-
tions in the survey, 85 percent of yes or no 
responses were unchanged between 2007 and 
2011. Similarly, most of the quantitative indi-
cators showed relatively little overall move-
ment throughout the crisis. 
This relatively slow evolution notwith-
standing, the World Bank survey shows 
notable changes in individual countries in 
several areas. For example, in an attempt to 
respond to the crisis, countries introduced a 
changes over time. For a discussion on credit 
rating agencies, see box 2.3.
Much work at the FSB level has been 
devoted to filling information gaps. In 2009, 
the G-20 finance ministers and central bank 
governors endorsed recommendations to 
address information gaps identified by the 
FSB Secretariat and IMF staff. The FSB, in 
cooperation with the IMF and others, has 
launched a major initiative to fill existing 
information gaps (FSB and IMF 2010).
To deal with the too-big-to-fail issue, the 
FSB has developed, in response to requests 
from G-20 leaders, a set of policies to address 
the systemic and moral hazard risks associ-
ated with systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs).21 The policies—to be 
implemented from 2012, with full implemen-
tation from 2019—basically consist of the 
following:22
•  A new international standard, titled “FSB 
Key Attributes of Effective Resolution 
Regimes,” setting out the responsibilities, 
instruments, and powers that national 
resolution regimes should have to enable 
authorities to resolve failing financial 
firms in an orderly manner and without 
exposing taxpayers to the risk of loss
•  Requirements  for  resolvability  assess-
ments and for recovery and resolution 
planning for global SIFIs, and for the 
development of institution-specific cross-
border cooperation agreements so that 
home and host authorities of the global 
SIFIs are better prepared for dealing with 
crises and have clarity on how to cooper-
ate in a crisis
•  Requirements for banks determined to be 
globally systemically important to have 
additional loss absorption capacity tai-
lored to the impact of their failure, rising 
from 1.0 percent to 2.5 percent of risk-
weighted assets, to be met with common 
equity
•  More intensive and effective supervision 
of SIFIs, including through stronger super-
visory mandates, resources, and powers, 
and higher supervisory expectations for 
risk management functions, data aggre-
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The survey also indicates that many juris-
dictions resorted to increasing the amount 
covered by deposit protection systems as a 
means to avert the systemic consequences of 
a widespread mistrust in banking institutions 
(figure 2.3). 
The crisis experience and the survey also 
provide a unique opportunity to reexamine 
the broader framework for regulation and 
supervision. One of the most visible devel-
opments in financial sector regulation in the 
past 20 years has been a shift from the tradi-
tional sector-by-sector approach to supervi-
sion toward a greater cross-sector integration 
of financial supervision Čihák and Podpiera 
2008). This shift, which was to a large extent 
in response to the growing integration of the 
banking, securities, and insurance markets, 
has an important impact on the practice of 
supervision and regulation around the globe. 
Box 2.4 discusses the crisis experience with 
the regulatory frameworks.
The World Bank’s Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey confirms that macropru-
dential policies received renewed impetus 
after the crisis, with many new macropru-
dential bodies involved (such as the Finan-
cial Stability Oversight Council in the United 
States and the European Systemic Risk Board 
in the European Union). This involvement 
led to rapid growth in new financial stabil-
ity reports, with India, Italy, and the United 
States being some of the recent entrants, and 
it also encouraged a trend toward increased 
publication of financial sector stress tests (fig-
ure 2.4). 
Most developing economy supervisory 
authorities still use the Basel I capital regime, 
though the majority plan on implementing 
the Basel II capital requirements soon (fig-
ure 2.5a). In the survey, some 75 percent of 
responding jurisdictions, including many 
developing economies, indicated their inten-
tion to implement Basel II. Basel II allows for 
several approaches, some relatively simple 
and similar to Basel I, so in principle, for 
developing economies, especially those facing 
important supervisory capacity constraints, 
a simplified version of the standardized 
approach is probably the most appropriate 
plethora of new requirements on bank gov-
ernance frameworks (figure 2.1), and they 
have sought or are seeking to strengthen 
bank insolvency frameworks (figure 2.2). 
Compensation for executives 
Independence of the Board
Existence of a direct reporting  
line from the chief risk officer to  
the Board or Board Committee 
Existence of a Board or 
a risk committee 
Other 
Number of responses 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
FiguRe 2.1 introduction of Bank governance Frameworks
(In response to the global financial crisis,  
have you introduced new regulations in the following areas?)
Source: world bank’s bank Regulation and supervision survey (database), 2011.
Note: the figure shows the number of positive responses in each area. a country could respond 
positively in several areas.
Introduced a separate bank
insolvency framework
Implemented coordination
arrangements among
domestic authorities
Revisions under
consideration
No revisions
Number of responses
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 8070 90
FiguRe 2.2 New insolvency Frameworks
(Have you introduced significant changes to the bank resolution  
framework in your country as a result of the global financial crisis?)
Source: world bank’s bank Regulation and supervision survey (database), 2011.
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option. Yet many are aiming to adopt more 
complex approaches (figure 2.5b), sometimes 
without justification in terms of the complex-
ity of the institutions that are to be super-
vised or the types of transactions in which 
they are involved. Indeed, experience from 
World Bank country work indicates that in 
some small or lower-income countries, the 
full range of options proposed by the BCBS 
is not properly thought through, resulting in 
the adoption of overly complex regulations 
for the level of economic development and 
complexity of the financial system. The sur-
vey indicates that introducing Basel II already 
had substantial impacts in many countries 
(figure 2.6), with the implementation being 
more challenging for the developing econo-
mies than for developed economies. 
Developing-economy regulators offer a 
variety of reasons why they want to adopt 
Basel II, although adoption is not manda-
tory outside the member states of the BCBS. 
Specifically, some are concerned that Basel 
I is beginning to be perceived as an inferior 
standard by international investors and that 
developing-economy financial institutions 
and markets may be penalized by inter-
national market participants or that their 
domestic banks may eventually be denied 
access to foreign markets if they do not com-
ply with the latest Basel standards. Accord-
ing to Financial Stability Institute (2004), the 
main driver among nonmember countries of 
the BCBS to move toward Basel II is the fact 
that foreign-controlled banks or local subsid-
iaries of foreign banks operating under Basel 
II expect regulators in low-income countries 
to adopt the framework as well. Whether or 
not these concerns are justified, they have 
accelerated the diffusion of the Basel frame-
works across the developing world, as docu-
mented by the World Bank survey.
The survey results suggest a somewhat 
increased emphasis on higher-quality capital 
in regulatory capital relative to earlier sur-
veys. For example, respondents in the more 
recent survey were less likely to include sub-
ordinated debt in regulatory capital (figure 
2.7). Also, since the 2007 survey, seven coun-
tries have added basic leverage ratios (with 
narrow definitions of capital and without risk 
weighting) to their minimum requirements. 
This trend is likely to continue as countries 
move toward Basel III. 
As for the impact of Basel III, recent cal-
culations (such as Majnoni 2012) suggest 
that Basel III implementation may, in con-
trast to Basel II, be relatively easier for devel-
oping economies than for developed ones, 
given that the former have built relatively 
higher capital buffers. Indeed, minimum 
required as well as actual risk-based capital 
ratios of banking systems tend to be rela-
tively higher in developing economies (figure 
2.8). However, higher capital (and liquidity) 
buffers may also be warranted, consider-
ing that emerging-market and developing-
economy banks operate in a more volatile 
economic environment. Also, a common 
observation from assessments under the 
World Bank/IMF’s Financial Sector Assess-
ment Program and other diagnostic work is 
that high reported capital buffers overstate 
the true resilience of financial institutions in 
light of deficiencies in accounting and regu-
latory frameworks, especially as regards loan 
classification, provisioning, and consolidated 
supervision. To examine the likely impact 
Increase in amount covered
Expansion of coverage
(types of exposures, nature
of depositor, and so on)
Government guarantee of
deposits and bank debts
Only minor changes
or no change
Number of responses
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 4035
FiguRe 2.3 introduction of Deposit Protection Schemes
(Have you introduced changes to your deposit protection system  
as a result of the global financial crisis?)
Source: world bank’s bank Regulation and supervision survey (database), 2011.
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Finally, the survey suggests there is further 
scope for improving disclosures and incen-
tives for stakeholders to monitor financial 
institutions, hence the need to address mar-
ket discipline. The findings in this area are 
somewhat mixed. Deposit insurance coverage 
has increased during the crisis and, coupled 
with too-big-to-fail policies, is further erod-
ing incentives to monitor. Although the sur-
vey suggests that some elements of disclosure 
and quality of information have improved, 
it is not clear whether market discipline has 
been strengthened overall.
of Basel III on developing economies, World 
Bank staff have undertaken in-depth analy-
sis of individual bank data. The results (box 
2.5) suggest that the impact of the new capi-
tal regulations may be broadly manageable, 
whereas the liquidity regulations may be 
more challenging, given the difficult exter-
nal funding environment, as well as the rela-
tively undeveloped local financial markets. 
However, there are important differences 
across regions, as well as within each region 
and across financial institutions.
 
BOX 2.4 institutional Structures for Regulation and Supervision
Regarding the broader architecture for regulation 
and supervision, three broad models are being used 
around the world: a three-pillar or “sectoral” model 
(banking, insurance, and securities); a two-pillar or 
“twin peak” model (prudential and business con-
duct); and an integrated model (all types of super-
vision under one roof). One of the arguably most 
remarkable developments of the past 10 years, con-
firmed by the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey, has been a trend from the three-
pillar model toward either the two-pillar model or 
the integrated model (with the twin peak model 
gaining traction in the early 2000s). 
In a recent study, Melecky and Podpiera (2012) 
examined the drivers of supervisory structures for 
prudential and business conduct supervision over 
the past decade in 98 countries, finding among other 
things that countries advancing to a higher stage of 
economic development tend to integrate their super-
visory structures, small open economies tend to opt 
for more integrated supervisory structures, financial 
deepening makes countries integrate supervision pro-
gressively more, and the lobbying power of the con-
centrated and highly profitable banking sector acts as 
a negative force against business conduct integration. 
(The related data on the structure of supervision are 
available on the website accompanying this report, 
http://www.worldbank.org/financialdevelopment.) 
How do these various institutional structures 
compare in terms of crisis frequency and the limit-
ing of the crisis impact? Cross-country regressions 
using data for a wide set of developing and devel-
oped economies provide some evidence in favor of 
the twin peak model and against the sectoral model 
(Cˇihák and Podpiera 2008). Indeed, during the 
global financial crisis, some of the twin peak juris-
dictions (particularly Australia and Canada) have 
been relatively unaffected, while the United States, a 
jurisdiction with a fractionalized sectoral approach 
to supervision, has been at the crisis epicenter. How-
ever, the crisis experience is far from black and 
white, with the Netherlands, one of the examples of 
the twin peaks model, being involved in the Fortis 
failure, one of the major European bank failures. It 
is still early to make a firm overall conclusion, and 
isolating the effects of supervisory architecture from 
other effects is notoriously hard. 
There is one area where the postcrisis policy con-
sensus is rather clear, though, and that relates to the 
role of the central bank in the supervisory frame-
work. Recent policy papers on the subject (such as 
Nier and others 2011) emphasize the importance of 
central banks playing an important role in macro-
prudential policy. Indeed, the World Bank’s bank 
regulation survey underscores the growing role of 
central banks in the supervisory framework and the 
growing emphasis on macroprudential policy. The 
emphasis here is on macroprudential, as views differ 
on the appropriate involvement of central banks in 
microprudential supervision. In a recent study on the 
subject, Masciandaro, Pansini, and Quintyn (2011) 
used empirical evidence from the crisis to make a 
case for keeping macro- and microprudential super-
vision institutionally separate to allow for more 
checks and balances and thus reduce the probability 
of supervisory failure.
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reflect issues of regulatory complexity as well 
as the capacity of the regulatory approach to 
address systemic risk that can lead to financial 
crises. The trend toward regulating more and 
the growing complexity of regulation distorts 
how to StRenGthen the 
cRiSiS ReSponSe
Are the global and national regulatory and 
supervisory responses sufficient to address 
the issues highlighted by the crisis? Is any-
thing missing in the crisis response so far? 
As illustrated in this chapter, the financial 
crisis has triggered much discussion and 
many regulatory reform initiatives on the 
global level as well as on the national level. 
Economists have been following this reform 
process, and have voiced concerns that the 
reforms are only going halfway (Beck 2011; 
Shadow Regulatory Financial Committee 
2011; Squam Lake Group 2010; London 
School of Economics 2010). Economists, 
regulators, and policy makers agree that 
the challenge is to design regulations to 
minimize the occurrence and cost of future 
crises; however, there is less agreement on 
the proposed approaches to regulation and 
supervision. Table 2.4 provides a summary 
of selected proposals.
One common theme emerging from these 
studies involves concerns about the effective-
ness and efficiency of the regulatory approach 
adopted by the official sector. The concerns 
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FiguRe 2.5 Push to implement New Basel Rules
Source: world bank’s bank Regulation and supervision survey (database).
Note: iRb = international ratings-based.
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regulation that may limit innovation and hin-
der the ability of the financial system to per-
form its role in supporting growth and devel-
opment. Overall, these reforms emphasize (a) 
the importance of greater transparency and 
disclosure, (b) closer attention to incentives, 
so that regulations are “incentive-robust,” 
and (c) simplicity, that is, keeping regulatory 
rules as simple as possible to make it more 
difficult for market participants to circum-
vent rules and easier for supervisors to moni-
tor and enforce them.
Asymmetric information, transparency, 
and disclosure
Further enhancing the disclosure of infor-
mation should be a key component of regu-
latory reform. Asymmetric information—a 
situation in which one party to the financial 
transaction, usually the debtor, has access to 
information material to the valuation of the 
transaction that is not available to the other 
party, usually the creditor (Bebczuk 2003; 
Stiglitz and Rothschild 1976)—is a central 
problem in financial systems because it lim-
its the capacity of the investors, lenders, and 
analysts to monitor effectively and to price 
correctly the risks in financial institutions 
and instruments. The problems of asymmet-
ric information have increased as financial 
incentives by facilitating regulatory arbitrage 
and undermining the ability of supervisors 
to monitor and enforce these regulations. 
The concerns also reflect the risk of excessive 
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BOX 2.5 impact of the Basel iii implementation in Developing economies
This box examines implications of the Basel III 
regulatory measures for developing economies. The 
analysis, which closely follows Ötker-Robe, Paz-
arbasioglu, and others (2010), focuses on the impact 
of Basel III capital requirements for banks to have 
higher and better quality capital with greater loss 
absorption characteristics, taking into account the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
rules on capital deductions and the market risk 
framework agreed to in July 2010. It also covers the 
impact of the new liquidity requirements in the form 
of the so-called net stable funding ratio (NSFR). 
Because of data constraints, this analysis does not 
include the short-term liquidity coverage ratio and 
the leverage ratio. The sample covers 127 banks in 
42 countries over six regions. 
The calculations are based, in large part, on com-
pany reports and data from the Bankscope database. 
An array of assumptions common to all banks are 
made, given the lack of access to more granular 
country-specific data on the various components of 
banks’ capital bases on a consistent basis. The find-
ings should hence be interpreted with caution. Since 
regional averages are affected by the sample, they 
may not fully represent the actual vulnerability of a 
given region to the new requirements.
According to the new capital standards, banks 
will be required to deduct most of their assets with 
less loss-absorbing characteristics—such as minority 
interests, goodwill, net deferred tax assets (DTAs), 
investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, and 
mortgage servicing rights (MSRs)—from the com-
mon equity component of capital. The definition of 
capital will contain only a limited amount of certain 
intangibles and qualified assets (for example, banks 
can count up to 10 percent of DTAs resulting from 
timing differences, MSRs, and significant invest-
ments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, capped at 15 
percent for the sum of DTAs, MSRs, and significant 
investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries). Analy-
sis follows the BCBS indication that market risk 
capital requirements will increase by an estimated 
average of three to four times for large, internation-
ally active banks.
Overall, the analysis suggests that the share of 
assets with less loss-absorbing characteristics to be 
deducted from core tier 1 capital is relatively small 
on average for EMDE banks, except in the Latin 
America and Caribbean region (figure B2.5.1). The 
proportion of core tier 1 capital to be deducted varies 
greatly across banks, reflecting their business char-
acteristics and differences in tax systems; hence, the 
needed increase in capital to meet the new require-
ments can be large for some banks. Other intan-
gible assets form the core of items to be deducted 
(more than 30 percent), followed by net DTAs due 
to loss carry forwards (23 percent) and invest-
ments in unconsolidated subsidiaries (20 percent). 
Net DTAs seem particularly important for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC), East Asia and 
Pacific (EAP), and Southern Africa, and investment 
in unconsolidated subsidiaries is relatively high in 
Europe and Central Asia (ECA) and EAP. If applied 
immediately, the proposed deductions and market 
(box continued next page)
FiguRe B2.5.1  eMDes: The impact of Basel iii Capital and Liquidity Requirements
a. % of core tier 1 to be deducted b. impact of Basel regulation on core capital ratio by end-2012
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BOX 2.5 impact of the Basel iii implementation in Developing economies (continued) 
risk adjustments would lower the core tier 1 ratio by 
about 1–3 percentage points on average. The overall 
impact on the core tier 1 ratio is the largest for LAC, 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and ECA 
regions, but most banks in the latter two regions still 
pass the required 7 percent level comfortably after 
the adjustments.
There is also wide variation in banks’ ability to 
meet the required 100 percent level for the net stable 
funding ratio (NSFR). The calculations suggest that 
the NSFR may have varying degrees of impact on 
EMDEs across regions, with wide variations within 
a given region. The ECA and LAC regions seem to 
be the most vulnerable to the NSFR, where depen-
dence on wholesale funding (ECA, given the high 
dependence on parent funding and underdeveloped 
local capital markets) or loan-to-deposit ratios are 
high (ECA and some LAC countries). However, 
other factors may also affect the level of NSFR (for 
example, low levels of government securities in asset 
portfolios may result in low NSFRs). Moreover, fur-
ther challenges may be ahead in meeting the NSFR 
requirement: for example, upcoming rollover needs 
of European banks and sovereigns may raise the cost 
of term funding that may spill over to EMDEs and 
result in competition for deposits. There are also 
challenges associated with holding high levels of (liq-
uid) government securities; this would help in meet-
ing the NSFR target but expose the bank to higher 
sovereign risk.
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on Bankscope data for 127 banks in 42 countries.
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
AL
L
AL
L
La
tin
 Am
eri
ca
an
d t
he
 Ca
rib
be
an
La
tin
 Am
eri
ca
an
d t
he
 Ca
rib
be
an
Mi
dd
le 
Ea
st 
an
d
No
rth
 Af
ric
a
Mi
dd
le 
Ea
st 
an
d
No
rth
 Af
ric
a
Eu
rop
e a
nd
Ce
ntr
al 
As
ia
Eu
rop
e a
nd
Ce
ntr
al 
As
ia
So
uth
 As
ia
So
uth
 As
ia
Ea
st 
As
ia
an
d P
ac
ific
Ea
st 
As
ia
an
d P
ac
ific
Su
b-S
ah
ara
n
Af
ric
a
Su
b-S
ah
ara
n
Af
ric
a
Percent
100
80
60
40
20
0
Percent
90%
72%
92% 91% 94% 96% 97%
10%
28%
8% 9% 6%
4% 3%
28.0%
10.1% 9.4% 8.0%
6.2%
4.0% 3.3%
Remaining core Tier 1 ratio (%)
Deduction items according to BCBS proposal (%)
Co
re 
Tie
r 1
rat
io,
 cu
rre
nt
De
du
cti
on
s
Inc
rea
se
 in
ma
rke
t R
W
A
Cu
mu
lat
ive
 re
tai
ne
d
ea
rni
ng
s, 
20
11
–1
2
Ba
se
l II
I c
ore
 Ti
er 
1
rat
io,
 cu
rre
nt
Ba
se
l II
I c
ore
 
rat
io,
 20
12
8
10
6
4
2
0
9.11%
0.92% 0.61%
7.58%
0.64%
8.22%
12
8
10
6
2
0
4
PercentPercent
9.1% 9.5%
10.6%
11.3%
8.2% 8.3%
10.9%
7.6%
6.3%
9.0%
9.5%
7.2% 7.4%
9.8%
8.2%
7.0%
10.0%
10.6%
7.6% 7.9%
10.7%
Core Tier 1 ratio Basel III core ratio, 2010
New Basel III core ratio, 2012
AL
L
La
tin
 Am
eri
ca
an
d t
he
 Ca
rib
be
an
Mi
dd
le 
Ea
st 
an
d
No
rth
 Af
ric
a
Eu
rop
e a
nd
Ce
ntr
al 
As
ia
So
uth
 As
ia
Ea
st 
As
ia
an
d P
ac
ific
Su
b-S
ah
ara
n
Af
ric
a
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Percent
La
tin
 Am
eri
ca
an
d t
he
 Ca
rib
be
an
Mi
dd
le 
Ea
st 
an
d
No
rth
 Af
ric
a
Eu
rop
e a
nd
Ce
ntr
al 
As
ia
So
uth
 As
ia
Ea
st 
As
ia
an
d P
ac
ific
Su
b-S
ah
ara
n
Af
ric
a
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Loan to deposit ratio
East Asia and Pacific Middle East and North Africa
Europe and Central Asia South Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean Sub-Saharan Africa
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Net stable funding ratio (%)
c. Current and adjusted core tier 1 ratios
e. NSFR vs. share of wholesale funding
d. Net stable funding ratio (available stable 
funding/required stable funding)
 
f. NSFR vs. loan to deposit ratio
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
AL
L
AL
L
La
tin
 Am
eri
ca
an
d t
he
 Ca
rib
be
an
La
tin
 Am
eri
ca
an
d t
he
 Ca
rib
be
an
Mi
dd
le 
Ea
st 
an
d
No
rth
 Af
ric
a
Mi
dd
le 
Ea
st 
an
d
No
rth
 Af
ric
a
Eu
rop
e a
nd
Ce
ntr
al 
As
ia
Eu
rop
e a
nd
Ce
ntr
al 
As
ia
So
uth
 As
ia
So
uth
 As
ia
Ea
st 
As
ia
an
d P
ac
ific
Ea
st 
As
ia
an
d P
ac
ific
Su
b-S
ah
ara
n
Af
ric
a
Su
b-S
ah
ara
n
Af
ric
a
Percent
100
80
60
40
20
0
Percent
90%
72%
92% 91% 94% 96% 97%
10%
28%
8% 9% 6%
4% 3%
28.0%
10.1% 9.4% 8.0
6.2%
4.0% 3.3%
Remaining core Tier 1 ratio (%)
Deduction items according to BCBS proposal (%)
Co
re 
Tie
r 1
rat
io,
 cu
rre
nt
De
du
cti
on
s
Inc
rea
se
 in
ma
rke
t R
W
A
Cu
mu
lat
ive
 re
tai
ne
d
ea
rni
ng
s, 
20
11
–1
2
Ba
se
l II
I c
ore
 Ti
er 
1
rat
io,
 cu
rre
nt
Ba
se
l II
I c
ore
 
rat
io,
 20
12
8
10
6
4
2
0
9.11%
0.92% 0.61%
7.58%
0.64%
8.22%
12
8
10
6
2
0
4
PercentPercent
9.1% 9.5%
10.6%
11.3%
8.2% 8.3%
10.9%
7.6%
6.3%
9.0%
9.5%
7.2% 7.4%
9.8%
8.2%
7.0%
10.0%
10.6%
7.6% 7.9%
10.7%
Core Tier 1 ratio Basel III core ratio, 2010
New Basel III core ratio, 2012
AL
L
La
tin
 Am
eri
ca
an
d t
he
 Ca
rib
be
an
Mi
dd
le 
Ea
st 
an
d
No
rth
 Af
ric
a
Eu
rop
e a
nd
Ce
ntr
al 
As
ia
So
uth
 As
ia
Ea
st 
As
ia
an
d P
ac
ific
Su
b-S
ah
ara
n
Af
ric
a
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Percent
La
tin
 Am
eri
ca
an
d t
he
 Ca
rib
be
an
Mi
dd
le 
Ea
st 
an
d
No
rth
 Af
ric
a
Eu
rop
e a
nd
Ce
ntr
al 
As
ia
So
uth
 As
ia
Ea
st 
As
ia
an
d P
ac
ific
Su
b-S
ah
ara
n
Af
ric
a
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Loan to deposit ratio
East Asia and Pacific Middle East and North Africa
Europe and Central Asia South Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean Sub-Saharan Africa
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Net stable funding ratio (%)
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
AL
L
AL
L
La
tin
 Am
eri
ca
an
d t
he
 Ca
rib
be
an
La
tin
 Am
eri
ca
an
d t
he
 Ca
rib
be
an
Mi
dd
le 
Ea
st 
an
d
No
rth
 Af
ric
a
Mi
dd
le 
Ea
st 
an
d
No
rth
 Af
ric
a
Eu
rop
e a
nd
Ce
ntr
al 
As
ia
Eu
rop
e a
nd
Ce
ntr
al 
As
ia
So
uth
 As
ia
So
uth
 As
ia
Ea
st 
As
ia
an
d P
ac
ific
Ea
st 
As
ia
an
d P
ac
ific
Su
b-S
ah
ara
n
Af
ric
a
Su
b-S
ah
ara
n
Af
ric
a
Percent
100
80
60
40
20
0
Percent
90%
72%
92% 91% 94% 96% 97%
10%
28%
8% 9% 6%
4% 3%
28.0%
10.1% 9.4% 8.0%
6.2%
4.0% 3.3%
Remaining core Tier 1 ratio (%)
Deduction items according to BCBS proposal (%)
Co
re 
Tie
r 1
rat
io,
 cu
rre
nt
De
du
cti
on
s
Inc
rea
se
 in
ma
rke
t R
W
A
Cu
mu
lat
ive
 re
tai
ne
d
ea
rni
ng
s, 
20
11
–1
2
Ba
se
l II
I c
ore
 Ti
er 
1
rat
io,
 cu
rre
nt
Ba
se
l II
I c
ore
 
rat
io,
 20
12
8
10
6
4
2
0
9.11
0.92% 0.61%
7.58%
0.64%
8.22%
12
8
10
6
2
0
4
PercentPercent
9.1% 9.5%
10.6%
11.3%
8.2% 8.3%
10.9%
7.6%
6.3%
9.0%
9.5%
7.2% 7.4%
9.8%
8.2%
7.0%
10.0%
10.6%
7.6% 7.9%
10.7%
Core Tier 1 ratio Basel III core ratio, 2010
New Basel III core ratio, 2012
AL
L
La
tin
 Am
eri
ca
an
d t
he
 Ca
rib
be
an
Mi
dd
le 
Ea
st 
an
d
No
rth
 Af
ric
a
Eu
rop
e a
nd
Ce
ntr
al 
As
ia
So
uth
 As
ia
Ea
st 
As
ia
an
d P
ac
ific
Su
b-S
ah
ara
n
Af
ric
a
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Percent
La
tin
 Am
eri
ca
an
d t
he
 Ca
rib
be
an
Mi
dd
le 
Ea
st 
an
d
No
rth
 Af
ric
a
Eu
rop
e a
nd
Ce
ntr
al 
As
ia
So
uth
 As
ia
Ea
st 
As
ia
an
d P
ac
ific
Su
b-S
ah
ara
n
Af
ric
a
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Loan to deposit ratio
East Asia and Pacific Middle East and North Africa
Europe and Central Asia South Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean Sub-Saharan Africa
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Net stable funding ratio (%)
Net s able funding ratio
East Asia and Pacific Middle East and North Africa
Europe and Central Asia South Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean Sub-Saharan Africa
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
0 10 20 30 40 50
Share of wholesale funding in total funding
60 70 80 90
GLOBAL finAnciAL DEVELOPMEnT REPORT 2013 t H e  s t a t e  a s  R e g u l a t o R  a n d  s u p e R v i s o R   69
TABLe 2.4 Summary of Selected Proposals for Regulatory Reform
  Proposal by Specific Steps
Admati and Hellwig 2012; 
Hellwig 2010
Replace risk-weighted capital ratios by (significantly higher) leverage ratios, 
combined with strong disclosures about risk exposures.
Barth, Caprio and Levine 
2012a
Rather than focusing on the regulations themselves, focuses on how to better 
oversee the regulators. Establishment of a “sentinel” agency, watching over the 
regulators on behalf of the taxpayers. 
Bartlett 2012 Redesign bank disclosures to facilitate credit modeling by market participants. 
(Illustrates that basic credit risk modeling, combined with appropriate bank 
disclosures, could have enhanced investors’ ability to detect the portfolio risk 
leading to recent banking crises, without revealing sensitive position-level data.)
Brunnemeier and others 
2009
Develop more “prompt corrective action”-types of rules to facilitate “leaning 
against the wind.”
Calomiris 2011 Proposes “incentive-robust” reform proposals to address mortgage risk 
subsidization, regulators’ inability to measure risks ex ante and losses ex 
post, the too-big-to-fail problem, liquidity risk, macroprudential regulations 
that vary over the cycle, prudential regulations to encourage the greater use 
of clearinghouses in clearing over-the-counter transactions, and design of 
appropriate guidelines to constrain government assistance to banks during 
crises.
Caprio, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Kane 2010
Make oversight more adaptive to changes (innovations) and hold supervisors 
accountable for their adaptiveness.
Regulators should disclose information on the value and measurement of 
potential claims that institutions make on the government’s safety net.
Establishing the right incentive structure for supervisors requires a chain of 
reforms. 
Cˇihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Johnston 2012a
Reorient the approach to financial regulation to have at its core the objective of 
addressing incentives on an ongoing basis. As part of this, consider conducting 
regular “incentive audits.”
Claessens and others 2010 Recognize mitigation of systemic risks as an explicit objective of all agencies 
involved in supervision, to enhance accountability:
Clear mandates and tools commensurate with these mandates to preserve 
financial stability; sufficient resources; clear allocation of responsibilities among 
agencies;
Clear communication among agencies.
de la Torre and Ize 2011 Establish strong and independent supervisory agencies, populated by highly 
skilled civil servants.
Demirgüç-Kunt 2011;  
Rajan 2010
Scale back explicit deposit insurance from large banks as an additional measure 
to claw back implicit guarantees and remove the too-big-to-fail subsidies.
Enriques and Hertig 2010 Strengthen internal and external governance of supervisors: (a) strong CEOs 
with boards’ and commissions’ powers limited to basic policy-making decisions 
and monitoring, (b) increased line responsibilities for staff, (c) requirement 
subjecting supervisors to stronger disclosure requirements.
FSA (The Turner
Review) 2009
Address the need for more intrusive supervision, more outcomes-oriented 
supervision, and more risk-based supervision, more systemic supervision, and 
international coordination of supervision.
Masciandaro, Pansini, 
Quintyn 2011
Make a clearer organizational distinction between macro- and microprudential 
supervision to allow for more checks and balances to improve supervisory 
governance.
(table continues next page)
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supervision. These initiatives, which focus 
primarily on ensuring better information for 
supervisory purposes, go some way toward 
addressing the weaknesses highlighted by the 
crisis. 
The focus on collecting better data for 
supervision should not detract from the need 
for much better public disclosure of informa-
tion. The value of transparency and disclo-
sure has been emphasized by many observers 
as well as by recent research (Bartlett 2012; 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Tressel 
2008). Greater disclosure would allow credi-
tors, investors, and analysts to assess directly 
the solvency of the financial institutions. The 
financial crisis illustrated that financial insti-
tutions are rather opaque organizations for 
investors in capital markets. Although bank 
regulatory policy has long sought to promote 
market discipline of banks through enhanced 
public disclosure, bank regulatory disclosures 
are notoriously lacking in granular, position-
level information concerning their credit 
investments, largely because of conflicting 
concerns about protecting the confidentiality 
of a bank’s proprietary investment strategies 
and customer information. 
When particular market sectors experi-
ence distress, investors are thus forced to 
speculate as to which institutions might be 
instruments, structures and interconnections, 
regulatory and accounting rules, and institu-
tions’ risk control and assessment techniques 
have become more complex. 
Asymmetries of information and principal- 
agent issues abound between buyers and sell-
ers of financial services and products, as evi-
denced by the malpractices in the U.S. 
mortgage sector in the run-up to the crisis. 
Professional bankers possess expert knowl-
edge, and obtaining such knowledge is time-
consuming and costly. This puts the client at 
a disadvantage, notably when monitoring 
compliance with contractual arrangements. 
In principle, disgruntled consumers can seek 
legal recourse, but the legal process is time-
consuming, costly, and uncertain. These con-
ditions highlight the general case for detailed 
disclosure requirements and conduct of busi-
ness regulation. Moreover, information asym-
metries are an important rationale for pru-
dential regulation and supervision of banks 
accepting deposits from retail clients, as these 
nonprofessional consumers are ill-equipped 
to evaluate the safety and soundness of banks. 
As part of the crisis response, the FSB and 
others have launched useful initiatives on 
data and information gaps. At the national 
level, many regulators have started collect-
ing additional data to allow for strengthened 
  Proposal by Specific Steps
Palmer and Cerutti 2009 Summon the “will to act” by (a) leaning more against the wind;  
(b) strengthening the context of supervision (independence, leadership, 
accountability); (c) strengthening supervisory processes by making them 
more intensive, result-oriented, risk-based, and proactive; (d) strengthening 
macroprudential surveillance and mitigating procyclicality; and (e) improving 
cross-border supervisory cooperation.
Viñals and others 2010 Implement more intrusive supervision—“skeptical but proactive supervision” 
that is comprehensive, adaptive, and conclusive. Achieve changes through 
(a) enabling legislation and budgetary resources; (b) clear strategy; (c) robust 
internal organization; and (d) effective coordination with other agencies. Create 
revisions through (a) clear mandate, (b) independence and accountability, (c) 
skilled staff, (d) healthy relationship with industry, and (e) partnership with board.
Weder di Mauro 2009 Establish more independence and accountability for supervisors to address 
time-inconsistency issues; offer higher compensation levels for supervisors; and 
set up supervision at supranational levels (Europe) to eliminate local industry 
capture.
Wellink 2011 Address the need for “intrusive supervision.”
TABLe 2.4 Summary of Selected Proposals for Regulatory Reform (continued)
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Further improvements in transparency 
and disclosures are seriously needed, both on 
the systemwide level and on the level of indi-
vidual financial institutions. As regards the 
disclosures on systemic risks, many countries 
have been publishing so-called financial sta-
bility reports. Recent research on the subject 
suggests that simply publishing a financial 
stability report seems to have no impact on 
financial stability (Čihák, Muñoz, Teh Shari-
fuddin, and Tintchev 2012). The effective-
ness of such reports in signaling and address-
ing systemic risk has, however, been affected 
by a number of factors. In the absence of a 
unifying analytical framework for assessing 
systemic risk, most financial stability reports 
were rather descriptive and refrained from 
explicit statements about the level of systemic 
risk present in the financial system. Data 
gaps, particularly in the nonbank sector, led 
many reports to focus on the banking sec-
tor, impeding a true systemwide perspective. 
Also, the articulation of financial stability 
analysis into remedial policies, aimed at curb-
ing the buildup of systemic risk, was prob-
lematic. There is thus substantial scope for 
improving such reports (as well as the asso-
ciated information on systemic-level risks) in 
terms of clarity, consistency over time, and 
coverage. The ongoing work on good prac-
tices in macroprudential surveillance (such as 
Nier and others 2011) could usefully address 
transparency and disclosures of systemic risk. 
At the level of individual financial institu-
tions, further reforms are needed to ensure a 
higher quality of disclosures. Much reliance 
has been placed on the external auditors, a 
sector that came to be dominated by the “Big 
Four” (KPMG, PwC, Ernst & Young, and 
Deloitte). In the run-up to the financial crisis, 
many financial institutions were given a clean 
bill of health by the external auditors, only 
to be bailed out a few months later as the 
financial crisis unfolded. In the wake of the 
crisis, the European Union has proposed a 
draft law to tighten supervision of the exter-
nal auditors. At the global level, the FSB has 
requested action from several global bodies 
to ensure greater international consistency in 
audit practices, and to provide more specific 
exposed, potentially causing significant dis-
ruptions in credit markets and contributing 
to systemic risk. Bartlett (2012) argues that 
redesigning bank disclosures to facilitate 
credit modeling by market participants has 
the potential to meaningfully increase mar-
ket discipline while minimizing the disclo-
sure of sensitive bank data. He illustrates 
how even basic credit risk modeling, when 
combined with appropriate bank disclosures, 
could have significantly enhanced investors’ 
ability to detect the portfolio risk leading to 
two recent severe banking crises. Moreover, 
because such an approach leverages the same 
aggregate metrics banks themselves use to 
monitor their risk exposure, the proposed 
disclosure regime would impose a limited 
disclosure burden on banks while avoiding 
the need to reveal sensitive position-level 
data. 
It would be naive, of course, to think that 
all creditors, investors, and analysts have the 
resources and capacity to understand, assess, 
and identify these increasingly more complex 
structures, institutions, and instruments. 
Indeed, the collective tendency of financial 
firms, nonfinancial corporations, and house-
holds to overexpose themselves to risk in the 
upswing of a credit cycle, and to become 
overly risk-averse in a downswing, has been 
well documented. These tendencies raise 
some questions about the capacity of finan-
cial markets and investors to instill discipline 
on the behavior of financial entities, and they 
underscore the importance of having both 
strong supervision and market discipline.
One of the important advantages of com-
plementing strong supervision with market 
discipline is that, with sufficient disclosures 
and proper incentives, investors and analysts 
would be more likely to develop their own 
assessments of capital adequacy and liquidity, 
and there could be scope for competition and 
evolution in the design of the most appropri-
ate measures. This approach would limit the 
likelihood of “groupthink” and focusing too 
much on a single and possibly flawed proxy 
or rating system. Ultimately, the approach 
would help in limiting the buildup of risk that 
occurred prior to the financial crisis. 
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source of financial instability in finan-
cial systems. Modern financial systems 
with limited liability encourage risk-tak-
ing incentives in financial institutions,25 
and these incentives can be exacerbated 
by badly designed regulations and safety 
nets. The literature has identified a number 
of market failures that are relevant to finan-
cial stability and that result from incentive 
problems. 26
Of course, most regulations affect incen-
tives in one way or another, and the impor-
tance of designing regulations in a way that 
is incentive-compatible is being increasingly 
recognized in international forums. The 
recent regulatory reforms at the global level, 
as well as at the country level, have included 
measures on systemically important financial 
institutions, compensation policies, a reduced 
role of credit ratings, initiatives on data, and 
information gaps, all of which go some way 
toward addressing the weaknesses high-
lighted by the crisis.
Reconciling private incentives with pub-
lic interest by regulation is key, but far from 
trivial. Addressing one incentive issue by a 
new or amended regulation often only leads 
to creating incentive breakdowns elsewhere. 
And some of the existing incentive issues 
(for example, lack of incentives of supervi-
sors from different jurisdictions to share 
relevant information in situations of stress) 
have not really been fully addressed, in spite 
of the efforts made at the international level 
under the coordination of the FSB. As dem-
onstrated, for example, in Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2012a), regulators have often failed 
to implement the regulations and exercise the 
powers that they already had. They point out 
that among other factors, psychological bias 
in favor of the industry—similar to that pre-
vailing in sports, where referees regularly call 
games in favor of home teams—also operates 
in finance. In the authors’ view, therefore, the 
key issue to address is not necessarily more 
regulations (although some additional regula-
tions may be appropriate), but it is how to get 
regulators to enforce the rules. So, how are 
governments to ensure that addressing the 
incentive breakdowns is indeed central to the 
guidance for external audits. The focus of 
these reforms is on ensuring higher-quality 
information for supervisors, but it is impor-
tant to use the momentum also for improving 
the quality of information that investors get 
from the audits. 
Finally, a further push is needed to 
strengthen global accounting standards. 
Many observers have recently awakened 
to the importance of accounting because 
of the controversy over the mark-to-market 
principle (or more appropriately, “fair value 
accounting”) and its impact during the finan-
cial crisis. In late 2007 and early 2008, sev-
eral prominent financiers and analysts pro-
tested that the rapid decreases in the market 
prices of U.S. mortgage-based securities and 
other assets were meaningless and caused by 
liquidity shortfalls. According to them, mark-
ing these assets to reduced amounts in bal-
ance sheets would precipitate an unnecessary 
crisis. With hindsight, this analysis was not 
completely correct. It is widely accepted that 
financial markets can overshoot in their cor-
rections, which in a mark-to-market environ-
ment could create contagion effects; however, 
for the most part, the reason for the reduced 
market prices was a permanent loss of value 
rather than a temporary effect resulting from 
lack of liquidity in the markets. In this case, 
the transparency that fair value accounting 
provided played a key role in pushing these 
institutions’ management through the recog-
nition of losses. Box 2.6 provides a viewpoint 
on this topic.
Greater transparency and better infor-
mation would not have the desired positive 
effect on sustainable financial development if 
market participants did not have incentives 
to monitor performance. The next section 
therefore turns to the issue of incentives.
incentive issues
The identification and correction of incen-
tive problems that create systemic risk 
should be at the center of any framework 
that seeks to maintain financial stabil-
ity. Many economists believe incentive 
problems are perhaps the most important 
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BOX 2.6 Accounting Standards (Viewpoint by Nicolas Véron)
Sometimes it takes a narrow lens to distinguish the 
true features of big objects. The future of financial 
globalization, whatever one’s perspective on its 
dangers or merits, is one of the biggest questions 
of the moment. By contrast, accounting has often 
been perceived as boring. But the policy debate on 
accounting, and especially on International Finan-
cial Reporting Standards (IFRS), entails large 
stakes and important lessons for global financial 
integration. 
As is so often the case, the policy debate is 
obscured by the weight of special interests. Most 
notably, financial industry executives and their lob-
byists were able to convince many policy makers and 
non–accounting experts that fair value accounting 
had been a major aggravating factor in the initial 
phase of the crisis, in late 2007 and early 2008, 
even as later developments clearly demonstrated that 
there had been no excessive undershooting of mar-
ket prices during that period. A similar sequence had 
happened a few years earlier in the United States, 
when corporate advocates managed to delay the 
accounting recognition of the cost of stock options 
for nearly a decade. In accounting, as in most other 
areas of financial regulation, the issues are technical 
and jargon-ridden, and the potential financial conse-
quences are large, so that public debates and policy 
decisions are easily captured. Therefore, governance 
arrangements are crucial. 
The governance of accounting standard setting 
has widely varied over time and across countries. 
The general trend of the past few decades has been 
toward standard setters that are more independent 
vis-à-vis governments and special industry interests. 
But the challenges related to the IFRS are unprece-
dented because these standards are set at the global 
level. There is no global government to oversee the 
IFRS Foundation, the organization that sets the stan-
dards, or to enforce consistent IFRS implementation 
across countries. Nor is there any coherent global 
representation of investors, whose information needs 
the standards are primarily meant to serve. 
Answers may lie in the IFRS Foundation mak-
ing more efforts to organize the global investor 
community, and setting incentives for individual 
jurisdictions to adopt and enforce standards to 
foster genuine cross-border comparability of finan-
cial statements. At this point, it is still too early to 
judge whether the attempt to make IFRS the domi-
nant global accounting language can succeed on an 
enduring basis. But there are already important les-
sons that have wide significance beyond the com-
munity of accounting professionals. 
First, global financial rules are not a utopian 
vision but a reality. The initial success of IFRS has 
been remarkable. Their adoption has been smooth 
and has generally improved financial reporting 
quality, starting in the European Union in 2005 but 
increasingly now in other countries as well. Given 
the right conditions, financial regulatory harmoni-
zation can work across continents. 
Second, the crisis has increased the need for pub-
lic oversight of financial rules, but it is not yet clear 
how this can be done effectively and consistently. A 
monitoring board of public entities was created in 
2009 to oversee the IFRS Foundation, but its con-
struction is awkward and raises concerns about its 
legitimacy and future effectiveness. For the foresee-
able future we will have to rely on trial-and-error 
experimentation for international financial regula-
tory bodies, which in most cases cannot take exist-
ing national arrangements as a direct model. 
Third, those global bodies that exist have yet to 
adapt to the ongoing rebalancing of the financial 
world. The IFRS Foundation is registered in the 
United States; its staff is in London; its monitor-
ing board gives permanent seats only to the United 
States, European Union, and Japan; and it still 
caters largely to audiences in the developed world, 
even as large emerging economies represent a rap-
idly increasing share of global finance. We don’t 
know whether or how China, India, and others 
will take responsibility at the global level for trans-
parency and integrity in financial reporting. But if 
efforts to empower them in formal global institu-
tions are not accelerated, it is hard to see how such 
institutions can fulfill their potential.
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approaches to assessing financial stability, in 
particular, stress testing and use of supervi-
sory codes and standards. The incentive audit 
would focus on the key elements that moti-
vate and guide financial decision making. 
A focus on correcting incentive issues and 
putting them front and center does not mean 
discarding the existing regulatory and super-
visory frameworks. In other words, what is 
needed is an evolutionary change, not a revo-
lution. The effort would involve a reorienta-
tion toward a regulatory and supervisory 
framework that is more focused on the suf-
ficiency of information disclosures, factors 
that influence the incentives to monitor activ-
ities within financial firms, corporate gover-
nance and compensation practices, conflicts 
of interest, and explicit and implicit guar-
antees. A greater focus on incentives, which 
could be achieved by extending or improving 
existing efforts, would support the regula-
tory approaches by identifying the underlying 
distortions that can give rise to systemic risk, 
including in the design and application of the 
regulations themselves. The effort would also 
help to prioritize the regulatory response on 
a systemwide basis and increase the attention 
on bolstering effective market discipline in 
support of regulation.
Keeping regulatory rules as simple 
as possible, and promoting strong 
enforcement
It is important to keep the rules as simple as 
needed for their effective monitoring, and to 
promote strong enforcement.27 This point 
relates closely to the previous two points on 
asymmetric information and incentive prob-
lems: complexity can make it difficult for 
supervisors, investors, and others to distill 
the relevant information about soundness 
of financial institutions and about systemic 
risk. Also, combined with bad incentives for 
financial institutions’ managers, complexity 
can make it easier for financial institutions to 
bypass regulatory rules and use obfuscation 
to their advantage. 
However, finance is not a simple busi-
ness. Imposing simplicity through draconian 
measures would be either too costly or not 
regulatory framework? One suggestion, pro-
posed by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2012a), 
instead of focusing on the regulations them-
selves, focuses on how to better oversee the 
regulators. Specifically, they propose a senti-
nel agency, which would watch the regulators 
on behalf of taxpayers. The agency would 
have no regulatory powers, but it would have 
the ability to obtain all the information avail-
able to regulatory agencies, along with the 
duty to report on the key systemic risks and 
on what the regulators are doing to address 
those risks.  
Going in a similar direction, Masciand-
aro, Pansini, and Quintyn (2011) emphasize 
the distinction between macro- and micro-
prudential supervision. Using empirical evi-
dence from the crisis, they make a case for 
keeping macroprudential supervision insti-
tutionally separate from microprudential 
supervision. In other words, it seems better 
for macroprudential supervisors not to have 
direct microprudential supervisory powers, 
as long as they have the ability to obtain all 
the relevant information to assess the key 
systemic risks and the steps to address those 
risks. Such an arrangement allows for more 
checks and balances and thus reduces the 
probability of supervisory failure.
Many countries have recently been put-
ting in place committees or new agencies to 
carry out macroprudential regulation and 
supervision. In some cases, these agencies or 
bodies maintain a clear separation between 
macro- and microprudential supervision. In 
other countries, however, macroprudential 
committees or agencies are also involved in 
microprudential supervision. This is different 
from the sentinel agency, which cannot have 
any direct regulatory or supervisory powers, 
to limit the risk of conflicts of interest. 
How are governments and agencies to 
increase the focus on incentives in prac-
tice?  ˇ Cihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Johnston 
(2012a, 2012b) propose that the identifica-
tion of incentive problems be based on a 
specific analysis of incentives, an “incen-
tive audit” (box 2.7). Such audits, building 
on a methodology proposed in an earlier 
paper by Johnston, Chai, and Schumacher 
(2000), could be used to complement other 
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have been circulated—for example, those 
that suggest directly constraining financial 
institutions’ size or substantially narrowing 
the range of permissible activities—would 
potentially have serious side effects and 
feasible. For example, requiring all banks 
to move from limited to unlimited liability 
could bring banks’ size down substantially, 
but it would not be feasible in contemporary 
financial systems.28 Other proposals that 
BOX 2.7 incentive Audits (Viewpoint by Martin Cˇihák, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and  
R. Barry Johnston)
Introducing incentive audits could strengthen finan-
cial sector policy. The basic idea of such audits is to 
more regularly and systemically evaluate structural 
factors that affect incentives for risk taking in the 
financial sector. The key issues that audits would 
need to cover include contract design, banking pow-
ers, banking relationships, structure of ownership 
and liabilities, industrial organizations, existence of 
guarantees, and the adequacy of safety nets. 
How would incentive audits look in practice? To 
get a clearer idea, one can take a 2010 report by a 
parliamentary commission examining the roots of 
the 2007 financial crisis in Iceland. The report notes 
the overly rapid growth of the three major Icelandic 
banks as a major contributor of the crisis, and docu-
ments the underlying “strong incentives for growth,” 
which included the banks’ incentive schemes as well 
as the high leverage of the major owners (Special 
Investigation Commission 2010). The report maps 
out the network of conflicting interests of key bank 
owners, who were also the largest debtors of these 
banks. 
This illustration captures the basic notion of 
an incentive audit. There are other examples (such 
as Calomiris 2011, who uses an incentive-based 
approach to propose a reform of the U.S. regulatory 
framework).  Cˇihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Johnston 
(2012b) provide a more detailed description of the 
audit, going from a top-level examination of the key 
elements of the financial environment in an econ-
omy—market structure and financial instruments, 
government safety net, legal framework, and quality 
of enforcement—to a more detailed and prioritized 
assessment of incentives, mindful of the likely effect 
on the behavior of the main agents in the system. 
The checklist of key features would be accompanied 
by guidance with evaluation methodology for con-
sistent application across countries.
To be effective, incentive audits would have to 
be performed regularly, and their outcome used 
to address incentive issues by adapting regula-
tion, supervision, and other measures. In Iceland, 
the analysis was done as a postmortem, benefiting 
from hindsight. But it is feasible to do such analy-
sis ex ante. Indeed, much of the information used 
in the commission’s report was available (read-
ily, or with moderate data-gathering effort) even 
before the crisis. Also, the commission had relatively 
modest resources (three members and small sup-
port staff), illustrating that incentive audits need 
not be very costly or overly complicated to per-
form. As the commission’s report points out, “it 
should have been clear to the supervisory authori-
ties that such incentives existed and that there was 
reason for concern,” but supervisors “did not keep 
up with the rapid changes in the banks’ practices,” 
and instead of examining the underlying reasons for 
the changes, they took comfort in the banks’ capital 
ratios exceeding a statutory minimum and appear-
ing robust in narrowly defined stress tests (Cˇihák 
and Ong 2010).
Existing approaches do not entirely overlook 
issues related to incentives. Many reports on finan-
cial stability focus very narrowly on a quantitative 
description and analysis of trends (Cˇihák, Muñoz, 
Teh Sharifuddin, and Tintchev 2012), but some do 
mention the misalignments between private sector 
incentives and public interests. So this area could 
be usefully extended and made a more permanent 
feature of the reporting. Also, in the context of the 
World Bank/IMF Financial Sector Assessment Pro-
gram, when assessments collect information on own-
ership of financial institutions, they look into issues 
such as safety nets. The idea of incentive audits, 
therefore, is not to build a new assessment from 
scratch, but to raise the profile of incentive-related 
issues and bring more structure to the assessments. 
Incentive audits should be seen not as a replacement 
of other parts of the overall assessment of vulner-
abilities, but as a complement.
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critical of the risk-weighted asset concept 
as a proxy for actual exposures, and sug-
gested replacing risk-weighted capital ratios 
with (significantly higher) leverage ratios, 
combined with strong disclosures about risk 
exposures. Their argument is based on the 
observation that the system of risk-calibrated 
capital requirements, in particular under the 
model-based approach, played a key role in 
allowing banks to be undercapitalized prior 
to the crisis, with strong systemic effects for 
deleveraging multipliers and for the function-
ing of interbank markets. The issue is not 
trivial, of course, partly because of the short- 
and medium-term adverse effects such high 
ratios could have on financial intermediation 
and financial development. 
Another alternative approach to current 
risk-based capital regulation would be to 
have a simple leverage ratio (which is simple 
enough to monitor and enforce) adjusted 
upward by the loan spreads banks charge 
their customers. As discussed in Calomiris 
(2011), using loan spreads to measure loan 
default risk is desirable because these spreads 
are accurate forecasters of the probability 
that a loan will become nonperforming (Ash-
craft and Morgan 2003). This would be an 
example not only of a simple regulation but 
also of an incentive-robust one, since banks 
clearly would not have an incentive to lower 
their interest rates just to reduce their capi-
tal budgeting against a loan, because doing 
so would reduce their income and defeat the 
purpose of circumventing the regulation.29 
An added advantage of this approach would 
be that monitoring interest rates is fairly 
uncomplicated even in the least developed of 
emerging markets. 
Other approaches focus on complement-
ing basic capital ratios (such as a common 
equity requirement) by so-called contingent 
capital (CoCo) requirements. These authors 
provide evidence that seems to imply that a 
CoCo requirement, complementing common 
equity, would be an effective prudential tool. 
CoCos can help the prompt recapitalization 
of banks after significant losses of equity 
but before the bank has run out of options 
to access the equity market. That dynamic 
weaknesses, such that their implementation 
should be subject to careful analysis before 
their actual adoption. One possible way to 
keep institutions from becoming systemically 
important, as noted, for example, in Rajan 
(2010), may not be through crude prohibi-
tions on size or activity, but through collect-
ing and monitoring of information about 
exposures among institutions and risk con-
centrations in the system.
An important aspect of the debate on com-
plexity relates to issues of capital adequacy 
and leverage. Empirical evidence suggests 
that when faced with uncertainty, markets 
tend to pay more attention to more basic indi-
cators that are more difficult to bypass. For 
example, Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and 
Merrouche (2012) used a multi country panel 
of banks to study whether better-capitalized 
banks experienced higher stock returns dur-
ing the financial crisis. They found that a 
stronger capital position was associated with 
better stock market performance, and that 
the relationship is stronger when capital is 
measured by the leverage ratio rather than the 
risk-adjusted capital ratio, and that higher-
quality forms of capital, such as tier 1 capi-
tal and tangible common equity, were more 
relevant. These empirical findings, of course, 
do not imply that using leverage as the only 
tool is a complete solution; nonetheless, the 
authors use these results to make a case for 
relatively greater reliance on simpler capi-
tal ratios, such as the leverage ratio, that are 
more difficult to circumvent.
Of course, a sole reliance on the lever-
age ratio, which is not risk-sensitive, could 
become problematic, as it could give banks 
an incentive to shift to riskier activities to 
boost returns. Therefore, it is important to 
take into account the relative riskiness of 
the various assets; however, views differ as 
to who should do it and how. Basel III has 
recognized the usefulness of basic leverage 
ratios and narrower (high-quality) measures 
of capital and has combined them with the 
risk-based ratios. 
Several authors have proposed to move 
even further. For example, Hellwig (2010) 
and Admati and Hellwig (2012) have been 
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The debate on these proposals is still ongo-
ing, so this is unlikely to be the last word. 
But most proposals argue that the regula-
tory framework should include well-defined 
capital and liquidity measures that are moni-
tored and enforced by a strong supervisory 
body, which should be held accountable for 
its activities. This need for strong enforce-
ment of regulatory rules should also include 
transparency and disclosure requirements 
(as pointed out, for example, by the Shadow 
Financial Regulatory Committee 2011). In 
other words, proposals suggest market dis-
cipline should become an important comple-
ment to the supervisory discipline provided 
by an independent but accountable supervi-
sory body (box 2.8). 
The issue of regulatory complexity is, 
of course, much broader than the capital 
requirements and the issue of risk weighting. 
The U.S. Shadow Regulatory Committee has 
long advocated simpler and more transpar-
ent regulations (Shadow Financial Regula-
tory Committee 2011). However, the broader 
incentive feature of a properly designed 
CoCo requirement would encourage effective 
risk governance by banks, provide a more 
effective solution to the too-big-to-fail prob-
lem, reduce forbearance risk (supervisory 
reluctance to recognize losses), and address 
uncertainty about the appropriate amount of 
capital banks need to hold (and the changes 
in that amount over time). Calomiris and 
Herring (2011) examine this proposal in 
detail, concluding that if a proper CoCo 
requirement had been in place in 2007, the 
disruptive failures of large financial institu-
tions, and the systemic meltdown after Sep-
tember 2008, could have been avoided. They 
note that, to be effective, (a) a large amount 
of CoCos relative to common equity should 
be required, (b) CoCo conversion should be 
based on a market value trigger, (c) all CoCos 
should convert if conversion is triggered, and 
(d) the conversion ratio should be dilutive of 
preexisting equity holders. However, how 
these untested instruments would actually 
perform in case of need remains to be seen.
BOX 2.8 Regulatory Discipline and Market Discipline: Opposites or Complements?
In a major precrisis study of banking regulation 
around the world, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) 
have used the data from the earlier versions of the 
World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervision Sur-
vey to examine the various regulatory approaches and 
compare them to the outcomes that countries care 
about. They concluded that the standard features of 
banking supervision and regulation do not reduce—
and may even increase—the chance that countries 
experience banking crises. Nor do these rules and 
regulations lead to more developed banking sectors or 
more efficient banks. These findings are, according to 
the authors, consistent with private interest views and 
the fact that “few countries have highly developed 
democratic institutions” (13). In contrast, policies 
that enable private markets to better monitor banks 
and that encourage private actors to “discipline” 
banks are associated with desirable outcomes. But 
critically, they found no link between market moni-
toring and the likelihood of a bank crisis.
The global financial crisis has highlighted fail-
ures both in regulatory and supervisory discipline 
as well as in market discipline. It has thrown a 
particularly unflattering light on market discipline, 
highlighting its intrinsic limitations, especially when 
key assumptions are not met. At the same time, the 
crisis has also highlighted the serious regulatory and 
supervisory failures that contributed to the crisis. 
In a recent paper, Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2012b) follow up on this analysis, using the crisis 
observations as well as data from the 2011 Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Survey database. The 
results of their analysis support a complementary 
role for regulation and market discipline, as high-
lighted recently by Haldane (2011). Market disci-
pline and state-imposed regulatory and supervisory 
discipline are complementary, since each has its own 
limitations, and market failures often have their 
roots in regulatory failures.
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that did not have a banking crisis in 2007 
through 2009—had more stringent defini-
tions of capital, higher capital levels, and less 
complex regulatory frameworks. They had 
stricter audit procedures, limits on related 
party exposures, and asset classification stan-
dards; and their supervisors were more likely 
to require shareholders to support distressed 
banks with new equity. Noncrisis countries 
were also characterized by better quality of 
financial information and greater incentives 
to use that information—among other rea-
sons, because they have relatively less gener-
ous deposit insurance coverage.
The global financial crisis has also trig-
gered a healthy policy debate on approaches 
to regulation and supervision. This ongoing 
debate among regulators, policy makers, and 
academics has led to multiple reform propos-
als, highlighting the diversity of views. This 
is likely to inform the regulatory reform pro-
cess and improve future outcomes.
This chapter reviewed the progress with 
regulatory reforms at the global level as well 
as in individual countries, and identified the 
advances made so far in many areas. It also 
recognized a number of reform proposals 
that suggest improvements on the current 
approaches to regulation and supervision. 
These proposals aim to limit regulatory arbi-
trage opportunities and better employ regu-
latory resources and capacity. Among the 
common themes of these proposals are calls 
for greater regulatory simplicity and trans-
parency as a way to enhance accountability, 
as well as for more proactive identifying and 
addressing of incentive problems.
noteS
 1. For example, Greenspan (2005, para. 17–19) 
remarked that “regulatory reform, coupled 
with innovative technologies, has stimulated 
the development of financial products, such 
as asset-backed securities, collateral loan 
obligations, and credit default swaps that 
facilitate the dispersion of risk. . . . These 
increasingly complex financial instruments 
have contributed to the development of a far 
more flexible, efficient, and hence resilient 
trend, confirmed also by the Bank Regula-
tion and Supervision Survey, is toward more 
complex regulations, not only in developed 
economies but also in developing economies. 
Various observers have pointed out the bur-
den of this new complexity for the industry;30 
but in many countries, especially the smaller 
and lower-income ones, this also adds sub-
stantially to the already existing capacity 
constraints. This complexity makes it more 
difficult for supervisors to ensure that regula-
tions are actually and effectively implemented 
and, importantly, for taxpayers to see what 
is being done to keep the system safe and to 
hold supervisors accountable. 
conclUSion 
Although the overall role of the state in 
finance is an open question, there is clearly 
an important role for the state in financial 
sector regulation and supervision. This is the 
one area where the role of the state is not in 
dispute; the real debate is over how to ensure 
that the role is performed well. 
Good regulation needs to better align pri-
vate incentives with public interest, without 
taxing or subsidizing private risk taking. 
Supervision is meant to ensure implementa-
tion of rules and regulations and to address 
limitations of market discipline.
The global financial crisis underscored 
limitations in both regulatory and market 
discipline. It emphasized the importance of 
combining strong, timely, and anticipatory 
supervisory enforcement with a better use 
of market discipline. It also highlighted the 
importance of the basics, that is, solid and 
transparent legal and institutional frame-
works to promote financial stability. In many 
developing economies, the conclusion is that 
building up supervisory capacity needs to be 
a top priority.
Lessons can be learned by analyzing regu-
lation and supervision in economies that were 
at the epicenter of the global financial crisis 
and those that were not. The World Bank’s 
new global survey, presented in this chap-
ter, suggests that noncrisis countries—those 
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poses. For example, U.S. supervisors did raise 
alarms about the risks of subprime lending, 
but a significant tightening of the pruden-
tial practices did not occur before the crisis, 
reflecting pressures from the industry and 
lawmakers (Levine 2010). Reviews of com-
pliance with the Basel Core Principles find 
that some of the weakest areas relate to the 
operational independence of the regulators, 
and that—despite some progress in recent 
years—this is still an issue in many develop-
ing economies (Čihák and Tieman 2011). 
13. For more on shadow banking and FSB-related 
response see FSB (2012).
14. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2011), using 
a wide international sample of banks, present 
evidence that casts doubts on the need for sys-
temically large banks even from the narrower 
perspective of bank shareholders. It suggests 
that bank growth has not been in the interest 
of bank shareholders in small economies, and 
it is not clear whether those in larger econo-
mies have benefited. Inadequate corporate 
governance structures in financial institutions 
have enabled managers to pursue high-growth 
strategies at the expense of shareholders, pro-
viding support for greater government regula-
tion (as also argued, for example, in Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 2012a).
15. The work of the FSB in this area is meant to 
make credible to all counterparts of a finan-
cial institution the possibility of its failure, so 
they exercise due monitoring on management 
and control of shareholders.
16. Another related, although less explored, facet 
of market discipline is the forced departure 
of managers from underperforming financial 
institutions. Schaeck and others (2011) find 
that when banks take on too much risk and 
get into trouble, their managers do get forced 
out. But it is often too late for the banks, 
which tend to remain in trouble for years 
after the turnover. 
17. For more on this subject, see also a recent 
debate between Rene Stulz of Ohio State 
University and Lucian Bebchuk of Harvard 
Law School and others at the “All About 
Finance” blog on the World Bank’s website. 
(http://blogs.worldbank.org/allaboutfinance/
the-aaf-virtual-debates).
18. Gaps and weaknesses in regulation and 
supervision were not the only factors con-
tributing to the crisis, as discussed earlier in 
this chapter, though they are expected to have 
financial system than the one that existed just 
a quarter-century ago.”
 2. See FSB Charter, article 1.
 3. This report uses a broad concept of “the 
state” that includes not only government but 
also autonomous or semiautonomous agen-
cies such as a central bank or financial super-
vision agency. 
 4. For example, Carmichel and Pomerleano 
(2002) and de la Torre, Ize, and Schmukler 
(2011).
 5. In addition to regulation, another state inter-
vention that can also have an impact on finan-
cial sector risk taking is financial taxation. It 
has received some policy attention during the 
crisis (see, for example, IMF 2010c). None-
theless, the regulatory approach is likely to 
remain central for practical policy in the fore-
seeable future, and is therefore the focus of this 
chapter (for a discussion of the pros and cons 
of regulation and taxation, see Keen 2011).
 6. Masciandaro, Pansini, and Quintyn (2011) 
provide an overview of the literature on the 
causes on the crisis, focusing on supervisory 
and regulatory failures.
 7. See the respective IMF country reports (IMF 
2010a; IMF 2012).
 8. Data on larger and more interconnected 
financial institutions show that they have 
been taking on more risk and have been more 
likely to experience financial stress than oth-
ers (Ötker-Robe and others 2011).
 9. Many banks, especially in advanced econo-
mies, held a relatively small part of capital 
as equity, with the remainder being in capital 
with weak loss-absorbing characteristics that 
had little value during the crisis. Given the 
large differences and lack of transparency in 
the definition of capital, it was hard to assess 
and compare the adequacy of capital across 
institutions.
10. Banks could reduce their risk capital require-
ments through shifts in assets to legally remote 
entities excluded from asset definitions, 
through credit default swaps that reduced the 
regulatory risks in their portfolio, or through 
credit enhancements that improved the rat-
ings of assets and thus the need to hold regu-
latory capital.
11. For example, the mandates of the United 
Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority and 
Switzerland’s Federal Banking Commission.
12. Even supervisors that are independent in 
principle can be overruled for political pur-
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the pros and cons of returning to unlimited 
liability for banks. Although such a move 
would almost certainly bring banks’ size 
down “with a bang” (as noted by Charles 
Goodhart in his March 1, 2012, debate 
with Robert Pringle at centralbanking.com), 
it would not be feasible in a contemporary 
financial system. 
26. For a broad overview of the underlying fac-
tors of financial crises, see de la Torre and Ize 
(2011). In addition to incentive breakdowns 
and asymmetric information, they also men-
tion issues of collective cognition (“nobody 
really understands what is going on”) and 
costly enforcement (“crises are a natural part 
of the financial landscape”).  
27. The long-running debate on rules versus 
principles in supervision (Mersch 2007) has 
been intensified by the crisis. In the context of 
this debate, for example, the incentive audits 
proposal calls for a greater emphasis on well-
defined principles. Specifically, the principles 
need to address the various misalignments in 
incentives, both among market participants 
and among regulators. But emphasizing well-
defined principles does not mean that one can 
do away with rules. Similarly, the proposal to 
focus on incentives does not mean abolishing 
microprudential supervision. Effective rules 
and efficient principles are both essential to 
promote financial integration and reinforce 
financial stability. It would be naive to think 
that principles applied on a stand-alone basis 
can eliminate the need for rules.
28. The intrinsic desirability of such a measure 
for financial stability purposes is far from 
undisputed, since the solvency analysis that 
creditors are expected to make would shift its 
focus from the bank per se to the personal 
wealth of the bank proprietors, which would 
probably prove to be a quite challenging task.
29. Interest rates on deposits could also be used 
because these too are associated with bank 
risk (Acharya and Mora 2012). However, 
deposit rates tend to be sensitive to bank risk 
only very close in time to bank insolvency 
because of explicit and implicit deposit insur-
ance.
30. For the United States, see for example, the 
Economist 2012; for the European Union, 
see, for example, Wall Street Journal 2011.
played an important role. Also, although 
systemic crisis prevention is not the only 
objective of regulation and supervision (for 
example, some regulations focus on customer 
protection, anti–money laundering, and so 
on), crisis prevention is usually seen as a 
key objective, so juxtaposing regulation and 
supervision in crisis and noncrisis countries 
does offer interesting insights. Nevertheless, 
users should note that these findings are cor-
relations, and do not imply causality.
19. This section does not aspire to be an all- 
inclusive compendium of all reforms. More 
work is ongoing or contemplated, for 
instance on accounting standards, shadow 
banking, financial supervision, and mar-
ket infrastructures. For more on these, see 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publications/r_111104.pdf.
20. See the Leaders’ statement after the Pittsburgh 
Summit in September 2009 (G-20 Leaders, 
2009).
21. See FSB (2011b). SIFIs are financial institu-
tions whose distress or disorderly failure, 
because of their size, complexity, and inter-
connectedness, would cause significant dis-
ruption to the wider financial system and 
economic activity. 
22. In addition to the four steps listed here, stron-
ger international standards for core financial 
market infrastructures are to be finalized in 
early 2012, aiming to reduce contagion risks 
when failures occur.
23. On May 31, 2012, the International Asso-
ciation of Insurance Supervisors released for 
public consultation its assessment method-
ology for identifying globally systemically 
important insurers (see http://www.iaisweb.
org/view/element_href.cfm?src=1/15384.
pdf). 
24. This report focuses on global trends. Recent 
regional reports of the World Bank provide 
related updates on regulatory and supervisory 
trends in individual regions, such as Latin 
America and the Caribbean (de la Torre, 
Ize, and Schmukler 2011) and Middle East 
and North Africa (Rocha, Arvai, and Farazi 
2011). 
25. Banks have not always operated with limited 
liability, pre-19th-century England being a 
case in point. Several authors have discussed 
3
the Role of the State in 
promoting bank competition
to future instability as a result of moral haz-
ard problems associated with too-big-to-fail 
institutions. Box 3.1 presents a recent debate 
on the relationship between competition and 
financial stability.
Another reason why competition mat-
ters is related to the changing mandate of 
central banks and bank regulatory agen-
cies. Although traditionally the primary goal 
of bank regulators has been to ensure bank 
stability, this is changing. According to the 
World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervi-
sion Survey, updated in 2011, 71 percent of 
The recent crisis reignited the interest of policy makers and academics in assess-ing bank competition and rethinking the 
role of the state in shaping competition policies 
(that is, policies and laws that affect the extent 
to which banks compete).1,2 Some believe that 
increases in competition and financial inno-
vation in markets such as subprime lending 
contributed to the recent financial turmoil. 
Others worry that the crisis and government 
support of the largest banks increased bank-
ing concentration, reducing competition and 
access to finance, and potentially contributing 
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•   Competition in the banking sector promotes efficiency and financial inclusion, with-
out necessarily undermining financial stability.  
•   Even if the recent crisis is perceived as an episode where competition exacerbated 
private risk taking and helped destabilize the system, the correct public policy is not 
to restrict competition. What is needed is a regulatory framework that ensures that 
private incentives are aligned with public interest. 
•   The state can play a role in enhancing banking competition by designing policies that 
guarantee market contestability through healthy entry of well-capitalized institutions 
and timely exit of insolvent ones and by creating a market-friendly informational and 
institutional framework.
•   Governments should be mindful of the consequences of their intervention during 
 crises and limit negative consequences on bank competition and risk taking.
82   t H e  R o l e  o f  t H e  s t a t e  i n  p R o m o t i n g  b a n k  c o m p e t i t i o n  GLOBAL finAnciAL DEVELOPMEnT REPORT 2013
BOX 3.1 Two Views on the Link between Competition and Stability
In a recent debate held by The Economist magazine, 
two banking professors expressed contrasting views 
about the role of bank competition in promoting 
stability. 
According to Franklin Allen, Nippon Life Pro-
fessor of Finance and Economics, Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania, “more competition does 
make banking more dangerous.” But he also cautions 
that “competition is only one of the factors contribut-
ing to instability.” He goes on to say that “the experi-
ence of a number of countries in the past and dur-
ing the recent crisis provides some insights into the 
relevant issues. Historically, the comparison that has 
often been made is between the stability of the Cana-
dian banking system compared to the United States’ 
experience. In the late 19th and early 20th century, 
the United States had many banking crises, while 
Canada did not. The standard explanation for this is 
that Canada had a few large banks, while the United 
States had many small banks. In the recent crisis, the 
banking system in Canada and also that in Australia 
were very resilient. Six banks dominate the Canadian 
financial system, while there are four major banks 
together with a few small domestic banks in Austra-
lia. However, the United Kingdom, whose banking 
system has a broadly similar structure to Australia’s, 
with four major banks and a few other small domes-
tic and foreign banks, had a very different experience. 
The lesson of this comparison is that competition is 
only one of the many factors that are important. In 
addition to the competitive nature of the industry, 
funding structure and the institutional and regulatory 
environments are important. These factors are well 
illustrated by the recent experience of Canada, Aus-
tralia, and the United Kingdom. Canadian and Aus-
tralian banks mainly relied on depositary funding. 
This funding source proved stable through the crisis. 
In contrast, British banks increasingly used wholesale 
funding from financial markets. Canada and Aus-
tralia also have much more conservative regulatory 
environments than the UK. For example, in Canada, 
capital regulation is stricter than the Basel agreements 
require. Banks’ foreign and wholesale activities are 
limited. The mortgage market is also conservative in 
terms of the products offered, with less than 3 percent 
being subprime and less than 30 percent being securi-
tized. In the UK a ‘light touch’ regulatory framework 
was implemented. An illustration is that capital ratios 
were weakened by banks’ off balance sheet vehicles, 
which were used to hold securitized assets.”
On the other hand, Thorsten Beck, Professor of 
Economics and Chairman of the European Banking 
Center at Tilburg University, argues that “compe-
tition in banking is not dangerous per se; it is the 
regulatory framework in which banks operate and 
which sets their risk-taking incentives that drives 
stability or fragility of banking. Competition can 
be a powerful source of useful innovation and effi-
ciency, ultimately benefitting enterprises and house-
holds; competition can also foster stability through 
improved lending technologies; competition, how-
ever, can also endanger stability if mixed with the 
wrong kind of regulation.”
“Risks and dangers in banking arise primarily 
from a regulatory framework that is not adapted 
to the market structure. Large financial institutions 
turn too-big-to-fail because the regulator does not 
have any means to properly discipline and resolve 
them. Similarly, competition results in herding and 
increased fragility risk in the absence of macro-pru-
dential tools to counter asset price and credit booms 
and take into account co-variation between banks’ 
risk profiles. The experience from the last crisis has 
led to reform attempts exactly in these two areas: 
resolution, especially of systemically important 
financial institutions, and macro-prudential regula-
tion. It is thus not market structure or competition 
per se, that drives fragility, but a regulatory frame-
work that sets the wrong incentives.”
“The challenge is to maintain competition in the 
market to the benefit of the real economy, while at 
the same time creating a regulatory framework that 
minimizes the negative implications that competi-
tion can have for stability. Such a framework would 
include additional capital charges for size, com-
plexity and systemic importance of banks, macro-
prudential regulations that take into account the 
interaction between financial institutions, and—
most critically—a resolution framework that allows 
resolving even the largest financial institutions, thus 
reducing the perverse incentives stemming from a 
too-big-to-fail status.”
This discussion suggests that both sides share 
more in common than they disagree with, but see 
Economist 2012 http://www.economist.com/debate/
days/view/706 for more. 
Source: The Economist 2012 (reprinted with permission). 
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and bank pricing behavior. It then reviews 
the evidence on the implications of banking 
competition for bank efficiency, access to 
finance, and financial stability. After that, the 
chapter analyzes the policy drivers of compe-
tition and highlights the role of the state as 
a regulator and enabler of a market-friendly 
informational and institutional environment. 
It also examines the impact on competition 
of government actions during crises. The 
chapter concludes by summarizing the policy 
implications. 
bank competition: 
meaSURement anD 
StylizeD FactS
There are three main approaches to assess-
ing bank competition: measures of bank 
concentration under the “structure-conduct-
performance” paradigm, regulatory indica-
tors that measure the contestability of the 
banking sector, and direct measures of bank 
pricing behavior or market power based on 
the “new empirical industrial organization” 
literature. 
An alternative approach used by some 
studies to analyze bank competition is based 
on interest spread decomposition (box 3.2). 
But spreads are outcome measures of effi-
ciency, and in addition to the competition 
environment, cross-country differences in 
spreads can reflect macroeconomic perfor-
mance, the extent of taxation on financial 
intermediation, the quality of the contractual 
and judicial environment, and bank-specific 
factors such as scale and risk preferences. So 
this chapter instead presents direct measures 
such as the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, the 
Lerner index, and the so-called Boone indica-
tor. Box 3.3 summarizes these measures.4
Competition may vary within economies 
and across products (for example, by type of 
loan, such as corporate or consumer). Ideally, 
competition should be measured by business 
line for different markets (box 3.4). But such 
disaggregated data are often not available, 
and most measures cannot be computed sep-
arately for these submarkets. Accordingly, in 
what follows, country and regional measures 
bank regulators report that their mandate 
also includes promoting financial inclusion 
and economic development. Also, 65 percent 
mention issues of market conduct, and nearly 
25 percent mention competition policy. 
Hence, either directly or indirectly—because 
competition influences market conduct and 
access to finance—competition is an impor-
tant issue for regulators.3
This chapter presents measures of bank 
competition and describes basic trends across 
economies and over time. By illustrating 
various approaches to measuring competi-
tion and discussing factors that drive it, the 
chapter seeks to provide guidance to policy 
makers.
The chapter conveys four main messages: 
•  Bank  competition  improves  efficiency 
across banks and enhances access to finan-
cial services, while not necessarily eroding 
the stability of the financial system.
•  Policies to address the causes of the recent 
crisis should not restrict competition. The 
correct public policy should establish a 
regulatory framework that supervises and 
ensures the alignment of private incentives 
with public interest.
•  The  state  should promote  competition 
both as a regulator and as an enabler of a 
market-friendly informational and institu-
tional environment. Policies that improve 
market contestability—through healthy 
entry of well-capitalized institutions and 
timely exit of insolvent ones, opportune 
flow of adequate credit information, and 
contract enforceability—will enhance 
competition among banks.
•  State interventions during crises may cre-
ate barriers to exit that permit insolvent 
and inefficient banks to survive and gener-
ate unhealthy competition. Governments 
should take steps to eliminate distortions 
in risk taking and limit their negative con-
sequences on bank competition. 
The chapter first discusses alternative 
measures of competition and presents trends 
across economies and over time, using mea-
sures of market concentration, contestability, 
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region have the largest CR5 concentration 
ratios (figure 3.2).
Concentration measures are not good pre-
dictors of competition.5 The predictive accu-
racy of concentration measures on banking 
competition is challenged by the concept of 
market contestability. The behavior of banks 
in contestable markets is determined by 
threat of entry and exit. Banks are pressured 
to behave competitively in an industry with 
low entry restrictions on new banks and easy 
exit conditions for unprofitable institutions—
even if the market is concentrated.
Figure 3.3 depicts two (admittedly imper-
fect) proxies of regulatory indicators that 
capture entry conditions into the banking 
industry: an index of barriers to entry and 
the share of banking licenses denied. These 
two indicators are from the World Bank’s 
Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, 
and they capture entry restrictions into the 
are used to illustrate different approaches to 
assessing bank competition.
The structure-conduct-performance para-
digm assumes that there is a stable, causal 
relationship between the structure of the 
banking industry, firm conduct, and perfor-
mance. It suggests that fewer and larger firms 
are more likely to engage in anticompetitive 
behavior. In this framework, competition is 
negatively related to measures of concentra-
tion, such as the share of assets held by the 
top three or five largest banks and the Her-
findahl index.
Figure 3.1 depicts the asset share of the 
five largest banks (CR5) in developed and 
developing economies, showing that banking 
systems are more concentrated in developing 
than developed economies. Across regions, 
banking systems in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) coun-
tries of the Middle East and North Africa 
BOX 3.2 Decomposing Bank Spreads to Make inferences about Bank Competition
Bank interest spreads are frequently used as an indi-
cator of the efficiency of the banking system (Beck 
and Fuchs 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
1999; Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine 2004). 
An accounting decomposition of bank spreads or 
of interest margins (the value of a bank’s net inter-
est income divided by assets) can be derived from a 
straightforward accounting identity:
Before-tax profits to assets (BTP/TA) = After-tax 
profits to assets (ATP/TA) + taxes to assets (TA/A)
From a bank’s income statement, before-tax profits 
must satisfy the accounting identity:
BTP/TA = NI/TA + NII/TA – OV/TA – LLP/TA
where NI is net interest income, NII refers to non-
interest income, OV stands for overhead costs, and 
LLP refers to loan loss provisioning. The identities 
above allow for a decomposition of net interest mar-
gins (NI/TA) into its components:
NI/TA = ATP/TA + TA/A − NII/TA + OV/TA + LLP/TA
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Beck 
and Fuchs (2004) follow the identities above to con-
duct an accounting decomposition and an economic 
analysis of the determinants of bank net interest 
margins using data for 80 countries between 1988–
95, in the first case, and focusing on 38 banks in 
Kenya for the year 2002, in the second case.
To the extent that high spreads are explained by 
high profit margins, these studies infer that lack of 
competition could be a factor. In the economic anal-
ysis of spreads, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) 
regress spreads and profits on measures of concen-
tration (as an indicator of competition) and conclude 
that, aside from other factors, lack of bank compe-
tition drives bank spreads and profits across coun-
tries. Similarly, Beck and Fuchs (2004) conclude that 
the high profit margins that explain part of the high 
spreads in Kenya are due to lack of competition in 
the banking sector.
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The competitive environment of the 
banking system can also be affected by 
the strategic reactions of banks. The new 
empirical industrial organization literature 
provides three indicators of banks’ pricing 
behavior.6
First, the H-statistic measures the elastic-
ity of banks’ revenues relative to input prices 
(Panzar and Rosse 1982, 1987). Under per-
fect competition, an increase in input prices 
raises both marginal costs and total revenues 
by the same amount, and hence the H-statis-
tic equals 1. Under a monopoly, an increase 
banking industry. The first indicator, an 
overall index of barriers to entry, summa-
rizes the information needed to obtain a 
banking license. Higher index values indicate 
more stringent requirements for bank entry. 
The second indicator of contestability is the 
share of applications for bank licenses that 
were denied. Regulations concerning entry 
to the banking sector are, on average, more 
stringent in developing economies than in 
developed ones. Between 2001 and 2010, the 
share of denied banking licenses declined for 
both groups of countries. 
BOX 3.3 Measuring Banking Sector Concentration and Competition
Banking concentration can be approximated by the 
concentration ratio—the share of assets held by the k 
largest banks (typically three or five) in a given econ-
omy—or the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), 
the sum of the squared market share of each bank in 
the system. The HHI accounts for the market share 
of all banks in the system and assigns a larger weight 
to the biggest banks. Instead, concentration ratios 
completely ignore the smaller banks in the system. 
The concentration ratio varies between nearly 0 and 
100. The HHI has values up to 10,000. If there is 
only a single bank that has 100 percent of the mar-
ket share, the HHI would be 10,000. If there were a 
large number of market participants with each bank 
having a market share of almost 0 percent, the HHI 
would be close to zero. 
The Panzar and Rosse (1982, 1987) H-statistic 
captures the elasticity of bank interest revenues to 
input prices. The H-statistic is calculated in two steps:
1. Running a regression of the log of gross total rev-
enues (or the log of interest revenues) on log mea-
sures of banks’ input prices.
2. Adding the estimated coefficients for each input 
price. Input prices include the price of depos-
its (commonly measured as the ratio of interest 
expenses to total deposits), the price of personnel 
(as captured by the ratio of personnel expenses to 
assets), and the price of equipment and fixed capi-
tal (approximated by the ratio of other operating 
and administrative expenses to total assets).
Higher values of the H-statistic are associated 
with more competitive banking systems. Under a 
monopoly, an increase in input prices results in a rise 
in marginal costs, a fall in output, and a decline in 
revenues (because the demand curve is downward 
sloping), leading to an H-statistic less than or equal 
to 0. Under perfect competition, an increase in input 
prices raises both marginal costs and total revenues 
by the same amount (since the demand curve is per-
fectly elastic); hence, the H-statistic will equal 1. 
A frequently used measure of markups in bank-
ing is the Lerner index, defined as the difference 
between output prices and marginal costs (relative 
to prices). Prices are calculated as total bank revenue 
over assets, whereas marginal costs are obtained 
from an estimated translog cost function with 
respect to output. Higher values of the Lerner index 
signal less bank competition.
The Boone indicator measures the effect of effi-
ciency on performance in terms of profits. It is calcu-
lated as the elasticity of profits to marginal costs. To 
calculate this elasticity, the log of a measure of prof-
its (such as return on assets) is regressed against a 
log measure of marginal costs. The elasticity is cap-
tured by the coefficient on log marginal costs, which 
are typically calculated from the first derivative of a 
translog cost function. The main idea of the Boone 
indicator is that more-efficient banks achieve higher 
profits. The more negative the Boone indicator is, 
the higher the level of competition is in the market, 
because the effect of reallocation is stronger. 
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in input prices results in a rise in marginal 
costs, a fall in output, and a decline in rev-
enues, leading to an H-statistic less than or 
equal to 0. Panzar and Rosse (1987) show 
that when H is between 0 and 1, the system 
operates under monopolistic competition. 
In general, the H-statistic is interpreted as a 
measure of the degree of competition in the 
banking market.7
Second, the Lerner index captures the dif-
ference between output prices and marginal 
costs of production—that is, the markup of 
output prices over marginal costs (Lerner 
1934).8 
Finally, the Boone indicator is based on 
the association between firm performance 
and efficiency (Boone 2001; Boone, Griffith, 
and Harrison 2005; Hay and Liu 1997). See 
box 3.3 for further details on the calculation 
BOX 3.4  Analyzing Bank Competition using Disaggregated Business Line Data: 
evidence from Brazil
Urdapilleta and Stephanou (2009) use disaggregated 
business data for banks in Brazil to analyze the driv-
ers of bank revenues, costs, and risks in the retail 
and corporate segments. The study allocates rev-
enues, costs, and all other line items in the financial 
statements of the banking system into different busi-
ness lines. This approach results in financial state-
ments and ratios by business line. Other public data 
sources were used and assumptions made to estimate 
notional financial statements for each business line. 
Interviews with senior management served as a con-
sistency check on the overall methodology.
A key finding of the analysis is that the retail 
banking segment has significantly higher returns (39 
percent) than the corporate segment (16 percent), 
despite being riskier and costlier. In particular, 
higher lending rates and fees more than compensate 
for additional expenses.
The study argues that one of the reasons for 
lower profitability in the corporate sector is the 
higher degree of competition among providers in the 
segment. In particular, the study mentions how the 
existence of more substitute providers (like capital 
markets or overseas banks) in the corporate sector 
keeps loan rates and fees lower. Similarly, the study 
cites easier access to credit information for large cor-
porations as another reason why competition in this 
segment is higher.
Among the policies that can foster competition 
in the retail segment, the study mentions promoting 
the portability of bank accounts, permitting positive 
credit information sharing, and expanding payment 
system interconnection. All these allow customers to 
switch banks more easily and, therefore, force banks 
to compete more actively. 
The study illustrates how differences across mar-
ket segments, which tend to be averaged out in an 
aggregate analysis, need to be taken into account 
when designing public policy in banking. The study 
also highlights that a great deal of in-depth knowl-
edge of the banking sector is required to be able to 
use the practitioner approach to obtaining profitabil-
ity measures by business line and to be able to assess 
bank competition across market segments.
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Source: calculations based on bankscope (database).
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indicator, a measure of the effect of effi-
ciency on performance in terms of profits. 
An increase in the Lerner index or the Boone 
indicator indicates a deterioration of the com-
petitive conduct of financial intermediaries. 
Banking competition in developed economies 
deteriorated initially (1996–2003), increased 
in the run-up to the global financial crisis 
(2004–08), and worsened afterward (2009–
10). The initial deterioration could be associ-
ated with the drop in competition observed 
in the euro area after the adoption of the 
European Monetary Union (Sun 2011) and in 
line with findings of less competitive behav-
ior of banks in large and integrated financial 
markets (Bikker and Spierdijk 2008).9
It is important to note that the simple 
observation that competition increased 
before the crisis does not necessarily suggest 
that greater competition in itself spurred the 
crisis. Recent studies suggest the problem was 
that the increase in competition occurred in 
an environment where regulation and super-
vision were too lax and incentives for ade-
quate risk management were missing (Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 2012; Caprio, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Kane 2010).
On the other hand, the financial cri-
sis—and the subsequent policy responses by 
of these pricing indicators of banking 
competition.
Figure 3.4 depicts the H-statistic for 
developed and developing economies. Bank 
pricing behavior was more sensitive to 
changes in the price of inputs among devel-
oped compared with developing economies 
in 1996–2007, indicating that banking 
systems in developed economies behave 
more competitively. But bank competition 
declined in 2008–10 for developed econo-
mies, while it improved for developing econ-
omies. It can be argued that the declining 
trend in developed economies may be attrib-
uted to the implications on industry struc-
ture and competitive conduct of the recent 
systemic banking crisis and its associated 
large-scale policy responses. 
Figure 3.5 examines the competitive 
behavior of banking systems across develop-
ing regions. Latin America has the systems 
with the highest sensitivity of output to input 
prices, whereas those in the Middle East and 
North Africa appear to be the least competi-
tive (see box 3.5 for further details). 
Figure 3.6 shows the evolution of the 
Lerner index, a measure of market power 
that compares output pricing and marginal 
costs (that is, markup), as well as the Boone 
FiguRe 3.2 Five Bank Concentration Ratio (CR5): Developing Regions, Median Values, 1996–2010
Source: calculations based on bankscope (database).
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and Spain). The Lerner index and the Boone 
indicator for developing economies evolve in 
a similar fashion, with a smoother trend in 
the Boone indicator than the Lerner index. 
Deterioration of bank competition may 
have taken place in spite of financial reforms 
across developing economies—especially in 
governments—may have affected the com-
petitive conduct of financial intermediaries 
in developed economies.10 Sun (2011) finds 
that bank competition in developed econo-
mies deteriorated during this period, espe-
cially in countries that had large credit and 
housing booms (such as the United States 
FiguRe 3.3 Regulatory indicators of Market Contestability
Sources: calculations based on bank Regulation and supervision survey (database), world bank, 2007 data; barth, caprio, and levine 2001, 2004, 2006; 
cˇihák and others 2012.
Note: the index of entry into banking requirements captures whether various types of legal submissions are required to obtain a banking license. Higher 
scores indicate greater restrictions on entry into banking. on the other hand, the share of denied licenses is the ratio of denied to total license requests.
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with variability across geographical regions 
(figure 3.7). Though GCC countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa display the 
least competitive banking systems, Latin 
American banking systems have the most 
competitive systems in developing regions.
the impact oF competition 
on the bankinG SyStem
Competition affects the banking industry 
along three dimensions: efficiency, access to 
finance, and stability.
Competition and banking efficiency
There are two views on the direction of cau-
sality between competition and efficiency. 
The “quiet life” hypothesis argues that 
monopoly power allows banks to relax their 
efforts and increases their costs, predicting a 
positive link from competition to efficiency 
(Hicks 1935). Alternatively, the “efficient 
structure” hypothesis predicts a negative 
relationship between competition and effi-
ciency, where causality runs from efficiency 
to competition (Demsetz 1973). According 
to this view, better managed, more efficient 
firms can secure the largest market shares, 
countries with weak institutions (low bureau-
cratic quality and low transparency) and low 
levels of economic development (Delis 2012). 
The Lerner index and Boone indicator in 
developing country regions mimic the aver-
age for developing economies—although 
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Source: world bank staff, based on bankscope (database).
Note: ols = ordinary least squares.
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BOX 3.5 Banking Competition in the Middle east and North Africa
Banking sectors in the Middle East and North 
Africa region (MENA) are among the deepest in 
the developing world (see table B3.5), but are they 
competitive? 
Anzoategui, Martínez Pería, and Rocha (2010) 
analyze bank competition in the region in four dif-
ferent ways. First, the study analyzes two distinct 
measures of competition, the H-statistic and the 
Lerner index, over a longer period of time, 1994–
2008. Second, the paper examines the behavior of 
competition in the region and tests for differences 
across two subperiods: 1994–2001 and 2002–08. 
Third, the paper compares the extent of banking 
sector competition in the region to that observed in 
other regions of the developing world. Finally, the 
paper analyzes the factors that explain differences 
in competition between MENA and other regions.
The estimations of the H-statistic and the Lerner 
index show that banking sectors in MENA operate 
under monopolistic competition. Comparisons over 
time indicate that competition within MENA, both 
among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries 
and non-GCC economies, has not improved and, in 
many cases, worsened. 
Relative to other regions, MENA is lagging 
behind in terms of bank competition. The evaluation 
of the factors explaining differences in banking sec-
tor competition between MENA and other regions 
suggests that a worse credit information environ-
ment and stricter regulations and practices govern-
ing bank entry are at least partly to blame.
TABLe B3.5.1  Competition in MeNA and across Regions
H-statistics Lerner index
Regions (1994–2008) (2002–08) (1994–2008) (2002–08)
Middle East and North Africa 0.520 0.482 0.320 0.373
 GCC countries 0.497 0.470 0.360 0.435
 Non-GCC countries 0.528 0.508 0.241 0.258
 p-value GCC = non-GCC 0.640 0.640 0.050 0.010
East Asia and Pacific 0.614 0.584 0.230 0.265
p-value East Asia and Pacific = GCC 0.070 0.120 0 0
p-value East Asia and Pacific = non-GCC 0.020 0.140 0.810 0.890
Eastern Europe 0.685 0.694 0.182 0.196
p-value Eastern Europe = GCC 0 0 0 0
p-value Eastern Europe = non-GCC 0 0 0.240 0.240
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.743 0.765 0.215 0.234
p-value Latin America and the Caribbean = GCC 0 0 0 0
p-value Latin America and the Caribbean = non-GCC 0 0 0.580 0.630
Former Soviet Union 0.659 0.669 0.271 0.266
p-value Former Soviet Union = GCC 0.010 0 0 0
p-value Former Soviet Union = non-GCC 0 0 0.520 0.860
South Asia 0.710 0.677 0.244 0.272
p-value South Asia = GCC 0 0.010 0.020 0
p-value South Asia = non-GCC 0 0 0.970 0.800
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.521 0.518 0.223 0.169
p-value Sub-Saharan Africa = GCC 0.700 0.510 0.040 0.020
p-value Sub-Saharan Africa = non-GCC 0.830 0.850 0.810 0.450
Note: gcc = gulf cooperation council, mena = middle east and north africa.
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asymmetries and agency costs, competition 
can reduce access by making it more dif-
ficult for banks to internalize the returns 
from investing in lending, in particular, with 
opaque clients.13
Most of the empirical studies on this 
question used concentration as a measure 
leading to more concentration and less 
competition.
Although studies that examine the link 
between concentration and efficiency find 
mixed results,11 the overwhelming major-
ity of recent empirical studies conclude that 
competition brings about improvements in 
efficiency in both developed and developing 
economies. Using data for more than 14,000 
banks operating in Europe and the United 
States, Schaeck and Čihák (2008) find a 
positive effect of competition on profit and 
cost efficiency. Similarly, using a technique 
to obtain joint estimates of efficiency and 
market power among banks in the European 
Monetary Union, Delis and Tsionas (2009) 
find a negative relationship, which is in line 
with the quiet life hypothesis.
Comparable findings are obtained when 
the sample of economies is extended to 
include developing economies. Using data on 
net interest margins and overhead costs for 
over 1,400 banks in 72 developed and devel-
oping economies, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, 
and Levine (2004) find that tighter regula-
tions on bank entry and bank activities lead 
to higher costs of financial intermediation. 
Lin, Ma, and Song (2010) find a similar 
result for 2,500 banks operating in 74 econ-
omies. Finally, focusing on 60 developing 
economies, Turk-Ariss (2010) finds a signifi-
cant negative association between bank mar-
ket power (as measured by the Lerner index) 
and cost efficiency.12
Overall, the literature examining the link 
between direct measures of competition and 
efficiency suggests that more bank competi-
tion increases bank efficiency in both devel-
oped and developing economies.
Competition and access to finance
Theory makes ambiguous predictions regard-
ing the effect of competition on access to 
finance. The conventional market power 
hypothesis argues that competition in the 
banking market reduces the cost of finance 
and increases the availability of credit. On 
the other hand, the information hypothesis 
posits that in the presence of information 
FiguRe 3.6 Bank Competition: Developed vs. Developing 
economies
Source: calculations based on bankscope (database).
Note: lerner index estimations follow the methodology described in demirgüç-kunt and martínez 
pería (2010). the regional estimates for the lerner index are based on the median of bank esti-
mates within the region. boone indicator estimations follow the methodology used by schaeck 
and cˇihák (2010a) with a modification to use marginal costs instead of average costs. data are 
pooled by region in order to estimate the regional boone indicator. boone indicator data are not 
shown for sub-saharan africa because of a lack of adequate data
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banking sectors.15 Using data on growth in 
value added from 1980–90 for 16 countries, 
and measuring competition at the country-
level (using the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic), 
Claessens and Laeven (2005) find that com-
petition is positively associated with indus-
trial growth. They suggest that competi-
tive banking sectors are better at providing 
financing to financially dependent firms.
Exploiting a rich dataset on small and 
medium-sized enterprises in Spain, Carbó-
Valverde, Rodríguez-Fernández, and Udell 
(2009) also find evidence that competition 
promotes access to finance, using the Lerner 
index.16 In sum, similar to the findings on 
the link between competition and efficiency, 
the evidence that measures bank competition 
directly suggests that competition is ben-
eficial for the banking sector. In particular, 
bank competition enhances access to credit.
Competition and banking stability 
Competing theories explain the link between 
competition and stability.17 The traditional 
view predicts that competitive banking sys-
tems are less stable because competition 
reduces bank profits and erodes the char-
ter value of banks, consequently increasing 
incentives for excessive risk taking (Chan, 
Greenbaum, and Thakor 1986; Keeley 1990; 
Marcus 1984). Furthermore, in more com-
petitive environments, banks earn lower 
informational rents from their relationship 
with borrowers, reducing their incentives to 
properly screen borrowers, again increasing 
the risk of fragility (Allen and Gale 2000, 
2004; Boot and Greenbaum 1993). Competi-
tion can also destabilize the banking sector 
through its impact on the interbank market 
and the payments system.
For example, if all banks are price-takers 
in a competitive market, banks have no incen-
tives to provide liquidity to a troubled bank, 
leading to bank failure, and creating negative 
repercussions for the entire sector (Allen and 
Gale 2000). A somewhat different argument 
in support of the competition-fragility view 
is that more concentrated banking systems 
have larger banks, which in turn allow them 
to diversify their portfolios better. A final 
of competition, obtaining mixed results.14 
But studies that focus on direct measures 
of competition and contestability show that 
access to finance is easier in more competitive 
FiguRe 3.7 Bank Competition across Developing Regions
Source: calculations based on bankscope (database).
Note: lerner index estimations follow the methodology described in demirgüç-kunt and martínez 
pería (2010). the regional estimates for the lerner index are based on the median of bank esti-
mates within the region. boone indicator estimations follow the methodology used by schaeck 
and cˇihák (2010a) with a modification to use marginal costs instead of average costs. data are 
pooled by region in order to estimate the regional boone indicator. boone indicator data are not 
shown for sub-saharan africa because of a lack of adequate data.
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2007a) find that more competitive banking 
systems (defined as those with fewer regula-
tory restrictions on bank entry and activities) 
are less likely to suffer systemic banking dis-
tress. This finding is confirmed by Schaeck, 
Čihák, and Wolfe (2009), who find a negative 
relationship between bank competition and 
systemic bank fragility using the H-statistic 
to measure competition. Schaeck and Čihák 
(2010b) identify bank capitalization as one 
of the channels through which competition 
fosters stability. Using data for more than 
2,600 European banks, they show that banks 
have higher capital ratios in more competitive 
environments. This is consistent with Berger, 
Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009), who find 
that banks in more competitive banking sys-
tems take greater lending risks, but compen-
sate with a higher capital-asset ratio, result-
ing in an overall lower level of bank risk, as 
measured by the z-score. 
Measures of bank risk, such as the 
z-score, ignore systemic stability, but regu-
lators are concerned with systemic stabil-
ity much more than the absolute level of 
risk of individual banks. In a recent paper, 
Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Zhu (2012) 
introduce a new measure of systemic risk 
taking by banks. Using Merton’s 1973 con-
tingent claim pricing framework, they cal-
culate the default probability for each bank 
in the system. They measure systemic risk 
as the codependence in default probability 
across banks. After controlling for various 
bank- and country-level variables, Anginer, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Zhu (2012) find a posi-
tive relationship between competition and 
systemic stability. They also show that lack 
of competition (as measured by the Lerner 
index) has a more adverse effect on systemic 
stability in countries with low levels of for-
eign ownership, weak investor protection, 
generous safety nets, and weak regulation 
and supervision.
The advantages of competition in an effi-
cient and inclusive financial system are sig-
nificant. Recent studies provide evidence 
questioning the conventional view that com-
petition is bad for stability. Importantly, 
policy bodies such as the OECD Competition 
Committee have suggested that to promote 
argument refers to the number of banks to be 
supervised. Given that a more concentrated 
banking system typically implies a smaller 
number of banks, this might reduce the 
supervisory burden and enhance the overall 
stability of the banking system. 
The competition-stability view argues 
that market power in banking boosts prof-
its and stability, yet ignores the potential 
impact of market power on borrower behav-
ior (Boyd and de Nicoló 2005). Because 
banks in less competitive sectors can charge 
higher interest rates, this may induce firms 
to assume greater risk—resulting in a 
higher probability that loans become non-
performing. Similarly, higher interest rates 
might attract riskier borrowers through the 
adverse selection effect. Thus, in contrast 
to the charter-value hypothesis, the com-
petition-stability view predicts that bank 
actions will result in more risk taking and 
greater fragility in more concentrated and 
less competitive banking systems. Advo-
cates of the competition-stability view also 
disagree with the notion that concentrated 
banking systems are easier to monitor than 
less concentrated banking systems with 
many banks, since larger banks can be more 
complex and, hence, harder to supervise. 
The early empirical literature on the link 
between competition and stability is mixed. 
Some country studies have shown that 
increasing competition leads to greater indi-
vidual bank risk taking.18 In the context of 
the U.S. subprime crisis, Dell’Ariccia, Igan, 
and Laeven (2012) document that the rapid 
growth of credit in U.S. mortgage markets 
in the run-up to the crisis was accompanied 
by a reduction in lending standards (lower 
loan application denial rates), which they 
argue was in part explained by the entry of 
new and large lending institutions. How-
ever, some previous studies failed to find that 
larger banks are less likely to fail as would be 
predicted by the competition-fragility view 
(Boyd and Graham 1991, 1996; Boyd and 
Runkle 1993; De Nicoló 2000).
On the other hand, studies using cross-
country, time-series data sets offer evidence 
supporting the competition-stability view. 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006, 
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practices, the state can shape the information 
environment and influence the extent of bank 
competition.
The institutional environment can also 
have an impact on bank competition. For 
example, to the extent that corruption is ram-
pant in the economy, there will be less scope 
for a level playing field in the financial sector, 
and competition will suffer as a result. Simi-
larly, to the degree that creditor rights are not 
protected, there will be less incentive for new 
banks to enter the banking sector. The state 
directly influences the institutional environ-
ment by the laws that it promotes and the 
extent to which it upholds compliance.
All else being equal, the entry of foreign 
banks and the presence of nonbank interme-
diaries are likely to affect bank competition. 
Foreign banks often bring new technologies 
and new products to banking sectors, creat-
ing an incentive for local banks to compete. 
Similarly, the presence of a liquid stock mar-
ket or other financial intermediaries that can 
provide financing to firms is likely to foster 
competition in the banking sector, because 
banks will have to compete to provide finan-
cial services to firms. Once again, the state 
has a role to play here by introducing regula-
tions and practices that foster the entry and 
operation of nonbank competitors. 
Finally, government ownership of banks 
can also affect bank competition. On the 
one hand, government banks can spur com-
petition if (because they typically do not 
maximize profits) they push other banks to 
lower prices. On the other hand, if govern-
ment banks dominate the system and other 
banks are crowded out, competition falls. 
Box 3.6 shows that banking systems are 
more competitive in countries with lower 
entry barriers, greater foreign bank par-
ticipation, and more developed capital mar-
kets (which are also associated with greater 
development of nonbank financial interme-
diaries).20 Greater information disclosure, 
as captured by depth of credit information, 
also promotes competition. Box 3.7, on the 
other hand, highlights the importance of 
consumer protection measures to enhance 
banking competition.
banking stability, policy makers should 
design and apply better regulations and 
supervisory practices rather than limit bank 
competition (OECD 2010). 
DRiveRS oF bank competition 
The main drivers of competition are entry 
and exit policies, underlying information and 
institutional environment, and competitive 
pressures in the financial sector.19 The state 
can directly influence all three. The state 
can also affect bank competition by owning 
banks. Box 3.6 analyzes the determinants of 
banking competition across economies. 
Entry and exit policies in banking are 
important for competition because they keep 
incumbents on their toes. The threat of entry 
and exit to the industry forces banks to worry 
about providing good, affordable products 
and limits their ability to exercise market 
power. Entry policies include regulations on 
licensing, as well as the practice by regulators 
of approving new licenses. Exit policies refer 
to regulations as well as the measures taken 
by regulators to close insolvent banks. The 
state can directly affect bank competition by 
promoting policies and practices that facili-
tate bank entry and exit. A delicate balance 
needs to be struck where regulators foster 
contestability (to streamline requirements for 
bank licensing, speed up the licensing pro-
cess, and implement efficient bank resolution) 
without jeopardizing bank stability (that is, 
maintaining a licensing process that keeps 
out unfit bankers). 
Access to credit history information about 
potential borrowers also facilitates compe-
tition in the banking sector. Dell’Ariccia, 
Friedman, and Marquez (1999) show that to 
the extent that access to credit information 
is restricted, incumbent banks are better able 
to exercise market power and limit competi-
tion. At the same time, greater disclosure of 
information regarding the terms of banking 
products will generate greater awareness by 
bank clients and promote bank competi-
tion. By promoting the establishment and 
operation of credit bureaus and by having in 
place consumer protection regulations and 
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holidays, provide blanket guarantees, inject 
capital, increase deposit insurance coverage 
limits, and extend liquidity support to banks 
on an unprecedented scale (Laeven and Valen-
cia 2008, 2010). During tranquil periods, the 
competitive effects of rescue operations on 
individual banks (such as capital injections, 
State inteRventionS 
DURinG cRiSeS anD bankinG 
competition
During crises, governments, central banks, 
and other authorities in charge of the super-
vision and regulation of financial institu-
tions introduce deposit freezes, declare bank 
BOX 3.6 An econometric Analysis of Drivers of Bank Competition
The Lerner index is used as the summary measure 
of competition across 83 countries and is regressed 
against variables capturing the following: 
1. Entry and exit policies in the banking sector.
2. The information and institutional environments.
3. Competitive pressures from within and outside the 
banking sector. Bank-level Bankscope data for the 
period 2000–10 are used to compute the Lerner 
index for all countries with at least five banks. 
The first group of barriers to entry comprise mea-
sures such as the number of documents and proce-
dures required to obtain a banking license, the per-
centage of denied applications for banking licenses, 
and the minimum entry capital required for banks. 
The second group includes a synthetic indicator of 
activity restrictions that captures a bank’s ability to 
engage in activities other than banking (say, securi-
ties, insurance, or real estate). Higher values of this 
index represent greater restrictions. Both indexes are 
constructed with data from the World Bank 2006 
Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey. 
The availability of credit history information is 
captured by the depth of credit information index 
gathered from Doing Business (see http://www.
doingbusiness.org). This index takes values from 0 
to 6, and higher values indicate greater availability 
of information. The extent to which the government 
requires that financial institutions disclose informa-
tion about financial contracts to potential users of 
this service is measured by an index on the strict-
ness of financial contract disclosure requirements, 
which was constructed based on questions from 
the World Bank Regulation and Supervision Sur-
vey. This contract disclosure index is also a measure 
of consumer protection. The quality of the overall 
institutional framework is measured by the index of 
control of corruption, which measures the degree to 
which public power is exercised for private benefit—
such as state capture by elites and private interests 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009).
Competitive pressures from within and outside 
the banking sector are captured by indicators of 
market structure, presence of foreign banks, liquid-
ity of the stock market, and importance of nonbank 
intermediaries such as insurance companies and 
pension funds. Market structure is measured by the 
share of assets held by the top five banks in the sys-
tem. To the extent that there is some validity to the 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm, this vari-
able is expected to be positive and significant. Cross-
border banking as captured by the share of banking 
assets held by foreign banks may reflect a greater 
degree of market contestability. To the extent that 
this is the case, promoting foreign bank participa-
tion may increase competition in the industry. On 
the other hand, if foreign bank entry is associated 
with mergers and acquisitions, it might not enhance 
competition. Finally, a more competitive banking 
system may arise from greater interindustry compe-
tition. In short, the development of nonbank finan-
cial intermediaries may affect the market power 
of the banking sector. The relative importance of 
such intermediaries is approximated by the value of 
shares traded to gross domestic product (GDP), the 
value of life insurance premiums to GDP, and the 
share of pension fund assets to GDP.
The table below suggests that the banking sec-
tor is more competitive (the Lerner index is lower) 
in countries with greater contestability (lower entry 
barriers), greater information disclosure, better 
institutions, more foreign bank participation, and 
more liquid stock markets.
(Continued on next page)
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affect large numbers of institutions, with 
potential implications for industry structure 
and competitive conduct in financial systems 
over longer periods of time.
An emerging body of research exam-
ines the effects of bank bailouts and other 
policy responses on risk taking at the bank 
emergency liquidity facilities, and assisted 
mergers) tend to be relevant only for a limited 
number of distressed institutions and their 
competitors (Gropp and others 2011; Hak-
enes and Schnabel 2010). However, episodes 
of systemic banking crises frequently result 
in large-scale, repeated policy responses that 
BOX 3.6 An econometric Analysis of Drivers of Bank Competition (continued)
TABLe B3.6.1 Cross-Country Determinants of Banking Competitiona
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
State as regulator: Market contestability
 Entry barriers 0.0401* 0.0376 0.013 0.0279 0.0242 0.0537**
[0.024] [0.023] [0.028] [0.021] [0.019] [0.021]
 Share of bank licenses denied –0.0025 0.0229 –0.0616 –0.0132 –0.0589
[0.038] [0.037] [0.049] [0.042] [0.043]
 Restrictions on bank activities –0.0074 –0.0049 –0.01 –0.0087 –0.009
[0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.006] [0.006]
 Minimum entry capital required (ln) 0.0025** 0.0022* 0.0011 0.0006 0.0005 0.0031**
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
State as enabler of market-friendly environments
 Depth of credit information –0.0110* –0.0130**
[0.006] [0.006]
 Strictness of financial contract –0.0074
  disclosure requirements (0-4) [0.010]
 Control of corruption –0.0291** –0.0172 –0.0299* –0.0318*** –0.0235* –0.0193
[0.011] [0.013] [0.017] [0.011] [0.012] [0.015]
State as bank owner
     Government bank participation –0.0417 –0.0793* –0.0854 –0.044 –0.0394 –0.0734
[0.046] [0.044] [0.064] [0.047] [0.047] [0.048]
Competitive pressures within the banking sector and from other parts of the financial sector
 Foreign bank participation –0.0594** –0.0677 –0.0614 –0.0859*** –0.0715** –0.0822**
[0.028] [0.034] [0.050] [0.029] [0.030] [0.034]
 Concentration (CR5) 0.1119** 0.0816 0.0191
[0.055] [0.063] [0.065]
 Stock market value traded –0.0371* –0.0616**
  (ratio to GDP) [0.020] [0.023]
 Life insurance premium 0.3105
  (ratio to GDP) [0.445]
 Pension fund assets 0.0448
  (ratio to GDP) [0.031]
 Constant 0.0178 0.0195 0.2706 0.0503 0.1403 –0.0858
[0.191] [0.189] [0.221] [0.176] [0.152] [0.158]
Observations 83 71 38 72 64 42
R-squared 0.189 0.231 0.369 0.273 0.355 0.399
Note: gdp = gross domestic product.
a. a country's lerner index is the median estimate across banks over the period 2000–10. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 
 ***p < 0.01 **p < 0.05 *p < 0.1
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entrenchment of the supported institutions; 
assisted mergers of large financial institutions 
increase concentration, presumably reducing 
competition in retail markets and reinforcing 
the perception that these banks are too big 
to fail (Beck and others 2010; Hakenes and 
Schnabel 2010).
More research is clearly needed in this 
area, though a number of studies suggest 
that state interventions that favor some bank 
level (Berger and others 2010; Duchin and 
Sosyura 2011; Farhi and Tirole 2012; Gropp, 
Hakenes, and Schnabel 2011; Hakenes and 
Schnabel 2010; Hoshi and Kashyap 2010; 
Richardson and Troost 2009). However, how 
these actions affect competition has received 
less attention. This issue is of vital impor-
tance because of the unintended (and pos-
sibly detrimental) effects for consumer wel-
fare. For example, guarantees can result in 
BOX 3.7 Consumer Protection and Competition in South Africa
Among emerging markets, South Africa has a well-
developed financial sector and one of the largest cap-
ital markets. In 2010, the outreach of the banking 
sector, as measured by its credit to the private sector, 
totaled 145 percent of GDP, while stock market cap-
italization to GDP amounted to 278 percent of GDP. 
In recent years, major South African banks have also 
expanded throughout the region—notably, Absa and 
Standard Bank (Beck and others 2011). However, 
the banking sector is heavily concentrated, with the 
five largest banks accounting for over 90 percent of 
total assets and deposits in the system in 2010. Esti-
mates of market power in the South African banking 
industry show that there is evidence of monopolis-
tic competition (Greenberg and Simbanegavi 2009; 
Mlambo and Ncube 2011), which is consistent with 
the fact that large banks tend to avoid competition 
among themselves, as reported by the Competition 
Commission on Banking (OECD 2008).
The lack of competition in the South African 
banking sector has been documented in several 
reports prepared for the National Treasury and the 
South African Reserve Bank (Falkena and others 
2004; Competition Commission of South Africa 
2006). As manifested by high prices and poor qual-
ity of financial services, low rates of innovation, 
and financial exclusion, the lack of competition was 
attributed partly to high concentration and profit-
ability in retail banking and payments (OECD 
2010). This led to the Banking Enquiry launched by 
the Competition Commission in August 2006. The 
result of this inquiry led to several recommendations 
to address problems of restrictive interbank arrange-
ments and barriers to entry in the payments systems, 
but the inquiry put special emphasis on measures of 
consumer protection.
Advances in consumer protection are justified 
on the grounds that they can promote competition 
and depth. Providing better information to custom-
ers can lead to rising price and product competi-
tion among banking intermediaries. In this context, 
South Africa established a series of mechanisms 
and institutions that promoted a more sound infor-
mation environment. The National Credit Act 34 
(enacted in 2005), for instance, provides a general 
framework to promote responsible lending practices, 
protect South African consumers from unfair credit 
and credit marketing practices and, more generally, 
establish norms and standards on consumer credit. 
It also created the National Credit Regulator to 
ensure the law’s compliance, investigate complaints, 
promote financial literacy, and provide a knowledge 
platform on credit practices. On the other hand, 
cases of noncompliance and appeals to decisions 
of the regulators were allowed to be presented and 
solved by the National Consumer Tribunal.
In spite of the advances on abusive lending prac-
tices, the mechanisms established by the National 
Credit Act to restructure consumer debt have been 
slow. For instance, Beck and others (2011) point 
out that as few as 5 percent of the 150,000 applica-
tions made by overly indebted consumers have been 
finalized by courts. Finally, better use of consumer 
protection networks requires financially aware con-
sumers. Efforts to raise the effectiveness of financial 
literacy programs are required.
Sources: Beck and others 2011; Greenberg and Simbanegavi 2009; Mlambo and Ncube 2011; OECD 2010.
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number of banks in the system can easily lead 
to lower levels of bank competition (OECD 
2009). In that case, governments should pro-
mote the entry of deserving institutions to 
mitigate the negative impact of mergers.
Overall, it is clear that state interven-
tions during crises can have an impact on 
bank competition and potentially on future 
banking stability. Governments should avoid 
insolvency resolution policies that not only 
distort risk-taking incentives and jeopardize 
future stability, but also have implications for 
the level of competition in the banking sector. 
implicationS FoR the DeSiGn 
oF competition policieS
Bank competition increases efficiency and 
financial inclusion. Recent evidence suggests 
that bank competition can even enhance sys-
temic financial stability. Hence, bank com-
petition should not be restricted with the 
hope of promoting stability. Instead, the state 
should design and enforce regulations that 
create the right incentives to safeguard stabil-
ity, while at the same time promote competi-
tion and efficiency.
The state can shape bank competition 
through its actions as a regulator and an 
enabler of a market-friendly and information- 
rich environment. In particular, banking 
sectors are more competitive in economies 
where the state designs, implements, and 
enforces regulatory frameworks that ensure 
greater contestability. More specifically, poli-
cies designed to ease the entry of deserving 
institutions (those that can pass fit and proper 
tests) and promote timely exit may prevent 
incumbent banks from exercising market 
power and lead to a more competitive envi-
ronment. Related to the less stringent barriers 
to entry, foreign bank penetration may also 
be conducive to greater competition. 
The state can also promote competition 
in the banking sector by ensuring banks’ 
and consumers’ access to information as 
well as by building up a sound institutional 
framework that levels the playing field. Free 
flow of credit information among banks and 
transparency of financial products offered 
services (such as guarantees, liquidity sup-
port, recapitalizations, and nationalizations) 
force competitors to behave more aggres-
sively, leading to decreased margins and 
increased competition (Gropp, Hakenes, and 
Schnabel 2011; Hovakimian and Kane 2000; 
Kane 1989). Using data for 138 countries that 
witnessed a variety of policy responses dur-
ing 46 banking crises, Calderón and Schaeck 
(2012) find that Lerner indexes and net inter-
est margins drop as a result of state interven-
tions such as guarantees, liquidity support, 
recapitalizations, and nationalizations.
This apparent increase in competition 
should be interpreted with caution—espe-
cially if the type of state intervention under 
consideration delays the exit of inefficient 
and insolvent banks. Kane (2000) argues 
that some state interventions can constitute 
a barrier to exit by allowing these banks 
to survive beyond their “natural death.” 
State support to these zombie banks—a 
term coined by Kane (1989)—would allow 
these institutions to bid up deposit rates and 
accept low interest rates on high-risk loans 
and investments, thus reducing profit mar-
gins in the industry (Kane 2000; Kane and 
Rice 2001). In sum, states can create zombie 
banks by distorting risk-taking incentives of 
the system and generating unhealthy com-
petition. Calderón and Schaeck (2012) show 
that the increase in competition that might 
result from state interventions during crises 
is also accompanied by other negative conse-
quences. Despite the evidence that the cost of 
borrowing is reduced and credit is restored as 
a result of these state interventions, access to 
credit by opaque borrowers such as small and 
medium enterprises is reduced. 
To avoid the distorting effects of state 
interventions, sunset clauses and exit plans 
are important (Beck, Coyle, and others 2010). 
By providing credible signals that interven-
tions are temporary, governments can reduce 
the negative repercussion for competition. 
Similarly, addressing governance deficien-
cies in the supported institutions can also be 
important in reducing incentives for excessive 
risk taking. Finally, measures such as gov-
ernment-sponsored mergers that reduce the 
GLOBAL finAnciAL DEVELOPMEnT REPORT 2013 t H e  R o l e  o f  t H e  s t a t e  i n  p R o m o t i n g  b a n k  c o m p e t i t i o n   99
by banks to potential consumers should be 
ensured by the state. A sound institutional 
framework that ensures the enforcement of 
contracts, property rights, and the rule of law 
that limits the exercise of public power for 
private benefit is conducive to greater com-
petition in the banking sector. Finally, poli-
cies to promote deeper and more diversified 
financial markets—especially the develop-
ment of nonbanking financial institutions—
also appear to increase the level of competi-
tion in the banking sector.
Government interventions during crises 
that prevent the exit of insolvent institutions 
and increase market power through mergers 
can also affect competition and bank risk 
taking. In trying to mitigate the impact of 
financial crises, governments should be aware 
of the potentially negative consequences of 
their actions on bank competition and future 
bank stability. 
Finally, implementation of competition 
policies depends on the institutional arrange-
ment in place. The increased integration 
across different parts of the financial industry 
has led to a shift in financial supervision from 
a sector-based approach to more integrated 
approaches, including (a) a fully integrated 
supervisory model with one agency (a Finan-
cial Supervision Authority) carrying out all 
supervisory roles (such as microprudential, 
business conduct, and competition policy), or 
(b) a so-called functional or objective-based 
approach in which sectorally integrated agen-
cies undertake different supervisory roles.21
An example of the latter is the twin peaks 
model. One agency is responsible for pruden-
tial supervision in the financial system, and 
another one oversees market conduct, con-
sumer protection, and corporate governance 
in all sectors.22 The effectiveness of the twin 
peaks approach, as argued by its advocates, is 
guaranteed by having a clear focus and divi-
sion of roles, to minimize turf battles between 
agencies, as well as strong collaboration, to 
work together in overlapping areas (Kremers 
and Schoenmaker 2008, 2010). Evidence so 
far suggests that regulatory quality is stron-
ger in systems with objectives-based super-
vision—in favor of the twin peaks model 
and full integration—as opposed to differ-
ent types of partial integration supervisory 
models. 
Competition can bring important benefits 
to the financial sector and should not be sac-
rificed for the sake of stability. Instead gov-
ernments should implement the measures dis-
cussed in this chapter to monitor competition 
and strengthen the information and institu-
tional frameworks to promote competition, 
while ensuring that regulations and super-
visory practices are in place that safeguard 
banking stability.
noteS
 1. The chapter focuses on competition in the 
banking sector rather than the broader finan-
cial sector. But it does touch on the impact of 
nonbank intermediaries on bank competition. 
See Motta (2004) for a broader discussion on 
the theory and practice of competition policy.
 2. For example, in February 2010, the OECD 
Competition Committee held a discussion on 
competition, concentration, and stability in 
the banking sector.
 3. Several developed and developing economies 
have competition agencies that have mandates 
or that can influence market outcomes in 
banking. Competition agencies enforce anti-
trust laws (for example, assess the competitive 
harm of mergers, deter anticompetitive behav-
ior, and minimize distortions from state aid) 
and promote measures to enable firm entry 
and rivalry (that is, competition advocacy).
 4. In general terms, the view of competition 
presented here and discussed in the litera-
ture is based on the notion that banks pri-
marily compete in deposit and loan markets. 
However, in practice, especially in developed 
economies, banks offer a variety of services 
(such as market making, asset management, 
and underwriting) where market power may 
arise. Payment systems are another area in 
which there might be significant deviations 
from marginal cost pricing. 
 5. See Cetorelli (1999), Claessens and Laeven 
(2004), and Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and 
Levine (2004), among others. Nevertheless, 
concentration measures are presented first 
because they are the most widely used and eas-
iest to compute of measures of competition.
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tration facilitates access credit, whereas Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2004) 
and Chong, Lu, and Ongena (2012) find the 
opposite result using data for 74 countries 
and for Chinese small and medium enter-
prises, respectively.
 15. At the same time, using bank-level data, Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martínez Pería (2008) 
find that barriers to banking (minimum bal-
ances to open deposit accounts and to obtain 
loans, as well as documentation require-
ments to access financial services) are higher 
in countries with greater entry restrictions for 
banks.
 16. At the same time, the authors find that their 
results for the Lerner index are not consistent 
with results using concentration as a measure 
of competition. They conclude that “research-
ers and policymakers need to be very careful 
in drawing strong conclusions about market 
power and credit availability based on analy-
ses that rely exclusively on concentration as a 
measure of market power.”
 17. See Beck (2008) for a thorough review of the 
theoretical and empirical literature on bank 
competition and stability.
 18. See, for example, Keeley (1990) and Dick 
(2006), in the case of the United States; 
Jimenez, Lopez, and Saurina (2007) in the 
case of Spain.
 19. See Anzoategui, Martínez Pería, and Rocha 
2010; Claessens and Laeven 2004; Delis 2012; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Martínez Pería 2010.
 20. Rocha, Arvai, and Farazi (2011) find that the 
lack of competition in the Middle East and 
North Africa banking sectors is the outcome 
of barriers to entry and lack of competition 
from nonbanking financial intermediaries, 
among other factors.
 21. Čihák and Podpiera (2008) discuss the differ-
ent types of supervisory arrangements. 
 22. Countries with a twin peaks supervisory 
structure are Australia (Australia Prudential 
Regulation Authority and the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission) and 
the Netherlands—with the Netherlands Bank 
(DNB) in charge of prudential supervision 
and the Authority for the Financial Mar-
kets supervising market conduct (Čihák and 
Podpiera 2008; Kremers and Schoenmaker 
2008).
 6. There is a growing literature on measuring 
and explaining bank competition using direct 
measures of competition: Anzoategui, Mar-
tínez Pería and Melecký (2010); Anzoategui, 
Martínez Pería, and Rocha (2010); Beck, de 
Jonghe, and Schepens (2011); Berger, Klap-
per, and Turk-Ariss (2009); and Delis (2012); 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Martínez Pería (2010); 
Schaeck and Čihák (2008, 2010a, 2010b); 
Schaeck, Čihák, and Wolfe (2009); Turk-
Ariss (2010), among others.
 7. Note that the H-statistic can only be used to 
test the hypothesis of perfect competition if 
the market is in long-run equilibrium (returns 
on bank assets are not related to input prices). 
However, tests using the H-statistic for the 
null of monopoly are still valid, since the 
long-run profit condition does not apply in 
the case of a monopoly.
 8. Measuring marginal costs is difficult and 
requires certain assumptions about the cost 
function of banks. Typically, studies that cal-
culate the Lerner index assume a translog cost 
function.
 9. Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) argue that banks 
in large and integrated financial markets (such 
as in Europe after establishing the European 
Monetary Union) are pushed by rising capi-
tal market competition and tend to shift from 
traditional intermediation to more sophisti-
cated and complex products associated with 
less price competition.
 10. In recent work, Calderon and Schaeck (2012) 
use data for 138 countries, of which 43 expe-
rienced banking crises. Their analyses show 
that government interventions (such as 
blanket guarantees, liquidity support by the 
central bank, recapitalizations, and nation-
alization of banks) during crises significantly 
increase competition in banking systems, and 
the distortionary effects cannot be reversed 
easily.
 11. See Berger (1995), Goldberg and Rai (1996), 
and Berger and Hannan (1998), among 
others. 
 12. One exception is Casu and Girardone (2009), 
who find a positive causation between market 
power and efficiency for 2,701 banks operat-
ing in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom from 2000 to 2005.
 13. See Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Marquez 
(2002).
 14. Using U.S. data, Petersen and Rajan (1995) 
and Zarutskie (2006) find that bank concen-
4
Direct State interventions
underserved segments of the economy—nota-
bly, small and medium enterprises (SMEs).1 In 
practice, however, widespread evidence shows 
that state banks have generally been very inef-
ficient in allocating credit, more often than 
State-owned banks were typically cre-ated to fulfill long-term development roles by filling market gaps in long-
term credit, infrastructure, and agriculture 
finance, and to promote access to finance for 
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•   Lending by state-owned banks is less procyclical than lending by private banks, and 
some state banks played a countercyclical role during the global financial crisis. How-
ever, this lending did not always target the most constrained borrowers and contin-
ued even after economic recovery ensued, questioning the effectiveness of the policy. 
Furthermore, the evidence based on previous episodes of downturns and recoveries is 
mixed.
•   Moreover, research finds that efforts to stabilize aggregate credit by state-owned banks 
come at a cost, particularly through the deterioration of the quality of intermediation 
and resource misallocation. This effect undermines the benefits of using state banks as 
a countercyclical tool.
•  The empirical evidence largely suggests that government bank ownership is associated 
with lower levels of financial development and slower economic growth. Policy makers 
need to avoid the inefficiencies associated with government bank ownership by pay-
ing special attention to the governance of these institutions and ensuring, among other 
things, that adequate risk management processes are in place, which is particularly chal-
lenging in weak institutional environments.
•  Another popular form of intervention during the recent crisis was through credit guar-
antee programs. Rigorous evaluations of these programs are rare, but existing studies 
suggest that the benefits are modest and costs are often significant. Success hinges on 
overcoming the challenges of getting the design right, particularly in underdeveloped 
institutional and legal settings.
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discusses public credit guarantees that were 
also widely used to offset the credit crunch 
and mentions other policies adopted by 
central banks to deal with the recent crisis. 
The main messages from this chapter are as 
follows. 
First, lending by state-owned banks is 
less procyclical. During the recent global 
financial crisis, state-owned banks in some 
countries expanded their lending portfolios 
and were credited with assisting in the eco-
nomic recovery. However, it is unclear that 
the recent crisis illustrates that state-owned 
banks can effectively play a countercyclical 
role. Lending growth continued even after 
economic recovery was under way, and loans 
were not directed to the most constrained 
borrowers. Furthermore, the evidence from 
previous crises on this issue is also mixed. 
Any benefits of credit stabilization that may 
arise from countercyclical lending by state-
owned banks come at a cost. The state faces 
a direct cost to the extent that outlays to the 
financial sector (such as state treasury pur-
chases of securities, recapitalization, and so 
forth) and public debt burdens are piling up.5 
Perhaps more important, financial interme-
diation by state-owned banks is subject to 
the risk of political capture and often leads 
to a deterioration of the quality of loans and 
misallocation of resources in the medium to 
long term. The bulk of the empirical evidence 
suggests that state ownership of banks tends 
to be associated with lower financial devel-
opment, greater financial instability, and 
slower rates of economic growth. Hence, the 
trade-off between the potential benefits of a 
countercyclical role of state banks and the 
long-term adverse impact on credit allocation 
requires careful consideration.
Second, focusing on the governance of 
state-owned banks ideally may help policy 
makers address the inefficiencies associated 
with these institutions. Policy makers need to 
design a clear mandate, allow the institutions 
to work as a complement to (rather than a 
substitute for) the private banks, and adopt 
risk management practices that allow them 
to guarantee a financially sustainable busi-
ness. However, these governance reforms are 
not serving political interests. Nevertheless, 
the recent global financial crisis underscored 
the countercyclical role of state-owned banks 
in offsetting the contraction of credit from 
private banks, leading to arguments that this 
function is an important one that can poten-
tially better justify their existence. 
During the recent global financial crisis, 
countries pursued a variety of strategies to 
restart their financial and real sectors. As the 
balance sheets of private banks deteriorated 
and they curtailed their lending activities, 
many countries used state-owned banks to 
step up their financing to the private sector 
(for example, Brazil, China, and Germany).2 
Some economies relied heavily on the use 
of credit guarantee programs. For exam-
ple, Canada, Chile, Finland, Germany, the 
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and the Neth-
erlands extended new and special schemes or 
refueled existing ones to alleviate the impact 
of the credit crunch on SMEs. Finally, other 
countries, such as the United States, United 
Kingdom, and those of the euro area, adopted 
a number of unconventional monetary and 
fiscal measures to prop up credit markets.3 
The crisis and the actions adopted by 
different countries reignited the debate on 
whether there is a need for direct government 
intervention in the financial sector. Support-
ers of state-owned banks argue that these 
institutions provide the state an additional 
tool for crisis management and, relative to 
central banks, they may be more capable of 
undertaking the role of safe haven for retail 
and interbank deposits, creating a fire break 
to mitigate contagion, and stabilizing aggre-
gate credit.
On the other hand, those who oppose 
government bank ownership point out that 
agency problems and politically motivated 
lending render state-owned banks breed-
ing grounds for corruption. Furthermore, 
rewarding political cronyism may build up 
large fiscal liabilities and threaten public sec-
tor solvency and financial fragility, as well as 
misallocate resources and retard development. 
This chapter reevaluates the merits of 
government bank ownership in the wake of 
the global financial crisis.4 The chapter also 
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be attributed to the recent bailouts, mergers, 
recapitalizations, and nationalization of dis-
tressed financial institutions that were more 
common among developed economies than 
developing economies.
Though government bank ownership is 
more prevalent in the developing world, it has 
declined considerably over time (figure 4.2). 
Since the 1970s, the share of state-owned 
banks relative to the total assets of the bank-
ing system declined sharply in all emerging 
regions, from an average of 67 percent in 
1970 to 22 percent in 2009. The retrench-
ment of government participation has been 
dramatic in the Eastern European and Cen-
tral Asian region. The massive privatization 
program in transition economies launched 
in the early 1990s reduced the government 
stake in the banking system from almost 
full ownership (88 percent in 1985) to inter-
mediate levels of government participation 
(20 percent in 2009).7 Finally, the World 
Bank report Financing Africa illustrates the 
dramatic transformation of the ownership 
structure in African banks over the last 50 
years (Beck and others 2011). From a system 
mostly dominated by state-owned banks, the 
region now has the second highest share of 
particularly challenging in weak institutional 
environments.
Third, credit guarantee schemes were also 
a popular intervention tool used during the 
recent crisis. However, because these pro-
grams are small scale, they are not likely to 
have a large macroeconomic impact. Fur-
thermore, research suggests that the benefits 
of these programs in terms of financial and 
economic “additionality” are rather mod-
est, and they may bring along significant fis-
cal and economic costs.6 The effectiveness of 
these programs relies on their design. Best 
practices include (a) leaving credit assess-
ments and decision making to the private 
sector, (b) capping coverage ratios and delay-
ing the payout of the guarantee until recov-
ery actions are taken by the lender so as to 
minimize moral hazard problems, (c) pricing 
guarantees so they take into account the need 
for financial sustainability and risk minimi-
zation, and (d) encouraging the use of risk 
management tools.
The rest of the chapter is organized as fol-
lows. It first presents data on bank ownership 
structure worldwide, highlighting the regions 
where state-owned bank presence is signifi-
cant. Next, it analyzes the countercyclical 
nature of government bank lending during 
the recent crisis and in previous episodes. It 
also discusses the evidence on the longer-term 
implications of government bank ownership 
and then turns to credit guarantee schemes.
owneRShip StRUctUReS 
aRoUnD the woRlD
State-owned banks account for less than 10 
percent of banking system assets in devel-
oped economies and double that share in 
developing economies (figure 4.1). In a com-
parison of the periods 2001–07 and 2008–
10, the recent global crisis brought about a 
small surge in government bank ownership 
in developed countries (6.7 percent to 8 
percent, respectively), while the opposite is 
true in developing economies (government 
bank ownership declined from 20.5 to 17.3 
percent). The uptick in the share of state-
owned banks in developed countries may 
FiguRe 4.1 Trends in government Ownership 
of Banks
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Sources: calculations based on farazi, feyen, and Rocha 2011; bank  
Regulation and supervision survey (database), world bank 2003, 2007, 
2011; barth, caprio, and levine 2001, 2004, 2008).
104  d i R e c t  s t a t e  i n t e R v e n t i o n s  GLOBAL finAnciAL DEVELOPMEnT REPORT 2013
have an asset market share between 20 and 
50 percent. While the average market share 
of government-owned banks is negligible 
in Eastern European nations, it is still large 
among countries in Central Asia.10 Almost 
half of the countries that responded to the lat-
est round of the World Bank’s Bank Regula-
tion and Supervision Survey report a market 
share for state-owned banks below 5 percent.
Role oF GoveRnment bank 
lenDinG in mitiGatinG 
economic cycleS anD cRiSeS
The recent global financial crisis has brought 
to the fore the potential role of state-owned 
banks in stabilizing aggregate credit.11 His-
torical evidence shows that the failure of 
credit flows to recover may drag down the 
recovery of real economic activity (Biggs, 
Mayer, and Pick 2010). In other words, a pre-
condition for the recovery of the corporate 
sector may be the recovery of the financial 
sector.12 Though a strand of the empirical lit-
erature argues that recoveries in real output 
without a recovery in credit flows—credit-
less recoveries or “Phoenix miracles”—are 
foreign-owned banks—trailing only the tran-
sition economies of Eastern Europe and Cen-
tral Asia.8 
The retrenchment of state-owned banks in 
the financial sector can be attributed to their 
poor financial performance as well as their 
less than stellar contribution to financial and 
economic development—especially in coun-
tries where they dominated the banking sys-
tem. This trend also reflects retrenchment of 
the public sector and fiscal consolidation in 
some countries.9 
Despite the fact that the activity and 
importance of state-owned banks declined 
sharply over time, they still play a substantive 
role in some countries. For instance, state-
owned banks still dominate the process of 
financial intermediation in Algeria, Belarus, 
China, the Arab Republic of Egypt, India, 
and the Syrian Arab Republic, where the asset 
market share of these banks exceeded half the 
assets of the banking system in 2010. In other 
countries, state-owned banks do not lead the 
process of credit creation but still play an 
important role. For example, state-owned 
banks in Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, 
Poland, the Russian Federation, and Turkey 
100 
60 
40 
20 
0 
80 
Asset share of government-owned banks in the financial system (%)
1970 1985 1995 2002 2009 
East Asia 
and Pacific 
Europe and 
Central Asia 
Latin America 
and the Caribbean 
Middle East and  
North Africa 
South Asia Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
FiguRe 4.2 government Ownership across Developing Regions, 1970–2009
Sources: calculations based on farazi, feyen, and Rocha 2011; bank Regulation and supervision survey (database), world bank 2003, 2007, 2011; barth, 
caprio, and levine 2001, 2004, 2008.
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banks. Governments injected capital into 
their state-owned banks to roll over exist-
ing loans or provided new credit to SMEs or 
exporting firms (this has been the case, for 
example, in Canada, Chile, Korea, and Tuni-
sia), raised credit ceilings of their state-owned 
banks (in Finland and Korea, among others), 
and established credit facilities for banks 
(for example, in India and Tunisia). In Bra-
zil, a state-owned development bank (Banco 
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico 
e Social, BNDES) played an important role 
in expanding credit during the recent cri-
sis. However, the fact that most loans seem 
to have gone to large firms and that credit 
continued to expand even after the economy 
recovered in 2010–11 calls into question the 
ability of this bank to behave countercycli-
cally (box 4.1). State-owned development 
banks in Mexico expanded their loan portfo-
lios and also supported key markets through 
special guarantee programs (box 4.2). Non-
performing loans (NPLs) and profitability 
seem stable so far, perhaps because most of 
the lending was through tier II operations in 
which credit decisions are left to private inter-
mediaries.13 However, because credit kept 
growing even after the economy recovered, 
it is still unclear whether state-owned devel-
opment banks in Mexico will be able to play 
an effective countercyclical role rather than 
crowd out private banks. 
In Poland, state-owned bank PKO Bank 
Polski has played a role in credit stabiliza-
tion by lending to the corporate and SME 
sectors (box 4.3). Though so far the bank 
has remained profitable and NPLs have not 
changed dramatically, time will tell whether 
the bank’s credit allocation was efficient. 
The case of Poland is not representative of 
all countries in Eastern Europe. Research 
comparing the behavior of state-owned and 
foreign-owned banks in relation to private 
domestic banks in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America before and after the 2007–09 crises 
(box 4.4) shows that in Eastern Europe, state-
owned banks in general did not play a coun-
tercyclical role. On the other hand, state-
owned banks in Latin America increased 
loan growth during the crisis relative to their 
not rare events, and become more frequent 
after a banking crisis or credit boom (Abiad, 
Dell’Ariccia, and Li 2011; Bijsterbosch and 
Dahlhaus 2011; Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi 
2006a, 2006b), the evidence at the macro-
economic level is far from conclusive and 
displays a great deal of heterogeneity. Fur-
thermore, firm-level evidence (Ayyagari, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2011a) 
shows that real sector recoveries are not cred-
itless, and that firms substitute short-term 
credit with long-term external finance, either 
through long-term borrowing or capital issu-
ance. In sum, Phoenix miracles are not sup-
ported by firm-level data either in the United 
States or among emerging markets.
The global recession in 2008–09 involved 
unprecedented conditions: real output fell 
sharply and in a synchronized fashion across 
the world (with more than 80 percent of the 
countries sharing a recessionary phase in the 
period from the third quarter of 2008 to the 
first quarter of 2009). In addition, real credit 
also fell in a synchronized manner across 
countries. Aisen and Franken (2010) show 
that 95 percent of countries experienced 
a contraction in bank credit in at least one 
month between September 2008 and May 
2009. The dire financial conditions in the 
world economy reignited the debate on the 
countercyclical role of government banks. 
The fact that recoveries may not take place 
without credit growth may be reason enough 
for the state to use their government bank 
infrastructure in order to keep the credit flow-
ing. State-owned banks may facilitate credit 
stabilization for several reasons. First, stabi-
lization of credit markets may be a part of 
state-owned banks’ mandate. In this context, 
state-owned banks may fill the gap of credit 
caused by underprovision by their private 
counterparts in times of crisis (Rudolph 2009, 
2010). Second, state-owned banks could be 
perceived as safer during recessions or crises, 
and their more stable deposit base could allow 
them to have more stable lending activity dur-
ing crises (Micco and Panizza 2006). 
During the recent crisis, many countries 
deployed their state-owned banks to counter-
act the credit contraction by privately owned 
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BOX 4.1 intervention using State-Owned Banks in Brazil
The Brazilian government actively used its state bank 
infrastructure to engineer a rapid countercyclical 
response to mitigate the contagion effects from the 
global financial crisis. New liquidity assistance lines 
were created by the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) to 
enable the country’s state commercial banks, Banco 
do Brasil (BB) and Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF), 
to acquire ownership interest in private and public 
financial institutions—including insurance compa-
nies, social welfare institutions, and capitalization 
companies—with or without the acquisition of the 
capital stock control. Moreover, the government used 
its public bank infrastructure—BB, CEF, and Banco 
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 
(BNDES), the state-owned development bank—to 
play a countercyclical role in credit markets during 
this period of global financial turmoil. Figure B4.1.1 
illustrates the expansion of credit by Brazilian state-
owned banks from 13.4 percent of GDP in Septem-
ber 2008 to 18.1 percent of GDP by end-2009. As 
of December 2011, credit extended by public banks 
represented 21.4 percent of GDP, while overall credit 
operations in the financial system totaled 49.1 per-
cent of GDP. The continued expansion of credit by 
public banks, and especially BNDES, in 2010 and 
2011 illustrates the difficulties of behaving counter-
cyclically during upswings in real economic activity.
BNDES played an important role: it extended 
special credit facilities thanks to a generous capital 
injection by the government (R$100 billion in 2009). 
Loans from BNDES were extended at a subsidized 
rate—the long-term interest rate was set at 6 percent, 
which is 7.5 percentage points lower than the market 
rate (Lazzarini and others 2011). In fact, credit by 
BNDES surged from R$160 billion (at 2005 prices) in 
September 2008 to R$277 billion in December 2010. 
The fact that most of this credit is being extended to 
large firms that are likely to get loans elsewhere (Laz-
zarini and others 2011) indicates that private banks 
are crowded out in credit markets.
The portfolio expansion of BNDES was accompa-
nied by a shift in the composition of its funding. Fig-
ure B4.1.2 shows that resources channeled from the 
national treasury rather than those coming from the 
Workers’ Assistance Fund became the main source of 
funding beginning in 2009. The transfer from Trea-
Source: central bank of brazil.
Note: government-owned banks refer to institutions in which federal, state, or municipal governments hold more than 50 percent of the voting capital. 
private domestic banks include those institutions in which individuals or corporate entities domiciled and resident in the country hold more than 50 
percent of the voting capital. foreign-owned banks include those institutions that have—under external control and either directly or indirectly—the 
majority of voting capital. they also include those banks established and headquartered abroad with agencies or branches in the country. 
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BOX 4.1 intervention using State-Owned Banks in Brazil (continued)
sury through bond issuances may crowd out private 
credit, keep interest rates at high levels, and thus 
reduce the provision of credit in the overall economy. 
The transfers also involve a fiscal cost that reduces 
the scope of direct public investment. 
As pointed out in the report, state-owned bank 
interventions in credit markets also carry economic 
consequences. Figure B4.1.3 breaks down BNDES dis-
bursements by firm size: 85 percent of disbursements 
by BNDES went to large firms in 2009 (R$115.9 bil-
lion)—the worst year of the crisis. In the midst of a 
strong postcrisis recovery, BNDES continued lending 
at the same pace of the crisis years (R$139.7 billion in 
2011 from R$136.4 billion in 2009). Large firms still 
represented a big share of BNDES disbursements in 
2011 (64 percent); however, the participation of micro 
and small firms as well as individuals has increased to 
26 percent (R$36.3 billion). 
Recent research also shows that loan activities 
deployed by BNDES are consistent with the politi-
cal view of public lending: an increasing amount 
of funds are typically channeled to firms in regions 
where allied incumbents are facing political competi-
tion (Carvalho 2010), or to firms that donate to can-
didates that won an election (Claessens, Feyen, and 
Laeven 2008; Lazzarini and others 2011). Economi-
cally, employment expands among (manufacturing) 
firms that are eligible to BNDES loans in regions 
where allied incumbents face political competition 
(Carvalho 2010). However, profitability, market val-
uation and investment appear to remain unchanged 
in firms that received funding from BNDES—either 
through loans or equity provision. Only their finan-
cial expenses were reduced considerably (Lazzarini 
and others 2011). 
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BOX 4.2 The Recent global Crisis and government Bank Lending in Mexico
Mexican development banks (DBs) rapidly expanded 
operations during the critical moments of the global 
financial crisis by providing short-term credit to well-
established private sector firms and nonbank finan-
cial institutions with problems, both to refinance 
their debt and to mitigate the sharp deceleration in 
private bank lending (figure B4.2.1).a Credit to the 
private sector (instead of public sector) expanded 
fastest, and overall credit stabilized or began declin-
ing after fourth quarter 2009. Despite the DBs’ 
strong lending expansion, the portfolio share of DBs 
relative to that of private banks remained below the 
2006 level, as its share in total lending had been con-
tracting prior to the crisis. 
Mexican DBs were credited with restoring oper-
ations in key markets such as commercial paper 
through special guarantee programs—with most of 
these programs being temporary. Overall, DBs have 
extended Mex$71 billion (approximately US$6.1 bil-
lion) in guarantees as of June 2011—about 20 per-
cent of the total loan portfolio balance—and each 
guaranteed peso induced 2.8 pesos in credit (figure 
B4.2.2). 
Nonperforming loans have remained at reason-
able levels—1.1 percent compared to 3.0 percent for 
private banks as of November 2011—and provisions 
cover about 200 percent of NPLs. Profitability has 
remained stable or even improved in some cases. Pre-
liminary estimates of the fiscal costs (in terms of cap-
ital allocations to DBs) appear modest because banks 
were adequately capitalized before the crisis and did 
not need additional funds to increase their lending 
portfolios. Moreover, the bulk of total interven-
tions took place through credit guarantees and tier 
II operations, in which credit decisions are left to pri-
vate intermediaries. Tier I lending expanded, but to 
a large extent (especially loans by Bancomext) those 
loans carried high rates and were highly collateral-
ized, providing firms with incentives for early repay-
ment as market conditions stabilized (which many 
firms have done). However, it is still early to assess 
the full impact on the quality of intermediation. 
Overall, Mexican DBs played an important coun-
tercyclical role during the downturn. However, the 
portfolio of credit and, especially, guarantees has 
decreased very slowly during the upturn. Expanded 
operations have so far not compromised the financial 
position of DBs. Going forward, it may be useful to 
establish mechanisms to facilitate the expansion and 
contraction of the DBs’ balance sheet—and, in par-
ticular, of capital—to mitigate incentives to compete 
with the private sector during the upswing.
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GLOBAL finAnciAL DEVELOPMEnT REPORT 2013 d i R e c t  s t a t e  i n t e R v e n t i o n s   109
BOX 4.3 State Commercial Banks in Action during the Crisis: The Case of Poland
Poland was the only economy in the European Union 
that avoided a recession in 2009 thanks to timely fis-
cal stimulus and growth in lending, which were sup-
ported by policy measures undertaken by the Polish 
Financial Supervisory Authority and the National 
Bank of Poland (NBP), as well as by an expansion of 
the loan portfolio by the country’s state-owned com-
mercial bank, PKO Bank Polski (PKO BP).
PKO BP expanded credit at a faster pace during 
the crisis than Polish subsidiaries of foreign banks, 
which control almost three-fourths of the total assets 
of the system. Despite high credit spreads, credit by 
PKO BP grew by more than 1 percent of GDP per 
year during 2009–11. PKO BP’s share in total lend-
ing increased from 15.6 percent of GDP in 2008 
Q3 to 17.2 percent in 2010 Q4 (figure B4.3.1). In 
turn, its loan portfolio increased for all market seg-
ments, including, most important, the corporate and 
SME sectors—in which the value of new loans that 
were extended to those sectors throughout the crisis 
totaled 0.5 percent of nominal GDP in 2011.
Rapid credit expansion by PKO BP relative to 
that of foreign-owned banks is attributed to four 
major drivers. First, PKO BP’s management made an 
arm’s-length commercial decision to capitalize on the 
decreased participation of foreign-owned banks in 
loan markets and to create attractive business oppor-
tunities for households and corporations. Second, 
the government supported PKO BP’s lending activi-
ties during the crisis through public announcements 
by its supervisory board. Third, PKO BP’s conserva-
tive funding structure reduced the bank’s dependence 
on wholesale financing (domestically and abroad), as 
opposed to foreign banks that relied partly on external 
funding from parent banks. Finally, PKO BP’s capital 
adequacy ratio—above the regulatory minimum of 8 
percent—was further raised following a 5 billion Pol-
ish zlotys rights and new share issuance in late 2009. 
So far, PKO BP’s nonperforming loans have 
increased at a roughly similar pace to that of the 
average of the largest foreign-owned banks, despite 
the substantial increase in lending during the crisis 
(figure B4.3.2). Credit overdue by more than 90 days 
amounted to 4.2 percent for PKO BP (as opposed 
to the 5.8 percent market average). Moreover, PKO 
BP remained profitable during the crisis period, 
as reflected by its high return on equity. However, 
these indicators are largely backward looking, and 
more time will be needed to assess the full impact of 
increased lending on loan quality.
Overall, PKO BP played a countercyclical role 
during the crisis, partly offsetting the decline in the 
available credit from foreign-owned bank subsidiar-
Source: Piatkowski 2012.
ies. Its relative success in propping up credit may 
be tied to the fact that it is a commercially oriented 
bank, open to free-market competition, and with 
conservative lending and funding policies. Stock 
market–induced transparency, market discipline, for-
midable budget constraints, and professional man-
agement have also played a role.  
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BOX 4.4 Bank Ownership and Credit growth during the 2008–09 Crisis:  
evidence from eastern europe and Latin America
Using bank-level data from 2004 to 2009, Cull and 
Martínez Pería (2012) examined the impact of bank 
ownership on credit growth in developing economies 
before and during the crisis (table B4.4.1). They ana-
lyzed the growth of banks’ overall loan portfolios, 
as well as changes in corporate, consumer, and resi-
dential mortgage loans. They compared the determi-
nants of credit growth for banks in eight countries in 
Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Repub-
lic, and Slovenia) and six countries in Latin America 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and 
Peru). They found that the decline of credit growth 
among foreign banks in Eastern Europe was larger 
than that of their domestic private counterparts 
during the crisis. In Latin America, foreign banks 
did not fuel loan growth prior to the crisis and did 
not contract their credit flow at a faster pace than 
their domestic counterparts. On the other hand, the 
behavior of state-owned banks in Eastern Europe 
(in terms of credit growth) did not differ from that 
of private domestic banks. In general, state-owned 
banks in Eastern Europe did not mitigate the impact 
of the crisis on aggregate credit in the economy. The 
opposite is true in Latin America. Lending by state-
owned banks grew during the crisis at a faster pace 
than domestic and foreign banks (figure B4.4.1).
Complementary evidence by de Haas and others 
(2012) from 1,294 banks for 30 Eastern European 
countries over the period 1999–2009 shows that for-
eign bank credit grew at a faster pace than domes-
tic (public and private) banks before the crisis, and 
it sharply decelerated in 2008. On the other hand, 
credit extended by both state and private domestic 
TABLe B4.4.1  Determinants of the growth of Total gross Loans
Variables Latin America Eastern Europe
Foreign banks (Fgn) –11.098*** –10.403*** –9.320*** 2.651 3.83 4.04
 [–6.293] [–6.014] [–4.705] [0.558] [0.986] [0.956]
Government banks (Govt) –8.66 –8.576 –9.833 –1.338 0.174 1.207
 [–1.779] [–1.694] [–1.765] [–0.248] [0.030] [0.203]
Crisis2008 (dummy) –39.508**  –22.540**  
 [–3.102]  [–3.360]  
Crisis2009 (dummy) –11.75  –19.179*  
 [–0.867]  [–2.063]  
Fgn 2 Crisis2008 11.431* 11.375* 8.793 2.499 1.909 1.83
 [2.267] [2.091] [1.450] [0.574] [0.384] [0.377]
Fgn 2 Crisis2009 –7.336 –10.269 –10.006 –14.394** –13.504* –15.562**
 [–0.508] [–0.754] [–0.994] [–3.048] [–2.120] [–2.648]
Govt 2 Crisis2008 27.569*** 27.648*** 27.926*** 4.677 2.303 0.318
 [8.882] [5.441] [4.778] [0.605] [0.302] [0.057]
Govt 2 Crisis2009 14.954 14.831* 20.421 –1.249 –3.244 –4.989
 [1.411] [2.222] [1.945] [–0.153] [–0.386] [–0.599]
Constant 53.932*** 48.121*** 70.439*** 47.285*** 17.877** 20.015
 [13.125] [11.527] [15.072] [7.362] [2.372] [1.606]
Country–time interactions No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Bank characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank characteristics interacted with  
 crisis No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 878 878 878 770 770 770
R-squared 0.17 0.311 0.326 0.21 0.54 0.544
Number of countries   6   6   6   8   8   8
Source: cull and martínez pería 2012.
Note: the dependent variabloe is the annual percentage in total gross loans. t-statistics are in brackets.
significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent
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(2006) find that state-owned bank lending 
is less procyclical than lending by private 
domestic banks. However, one important 
caveat is that their paper does not analyze the 
general equilibrium effect of the smoothing 
activity of state-owned banks. State-owned 
bank lending may merely crowd out lending 
from private banks; hence, the presence of 
state-owned banks would not affect aggregate 
lending during the business cycle. Comparing 
the lending behavior of Western European 
state-owned and private banks during 2000–
09, Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi (2011) find 
no difference in the behavior of both types of 
banks across the business cycle. Nonetheless, 
unlike private banks, loan growth of state-
owned banks is significantly more sensitive to 
the election cycle, thus indicating the politi-
cal role of the government as a bank’s owner. 
private counterparts (box 4.4 and Cull and 
Martínez Pería 2012). 
In sum, the experiences mentioned above 
regarding the role of state-owned banks dur-
ing the recent crisis show that they played a 
countercyclical role in some instances but not 
others. Furthermore, although it is too early 
to assess the quality of intermediation based 
on information on NPLs, there is evidence, 
in some cases, of (a) difficulty unwinding the 
expanded portfolios of development banks; 
(b) politically motivated lending; and (c) neg-
ligible effects on revenues, investment, and 
employment for eligible firms.
The evidence is also mixed regarding the 
cyclicality of lending by government banks 
in previous crises and economic cycles. 
Using bank-level data for 119 countries over 
the 1995–2002 period, Micco and Panizza 
BOX 4.4 Bank Ownership and Credit growth during the 2008–09 Crisis:  
evidence from eastern europe and Latin America (continued)
banks declined in 2009. However, the behavior of 
state banks was less procyclical than that of (domes-
tic and foreign) private banks. Hence, state-owned 
banks in some Eastern European countries may have 
partly mitigated the contraction of credit when pri-
vate banks began to deleverage.
FiguRe B4.4.1 growth of gross Loans and Bank Ownership in Latin America and eastern europe, 2004–2009
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capital is scarce, and public distrust is sig-
nificant, government banks can play a signifi-
cant role in jump-starting financial and eco-
nomic development.15 According to this view, 
governments have adequate information 
and incentives to promote socially desirable 
projects, and ownership of banks enables 
the government both to collect savings and 
to direct them toward strategic longer-term 
projects. Through such project finance, the 
government overcomes institutional failures 
that are undermining private capital markets 
and generates aggregate demand and other 
externalities that foster growth (Armendáriz 
de Aghion 1999; Bruck 1998).
In stark contrast, the political view 
argues that governments do not have suf-
ficient incentives to ensure socially desirable 
investments and acquire control of banks to 
provide employment, subsidies, and other 
benefits to supporters, who return the favor 
in the form of votes, political contributions, 
and bribes (Kornai 1979; Shleifer and Vishny 
1998).16 In this view, government ownership 
politicizes resource allocation, softens budget 
constraints, and hinders economic efficiency. 
The development and political views of 
government ownership make contrasting 
predictions about the impact of government 
ownership on financial development. Accord-
ing to the development view, government 
ownership should result in deeper, more effi-
cient, inclusive, and stable credit markets. On 
the other hand, the political view predicts 
that government ownership of banks will 
result in inefficient, noninclusive, underdevel-
oped, and unstable credit markets. While the 
development view predicts that government 
ownership will enhance economic growth 
through its positive impact on financial sec-
tor development, the political view maintains 
that government ownership could be perni-
cious for the real economy because it leads to 
credit misallocation.
Theoretical arguments notwithstanding, 
the bulk of the empirical evidence suggests 
that government bank ownership in develop-
ing economies has had negative consequences 
for long-run financial and economic devel-
opment. A large number of cross-country 
In a recent paper, Bertay, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Huizinga (2012) use an approach simi-
lar to Micco and Panizza (2006) and Ian-
notta, Nocera, and Sironi (2011), but unlike 
these studies they control for the endogene-
ity of GDP growth to credit growth by using 
the system-generalized method of moments 
estimation. Using a large worldwide sample 
of banks for the recent period from 1999 to 
2010, they also show that state bank lend-
ing is less procyclical than lending by private 
banks, especially in countries with good gov-
ernance. Furthermore, they show that lend-
ing by state banks in high-income countries 
is even countercyclical. Finally, using mac-
rolevel data on bank credit and government 
bank participation, Calderón (2012) shows 
that cycles in real credit per capita are more 
volatile in countries with large participation 
of state-owned banks (as opposed to those 
with low participation) and that the recov-
ery of credit—although stronger because of 
a larger rebound effect—is slower (box 4.5).
lonG-RUn impact oF 
GoveRnment bank 
owneRShip
The countercyclical role of state banks can-
not be evaluated independently of their 
long-term performance in credit allocation. 
In theory, economists hold different views 
about the merits of government bank own-
ership for long-run financial development 
and economic growth.14 Box 4.6 summarizes 
competing views on the role of state-owned 
banks in promoting financial development 
and access. 
Advocates of state presence argue that gov-
ernment ownership in banking is justified by 
market failures and development goals. They 
point out that financial markets are differ-
ent from other markets and that government 
intervention can remedy market failures (such 
as the underprovision of information or the 
undersupply of capital in the case of projects 
that have externalities). The development 
view, associated with Alexander Gerschen-
kron (1962), argues that in countries where 
economic institutions are not developed, 
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BOX 4.5 Macroeconomic evidence on the impact of government Banks on Credit 
and Output Cycles
Calderón (2012) studies the impact of government 
bank participation on credit and output cyclicality 
using a country-level quarterly database of 66 coun-
tries over 1980–2010. Aggregate credit cycles are 
deeper in financial systems of countries with high 
participation of government-owned banks (GOBs), 
especially during times of banking crises. In fact, 
credit contractions are almost twice as deep in coun-
tries with high GOB participation when compared 
with those with a low participation—14.3 versus 7.7 
percent, respectively (table B4.5.1). Credit recoveries 
are faster and have a stronger rebound effect in coun-
tries with high GOB participation (8.4 percent) than 
those with low participation (5.1 percent).
During financial crises, credit contractions tend 
to be shorter but deeper in developing economies 
with high GOB share relative to those with low 
share. Calderón (2012) shows that credit dropped at 
an annualized rate of 6.4 percent per quarter over a 
9-quarter period in countries with high GOB share, 
while it declined at 2.9 percent per quarter over an 
11-quarter period in those with low GOB share. 
Credit recoveries following the banking crises were 
shorter: it took approximately 5 quarters for the 
trough in real credit to reach the previous peak in 
developing economies with high GOB share com-
pared with the 9 quarters that it took a country with 
low GOB share. Also, credit recoveries after crises 
occurred at a slightly faster pace in high-GOB-share 
developing economies (3.2 percent per quarter).
When looking at upswings in real economic 
activity, credit appears to behave procyclically. Fig-
ure B4.5.1 shows that credit grows in tandem with 
real GDP as real economic activity starts its recov-
ery (period T), and the recovery in real output and 
credit in countries with high GOB share appears to 
be stronger because of a larger rebound effect. How-
ever, credit growth is above trend after 10 quarters of 
TABLe B4.5.1 Credit Cycles and government Ownership of Banks
Main feature of credit contractions and recoveries
GOB
Sharea
All episodes Episodes coinciding with crisis Episodes with no crisis
Region Duration Amplitude Slope  Duration Amplitude Slope  Duration Amplitude Slope
1. Credit contractions
 All economies Low 6.7  –7.7% –1.7%  9.3 –16.2% –2.0% 6.4  –6.9% –1.6%
High 6.8 –14.3% –2.3%  9.2 –37.4% –5.3% 6.3 –11.8% –2.1%
 Developed economies Low 6.7  –4.9% –1.1% 18.0 –25.1% –1.4% 6.4  –4.6% –1.1%
High 6.2  –6.7% –1.6%  7.3  –6.7% –1.7% 6.0  –6.6% –1.3%
 Developing economies Low 7.0 –11.3% –2.0% 11.1 –22.8% –2.9% 6.6 –10.0% –2.0%
High 6.7 –15.4% –2.8%  8.6 –45.0% –6.4% 6.0 –13.6% –2.5%
2. Credit recoveries
 All countries Low 4.9 5.1% 1.2%  8.8  9.2% 1.3% 4.6 4.9% 1.2%
High 4.5 8.4% 2.0%  5.8  9.4% 2.8% 4.3 8.0% 1.8%
 Developed economies Low 5.3 4.4% 0.9% 30.0  4.5% 0.8% 4.9 4.4% 0.9%
High 4.6 4.4% 0.6%  6.6  1.8% 0.4% 4.3 4.8% 0.6%
 Developing economies Low 4.7 5.7% 1.5%  9.2 19.5% 2.9% 4.4 5.5% 1.5%
High 4.5 9.6% 2.5%  4.9  9.6% 3.2% 4.4 9.3% 2.3%
Source: calderón 2012. 
Note: the duration of contractions is defined as the period (in quarters) between the peak in real credit per capita and its subsequent trough. Recoveries, on the 
other hand, are defined as the early stages of expansion. duration of contractions elapses the time that the corresponding variable goes from its trough to the 
previous peak level. the table reports the average duration of the different cyclical phases (downturns and upturns) for real credit per capita. the statistics for 
amplitude and slope refer to sample median across episodes. the amplitude of the downturn is the distance between the peak in real output and its subsequent 
trough, and that of the upturn is computed as the four-quarter cumulative variation in real output following the trough. the slope of the downturn is the ratio of 
the peak-to-trough (trough-to-peak) phase of the cycle to its duration. these calculations were made using a quarterly database of 66 countries over the period 
1980–2010 (21 developed economies and 45 developing economies).
a. the financial system of a country with high (low) participation of state-owned banks is defined as the system with an asset share of government-owned banks 
that is above the median sample.
(Continued on next page)
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BOX 4.5 Macroeconomic evidence on the impact of government Banks on Credit 
and Output Cycles (continued)
FiguRe B4.5.1 evolution of Real gDP and Credit around Recoveries in economic Activity
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Source: calderón 2012.
Note: t represents the trough in real gdp (start of the recovery period).
the start of the recovery in countries with low GOB 
share, while it is still converging to trend growth in 
high-GOB-share countries.a
In general, credit starts to recover in the period 
following the start of the upswing in real GDP—
period T + 1—regardless of the magnitude of the 
shock that led the economy to a recession. Figure 
B4.5.2 shows that the dynamics of credit around 
real economic recoveries is similar among countries 
with low GOB share when comparing crisis-related 
upturns with other upturns. It can be inferred from 
this finding that countries may not be equipped with 
government infrastructure or may find ways other 
than government banking to prop up financial con-
ditions. For instance, they may choose to expand 
the balance sheet of their central bank. In countries 
with high GOB share, real credit per capita fluctuates 
more intensely in recoveries that follow crisis-related 
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BOX 4.5 Macroeconomic evidence on the impact of government Banks on Credit 
and Output Cycles (continued)
FiguRe B4.5.2 evolution of Real gDP and Credit around Recoveries in economic Activity
Deviations from trend 
a. Countries with low participation of GOBs
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Source: calderón 2012.
Note: t represents the trough in real gdp (start of the recovery period), and the dating of the banking crisis corresponds to that of laeven and valencia (2010).
recessions when compared with regular upswings in 
economic activity. Following a crisis-related reces-
sion, credit takes more time to hit a trough and start 
its own recovery. Also, the stronger surge in credit 
in countries with GOB share is related to a greater 
rebound effect from the crisis.
a. The analysis conducted in figure B4.5.1 and B4.5.2 follows Beck, Levine, and Levkov (2010). It consists of regressing 
the (year-on-year) growth in real credit on a 25-quarter window (12 quarters before and after the peak or trough in real 
GDP) centered on a dummy variable at time T that takes the value of 1 when there is a trough in real GDP at quarter T 
(that is, the starting period of a recovery). The remaining variables are leads and lags of the trough taking place at time T. 
These regressions also include dummy variables to control for other country-specific characteristics. The plot of the time 
evolution of credit along this window shows deviations of credit relative to the average credit growth in  tranquil times.
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BOX 4.6 Two Views on the Role of State-Owned Banks
In a recent debate published in the World Bank’s All 
About Finance blog, two academics expressed con-
trasting views about the role of state-owned banks in 
promoting financial stability and access.
Franklin Allen, Nippon Life Professor of Finance 
and Economics, Wharton School, University of Penn-
sylvania, argues that, despite being outperformed 
by their private counterparts in terms of long-term 
resource allocation, “public banks may enjoy an 
advantage over private banks in times of crisis and, 
hence, their merits need to be reassessed.” He goes 
on to say that “the real advantage would come when 
there is a crisis. Rather than having central banks 
intervene in commercial credit markets, where they 
have little expertise, the state-owned commercial 
bank can temporarily expand its role both in terms 
of assets and loans. This should considerably improve 
the functioning of the economy and overcome credit 
crunch problems.”
“The financial system can be safeguarded during 
times of crisis through a mixed system with mostly 
private banks but one or two are state-owned com-
mercial banks. They would compete with private 
banks in normal times to ensure a competitive cost 
structure and prevent corruption, and they would 
provide useful information to regulators by signaling 
excess risk-taking or exercise of monopoly power by 
private banks. However, their real advantage would 
become evident during a financial crisis. State-owned 
commercial banks would be a safe haven for retail 
and interbank deposits, act as a fire break in the pro-
cess of contagion, and provide loans to businesses—
particularly small and medium size enterprises—
through the crisis. They could expand and take 
up the slack in the banking business left by private 
banks. Listing such banks will ensure full informa-
tion on them is available and their stock prices will 
indicate how well they are performing.”
“Public banks can play another important role 
in increasing access to financial services. If the gov-
ernment wishes it to pursue this agenda then it may 
be helpful to subsidize this kind of activity. In many 
European countries in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, the post office provided access to savings 
accounts and other kinds of financial services that 
many customers would not otherwise have had. A 
good example of a public bank that plays these roles 
is Chile’s Banco del Estado, which is entirely owned 
by the Chilean Government. It is the country’s third 
largest lender and operates in all major segments of 
the banking market. The fact that it has to compete 
with private banks ensures it is well run. Banco del 
Estado also has a long history of promoting access in 
all parts of the country and to all people. Many other 
countries might benefit from this type of bank.”
In contrast, Charles Calomiris, Henry Kaufman 
Professor of Financial Institutions at Columbia Uni-
versity, argues that academic work “indicates power-
fully the negative effects of state-controlled banks on 
the banking systems of the countries in which they 
operate and that the winding down of state-con-
trolled banks was rightly celebrated in many coun-
tries in the 1990s as creating new potential for eco-
nomic growth and political reform.” He goes on to 
say that there are three main reasons that explain the 
dismal performance of state-controlled banks. “First, 
government officials do not face incentives that are 
conducive to operating well-functioning banks. They 
are typically not incentivized to maximize economic 
effectiveness and they tend not to be trained in credit 
analysis as well as private bankers. They face incen-
tives that reward politically rather than economi-
cally motivated allocations of credit. Second, the 
politically motivated allocation of funds to crony 
capitalists has adverse consequences for the politi-
cal and social system of a region or country. State-
controlled banks are a breeding ground for corrup-
tion of elected and appointed government officials, 
the financial regulatory authorities, and the courts. 
Not only do they stunt the growth of the economy, 
they also weaken the core political and bureaucratic 
institutions on which democracy and adherence 
to the rule of law depend. Third, state-controlled 
banks are ‘loss-making machines.’ Because they 
are not geared toward profitability or the aggressive 
enforcement of loan repayment, but rather toward 
rewarding political cronies with funding, the losses 
of state-controlled banks pose a major fiscal cost for 
governments. Those fiscal costs crowd out desirable 
government initiatives, and given the large size of the 
losses, can be a threat to the solvency of government 
and a source of inflationary deficit financing.”
“The crisis has only reconfirmed the extreme dam-
age that politically motivated lending can inflict. The 
quasi-state-controlled U.S. entities Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac accounted for more than half of the 
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and Yañez 2007).18 State-owned banks also 
tend to display lower z-scores, thus showing 
greater instability than their private counter-
parts (Ianotta, Nocera, and Sironi 2007). 
Interpreting cross-country evidence is dif-
ficult because of the potential for endogeneity 
biases resulting from reverse causation and 
omitted factors.19 In other words, it is feasible 
that the negative association of government 
bank ownership with the different dimen-
sions of financial development and with eco-
nomic growth could arise from the need for 
more government intervention in countries 
with lower financial and economic devel-
opment or from some omitted factor. Simi-
larly, analyzing differences in the profitabil-
ity of state-owned versus private banks does 
not necessarily provide conclusive evidence 
regarding their impact and performance. 
State-owned banks may exhibit lower profit-
ability because they maximize broader social 
objectives, investing in financially unprofit-
able projects with positive externalities. 
studies show that greater government par-
ticipation in bank ownership is associated 
with lower levels of financial development 
(Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2001, 2004; La 
Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2002), 
more politically motivated lending (Dinç 
2005; Micco, Panizza, and Yañez 2007), 
lower banking-sector outreach (Beck, Demir-
güç-Kunt, and Martínez Pería 2007), wider 
intermediation spreads and slower economic 
growth (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer 2002), and greater financial insta-
bility (Caprio and Martínez Pería 2002; La 
Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2002).17 
The evidence also suggests that state-owned 
commercial banks operating in develop-
ing economies have lower profitability than 
comparable private banks, as well as lower 
interest margins, higher overhead costs, and 
a higher fraction of nonperforming loans 
(Berger, Hasan, and Zhou 2009; Farazi, 
Feyen, and Rocha 2011; Iannotta, Nocera, 
and Sironi 2007; IDB 2005; Micco, Panizza, 
BOX 4.6 Two Views on the Role of State-Owned Banks (continued)
funding of subprime and Alt-A mortgages leading up 
to the crisis. There is evidence that political motiva-
tions drove the intentional risk taking and deteriora-
tion of underwriting standards at those institutions 
after 2003—a crucial ingredient in the subprime 
boom of 2004–2007. Government quotas dramati-
cally increased the funding that Fannie and Freddie 
had to supply to low-income and underserved borrow-
ers, but the supply of creditworthy low-income and 
underserved borrowers was limited. Inevitably, lend-
ing standards were relaxed. The U.S. experience is not 
unique. Political motivations drove Spanish cajas to 
support a real-estate boom that ended in a massive 
bust. In Germany, state-controlled banks also made 
horrible investment decisions, thus reflecting incom-
petence more than corruption or political motives 
for channeling funds. Looking back historically, it is 
clear that state-controlled lending has been a major 
contributor to unwise and politically motivated risk 
taking that has ended badly over and over again.”
“The huge crisis-related losses of equity capital in 
the banking system and the subsequent stepping up 
of regulatory oversight over banks have resulted in 
a short-term contraction in the supply of credit. This 
credit crunch magnified the decline of GDP during 
the recession, and slowed the pace of the recovery. In 
such an environment, it may seem appealing to pass 
a law creating a state-owned bank with the goal of 
re-starting the rapid flow of loanable funds. But such 
an initiative would be short-sighted. Rather than 
promoting sustainable growth, it would slow growth 
over the medium or long run, as funds would be 
channeled to low-productivity users. A move to sup-
port state-controlled banks would also raise systemic 
risk (as Fannie and Freddie, and the Spanish cajas 
clearly show), promote corruption of government 
officials and institutions, and lead to fiscal losses that 
could threaten the solvency of government and lead 
to high inflation.”
Source: All About Finance (blog), World Bank.
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to target rents to voters by subsidizing mul-
tilocation firms to shift employment and 
capital toward politically attractive regions 
and away from nonattractive regions. Politi-
cal manipulation of public bank lending does 
not seem to be restricted to developing econ-
omies, as shown by Sapienza (2004), who 
presents evidence that state-owned banks 
serve as a mechanism to provide political 
patronage in Italy.
Not only are state-owned banks more 
likely to be engaged in political lending, 
but they also do not serve firms that require 
more active participation of the state—that 
is, firms with deeper asymmetric informa-
tion problems, such as SMEs. In a study of 
bank lending relationships in India, using 
firm-level and bank-level data during the late 
1990s, Berger and others (2008) find that 
state-owned banks have tighter relations with 
state-owned enterprises than with SMEs. 
Similarly, Ongena and Sendeniz-Yuncu 
(2011) find that Turkish state banks fail to 
engage small opaque firms. 
State-owned banks can also exist for pop-
ulist reasons. Acharya (2011) demonstrates 
that the government can threaten the stability 
of the financial system with the formulation 
and implementation of financial policies that 
focus on short-term populist goals. So-called 
short-termist governments may extend guar-
antees, weaken capital requirements, provide 
direct lending, and encourage competition to 
generate greater entry into the financial sec-
tor and expand economic activity. Excess 
risk-taking arising from these policies may 
fuel credit booms and threaten the stability 
of the financial system down the line. The 
boom-bust cycle of U.S. housing prices in the 
run-up to the 2007–09 financial crisis is an 
illustration of this type of policies.21 
Not all state-owned banks are alike, 
however. Depending on whether they aim 
for profit maximization, take deposits, or 
have a clear mandate, state-owned banks 
can be classified as state commercial banks, 
state development banks, and development 
financial institutions (Scott 2007). State-
owned commercial banks are institutions 
that behave similarly to private commercial 
However, detailed within-country stud-
ies that are less susceptible to endogeneity 
concerns and are better able to identify the 
impact of government ownership provide evi-
dence consistent with the bulk of the cross-
country studies. For instance, Cole (2009a) 
analyzes the expansion of government bank 
ownership through nationalization in India 
and finds that, although areas with more 
nationalized banks showed a large increase 
in credit to rural borrowers, this increase did 
not result in improved agricultural outcomes. 
Moreover, his results suggest that govern-
ment bank ownership was associated with a 
lower quality of financial intermediation and 
a misallocation of resources. Using detailed 
loan-level data from Pakistan, Khwaja and 
Mian (2005) find that politically connected 
firms were able to obtain larger and cheaper 
loans from state-owned banks (but not from 
private ones) and defaulted on these loans 
more frequently than nonconnected bor-
rowers. They estimate that the economy-
wide costs of the resulting misallocation of 
resources could be as high as 1.9 percent of 
GDP every year. Cole (2009b) also presents 
evidence of political manipulation of lending 
in India, with state-owned banks increasing 
agricultural lending substantially in tightly 
contested districts during election years.20 
The election-year increase in government 
lending is associated with higher default rates 
and does not have a measurable effect on 
agricultural output. 
Carvalho (2010) provides support for the 
view that politicians use government bank 
lending to influence the real behavior of firms 
using plant-level data for the universe of Bra-
zilian manufacturing firms with at least 50 
employees. He shows that firms eligible for 
government bank lending expand employ-
ment in regions with allied incumbents near 
reelection years. The effects represent persis-
tent and economically important increases in 
the local employment of firms and are asso-
ciated with greater borrowing from govern-
ment banks. However, they are not associ-
ated with persistent expansions of the overall 
employment and capital of firms. The analy-
sis suggests that politicians use bank lending 
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banks: they are deposit-taking institutions 
that may have a profit-maximizing objective. 
State development banks can take deposits 
and have a clear mandate, while development 
financial institutions are state-owned finan-
cial institutions that have a specific mandate 
and are not funded through deposits. State-
owned development banks and financial 
institutions further distinguish between tier 
1 and tier 2 institutions—those that lend 
directly to the public and those that lend to 
private banks that in turn lend to the pub-
lic. A large part of the evidence on the impact 
of state-owned banks either focuses entirely 
on commercial banks or does not distinguish 
between commercial and development banks.
De Luna and Vicente (2012) have recently 
undertaken a global survey of development 
banks, which include state development 
banks and development financial institu-
tions. They find large differences in the way 
these institutions are run and perform. The 
authors show that although there are some 
bright spots, in general, most development 
banks and institutions need institutional 
reform (box 4.7). The literature identi-
fies a set of good practices to follow so that 
state-owned banks institutions are well-run 
(Gutiérrez and others 2011; Rudolph 2009; 
Scott 2007). To avoid the problems of credit 
misallocation discussed earlier, state-owned 
banks need a clear and sustainable mandate. 
To fulfill their mandate, state-owned banks 
should target strategic sectors and work as 
complements to rather than substitutes for 
private sector efforts to allocate resources. 
They also require adequate risk management 
systems to guarantee financially sustainable 
business and to obtain funding from markets 
without explicit guarantees from the gov-
ernment. Sound corporate governance plays 
a key role in explaining good performance 
of state-owned banks. It requires the trans-
parent nomination of board members and 
the selection of senior management by the 
board. Drafting an ownership policy is rec-
ommended, with principles associated with 
sound commercial practices, good corporate 
governance, and competitive neutrality (Scott 
2007). Unfortunately, getting these design 
features right tends to be most challenging 
in weak institutional environments, where 
the potential benefits of these institutions are 
likely to be the greatest.
Few success stories can be found for the 
role of state-owned banks in promoting 
financial development when these institu-
tions are engaged directly in the allocation 
and pricing of credit. However, some exam-
ples of targeted government interventions 
in the financial sector show positive results. 
Development banks in Mexico have played a 
positive role in the provision of more complex 
(noncredit) financial services despite heavy 
setup costs and uncertainty on financial 
returns. Partnership of state-owned finan-
cial intermediaries with their private coun-
terparts has allowed them to overcome first-
mover disincentives, coordination failures, 
and obstacles to risk sharing and distribution 
(Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck, and Honohan 2008). 
For instance, NAFIN (Nacional Financiera) 
developed an online platform called Cadenas 
Productivas to provide reverse factoring ser-
vices to SMEs. This framework allows small 
suppliers to use their accounts receivable 
from large creditworthy firms to get working 
capital financing (Klapper 2006). BANSEFI 
(Banca de Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Finan-
cieros) implemented an electronic platform to 
help semiformal and informal financial insti-
tutions reduce their operating costs by pro-
viding centralized back-office operations (for 
example, clearinghouse services and liquidity 
management, among others). Finally, FIRA 
(Fideicomisos Instituidos en Relación con la 
Agricultura) has brokered structured finan-
cial products to align incentives and curtail 
adverse selection problems between financial 
intermediaries and firms in different parts 
of the supply chain of several industries. For 
example, FIRA has arranged collateralized 
loan obligations for shrimp producers and 
asset-backed securities for sugar mills (de la 
Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler 2007).22 These 
examples suggest that the government has 
a role, to be directly involved in the finan-
cial sector through short-run interventions 
that address specific market failures and 
that seek to complement private financial 
120  d i R e c t  s t a t e  i n t e R v e n t i o n s  GLOBAL finAnciAL DEVELOPMEnT REPORT 2013
BOX 4.7 Development Banks: What Do We Know? What Do We Need to Know?
The world economy has witnessed a revival of inter-
est in development banks (DBs) in recent years. New 
DBs have been formed in low- and middle-income 
countries (for example, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
India, Malawi, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, 
Serbia, and Thailand) as well as in some high-income 
countries (for example, the U.K.’s Green Investment 
Bank). DBs, along with other state-owned financial 
institutions, account for one-quarter of banking 
assets in developing economies—and this share is 
even larger among Brazil, Russia, India, and China. 
The renewed debate and interest in DBs has been 
fueled by their potential countercyclical role in times 
of crisis. Typically, DBs have fulfilled long-term 
development roles by filling market gaps in long-
term credit and agriculture finance and by promoting 
access to finance for SMEs. More recently, in light 
of the global financial crisis, DBs are now being per-
ceived by national authorities as an important part of 
the policy toolkit to mitigate contractions in aggre-
gate credit during crises. In fact, the loan portfolio 
of DBs grew by 36 percent globally during the period 
2007–09—that is, four times as fast as the growth 
in credit provided by private commercial banks. 
However, there is historical evidence that the benefits 
from DBs’ intervention in credit markets may come 
with potentially large costs, if these institutions have 
unsound operating practices—that is, if they have 
neither appropriate risk management practices nor 
sound corporate governance. 
A global survey conducted by De Luna-Martínez 
and Vicente (2012) aims at building new knowl-
edge on activities, funding, business models, lend-
ing instruments, government arrangements, and 
challenges faced by development banks. The survey, 
which defines development banks as financial insti-
tutions with more than 30 percent of their shares 
owned by the state and with a public mandate, cov-
ers 90 DBs from 61 countries—with their combined 
assets and their loan portfolio as of December 2009 
being approximately US$2 trillion and US$1.6 tril-
lion, respectively. 
The global survey suggests that the performance 
of most DBs still needs substantial improvement. 
Although one can identify some bright spots among 
development banks (for example, Mexico’s NAFIN 
and Germany’s Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau 
[KfW]), many DBs still are far from adopting best 
practices in governance and risk management. For 
instance, DBs remain vulnerable to undue political 
interference and capture by interest groups because 
about 75 percent of them do not have independent 
members on their boards. In addition, several DBs 
have not adopted criteria with regard to the minimum 
qualifications that their board members and senior 
management should meet. There is concern about the 
real financial situation of DBs—about one-quarter of 
the surveyed institutions are not supervised with the 
same accounting and prudential standards applicable 
to private commercial banks.
Financial performance of DBs is mixed. Although 
15 percent of DBs report nonperforming loans 
exceeding 30 percent of their total loan portfolio, 
78 percent of them admit the need to improve their 
risk management framework. Going forward, DBs’ 
major challenges include the need to reduce their reli-
ance on government budget transfers and to improve 
their own profitability: 59 percent of them indicate 
that self-sustainability is a major challenge. Success 
of DBs would also require major improvement in cor-
porate governance and transparency, with one out of 
two institutions surveyed responding that they are 
still far from having best practices in these areas.
Successful stories of government bank owner-
ship are not abundant. However, some DBs have 
proved more effective than others in achieving their 
goals while ensuring financial sustainability. The 
more effective DBs have defined a clear and sustain-
able mandate and have adopted better corporate 
governance practices. A clear mandate (including a 
target sector, positioning with regard to the private 
sector and other DBs, and financial sustainability 
objectives) helps to focus the activity of the DBs and 
avoids the tendency to engage DBs in business where 
the private sector has a comparative advantage. A 
clear mandate also complements the accountability 
of the board of directors and management and facili-
tates performance monitoring. 
Good practices in DB governance call for clear 
definition of the roles of shareholders, the board of 
directors, and management, as well as a separation 
of their functions to avoid conflicts of interest. The 
shareholder representative should be clearly identi-
fied (for example, the minister of finance), provide 
broad policy guidelines, and appoint the board of 
directors, but it is advisable to avoid the presence of 
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can also diversify risk by guaranteeing loans 
across different sectors or geographic areas. 
Credit guarantee schemes are designed to 
enable lenders to learn about the creditwor-
thiness of constrained borrowers without 
incurring the initial risks involved and to 
allow these borrowers to establish a repay-
ment reputation and in time graduate to non-
guarantee loans. Public guarantee schemes 
refer to those funded or managed with gov-
ernment resources.
Even before the crisis, credit guarantee 
schemes have become one of the most popu-
lar mechanisms of intervention to expand 
the use of financial services for credit-con-
strained firms, such as SMEs. According 
to Green (2003), there are over 2,000 such 
schemes in place in almost 100 countries. As 
discussed by Honohan (2010), credit guar-
antee schemes can emerge for three main 
reasons: to mitigate asymmetric information 
problems between lenders and borrowers 
that can result in credit rationing, as a means 
intermediation, not replace it. Of course, 
once again the design and governance of such 
interventions are key factors.
GoveRnment inteRvention 
in cReDit maRketS beyonD 
bank owneRShip 
Credit guarantee schemes are a popular 
intervention tool during crises. For example, 
during the 2007–08 crisis, many govern-
ments (for example, Canada, Chile, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Netherlands, the United King-
dom, and the United States) extended new 
and special schemes or refueled existing ones 
to alleviate the impact of the credit crunch on 
SMEs.23 Credit guarantee schemes typically 
serve as risk transfer and risk diversification 
mechanisms. By replacing part or all the risk 
of the borrower with that of the issuer of the 
guarantee (depending on the coverage ratio), 
they tend to lower the lender’s risk. They 
BOX 4.7 Development Banks: What Do We Know? What Do We Need to 
Know? (continued)
ministers on the board of DBs. The board should be 
professional and independent. The board provides a 
strategic vision to ensure compliance with the policy 
objectives and establishes indicators to monitor per-
formance. It should also ensure that the financial sus-
tainability of the institution is preserved and should 
appoint and dismiss the chief executive officer. 
Finally, more effective DBs are supervised and regu-
lated as any other bank by the financial supervisory 
authorities.
The survey found that innovative procedures have 
been put in place to help DBs operate effectively in 
various jurisdictions. For instance, some DBs are 
legally obliged to achieve a minimum return on 
capital, measured in terms of the inflation rate or the 
government’s cost of borrowing. Moreover, certain 
DBs have been partially privatized, and the man-
agement has been transferred to the private sector 
under management contracts. Certain governments 
have also adopted legislation that prevents them from 
bailing out DBs in case of failure. In other jurisdic-
tions, DBs lend only through tier II operations and 
share with the private sector the risk of lending to 
underserved segments of the market. Some DBs 
are also governed by boards with only independent 
members. It is worth exploring all these innovations 
because they may be part of the solutions needed to 
strengthen the weak institutions covered in the sur-
vey, in particular those operating in difficult institu-
tional environments.
Good practice recommendations are particularly 
difficult to apply in countries with weak institu-
tional settings. Development banks could add most 
value in financially underdeveloped countries where 
there are significant market failures, but it is in those 
environments in particular that the design can go 
bad. That is why, in practice, many DBs tend to 
underperform.
Source: De Luna-Martínez and Vicente 2012.
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income and quality of life of the borrowers 
and, in general, an increase in the amount 
of commercial and economic activity in the 
country, as measured in terms of employment 
and economic growth. 
Measuring the benefits of credit guaran-
tees through financial and economic addi-
tionality is far from easy, and most of the 
existing evidence examines the ability of 
credit guarantees to overcome problems in 
access to credit—that is, financial additional-
ity. For instance, Riding, Madill, and Haines 
(2007) found that 75 percent of guarantees 
generated additional loans thanks to the 
implementation of a credit scoring methodol-
ogy on loan applications to Canadian banks. 
In Chile, there is evidence that microenter-
prises are more likely to get a bank loan using 
the State-Owned Guarantee Fund for Small 
Entepreneurs, or FOGAPE (Larraín and 
Quiroz 2006), and credit guarantees have 
helped expand lending to insurance-intensive 
sectors (Cowan, Drexler, and Yañez 2009). 
There is also evidence of financial additional-
ity among G-7 countries. For example, firms 
that participated in the Italian credit guaran-
tee scheme during 1999–2004 benefited from 
an increase in credit and a reduction in bor-
rowing costs (Zecchini and Ventura 2006). 
In Japan, SMEs using the Special Credit 
Guarantee Program for financial stability 
received more credit than nonusers (Uesugi, 
Sakai, and Yamashiro 2010; Wilcox and Yas-
uda 2008). Finally, guaranteed loans by the 
U.S. Small Business Administration were less 
affected by economic shocks than nonguar-
anteed loans—thus providing some evidence 
of countercyclicality of guarantee schemes 
(Hancock, Peek, and Wilcox 2007).
There is also some evidence—although 
rather scant—of economic additionality. For 
instance, the rate of employment was higher 
in U.S. districts that received more guaran-
teed lending (Craig, Jackson, and Thompson 
2007). In addition, sales performance and 
productivity improved among firms financed 
by KOTEC, a Korean government guaran-
tor that provides credit guarantees to new 
technology-based enterprises (Kang and Hes-
hmati 2008; Roper 2009).
of spreading and diversifying risk, and to 
exploit regulatory arbitrage if the guarantor 
is not subject to the same regulatory require-
ment as the lender. None of these three rea-
sons per se imply government involvement in 
guarantee schemes.
Government involvement in guarantee 
schemes can be primarily justified on the 
grounds of coordination failures among pri-
vate parties.24 Coordination failure among 
private parties and first mover disadvantage 
can prevent private providers from entering 
the market for credit guarantees or prevent 
lenders from pooling resources for such a 
scheme. As Green (2003) argues, because 
banks cannot exclude the free riding of other 
financial institutions, they have little incen-
tive to produce information on constrained 
borrowers such as SMEs. A similar reluc-
tance applies to developing lending technolo-
gies suitable for such borrowers. Anginer, 
de la Torre, and Ize (2011) argue that gov-
ernment guarantees may have an edge over 
private guarantees because the government 
is better at solving collective action fric-
tions or coordinating failures among private 
parties—rather than solving agency fric-
tions (such as informational asymmetries or 
adverse selection).
Political factors also justify the existence 
of public guarantee schemes (for example, 
Beck and others 2010). Theory shows that 
guarantee funds are more effective and less 
costly in expanding access than directed 
lending schemes (Arping, Lóránth, and Mor-
rison 2010). Also, guarantee schemes might 
be easier to justify politically because they 
resemble market-friendly instruments, in 
which the lending decision typically stays 
with the lender, and because they imply small 
initial costs of funding (losses accumulate 
over time as defaults materialize).
Rigorous evaluations of the total costs and 
benefits of these schemes are rare. Guaran-
tee schemes strive to attain financial and, 
ultimately, economic additionality. Financial 
additionality refers to greater provision of 
credit to credible clients for whom credit was 
previously rationed. Economic additionality, 
by comparison, refers to improvements in the 
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Honohan 2010). For instance, credit risk 
assessment practices should be outsourced 
to the private sector (rather than being con-
ducted by the government) to improve the 
quality of risk decisions and to minimize loan 
losses. However, outsourcing risk manage-
ment in the case of public guarantee schemes 
could potentially lead the lender to assign to 
the guarantee the worst eligible risks in the 
portfolio. This can be mitigated by penal-
izing lenders that have high claims and by 
imposing higher future premium payments. 
Targeting for the credit guarantee scheme 
should be broad (for example, specific sector 
and areas) if the focus remains on credit-con-
strained groups, whereas too-specific target-
ing may involve high bureaucratic costs that 
might distort lending decisions. The coverage 
ratios determined by the scheme should pro-
vide incentives for lenders to properly assess 
and monitor borrowers. Most practitioners 
argue that lenders should retain a significant 
part of the risk—for example, from 30 to 40 
percent. However, in practice, 40 percent of 
the 76 credit guarantee schemes analyzed in 
Beck and others (2010) offer guarantees of 
up to 100 percent. The median coverage is 
80 percent, which is certainly not in line with 
providing incentives for lenders to properly 
assess and monitor borrowers. Guarantee 
programs with coverage ratios between 90 
and 100 percent have been shown to bring 
about large losses. For instance, the rural 
credit guarantee fund established by the Lith-
uanian government, which offered 100 per-
cent coverage for loans aimed at financing the 
purchase of tractors and other agricultural 
equipment, brought about a large number of 
bad loans within three years of its starting 
date (Rute 2002).
Regarding the pricing of credit guaran-
tees, the fees charged by the scheme should 
be high enough to ensure financial sustain-
ability of the fund and low enough to secure 
adequate participation by lenders and bor-
rowers. The payout of the guarantee should 
take place after the bank initiates legal action 
following default in order to reduce moral 
hazard on the side of the lender, who might 
be too quick to write off a loan after default. 
Credit guarantees can generate financial 
and economic benefits; however, because the 
programs are generally targeted to specific 
sectors, they are unlikely to have large mac-
roeconomic effects. Also, they are not truly 
countercyclical tools since they do not tend to 
contract during periods of economic booms. 
At the same time, they can bring about siz-
able displacements and deadweight losses. 
For instance, there is evidence that a large 
and growing share of guarantees granted by 
FOGAPE have been allocated to the same 
firms (Benavente, Galetovic, and Sanhueza 
2006). In addition, approximately half of 
the guaranteed loans in the Philippines went 
to borrowers with sufficient collateral, thus 
generating significant deadweight loss (Sal-
dana 2000). In Pakistan, half of the subsi-
dized credit for exporters went to financially 
unconstrained firms that did not need the 
funds, and the diversion in unneeded credit to 
beneficiary firms could have held GDP below 
its potential by 0.75 percent (Zia 2008).
There is also evidence of significant costs 
in credit guarantee schemes among devel-
oped nations. The massive credit guarantee 
program implemented by the government 
of Japan between 1998 and 2001 rendered 
only a temporary availability of funds for 
the intended program participants, and their 
ex post performance deteriorated relative 
to nonusers of the guarantee. Also, major 
banks often used the guarantee scheme to 
replace nonguarantee loans with guaran-
teed ones to minimize their exposure to 
risky assets (Uesugi, Sakai, and Yamashiro 
(2010). Another scheme set up by the Japa-
nese government in October 2008, the Emer-
gency Credit Guarantee Program, failed to 
translate a greater availability of funds into 
higher investment and employment among 
user firms and, in addition, deteriorated their 
creditworthiness (Ono, Uesugi, and Yasuda 
2011). 
The success of credit guarantees is tightly 
linked to the design of the scheme. The lit-
erature identifies and discusses a set of good 
practices that contribute to the success-
ful implementation of a credit guarantee 
scheme (Beck and others 2010; Green 2003; 
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laws and enforcement mechanisms is prefer-
able to government interventions in address-
ing inadequacies of the legal framework asso-
ciated with the credit system (Holden 1997; 
Vogel and Adams 1997). Although rigorous 
impact evaluations of their costs and benefits 
are still scarce, their performance hinges on 
good design, which is more challenging to 
get right in weak institutional environments. 
Best-practice lessons suggest that the most 
successful credit guarantee schemes are those 
that move to broad eligibility and other cri-
teria, reduce subsidies, and make greater use 
of the portfolio and wholesaling approach in 
preference to case-by-case evaluation by the 
guarantor of retail loans. 
Finally, deploying credit through state-
owned banks and extending credit guaran-
tees were not the only means used by gov-
ernments to prop up financial conditions 
during the recent crisis.25 Some countries 
implemented alternative strategies to offset 
the credit crunch using their central banks. In 
addition to traditional policies such as inter-
est rate cuts to support aggregate demand, 
developed economies tried to revive the ailing 
financial markets by implementing uncon-
ventional monetary policies that led to the 
expansion and change in the composition 
of their central bank’s balance sheets. The 
wide array of measures implemented include 
the U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s purchase of 
long-term Treasury bills, the European Cen-
tral Bank’s purchase of covered bonds, relax-
ation of the collateral framework to access 
the discount window, changes in funding 
terms or auction schedules, support of money 
markets, and foreign currency swaps.26 
Using the central bank as a countercycli-
cal tool in times of crisis has its advantages. 
This type of intervention not only has smaller 
implementation lags but also is easier to 
unwind. Generating mechanisms to retrench 
lending activity by state-owned banks is more 
cumbersome, especially during the expan-
sion that follows a crisis. However, legal 
constraints and credibility issues due to high 
inflation episodes may make it difficult for 
emerging markets to use a more unconven-
tional approach to central banking and credit 
However, there is a dearth of schemes that 
structure the payout so as to maximize incen-
tives for lenders to minimize loan losses 
(Beck and others 2010). Finally, among risk 
management practices, guarantee schemes 
can reduce lenders’ own ex post exposure to 
loan defaults through reinsurance, loan sales, 
or portfolio securitization. Risk diversifica-
tion abilities are tied to the development of 
local capital markets and financial products. 
Beck and others (2010) find that 76 percent 
of guarantee schemes use risk management 
tools. This figure is encouraging since the 
authors also find that schemes that do not use 
risk management tools exhibit higher inci-
dence of default losses.
Finally, recent research shows that 49 
percent of the 76 credit-guaranteed schemes 
covered in Beck and others (2010) are funded 
by governments. The government has a 
much more limited role in management, 
risk assessment, and recovery: less than 20 
percent of schemes are managed by govern-
ments, and credit risk assessment and recov-
ery are conducted by governments in only 
approximately 10 percent of the schemes. 
Government-backed guarantee schemes with 
responsibilities in credit risk and recovery 
are typically older, are more prone to guar-
antee loan portfolios, pay out after the bank 
initiates recovery, and lack a risk manage-
ment program. These results are consistent 
with the notion that guarantee schemes with 
greater government involvement are less 
likely to manage risk and losses. Consistent 
with these findings, Beck and others (2010) 
find that government involvement in credit 
decisions is associated with higher incidence 
of default losses.
Overall, although government-backed 
credit guarantee schemes might help jump-
start lending to certain borrowers in certain 
sectors, these schemes are not likely to have 
large macroeconomic effects nor are they 
likely to work as truly countercyclical tools. 
Furthermore, they cannot substitute for 
reform of the underlying institutional require-
ments of an effective credit system and should 
not diminish the focus on these long-term 
reforms. For instance, improving collateral 
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that the recovery of credit—although stron-
ger because of a larger rebound effect—is 
slower. Microlevel evidence for the Latin 
America and the Caribbean and Central and 
Eastern Europe regions suggests that state-
owned banks were not universally respon-
sible for propping up credit during the recent 
crisis. Banks in Latin America and the Carib-
bean seem primarily to have played a coun-
tercyclical role. 
Furthermore, the benefits of this short-
term credit stabilization may come at a cost. 
From experience, the associated costs of 
the intervention are likely to be steep, with 
agency and political economy problems lead-
ing to credit misallocation and economic 
inefficiency. Lending and investment deci-
sions by state-owned banks (typically moti-
vated by political connections or allegiances) 
lead to a deterioration of the quality of loans 
and, hence, to a greater misallocation of 
resources. So far, the financial and economic 
costs of recent state interventions are difficult 
to ascertain since the overall effects are still 
unfolding. Hence, the potential benefits and 
costs require careful consideration by policy 
makers. The track record of state banks in 
credit allocation remains generally unimpres-
sive, questioning the wisdom of using state 
banks as a countercyclical tool. 
Ideally, the performance of state-owned 
banks can be improved by adopting a set of 
good practices in their institutional design. A 
clear and sustainable mandate is needed so 
that state-owned banks complement rather 
than substitute private efforts in the credit 
markets. An adequate risk management 
system is required to guarantee the finan-
cial sustainability of the institution. Finally, 
sound corporate governance—and, more 
specifically, the elaboration of an ownership 
policy—is also a key factor for the optimal 
function of these banks. Unfortunately, these 
design features are challenging to implement 
in weak institutional environments, precisely 
where state-owned banks can make the 
greatest contributions—but often fail to do 
so because of these design weaknesses. 
Governments also devised strategies to 
prop up the financial sector that did not 
stabilization. Also, emerging market econo-
mies do not have an international reserve 
currency, so quantitative easing measures 
may jeopardize the stability and value of their 
currencies. Finally, the monetary authority in 
emerging markets can actively participate by 
setting up open bank assistance lines to the 
financial sector. However, as in the case of 
bank ownership, this approach also requires 
strong corporate governance so as to avoid 
political interference.
A comprehensive examination of the con-
duct of monetary policy, conventional or 
unconventional, during times of financial 
stress is beyond the scope of this report. A 
more detailed account of the response of 
the monetary authority during the recent 
crisis can be found in Aït-Sahalia and oth-
ers (2010); Brave and Gesnay (2011); Gian-
none and others (2011); and Lenza, Pill, and 
Reichlin (2010).27
conclUSion
Governments actively responded to restore 
credit conditions during the recent global 
financial crisis. Emerging markets used their 
state-owned banks mainly to inject liquidity 
in their financial markets, while many devel-
oped economies effectively used their central 
bank to prop up the financial sector. Credit 
guarantees were also actively used to foster 
credit in some underserved segments of the 
economy.
Having state-owned banks may have 
facilitated the flow of credit in some coun-
tries during the recent global financial crisis. 
It helped stabilize aggregate credit in some 
emerging markets and restored credit condi-
tions. State-owned banks partially compen-
sated for the slowdown (and, in some cases, 
decline) in credit provided by (domestic and 
foreign) private banks. However, the evidence 
on the short-term benefits of government 
bank lending is far from conclusive. Some 
macrolevel evidence, including the recent as 
well as previous crises, shows that credit fluc-
tuations are more volatile in countries with 
high participation of state-owned banks (as 
opposed to those with low participation) and 
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unconventional monetary and fiscal policies, 
see Aït-Sahalia and others (2010), Claessens 
and others (2011), and Lenza, Pill, and Reich-
lin (2010).
 4. The main focus of this chapter is on direct 
interventions using state-owned banks rather 
than direct interventions in nonbank financial 
institutions (NBFIs) and markets. The choice 
to focus primarily on state-owned banks is 
driven by the wider evidence among develop-
ing economies and the greater availability of 
data on banking rather than on nonbanking 
institutions.
 5. Laeven and Valencia (2010) document the 
increase in public debt and direct fiscal costs 
arising from the recent global financial crisis.
 6. Financial additionality refers to whether the 
guarantee allows previous nonborrowers to 
access credit. Economic additionality refers to 
the real effects from a larger number of bor-
rowers having access to credit as a result of 
guarantees (for example, more jobs created, 
firms being able to invest more).
 7. Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel (2005) provide 
a detailed examination of the trends and 
consequences of bank privatization in transi-
tion economies—namely, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Romania). 
 8. The flagship report points out that the pen-
etration of foreign banking in Africa wit-
nessed another development over the past 
15 years: a marked increase in the share of 
African banks among foreign banks, espe-
cially the expansion throughout the region of 
South African banks (for example, Absa and 
Standard Bank), West African banks (Bank 
of Africa and Ecobank), as well as Moroccan 
and Nigerian banks (Beck, Maimbo, and oth-
ers 2011).
 9. Clarke, Cull, and Megginson (2005) provide 
extensive evidence on the trends, determi-
nants, and consequences of bank privatiza-
tion both at the cross-country level and in 
country case studies. 
 10. Farazi, Feyen, and Rocha (2011) point out 
that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in 
terms of government ownership in the Europe 
and Central Asia region. 
 11. Recent evidence suggests that much of the 
decline in new lending reflects changes in the 
supply as opposed to the demand for credit 
(Huang and Stephens 2011; Ivashina and 
Scharfstein 2010).
directly involve the use of state-owned 
banks. Both developing and developed coun-
tries actively used credit guarantees during 
the crisis to enhance credit to the sectors of 
the economy underserved by private finan-
cial intermediaries (for example, small and 
medium enterprises). Analogous to interven-
tions through state-owned banks, credit guar-
antees may generate some short-term benefits, 
but they often come with fiscal and economic 
costs in the form of contingent government 
liabilities and misallocation of resources. The 
success of guarantee schemes hinges on their 
design features. Best practices include (a) leav-
ing credit assessments and decision making to 
the private sector, (b) capping coverage ratios 
and delaying the payout of the guarantee 
until recovery actions are taken by the lender 
so as to minimize moral hazard problems, 
(c) pricing guarantees to take into account 
the need for financial sustainability and risk 
minimization, and (d) encouraging the use of 
risk management tools. However, as in the 
case of state banks, these best-practice design 
features are more challenging to get right in 
weak institutional environments.
Finally, the monetary authority in 
advanced countries provided unprecedented 
amounts of liquidity to the financial sector 
by expanding their balance sheets. Although 
easier to unwind than the expansion of the 
balance sheets of government banks, the 
method’s successful implementation among 
emerging countries may be difficult because 
of legal obstacles and policy credibility issues.
noteS
 1. State-owned banks can also be deployed for 
populist reasons (Acharya 2011).
 2. During the crisis, Germany’s KfW introduced 
a “special countercyclical program” that pro-
vided lines of credit and loan guarantees to 
banks to keep credit to the economy flowing. 
For more details on the actions undertaken 
by governments in the financial markets, see 
Laeven and Valencia (2010, 2011), Rudolph 
(2010), among others.
 3. For a more detailed look at the policy 
responses of advanced countries in terms of 
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of government bank ownership on private 
credit growth. Galindo and Micco (2004) try 
to address the problem of causality by ana-
lyzing within-country differences in industry 
growth. They find that the development of 
private financial intermediaries is associated 
with a higher growth rate of industries that 
rely more on external finance and have less 
collateral, while public bank ownership has 
no effect on the growth of these industries.
 20. Dinç (2005) shows that increased lending 
by government-owned banks during elec-
tion years is not specific to India but is also 
observed in a sample of 19 emerging markets 
(but not in developed economies). Micco, 
Panizza, and Yañez (2007) show that these 
results hold for a much larger sample of 
developing economies and that the increased 
lending by government-owned banks during 
election years is associated with a decrease in 
their interest rate margins and profitability.
 21. Acharya (2011) shows that government poli-
cies in the housing market that enhanced the 
ability of the government-sponsored enter-
prises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to take 
riskier mortgages led to the deterioration of 
the quality of their assets and a competitive 
“race to the bottom” among financial inter-
mediaries.
 22. De la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler (2007) 
provide an extensive description of the dif-
ferent advances in the provision of noncredit 
services by Mexican state development banks. 
Other well-established state-owned banks 
include Japan Development Bank, Kredi-
tanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW) in Ger-
many, Kommunalbank in Norway, as well the 
multilateral development banks, all of which 
have remained profitable for decades.
 23. Podpiera (2011) also documents the use of 
credit subsidies as a countercyclical crisis 
measure in Serbia.
 24. This is what Anginer, de la Torre, and Ize 
(2011) call collective action frictions. Fur-
thermore, they argue that in a world devoid 
of risk aversion and collective action frictions, 
agency frictions (such as informational asym-
metries or adverse selection) cannot justify 
government guarantees. They argue that only 
partial equilibrium models that ignore the 
welfare effects of the taxes needed to finance 
the guarantees come to the flawed conclusion 
that guarantees are not justified by agency 
frictions.
 12. Biggs, Mayer, and Pick (2010) argue that 
recoveries in the real sector typically come 
along with a recovery in the flow of credit. 
The authors build a model in which an 
upturn in real GDP coincide with a recovery 
in the flow of credit even as the stock of credit 
decreases. Data from developed economies 
and emerging market economies confirm that 
premise of their model.
 13. Tier 2 credit operations refer to lending by 
state-owned banks through other private 
financial institutions to reach agents in the 
economy.
 14. De la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler (2007) pro-
vide a good summary of the different views on 
the role of the state in the financial sector.
 15. The development view is also referred to as 
“the interventionist view” (de la Torre, Gozzi, 
and Schmukler 2007).
 16. The political view is included in what de la 
Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler (2007) refer to 
as “the laissez faire” view.
 17. IDB (2005) reviews the empirical evidence 
on the impact of government-owned banks 
and finds that, although the result that these 
banks have a negative impact is not as strong 
as previously thought, there is no indica-
tion that government ownership has a posi-
tive effect. It concludes that public banks, at 
best, do not play much of a role in financial 
development. Andrianova, Demetriades, and 
Shortland (2010) and Körner and Schnabel 
(2010) conducted cross-country analyses of 
the effects of government bank ownership on 
financial development and macroeconomic 
outcomes, which conclude that government 
bank ownership might not be as harmful to 
development as suggested by earlier studies. 
However, these studies cannot convincingly 
dispel concerns about omitted variables and 
reverse causality biases.
 18. In contrast with the observed lower profit-
ability and efficiency of government-owned 
commercial banks in developing economies, 
the empirical evidence suggests that in devel-
oped countries there are no significant dif-
ferences in performance between public and 
private banks (see, for example, Altunbas, 
Evans, and Molyneux 2001; Micco, Panizza, 
and Yañez 2007).
 19. For example, Levy Yeyati, Micco, and Panizza 
(2007) try to deal with the endogeneity prob-
lem by using panel data and by conducting 
GMM System estimations and find no impact 
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 25. It should be noted that though many coun-
tries did not have a significant presence of 
state-owned banks before the crisis, measures 
taken during the crisis, such as massive bail-
outs and nationalizations, amounted to the 
socialization of risks and losses that might 
also bring negative consequences to the econ-
omy down the line.
 26. For instance, the Federal Reserve Board of the 
United States aggressively expanded its bal-
ance sheet in two different stages. First, it tried 
to contain the stress in financial markets by 
providing loans to financial institutions and 
injecting liquidity in key markets. Second, it 
launched a massive asset purchase program.
 27. Countercyclical fiscal policy can complement 
the actions from the central bank and state-
owned banks by containing the response of 
aggregate expenditure to changing financial 
conditions. However, discretionary counter-
cyclical deployment of fiscal policy often faces 
considerable delays, which limit its ability to 
counteract a sudden crash in a timely manner. 
This limitation underscores the need to build 
up self-deploying automatic stabilizers, which 
are still weak in most developing economies, 
including Latin America (Claessens and oth-
ers 2010; Debrun and Kapoor 2010). 
5
the Role of the State in 
Financial infrastructure
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•   The global financial crisis has highlighted the importance of a resilient financial infra-
structure and reignited the debate on what role the state should play in its develop-
ment, particularly in (a) promoting the availability and exchange of reliable credit 
information and (b) supporting the development of institutions to better manage 
counterparty risk in interbank markets and securities transactions.
•   Transparent credit information is a prerequisite for sound risk management and finan-
cial stability. However, due to the prevalence of monopoly rents in the market for 
credit information, information sharing among private lenders may not arise natu-
rally. This creates an important rationale for the involvement of the state. 
•   Existing credit reporting systems contain extensive information on credit risks in the 
financial sector. There is significant potential for improving their use for risk manage-
ment and prudential supervision.
•   Many credit reporting systems cover only risks in the traditional financial sector. 
This limits their effectiveness in supporting credit market efficiency and stability. An 
important role of the state is to help extend the coverage of credit reporting systems to 
include nonregulated lenders, such as nonbank financial institutions and microfinance 
lenders, in existing credit reporting systems.
•   The state can help establish market infrastructure that helps to manage and mitigate 
counterparty risk. This includes robust large-value payment systems and, potentially, 
support for the development of collateralized interbank markets.
•   There is significant scope for state involvement in the development of a robust infra-
structure for securities and derivatives settlements. The state can further reduce 
counter party and settlement risks by monitoring these transactions and their clearing 
and settlement arrangements.
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the important role of the state in establish-
ing a legal and regulatory framework that 
allows open and transparent credit reporting 
to emerge. The chapter emphasizes the chal-
lenges posed by market segmentation and 
the prevalence of monopolies in the market 
for credit information, which may provide a 
rationale for the measured involvement of the 
state. The chapter then turns to the lessons 
of the financial crisis for credit reporting and 
discusses how existing credit information 
systems can be used as a tool for prudential 
oversight and regulation.
The second part of the chapter discusses 
the role of the state in ensuring the stability 
of payment and securities settlement systems. 
The chapter argues that large-value payment 
systems around the world have demonstrated 
remarkable stability during the global finan-
cial crisis, thanks in large part to the wide-
spread adoption of modern real-time settle-
ment systems over the past two decades. The 
crisis nonetheless revealed several areas for 
policy improvements. In particular, the chap-
ter argues that the state can further reduce 
counterparty risk by supporting the develop-
ment of collateralized interbank markets and 
derivatives settlement systems, particularly in 
countries where the development of a modern 
settlement infrastructure has lagged the rapid 
growth of equity and securities markets.
cReDit RepoRtinG
introduction
Transparent credit information is a prerequi-
site for sound risk management and financial 
stability. Credit reporting institutions sup-
port financial stability and credit market effi-
ciency and stability in two important ways. 
First, banks and nonbank financial institu-
tions (NBFIs) draw on credit reporting sys-
tems to screen borrowers and monitor the 
risk profile of existing loan portfolios. Sec-
ond, regulators rely on credit information to 
understand the interconnected credit risks 
faced by systemically important borrow-
ers and financial institutions and to conduct 
essential oversight functions. Such efforts 
The global financial crisis has high-lighted the importance of a resilient financial infrastructure and reignited 
the debate on what role central banks and 
other state agencies should play in its develop-
ment. Financial infrastructure, as defined in 
this report, consists of credit reporting insti-
tutions (credit registries and bureaus), pay-
ment and settlement systems, and the legal 
framework that governs financial transac-
tions.1 A well-developed financial infrastruc-
ture makes credit markets more efficient by 
reducing information asymmetries and legal 
uncertainties that may hamper the supply of 
new credit. This improves the depth of credit 
market transactions and broadens access to 
finance. The global financial crisis has also 
renewed interest in the role of financial infra-
structure in supporting systemic stability. 
Financial infrastructure promotes financial 
stability in several ways. Transparent credit 
reporting can support the internal risk man-
agement of financial institutions and supply 
financial regulators with timely information 
on the risk profile of systemically important 
financial institutions. Similarly, well-designed 
payment and security settlement systems 
enhance financial stability by reducing coun-
terparty risk in interbank markets and com-
plex securities and derivatives transactions.
The role of the state in financial infra-
structure has varied over time and across 
countries. This chapter examines how state 
agencies and central banks can operate, reg-
ulate, and oversee financial infrastructure. 
The focus is on two areas: first, the state’s 
role in developing and using credit informa-
tion systems, and second, the state’s role in 
improving payment and securities settlement 
systems. The chapter does not examine, for 
example, retail payment systems or the legal 
framework that governs financial transac-
tions. Reflecting the report’s focus on the 
financial crisis, these areas will be explored 
in future editions. 
The first part of the chapter focuses on the 
role of the state in credit reporting. It reviews 
the evidence on credit information and finan-
cial stability and the public good nature of 
information sharing. The chapter highlights 
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developing the capabilities of private credit 
reporting institutions through public private 
partnerships and institutional innovation. 
The World Bank’s General Principles for 
Credit Reporting (2011a) reviews best prac-
tices and makes policy recommendations for 
developing credit reporting systems.
Credit information as a public good
The open and transparent exchange of credit 
information has several characteristics of a 
public good that benefits both borrowers and 
lenders. However, because lenders can use 
the information advantage over their exist-
ing clients to extract monopoly rents, credit 
information sharing does not always arise 
naturally. The state therefore plays an impor-
tant role in promoting the exchange of credit 
information and in protecting open and equal 
access to the market for credit information. 
There are at least three areas in which a 
well-functioning credit reporting infrastruc-
ture performs the role of a public good. First, 
credit reporting benefits banks and nonbank 
lenders by mitigating problems of moral haz-
ard and adverse selection. Detailed infor-
mation on the credit history of individual 
borrowers allows banks to improve the ex 
ante screening of prospective clients as well 
as the ex post monitoring of credit risks in 
their existing loan portfolios. This, in turn, 
reduces the cost of financial intermediation 
and allows banks to price, target, and moni-
tor loans more effectively. 
Second, credit reporting supports finan-
cial stability by making it easier for financial 
regulators to assess and monitor systemic 
risks. Although traditional approaches to 
financial oversight have focused on risks 
at the level of individual financial institu-
tions, a key advantage of comprehensive 
credit information systems is that they allow 
regulators to monitor the interconnected 
risks of systemically important financial 
institutions. 
While the recent financial crisis has under-
scored this important function of credit 
reporting, it has also revealed a number of 
limitations of current credit information 
reduce default risk and improve the efficiency 
of financial intermediation. In a competitive 
credit market, these efforts ultimately benefit 
consumers through lower interest rates.
Effective credit reporting systems can 
mitigate a number of market failures that 
are common in financial markets around 
the world, and most severely apparent in 
less developed economies. The availability of 
high- quality credit information, for example, 
reduces problems of adverse selection and 
asymmetric information between borrowers 
and lenders (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Jappelli 
and Pagano 2002; Pagano and Jappelli 1993). 
This reduces default risk and improves the 
allocation of new credit. Information shar-
ing can also promote a responsible “credit 
culture” by discouraging excessive debt and 
rewarding responsible borrowing and repay-
ment (de Janvry, McIntosh, and Sadoulet 
2010; Padilla and Pagano 2000).2
Perhaps most important, credit report-
ing allows borrowers to build a credit his-
tory and to use this “reputational collateral” 
to access formal credit outside established 
lending relationships. This is especially ben-
eficial for small enterprises and new borrow-
ers with limited access to physical collateral 
(Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007; Love 
and Mylenko 2003; see also Padilla and 
Pagano 2000). Stylized evidence from the 
recent financial crisis also suggests that posi-
tive credit information helped to safeguard 
the financial access of creditworthy borrow-
ers that would have otherwise been cut off 
from institutional credit (Simovic, Vaskovic, 
and Poznanovic 2009). This finding is consis-
tent with evidence from the literature on rela-
tionship banking (Berger and others 2003; 
Petersen and Rajan 1995), which emphasizes 
how access to more detailed client informa-
tion can facilitate profitable lending to infor-
mationally opaque borrowers, such as start-
ups and small enterprises (Mian 2006).3
The World Bank Group has supported 
the development of credit reporting systems 
around the world for more than a decade. 
The International Finance Corporation’s 
Credit Bureau Knowledge Guide (IFC 2006) 
provides an overview of experiences in 
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Public and private credit reporting 
around the world
The role of the state in credit reporting has 
varied widely across countries and over time. 
Two main types of credit reporting insti-
tutions can be found around the world: (a) 
credit registries, which are public entities that 
are managed by bank supervisors or cen-
tral banks and typically collect information 
from supervised financial institutions, and 
(b) credit bureaus, which are privately owned 
enterprises that tend to cover smaller loans, 
often collect credit information from bank 
and nonbank lenders, and provide a range of 
value-added services, such as credit scores, to 
banks and nonbank lenders.
Historically, public and private credit 
reporting institutions have evolved to serve 
different purposes. Credit registries gener-
ally developed to support the state’s role as 
a supervisor of financial institutions. Where 
credit registries exist, loans above a certain 
amount must, by law, be registered in the 
national credit registry. In some cases, credit 
registries have relatively high thresholds for 
loans that are included in their databases. 
Credit registries tend to monitor loans made 
by regulated financial institutions and usu-
ally do not offer value-added services, such 
as credit scores or collection services. Against 
the backdrop of the financial crisis, many 
countries have made efforts to optimize the 
use of credit registry data for prudential over-
sight and regulation.
Credit bureaus, by contrast, are privately 
owned commercial enterprises catering to 
the information requirements of commer-
cial lenders. Though there is variation in the 
type and extent of information they collect, 
credit bureaus generally strive to collect very 
detailed data on individual clients. They 
therefore tend to cover smaller loans than 
registries and often collect information from 
a wide variety of financial and nonfinancial 
entities, including retailers, credit card com-
panies, and microfinance institutions. As a 
result, data collected by credit bureaus are 
often more comprehensive and better geared 
to assess and monitor the creditworthiness of 
systems. In many countries, regulators have 
access to credit information only from regu-
lated financial institutions but lack access to 
similarly comprehensive data on nonregu-
lated lenders. Extending the reach of credit 
information systems to nonregulated lenders 
to better capture systemic risks outside the 
traditional banking sector is an important 
policy prescription that has emerged from the 
recent financial crisis. At the same time, the 
unfolding of the financial crisis in the United 
States and around the globe has shown that 
the availability of high-quality credit infor-
mation is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition to promote financial stability: 
even where a well-developed information 
infrastructure exists, it needs to be accom-
panied by regulatory incentives that reward 
the appropriate use of available information 
in the evaluation and management of credit 
risk.
Third, open and transparent credit report-
ing benefits bank customers by promoting 
credit market competition. The exchange of 
credit information enables customers to build 
reputational collateral and to access credit 
outside established lending relationships. 
This reduces the ability of established lend-
ers to exploit their privileged knowledge of 
clients’ credit histories. Because open access 
to credit information erodes the information 
monopoly of individual lenders, banks are 
often reluctant to share such information—
especially positive information that may 
empower borrowers with good credit histo-
ries to seek credit elsewhere. Similarly, where 
credit reporting institutions exist, larger 
financial institutions often have an incentive 
to prevent equitable access to credit informa-
tion through anticompetitive pricing or the 
formation of closed user groups, despite the 
positive efficiency implications that improved 
access to credit information would have on 
the financial system as a whole. 
Taken together, the positive implications 
of credit reporting for financial stability and 
credit market efficiency create an important 
rationale for an active role of the state in pro-
moting the development of an effective credit 
reporting infrastructure. 
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To provide an overview of the state of 
public and private credit reporting around 
the world, this section presents data on the 
ownership structure and extent of informa-
tion collected by credit bureaus and regis-
tries. Map 5.1 shows the prevalence of credit 
reporting institutions around the world. The 
maps and summary statistics in table 5.1 
individual clients. Compared to credit regis-
tries, private credit bureaus are a relatively 
recent institution. Although credit bureaus 
have existed in Germany, Sweden, and 
the United States for nearly a century, they 
emerged in many other high-income coun-
tries, including France, Italy, and Spain, as 
recently as the 1990s.4
MAP 5.1 Credit information Systems around the World
a. global distribution of credit registries
Source: doing business indicators database. 
b. global distribution of credit bureaus
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TABLe 5.1 Credit Reporting, Coverage by Region
Credit registry coverage Credit bureau coverage
 Region % of population % of GDP % of population % of GDP
East Asia and Pacific 8.2  60.5 17.3  20.2
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 13.1  38.9 21.3  35.8
Latin America and the Caribbean 10.1  19.5 31.5  18.1
Middle East and North Africa 5.3  53.2  7.0  13.2
OECD 8.0 157.1 61.1  36.6
South Asia 0.8  46.2  3.8 108.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.7  16.6  4.9   7.9
Source: calculations based on doing business indicators database.
Note: gdp = gross domestic product.
credit information infrastructure in place. 
The first credit registries emerged in the 
United States in the 1830s in response to 
recurring episodes of defaults and financial 
instability, but credit reporting institutions 
did not arise in many other countries until 
much later. Especially in countries with a 
European common law tradition, legal bar-
riers to disclosing credit information have 
often constrained the development of private 
credit reporting (Djankov, McLiesh, and 
Shleifer 2007; Olegario 2003). Despite these 
obstacles, which persist in many countries, 
credit information has expanded rapidly. The 
number of credit markets covered by either 
private or public credit reporting systems 
(or both) almost tripled over the past two 
decades. 
The effectiveness of a credit reporting sys-
tem is determined by the quality and depth 
of information it makes available to market 
participants. To assess the quality of infor-
mation sharing, this report focuses on three 
important characteristics of a country’s 
credit reporting system: (a) the coverage of 
the credit reporting system, measured by the 
number of borrowers or the volume of credit 
listed in the credit reporting system (see sum-
mary figures in table 5.1 and figure 5.2); (b) 
the extent of institutional participation (that 
is, which types of financial and nonfinancial 
institutions exchange information through 
the credit reporting system); and (c) the depth 
of credit information (that is, what kind of 
information on borrowers and credit risk is 
tracked).
show that there is some striking geographic 
variation in the existence of public and pri-
vate credit reporting institutions. Overall, 
credit registries are more prevalent in coun-
tries with a French legal tradition, whereas 
private credit reporting is more widespread in 
countries of British legal origin. In a number 
of countries—primarily in Latin America—
private and public credit reporting systems 
coexist, often catering to distinct segments of 
the credit market. 
Figure 5.1 looks at the evolution of credit 
reporting institutions over time. As late as the 
early 1980s, few countries had a significant 
FiguRe 5.1 The Development of Credit Reporting institutions, 
1980–2012
Source: calculations based on doing business indicators database.
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payments. Each information item can be clas-
sified as personal information, loan informa-
tion, or information on a client’s repayment 
history. Each index sums the range of infor-
mation items contained in the credit registry 
or bureau and normalizes the resulting score 
so that the summary index lies between 0 
(poor information content) and 1 (high infor-
mation content). 
Figure 5.4 reveals some striking differ-
ences in the type of information collected 
by credit bureaus and credit registries. On 
average, credit registries and credit bureaus 
collect approximately the same extent of 
information on the personal or identify-
ing information of borrowers. In line with 
their historical role as a supporter of the 
state’s supervisory function, registries tend 
to record more-detailed information about 
the type, terms, and structure of individual 
loans. The information collected by credit 
bureaus, on the other hand, is much more 
geared toward tracking the repayment his-
tory of individual borrowers in order to 
provide commercially viable data to market 
participants.
Figure 5.3 presents evidence on the reach 
of credit reporting institutions by summa-
rizing which types of financial institutions 
participate in the exchange of credit informa-
tion. The figure shows that credit registries 
are less likely than credit bureaus to contain 
data from nonregulated financial institutions. 
Nearly all credit registries collect information 
from banks, whereas only 67 percent of reg-
istries contain information from any unregu-
lated lender. Credit bureaus are more likely 
to cover NBFIs such as leasing and retail 
finance companies and microfinance lend-
ers—and may therefore be better suited to 
promote financial access of new borrowers.
Turning to the quality and depth of avail-
able credit information, figure 5.4 compares 
the type of credit information collected by 
credit registries and credit bureaus, respec-
tively. To do so, the figure presents four infor-
mation indexes based on the Doing Business 
data. For each credit reporting institution, the 
data set provides information on the different 
types of information collected and reported 
by the credit registry or bureau. Examples of 
information items include customer age, total 
liabilities, or data on previous defaults or late 
FiguRe 5.2 Prevalence of Credit Reporting 
by income group
Source: calculations based on doing business indicators database.
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FiguRe 5.3 The Reach of Credit Reporting: Who Contributes 
information?
Source: calculations based on doing business indicators database.
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credit reporting infrastructure. First, state 
actors, such as central banks and financial 
regulators, can both operate and use credit 
reporting systems. Second, the state can act 
as a regulator of credit reporting systems, 
compelling private lenders to exchange high-
quality credit information and ensuring open 
and equal access to credit reporting systems. 
Finally, the state can act to promote the 
development of a private credit reporting 
infrastructure that can complement the role 
of public credit registries in supporting credit 
market efficiency. This section reviews each 
of these roles in turn and provides examples 
of the challenges and opportunities of the 
state’s involvement in credit reporting, with 
a special focus on the state’s changing role 
in light of the global financial crisis.
The state as a user of credit information: 
Risk management and supervision
The global financial crisis has generated 
renewed interest in the use of information 
from national credit registries for pruden-
tial oversight and regulation (Girault and 
Hwang 2010). Although many countries’ 
registries collect detailed data on loans, the 
crisis has highlighted the need for improve-
ments in the use of existing credit infor-
mation for financial oversight and regula-
tion. The new Basel III accords, which are 
being adopted around the world, present 
an important window of opportunity to 
improve the use of credit information for the 
purpose of identifying and managing threats 
to financial stability.
Currently, financial regulators use data 
from credit registries primarily for the off-
site monitoring of credit risks. Credit reg-
istry data can support this task in several 
ways. First, they allow regulators to esti-
mate the portfolio credit risk and calculate 
loan loss provisions for individual financial 
institutions. Second, they enable regulators 
to compare loan credit risk across banks, to 
conduct stress tests, and to detect anomalies 
in lending patterns, portfolio structure, and 
loan performance. Third, registries track 
Despite the growth of credit reporting 
institutions, their development has been 
highly uneven across and within regions. In 
many emerging credit markets, the develop-
ment of credit reporting systems remains 
constrained by the lack of an appropriate 
legal infrastructure needed for the volun-
tary exchange of credit information. In many 
countries, privacy laws have no provision for 
credit reporting or, in some cases, prohibit 
the disclosure of vital information to third 
parties altogether. Finally, as the chapter 
discusses in greater detail in the following 
sections, the structure of competition in the 
banking sector can pose a significant obsta-
cle to the emergence of comprehensive credit 
reporting systems. This creates an important 
role for the state in establishing an appropri-
ate legal framework in which transparent 
credit reporting can evolve. 
cReDit RepoRtinG 
anD the State
The state can play three main roles in sup-
porting the development of a transparent 
FiguRe 5.4 The Depth of Credit Reporting: What information is 
Collected?
Source: calculations based on doing business indicators database.
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themselves, credit registries can provide a 
wealth of data for this purpose (see box 5.1). 
Since credit registries generally contain infor-
mation on all loans above a given threshold, 
making full use of this information allows 
regulators to obtain a more comprehensive 
picture of interconnected risks in the finan-
cial sector.
The main challenges to the use of existing 
credit registry data for prudential supervision 
are the limited coverage of unregulated finan-
cial institutions and the often high minimum 
loan sizes of existing credit registries, which 
further limit the range of loans captured by 
the registry. The unfolding of the financial 
crisis in Europe and the United States has 
shown that financial stability is increasingly 
affected by the risks taken on by nonregu-
lated financial entities. In developed econo-
mies this market includes hedge funds, money 
market funds, and structured investment 
vehicles, sometimes referred to as the shadow 
banking system. In many emerging markets, 
nonbanking financial institutions play an 
important role in consumer credit, which has 
often remained outside the scope of informa-
tion available to financial regulators. 
In its role as a user and regulator of credit 
information, the state can therefore play an 
important role in extending the coverage of 
existing credit reporting systems to new and 
systemically important borrower groups, and 
in incentivizing regulators to make appropri-
ate use of credit reporting systems for iden-
tifying and monitoring threats to systemic 
stability.
The state as a regulator of credit 
reporting: Removing barriers to 
information sharing
Another important role of the state is to 
ensure that the market for credit informa-
tion remains transparent, open, and efficient. 
Because banks can extract information rents 
from proprietary credit information, lenders 
may try to retain monopolistic knowledge 
of their clients’ creditworthiness by sharing 
only limited, inaccurate, or incomplete credit 
and monitor the development of credit risk 
by type of borrower or type of credit. This 
allows regulators to detect credit risks con-
centrated in a specific sector, loan category, 
or region. 
The Basel III accords represent a shift 
from a microprudential approach to financial 
regulation, centered on the risk of individual 
financial institutions, toward a macropruden-
tial approach that is focused on systemically 
important financial institutions. Understand-
ing and containing these threats requires 
detailed understanding of interconnected 
credit risks in the traditional financial sys-
tem as well as risks outside it. There is much 
room to leverage data from credit registries 
for this purpose. Credit registry data can pro-
vide the basis for
•  Evaluating the systemic importance 
of financial institutions. The Basel III 
accords require more stringent provisions 
for systemically important financial insti-
tutions. Comprehensive credit informa-
tion is required to assess and monitor their 
interrelated exposures.
•  Informing countercyclical buffer deci-
sions. The countercyclical capital frame-
work introduced by the Basel III accords 
tries to reduce the cyclicality of bank lend-
ing. It introduces a conservation buffer, 
set at 2.5 percent of banks’ risk-weighted 
assets, and a countercyclical capital buffer 
to address potentially excessive risk-taking 
as a result of cyclical credit growth. Bet-
ter credit information can increase the 
accuracy of risk weighting in banks’ loan 
portfolios. 
•  Building more reliable early warning sys-
tems. Early warning systems used by bank 
regulators often only capture portfolio 
risk for individual financial institutions. 
Better use of credit registry data for off-
site monitoring allows for more nuanced 
tracking of links in credit risk exposures 
across institutions.
Though some of these tasks can be accom-
plished with data from financial institutions 
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As a first step, the government can help 
lay the legal foundations for effective infor-
mation sharing. This includes a sound legal 
framework that maintains consumer pro-
tection but at the same time permits banks 
and nonbank lenders to share relevant 
information. The state can act to overcome 
such barriers to information sharing in a 
variety of ways, ranging from the establish-
ment of an appropriate legal framework to 
direct interventions, mandating the exchange 
of credit information. 
BOX 5.1 Argentina: using Credit Registry information for Prudential Supervision
Argentina’s central bank, the Banco Central de la 
República Argentina, has been operating a credit 
reporting system since 1991. The system is mostly 
focused on large loans and has been increasingly 
used for supervisory purposes. In 1995, the system 
was reformed, and access to data was granted to 
financial institutions. After Argentina’s financial 
crisis in 2003, several reforms of Argentina’s credit 
reporting system were undertaken to facilitate its use 
for prudential regulation and to support greater sta-
bility in the financial sector.
Currently, the Argentine credit reporting indus-
try comprises a public credit registry and several 
private sector credit bureaus. The legal and regula-
tory framework covering credit reporting activities 
in Argentina is limited to data protection compli-
ance, which places some limitations on the authori-
ties’ ability to adopt a holistic approach to credit 
reporting. The Argentine central bank currently acts 
as an operator of databases. Regulated entities are 
required to report their credit exposures to the cen-
tral bank, which makes this information available 
to private credit reporting agencies.a Several private 
credit bureaus operate in Argentina, with the largest 
credit bureau, Veraz, holding data on approximately 
90 percent of all credit lines in the market.
In the aftermath of the Argentine economic crisis, 
the central bank focused on a strategy to enhance the 
availability of credit information for risk management 
and prudential supervision. This strategy included 
extending the coverage of the system and the collec-
tion of new information. In addition to providing data 
useful for prudential oversight and regulation, these 
reforms also aimed to facilitate the restructuring of 
the banking sector. The aim of these reforms was to 
make it easier for banks and regulators to (a) iden-
tify and contain a deterioration in the quality of loan 
portfolios, (b) facilitate provisioning and supervision 
of provisioning requirements for credit risk, and (c) 
facilitate the debt refinancing process. Monitoring 
credit risk and informing banks of these risks remain 
primary objectives of the Argentine credit registry. 
Init ial ly, Argentina’s public credit regis-
try included only information on debts above 
US$200,000. As a means of broadening the coverage 
of the system, the minimum threshold was reduced 
to US$50,000 in 2002. To further improve the qual-
ity of recorded credit information, the central bank 
has taken important steps toward the establishment 
of a financial statements database and has begun to 
collect new information on loans already covered by 
the system (including credit lines, currency denomi-
nation, and maturity structure of outstanding liabil-
ities). These improvements in data collection have 
been particularly helpful in facilitating the imple-
mentation of portfolio models of credit risk based on 
data from the registry. In particular, the expanded 
data can be used to check that provisions for credit 
risk properly cover banks’ expected and unexpected 
losses and serve as the foundation of scenario analy-
ses and stress tests. For example, credit registry data 
can be used for simulations to test for the effects 
of new internal ratings–based capital standards as 
envisaged in the Basel III accords.
Taken together, these changes have signifi-
cantly enhanced the central bank’s ability to lever-
age Argentina’s existing credit reporting system for 
the purpose of prudential oversight and regulation. 
Some opportunities for improving the capabilities 
of the system nonetheless exist, for example, with 
regard to tracking the risk profile of securitized loans 
and monitoring loan portfolios after origination.
a. Initially, this arrangement came into existence because Argentina’s leading banks failed to agree on a mechanism 
for the voluntary exchange of credit information (see Berger and others 2003). In response, the Argentine authorities 
required banks to share information and made the data available to private credit reporting agencies on an equal basis. 
Private credit reporting agencies may access data from the central bank’s databases and offer value-added services.
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in the information-sharing framework. In 
addition, capturing information from nonfi-
nancial entities can provide information that 
gives greater insight into borrowers’ pay-
ment behavior, for example, vis-à-vis utility 
companies and retailers. Enabling compa-
nies outside the traditional banking sector to 
share credit information is advantageous for 
borrowers because it facilitates the establish-
ment of a credit history, but it may require 
additional changes to existing laws. The col-
lection of such additional information may, 
however, also place greater consumer protec-
tion responsibilities on the regulator. 
Although having a sound legal framework 
in place is crucial for allowing the market 
for credit information to develop, it may not 
be enough to ensure a level playing field for 
the exchange of credit information. As high-
lighted in this section and in Bruhn, Farazi, 
and Kanz (2012), market failures such as 
monopoly rents and coordination problems 
are prevalent in the market for credit infor-
mation and can create important barriers to 
the development of a private credit reporting 
infrastructure.
Since credit information is a public good, 
it is most effective when contribution and 
access to credit reporting systems are widely 
shared. For an individual lender, the ben-
efits of joining a credit bureau depend on the 
number of other members. Setting up a credit 
bureau thus requires extensive coordination 
and collaboration among lenders. In practice, 
this coordination may be difficult to achieve. 
In fact, experience has shown that commit-
ment by lenders can be a major problem in 
establishing credit bureaus in developing 
economies. In addition, the private interests 
of banks and other information providers 
may also get in the way of sharing deep and 
comprehensive information among a large 
number of entities, since individual banks 
can capture monopoly rents by not sharing 
information. That is, lenders benefit from 
having information on borrowers from other 
lenders, but at the same time they can profit 
from not sharing their own information with 
other lenders. Large banks may therefore be 
particularly reluctant to share proprietary 
information with credit reporting institu-
tions. The legal framework that governs 
the exchange of credit information should 
include provisions that limit the data that 
can be shared among lenders to just infor-
mation that is relevant for the lending deci-
sion (for example, to prevent discrimination 
in lending).5 It should also grant borrowers 
the right to appeal incorrect information. 
At the same time, government and regula-
tors need to ensure that consumer protec-
tion laws are clear and that the administra-
tive burden for compliance does not in fact 
reduce incentives for information sharing. 
Brazil’s data protection law, the Consumer 
Protection and Defense Code, for example, 
requires lenders to notify consumers when-
ever their data are updated. It has been 
argued that this procedure is so costly that it 
prevents lenders from sharing positive credit 
information and constrains credit reporting 
more generally (OECD 2010).
In some countries, the existing legal 
framework may already balance the goals 
of protecting consumers while allowing 
for broad and comprehensive credit report-
ing. However, in many countries, the exist-
ing legal infrastructure may constrain the 
exchange of credit information. This was the 
case in Egypt (see box 5.2). Until recently, 
Egypt’s existing banking and data protec-
tion laws were highly restrictive and did not 
allow lenders to disclose client information to 
the market. Amendments to the legal frame-
work for credit information sharing had to 
be made to allow the exchange of informa-
tion among lenders, credit bureaus, and the 
central bank without obtaining borrower 
consent for each report. The Central Bank of 
Egypt was instrumental in helping to bring 
about these changes and helped to create a 
framework conducive to the operation of a 
credit bureau covering both banks and non-
bank lenders.
When considering whether any changes 
to existing laws are necessary, policy makers 
should keep in mind that information shar-
ing may involve not only banks. Other lend-
ers, such as mortgage finance, leasing, and 
credit card companies may also be included 
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BOX 5.2 egypt: Removing Regulatory Barriers to the Development of a Private 
Credit Bureau
The first private credit bureau in Egypt—“I-Score”— 
was established in September 2005 and became 
operational in March 2008. I-Score’s sharehold-
ers consist of 25 banks and Egypt’s Social Fund for 
Development. In Egypt, data secrecy laws posed 
a major obstacle to the establishment of a private 
credit reporting infrastructure. The Central Bank 
of Egypt was highly instrumental in creating a leg-
islative framework conducive to the operations of a 
private credit bureau. 
The World Bank Group, through the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation, provided implementa-
tion support accompanying the launch of I-Score in 
2008. On the legislative front, existing laws were 
amended to allow the exchange of information 
among banks, mortgage finance and financial leas-
ing companies, credit bureaus, and the central bank 
without obtaining individual borrower consent. 
The new legislation also specifies which users—
that is, subscribers of I-Score—have a legitimate 
purpose to inquire, obtain credit reports, and use 
the services provided by the bureau. In September 
2006, I-Score contracted with an international 
partner, Dun & Bradstreet, to provide software 
solutions, enhance operational know-how, and 
build the technological capability for the manage-
ment of its database. 
Since the beginning of 2011, I-Score has been 
proactive in winning the confidence of microfi-
nance institutions (MFIs) to participate in the 
Egyptian information-sharing scheme. Initially, 
Egypt’s MFIs envisioned a separate credit bureau 
for microfinance clients. However, a pilot study 
highlighted how much relevant borrower infor-
mation would remain invisible to MFIs in a seg-
mented credit information system. This convinced 
the country’s leading MFIs to defer their decision 
to establish a separate microfinance credit bureau 
and to join I-Score instead. Including MFI clients 
in the credit reporting system will prevent the nega-
tive effects of data fragmentation and enhance the 
use of credit bureau data for risk management and 
financial inclusion. 
Since its inception, I-Score has managed to 
establish a transparent and advanced credit bureau 
that offers services in Arabic and English. I-Score’s 
data center has been vastly expanded to include 9 
million data records, a 13-fold increase from the 
baseline of 0.9 million facilities initially held by 
the Central Bank of Egypt’s Public Credit Regis-
try. The data pertain to over 4 million small and 
medium enterprises and consumer borrowers. 
I-Score currently services the credit information 
needs of 55 institutional subscribers, which include 
41 banks, eight mortgage finance companies, four 
leasing companies, the Egyptian Social Fund for 
Development, and one retailer. All banking insti-
tutions and the Social Fund for Development have 
completed the credit data migration process to 
I-Score. Mortgage finance companies have submit-
ted approximately 65 percent of their data records, 
and the four leasing companies have submitted 35 
percent of their data. I-Score has devised a specific 
package for MFIs to help them join in the credit 
information–sharing scheme; that is, special prices 
have been agreed upon for MFI lenders, technical 
support is being offered, a free trial period for new-
comers is being granted, and the development of ad 
hoc services is part of the package tailored to the 
specific needs of Egyptian MFIs.
The role of I-Score is to provide Egyptian facil-
ity grantors with accurate, factual information 
relevant to the history and payment habits of their 
existing or prospective clients, enabling them to 
better assess their clients’ creditworthiness. To 
date, the effects on financial access and risk man-
agement have been very impressive. For example, 
since 2008 the consumer loans have been on an 
ascending scale while the nonperforming loans 
have decreased by significant percentages. I-Score 
also aims to educate the general public of the val-
ues, benefits, and consequences of owning a good 
credit file. Therefore, it plays a major role in chang-
ing and modifying the behavior and culture of bor-
rowers in the Egyptian credit market. Reforms to 
the legal and regulatory framework governing the 
exchange of credit information were essential in 
removing barriers to the establishment of a well-
functioning credit reporting system in Egypt and 
laid the foundation for I-Score’s success.
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competition in the market for credit infor-
mation. In doing so, the state as a regulator 
has to balance the need to counter monopo-
listic tendencies, while avoiding excessive 
market fragmentation. Although no consen-
sus exists about the optimal degree of com-
petition in credit reporting, there is agree-
ment among regulators and policy makers 
that regulatory oversight should (a) ensure a 
level playing field for new entrants into the 
credit information market, (b) ensure open 
and equal access to credit information sys-
tems for regulated and unregulated lenders, 
(c) identify and eliminate anticompetitive 
credit information. Empirical evidence (see 
box 5.3) shows that credit bureaus are indeed 
less likely to emerge in markets where the 
banking sector is highly concentrated and 
dominated by a small number of lenders. 
This finding highlights that policies or reg-
ulatory interventions intended to support 
the development of a comprehensive credit 
reporting system need to be informed by an 
understanding of the underlying structure of 
credit market competition.
Where a well-functioning private credit 
reporting infrastructure is in place, the state 
plays an important role in safeguarding 
BOX 5.3 Monopoly Rents, Bank Concentration, and Private Credit Reporting
Although the existence of a comprehensive credit 
reporting system is beneficial for the financial mar-
ket as a whole, individual lenders may profit from 
sharing only limited information with other market 
participants. If only one lender has credit information 
on firms or individuals, this lender faces less com-
petition in lending to these borrowers because other 
institutions may be reluctant to offer them credit. In 
economic terms, a lender can capture monopoly rents 
from not sharing information. This issue may be par-
ticularly pronounced when the market for credit is 
dominated by a few large banks. These banks each 
have a broad customer base already and may try to 
maintain their large market share by holding onto 
information. Not making information available can 
also prevent entry from new banks. 
Bruhn, Farazi, and Kanz (2012) study the rela-
tionship between bank concentration and the emer-
gence of private credit reporting. Using data for close 
to 130 countries, the authors find that bank concen-
tration is negatively associated with the probability 
that a credit bureau emerges. Table B5.3.1 illustrates 
that 80 percent of countries with low bank concen-
tration have a credit bureau, whereas only 39 per-
cent of countries with high bank concentration have 
a credit bureau. This difference is smaller for credit 
registries (56 percent versus 37 percent), which may 
reflect the fact that banks are required to report to a 
credit registry while participation in a credit bureau 
is often voluntary. 
This result is robust for controlling for confound-
ing factors that could bias the analysis. In addition, 
the data also show that higher bank concentration is 
associated with lower coverage and quality of infor-
mation being distributed by credit bureaus. These 
findings suggest that market failures can prevent 
the development of effective credit-sharing systems, 
implying that the state may have to intervene to help 
overcome these obstacles.
 countries with low countries with high
 bank concentration bank concentration
credit registry? 0.56 0.37
credit bureau? 0.80 0.39
credit bureau or registry? 0.92 0.53
Source: bruhn, farazi, and kanz 2012. 
TABLe B5.3.1 Bank Concentration and Credit Reporting
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Finally, the state also plays a role in moni-
toring the quality of credit information. This 
is important since lenders, when required to 
share information, may try to retain market 
power by reporting inaccurate, incomplete, 
or lower-quality information (Semenova 
2008). 
The state as a promoter of private 
credit reporting
Public and private credit reporting systems 
fulfill distinct and at times complementary 
roles. Aside from acting as an operator and 
regulator of credit reporting systems, the 
state can therefore enhance credit market 
efficiency by promoting the development of a 
private credit reporting infrastructure.
In many cases, the type of credit infor-
mation required by private lenders differs 
significantly from that required by central 
banks and financial regulators. Regulators 
require information allowing them to moni-
tor the loan portfolio of financial institutions 
and to estimate associated risks. Such infor-
mation is often available from public credit 
registries. Private lenders, by contrast, have 
to assess the creditworthiness of individual 
borrowers. This assessment may require 
more detailed information on indebtedness 
and repayment behavior, including informa-
tion on utility payments, debt with credit 
card companies and retailers, or individual 
credit scores. This generally goes beyond the 
information available from national credit 
registries and is more readily available from 
private credit bureaus that routinely provide 
such data through their value-added services. 
This functional differentiation explains why 
public and private credit information systems 
often coexist, and it makes a case for the role 
of the state in promoting the development of 
a private credit reporting infrastructure even 
where a credit registry is already in place.
Governments can promote private credit 
reporting by working closely with lenders to 
help them overcome the coordination fail-
ures discussed in the previous section and 
pricing policies, and (d) prevent the forma-
tion of closed user groups. 
If market failures prevent the development 
of a transparent credit reporting system alto-
gether, the state can play a productive role by 
creating incentives for information sharing 
or—in extreme cases—by requiring banks to 
provide credit information to public or pri-
vate providers of credit information. 
There are several cases in which states 
have mandated information sharing among 
private lenders to overcome monopolies 
and coordination problems in the market 
for credit information. Argentina, as one 
example, managed to extend its credit report-
ing infrastructure in this manner, despite a 
backdrop of high and increasing bank con-
centration. Because banks were reluctant to 
share credit information directly, the central 
bank made information sharing mandatory 
for all loans above 50 pesos, which essen-
tially meant that the national credit registry, 
the Central de Riesgo, covered all loans in 
the market. To promote the development of 
a private credit reporting infrastructure, the 
Argentine central bank then made these data 
available to private credit information pro-
viders, which provide client-level risk assess-
ments and other value-added services (see 
Berger and others 2003). 
Elsewhere, state interventions to over-
come barriers to competition in credit report-
ing have met with greater challenges. Even 
after a private credit reporting infrastructure 
emerges, the information can be captured 
by closed user groups. As discussed in box 
5.4, this has been a challenge in the case of 
Mexico, where credit information is frag-
mented among multiple credit bureaus, each 
controlled by a distinct subset of lenders that 
cover different segments of the market. Mexi-
can regulators have made attempts to over-
come these barriers to the emergence of a uni-
versal credit reporting system. These attempts 
have, however, been challenging because the 
fragmentation of the market for credit infor-
mation reflects a similar underlying segmen-
tation of the Mexican credit market. 
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BOX 5.4 Mexico: State interventions to Prevent Market Fragmentation  
and Closed user groups
Until the early 1990s, very little credit information 
was available and shared in Mexican credit markets. 
The only information-sharing mechanism available 
at that time was the National Banking Credit Infor-
mation Service (Servicio Nacional de Información 
de Crédito Bancario), a public credit registry estab-
lished by Banco de Mexico in 1964. In the mid-
1990s, several segments of the Mexican credit mar-
kets were experiencing fast growth, particularly the 
consumer lending and residential mortgages sectors. 
The 1994 Tequila Crisis and ensuing large wave of 
defaults prompted lenders, as well as the Mexican 
regulators, to pay greater attention to background 
checks based on credit information to facilitate 
sound credit decisions.
In reaction to this situation, Mexico’s largest 
private credit reporting agency, Buró de Crédito, 
was established in 1995, as a collaboration between 
TransUnion Mexico (covering consumer credit) and 
Dun & Bradstreet (covering SME lending). The Buró 
de Crédito includes information on loans from the 
banking sector, and commercial banks have been 
holding a stake of up to 70 percent in the credit 
bureau. At present, Buró de Crédito, with 2,800 
users and 900 data contributors, contains informa-
tion on 52 million individuals and 6 million firms. 
Two other credit bureaus existed in Mexico, but 
both have ceased operations: Experian failed to 
obtain sufficient data from the banking sector, and 
Equifax sold its database to TransUnion so that it 
was subsumed in Buró de Crédito in 2000.
To foster competition in the credit information 
industry, the Mexican authorities passed a new legal 
framework in 2002.a The framework mandated all 
regulated institutions to have access to a report as 
part of their underwriting practices, based on the 
data subject’s consent. In addition, it allowed for 
credit reporting service providers to exchange data-
bases between themselves on a for-profit basis. 
During the early 2000s consumer credit from 
nonfinancial institutions grew significantly in Mex-
ico and accounted for 40 percent of total credit to 
the private sector after 2000. Partly in response to 
this development, in 2005 a new credit bureau, Cir-
culo de Crédito, was established, which covered pri-
marily retail and mass-market loans. For example, 
Circulo de Crédito collects information from major 
microfinance institutions, credit cooperatives, sav-
ings and loans firms, retailers, grocery stores, and 
two banks that specialize in consumer credit to 
poorer segments of the population.
The Buró de Crédito and the Circulo de Crédito, 
however, did not exchange information, leading to 
data fragmentation within the credit reporting sys-
tem, because each bureau filled a niche in the mar-
ket for credit information. In an effort to address 
these issues, Mexican regulators amended the laws 
governing credit reporting in 2004, 2008, and more 
recently in 2010. One legal change introduced a new 
governance structure within the Buró de Crédito, 
limiting the extent to which users of the system 
could simultaneously act as owners of credit report-
ing service providers. The reforms also established 
new rules for the exchange of databases and cre-
ated a mechanism to avoid exclusivity agreements 
between lenders and providers of credit information.
These legal changes have facilitated access to 
the Buró de Crédito by smaller banks, an impor-
tant achievement in Mexico’s concentrated banking 
market, where the five largest banks hold more than 
80 percent of total assets. The Buró de Crédito and 
the Circulo de Crédito have also started exchanging 
some information, but this exchange remains lim-
ited because fragmentation of the market for credit 
information reflects a corresponding segmentation 
in the credit market (with banks serving higher-
income clients and NBFIs catering to lower-income 
households).
a. The main components of this legislation were the Law to Regulate Credit Information Societies (Ley para Regular las 
Sociedades de Información Crediticia), the Operational Rules for the Functioning of Credit Reporting Systems (Reglas a 
las que Deberán Sujetarán las Operaciones y Actividades de las SIC y Sus Usuarios), and the Law to Regulate Financial 
Groups (Ley de Grupos Financieros).
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conSUmeR cReDit anD 
micRoFinance: eXtenDinG 
the Reach oF cReDit 
RepoRtinG SyStemS
Credit reporting is most effective in support-
ing financial access, efficiency, and stability 
when participation in the exchange of credit 
information is as widely shared as possible. 
Nonetheless, many credit reporting systems 
cover only risks in the traditional banking 
sector. This limits their effectiveness in sup-
porting market efficiency and creates an 
important rationale for an active role of the 
state in promoting the inclusion of nonregu-
lated lenders (such as NBFIs and microfi-
nance lenders) into existing credit reporting 
systems.
Over the past decade, many emerging 
markets have witnessed a dramatic growth in 
consumer and microfinance lending. In Indo-
nesia, for example, consumer lending grew at 
an average of 36 percent annually between 
2001 and 2007 (Santoso and Sukada 2009). 
In many countries, this expansion in con-
sumer credit has been spearheaded by non-
regulated lenders, such as microfinance insti-
tutions and NBFIs. Bringing information on 
this rapidly growing market segment into the 
fold of the credit reporting infrastructure is 
important not only for the risk management 
of individual financial institutions but also 
for systemic stability. Many regulators have 
begun to recognize this and have been pro-
active in extending the coverage of credit 
reporting systems to lenders outside the tra-
ditional banking sector.
The challenges of extending the reach of 
existing credit reporting systems to new bor-
rower groups and lenders outside the tradi-
tional financial system are twofold: First, 
established lenders often view microfinance 
institutions and NBFIs as potential com-
petitors and are therefore reluctant to grant 
them access to existing information-sharing 
arrangements. This gives rise to the well- 
documented concerns of data fragmentation 
and closed user groups highlighted in the pre-
vious section. Second, nonregulated financial 
institutions, such as NBFIs and microlenders, 
to provide legislation that makes it easy for 
lenders to make credit information avail-
able to a credit bureau. Several successful 
country cases illustrate how public-private 
partnerships can be used to improve a coun-
try’s credit reporting infrastructure. Box 5.5 
describes the case of Morocco, where the cen-
tral bank worked with lenders from different 
market segments to build a comprehensive 
information-sharing network.
An important point, highlighted by the 
case of Morocco, is that—where public and 
private credit reporting institutions coexist—
the state needs to ensure that public credit 
registries and private credit bureaus do not 
duplicate services. After a well-functioning 
credit bureau is in place, the state may, for 
example, scale back the services provided by 
the credit registry. 
Providing support for the development of 
a private credit reporting infrastructure can 
also allow central banks to focus on their 
core competencies of collecting credit infor-
mation for the purpose of prudential over-
sight and regulation. In fact, there is no clear 
economic reason why the state should act as 
a distributor of comprehensive data on indi-
vidual borrowers for commercial purposes or 
why it should provide value-added services, 
such as credit scores, if these can be provided 
by a private entity instead, after market fail-
ures have been addressed successfully. As the 
previous section has argued, a more produc-
tive role for the state is to establish the legal 
framework that allows for the transparent 
exchange of credit information, to forestall 
the formation of information monopolies and 
closed user groups, and to provide technical 
assistance for the establishment of private 
credit reporting institutions where such assis-
tance is required.
To summarize, in addition to its supervi-
sory and regulatory responsibilities, the most 
adequate role for the state may be to remove 
legal and institutional obstacles to the devel-
opment of private credit reporting rather 
than to provide comprehensive and value-
added credit information services to lenders 
where such information can be provided by 
the private sector. 
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BOX 5.5 Morocco: Public Support for the Development of a Private Credit Bureau
At the onset of 2005, Morocco was characterized 
by unfavorable credit market conditionsa and an 
inadequate credit reporting system.b The country 
lacked a stable regulatory framework for credit 
reporting, and there was no cross-sector informa-
tion sharing by key lenders (that is, banks, micro-
finance institutions, and nonbank institutions. 
Responding to these shortcomings, lenders were 
considering plans to create separate informational 
databases, one for each sector. This would have led 
to a fragmented, partial credit reporting system, 
which would not allow lenders to check the com-
plete financial profile of credit applicants. Against 
this background, Morocco’s central bank, the Bank 
of Morocco, decided to take a leadership role in 
introducing a best practice private credit reporting 
system in the country.
Initially, the Bank of Morocco planned to 
upgrade Morocco’s existing public credit regis-
try. However, in a successive stage, the Bank of 
Morocco was open to consider other viable credit 
reporting models, including the participation of 
private sector partners. Given the limited capabili-
ties of Morocco’s existing public credit reporting 
system, and drawing on the results of a market 
assessment study, the International Finance Corpo-
ration suggested a public-private partnership model 
similar to that operating in several Latin Ameri-
can countries (such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru). 
In this model, the central bank first upgraded its 
technological capabilities necessary to receive and 
process credit information (positive and negative) 
from the entire universe of regulated lenders. Build-
ing on the trusted leadership of the central bank 
among financial institutions, the public credit reg-
istry would then consolidate this information and 
make it available to any private credit bureau estab-
lished and licensed by the central bank. In Septem-
ber 2007, the central bank issued the first private 
credit bureau license to Experian Morocco, which 
provides both positive and negative credit reporting 
information.
So that overlap in the services provided by the 
public and private credit reporting systems could be 
prevented, lenders could no longer access the public 
credit registry once the first private credit bureau 
became operational. (Lenders were, however, still 
required to provide information.) To promote the 
use of available credit information, the system 
also required lenders to consult at least one credit 
bureau prior to making any credit decision. The 
central bank also introduced several innovative 
measures to achieve a more effective credit report-
ing infrastructure. Nonregulated lenders would be 
able to provide information directly to any private 
credit bureau on consumer consent. Nonregulated 
lenders that provided data to the credit bureau were 
then given the right to consult the bureau on the 
basis of reciprocity principles. This step ensured 
that participation in the private credit reporting 
system would gradually extend to nonregulated 
lenders outside the traditional banking system.
Finally, to provide the legal framework for the 
effective operation of private credit bureaus in the 
country, the government and central bank also 
undertook some reforms to the legal and regulatory 
framework governing the exchange of credit infor-
mation. The current legislative and operational 
framework counteracts the creation of information 
monopolies and closed user groups, because all 
existing and future private credit bureaus will be 
supplied with the same information from the cen-
tral bank. This, in return, will allow for competi-
tion on prices and service quality. 
Through this initiative, Morocco’s central bank 
has established a transparent, competitive, and 
advanced credit information sharing infrastructure 
that incorporates private credit bureaus to pro-
vide value-added services that are more effectively 
supplied by the private sector. At the same time, 
Morocco’s central bank has been building a wealth 
of information that assists in its supervisory role as 
a regulator of the financial system, as well as the 
regulator of private credit reporting institutions.
a. Specifically, this included limited, collateralized, and selective credit access, elevated rejection rates, and extremely 
high debt rates.
b. Bank Al-Maghrib’s public credit registry (established in 1978) was the only entity providing, albeit limited, credit 
information.
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market into a comprehensive credit informa-
tion infrastructure.
Extending the reach of credit reporting 
to new client groups can also pose techno-
logical challenges. Participation in advanced 
credit reporting systems can be expensive 
and technologically complex, requiring lend-
ers to adopt new data management and tele-
communications solutions. In addition, for 
a credit reporting system to function effec-
tively, it must be possible to identify borrow-
ers with reasonable certainty. Many develop-
ing economies lack a national identification 
system, particularly for borrowers at the 
bottom of the financial pyramid. This con-
straint has given rise to some innovative solu-
tions using, for example, biometric technol-
ogy to uniquely identify borrowers (see, for 
example, Giné, Goldberg, and Yang 2011). 
Many initiatives in this area are state led, and 
the state can play an important role in sup-
porting both the technological and regula-
tory infrastructure required to extend credit 
reporting to important new borrower groups, 
such as consumer finance clients and microfi-
nance borrowers.
intRoDUction to payment 
anD SecURitieS Settlement 
SyStemS
Payment and securities settlement systems are 
a key part of a country’s financial infrastruc-
ture. They can also be a major transmission 
channel of shocks during times of crisis. The 
state can reduce potential threats to systemic 
stability through the regulation of payment 
and securities settlement systems or through 
direct interventions to reduce counterparty 
risk. State agencies and central banks can 
also support systemically important par-
ticipants of payment and settlement systems 
in times of financial distress. This section 
explores the role that the state has played in 
the development and operation of payment 
and securities settlement infrastructure. 
There are two ways in which state inter-
ventions before and during the financial crisis 
helped to promote the stability of payment 
and settlement systems. First, large-value 
may also lack the technological capabilities 
necessary to participate in comprehensive 
information sharing. 
In both instances, the state can support 
market efficiency through regulation and 
capacity-building initiatives that ensure that 
information on the rapidly growing mar-
ket for microfinance and consumer credit is 
brought into the view of established credit 
reporting systems. There are several models 
of how this can be achieved. In China, where 
consumer lending has grown at double-digit 
rates since the deregulation of consumer 
credit in 1999, the state has taken an active 
role in the establishment of a comprehensive 
credit reporting infrastructure. The People’s 
Bank of China is currently establishing the 
world’s largest credit registry, covering more 
than 600 million consumers. Information 
sharing is mandatory, and the registry col-
lects data from regulated as well as nonreg-
ulated lenders, so that it covers more than 
90 percent of all consumer loans (Jentzsch 
2008). 
Attaining similarly high coverage rates 
for mass-market and microfinance loans has 
been more challenging elsewhere, despite 
regulatory interventions. In Latin America, 
the significant presence of microfinance lend-
ers has required regulators to incorporate 
nonregulated lenders into credit reporting 
systems much earlier than in other world 
regions. However, both the involvement of 
the state and the success in creating a level 
playing field for the exchange of credit infor-
mation have varied. In Guatemala, the state 
limited its intervention to the creation of a 
legal framework that allowed the country’s 
leading microfinance lenders to form a pri-
vate credit bureau. In Bolivia, by contrast, 
regulators responded to a large microfinance 
default crisis in the late 1990s by promoting 
the development of credit reporting institu-
tions outside the traditional banking sector. 
Despite such reforms, many credit reporting 
systems in the region remain highly frag-
mented and characterized by closed user 
groups. As a result, these credit reporting sys-
tems have often lagged behind in their abil-
ity to incorporate new segments of the credit 
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payment systems survived the crisis relatively 
unaffected, in large part because of efforts by 
central banks to introduce robust payment 
systems (such as real-time gross settlement 
systems that reduce counterparty risk) well 
before the onset of the crisis. Second, once the 
crisis spread, many central banks acted deci-
sively to step up liquidity provision to stabilize 
large-value payment systems and the markets 
that rely on this infrastructure, such as the 
interbank money market. Without support 
from central banks, the failure of one or more 
participants to settle their exposures in these 
markets could have created credit or liquid-
ity problems for other participants and posed 
a systemic risk to the financial system. The 
timely provision of liquidity by and large miti-
gated these concerns about counterparty risk.
The global financial crisis did, nonethe-
less, reveal some limitations in existing pay-
ment and securities settlement systems. For 
instance, stress emerged in securities settle-
ment systems, in particular for over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives markets. In this 
area, the crisis highlighted limitations in the 
transparency and legal framework govern-
ing securities settlement systems.6 Building 
a stronger infrastructure for securities and 
derivatives settlement systems to minimize 
counterparty risk is an important concern for 
many emerging markets, where the develop-
ment of robust securities settlement systems 
has sometimes lagged behind the rapid devel-
opment of equity and derivatives markets.
The remainder of this section reviews the 
role that state agencies and central banks 
have played in supporting payment and set-
tlement systems through the financial crisis. 
It also highlights some of the challenges to 
the development and operation of payment 
and securities settlement systems that have 
become apparent during the crisis. The chap-
ter argues for an active role of the state in 
the development, regulation, and oversight 
of payment and securities settlement sys-
tems, particularly in (a) mitigating counter-
party risk through interventions in interbank 
markets and (b) mitigating counterparty and 
settlement risks in securities transactions 
through the development of a sound legal 
and regulatory framework. 
Payment and securities settlement 
systems 
Payment and securities settlement systems are 
the infrastructure that enables the transfer of 
monetary value between parties discharging 
mutual obligations (World Bank 2011b). This 
infrastructure consists of several components, 
which include the legal, regulatory, and over-
sight frameworks for payment transactions, 
large-value funds transfer systems, retail pay-
ment systems, foreign exchange settlement 
systems, and securities settlement systems. 
Payment systems are a key part of a coun-
try’s financial infrastructure. They can, how-
ever, also be a major transmission channel 
of shocks during times of financial crisis: 
large-value payment systems are particularly 
important for systemic stability because they 
have the potential to generate and transmit 
disruptions between the financial and the 
real sector of an economy. Since the cur-
rent report focuses on financial stability and 
the role of the state, this chapter focuses on 
large-value payment systems and the steps 
that central banks have taken to strengthen 
these systems. The chapter also touches on 
securities settlement systems. In particular, it 
reviews the performance of OTC derivatives 
settlement systems, which is one of the areas 
in which the crisis highlighted the need for 
proactive oversight and development support.
Robust payment and security settlement 
systems promote economic activity by con-
trolling the counterparty risk inherent in the 
transfer of high-value funds and by helping 
with the implementation of monetary policy. 
Payment systems are essential for financial 
sector development because they contribute 
to the innovation and development of new 
financial products and facilitate functioning 
of financial markets (Listfield and Montes-
Negret 1994). The smooth functioning of 
payment systems can mitigate financial crises 
by reducing or eliminating counterparty risk 
related to financial market transactions and is 
therefore vital for ensuring financial stability 
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Large-value payment systems are impor-
tant for systemic stability because they are 
able to generate and transmit disturbances 
of a systemic nature to the financial sector. 
Bank-to-bank transactions in the interbank 
money market, in particular, depend strongly 
on large-value payment systems in two ways. 
First, the interbank money market, as the dis-
tributor of liquidity throughout the financial 
sector, relies heavily on payment systems to 
transmit funds across the financial system 
rapidly and safely. Second, the interbank 
money market is a key source of liquidity 
for the operation of payment and settlement 
systems. Because of their central role in allo-
cating liquidity, efficient large-value payment 
systems are also indispensable for the swift 
implementation of monetary policy. Because 
of the significant amount of funds channeled 
through the system, large-value payment sys-
tems can also transmit and, where inefficien-
cies exist, amplify disturbances in the finan-
cial sector. 
The turnover of large-value payment sys-
tems, as measured by the number of times 
an amount equivalent to the value of the 
GDP in each country is settled in a year, is 
typically several times a country’s GDP. Fig-
ure 5.5 shows that the size of these flows, 
however, varies quite substantially across 
regions. It tends to be higher in countries 
with active securities markets that are sup-
ported by large-value payment systems, with 
several national payment systems handling 
transactions more than 30 to 40 times their 
country’s GDP. These high turnover rates 
underscore the importance of well-function-
ing payments infrastructure for financial 
stability more broadly.9
The role of central banks in large-value 
payment systems
Central banks have historically performed 
the function of payment intermediaries and 
remain centrally important for the efficient 
operation of payment systems (Johnson 
and Steigerwald 2008; Millard and Saporta 
2005). In particular, central banks pro-
vide banks with the physical infrastructure 
(Afonso and Shin 2009; Cirasino and García 
2009; Flannery 1996). Finally, improvements 
in payment infrastructure can result in signif-
icant efficiency gains, reductions in transac-
tion costs, and increased economies of scale 
in financial intermediation (Hasan, Schmie-
del, and Song 2009; Humphrey and others 
2006; Lindquist 2002). Greater efficiency 
of interbank payment systems can therefore 
have a wider positive impact on credit cre-
ation and financial development (Merrouche 
and Nier 2010).
The World Bank, through its Payment 
Systems Development Group, has been pay-
ing close attention to payment and securities 
settlement systems as a key component of 
the financial infrastructure of a country. For 
example, country assessments done by the 
World Bank and the IMF under the Finan-
cial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) fre-
quently include a component that assesses 
the design, safety, and efficiency of payment 
and securities settlement systems.7 Some 
concrete recommendations on payment sys-
tems that have come out of recent FSAPs 
include (a) strengthening the overall legal 
framework for payment system oversight to 
ensure safety and soundness of the system, 
(b) linking large-value payment systems with 
securities depositories to address potential 
settlement risks for securities transactions, 
and (c) ensuring business continuity of pay-
ment systems by having backup servers to 
avoid any loss of transaction data. The World 
Bank also actively works with international 
standard-setting bodies to establish the set of 
standards and best practices.8 
Large-value payment systems
Large-value payment systems are the finan-
cial infrastructure used to process time- 
sensitive high-value payments. Banks and 
other financial institutions use these systems 
to transfer funds to each other. They are 
also the platform on which the interbank 
money market operates. As such, stable and 
resilient large-value payment systems are an 
essential prerequisite for the efficient opera-
tion of a financial market. 
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cooperation and coordination among pay-
ment system participants.
Instead of discussing each role separately, 
this chapter focuses on the recent contribu-
tions central banks have made to make large-
value payment infrastructure more resilient 
and on the role payment systems can play in 
possible future crises. 
evolution of real-time gross settlement 
systems and the role of central banks
Around the world, large-value payment sys-
tems have rapidly evolved over the past two 
decades. Two key risks faced by such systems 
are liquidity and credit risk, and most coun-
tries have upgraded existing large-value pay-
ment systems to more effectively address these 
risks.11 Over the past two decades, countries 
have largely moved away from deferred net 
settlement (DNS) systems to real-time gross 
settlement (RTGS) systems. The key advan-
tage of RTGS is that each payment is settled 
immediately (in real time) and processed 
individually (on a gross basis). On the other 
hand, in a DNS system, processing of funds 
is delayed (usually at the end of the business 
day) and is done on net basis (see Martin 
needed to make interbank payments, as well 
as overdraft and deposit facilities (central 
bank money10). Central banks have also been 
actively involved in promoting safety and effi-
ciency of these systems to maintain financial 
stability (Bech, Preisig, and Soramäki 2008). 
The involvement of the central bank in pay-
ment systems can take several non–mutually 
exclusive forms:
•  As an operator of payment systems, the 
central bank acts as the settlement and 
sometimes clearing agent in payment sys-
tems. In this role, the central bank also 
at times provides the technological infra-
structure for settlement systems, as well 
as intraday and overnight credit (lender 
of last resort), to preserve liquidity in the 
system. 
•  As a regulator of payment systems, the 
central bank enforces regulatory rules and 
monitors safety and efficiency of transac-
tions taking place through the system. It 
also safeguards the legal rules governing 
interactions in interbank money markets 
and other transactions using the large-
value payment system.
•  As a promoter of the development, it acts 
as a catalyst of innovation and supports 
FiguRe 5.5 gDP Turnover of Large-Value Payment Systems by Region, 2009
Sources: world bank 2011b and global payment systems survey 2010. 
note: weighted averages.
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countries have followed suit and have shifted 
to real-time gross settlement systems in the 
past decade. More recent adopters include, 
for example, El Salvador and the West Bank 
and Gaza, where RTGS systems did not 
become operational until 2010, and Ethiopia 
and Rwanda, which established RTGS sys-
tems in 2011 (World Bank 2011b).12 Accord-
ing to the World Bank’s 2010 Global Payment 
Systems Survey, 116 out of 139 countries 
surveyed (83 percent) have RTGS systems 
(World Bank 2011b). In 112 of these coun-
tries, central banks act as the operator of the 
system (private entities operate the system in 
the remaining four countries). In virtually all 
of those countries (115), the central bank also 
acts as settlement agent for the system. The 
vast majority of RTGS participants are com-
mercial banks: the payment systems survey 
shows that 95 percent of RTGS systems give 
access to only commercial banks, 60 percent 
give access to noncommercial banks, and 69 
percent give access to NBFIs.
In addition to managing liquidity risk, cen-
tral banks and regulators have also played an 
important role in reforming large-value pay-
ment systems to mitigate systemic risk. Before 
we turn to the role of central banks in man-
aging liquidity risk, box 5.6 reviews coun-
try cases highlighting a number of reforms 
designed to make large-value payment systems 
more resilient to systemic financial risks. 13
the State’S Role in payment 
anD SecURitieS Settlement 
SyStemS
At the peak of the financial crisis, large-value 
payment systems showed some signs of dis-
tress but generally proved to be resilient.14 
This resilience was mainly due to the swift 
and decisive action of central banks pro-
viding liquidity to the system. This section 
looks at the role of central banks in distrib-
uting liquidity in the system to address ris-
ing concerns about counterparty risk during 
the recent financial crisis. In particular, it 
considers the role of central banks in stabiliz-
ing interbank money markets and highlights 
some new measures that have been proposed 
to improve the management of liquidity risk. 
2005 for more detail). The main drawback 
of conventional DNS systems is that they are 
vulnerable to counterparty credit risk: a pay-
ment system participant can become insol-
vent between the time a payment is made 
and the time it is settled. The credit risk in 
deferred settlement systems is thus generally 
borne by market participants. 
Real-time gross settlement systems elimi-
nate this risk, because all transactions are 
settled instantaneously on an individual 
basis. However, the central bank now has a 
greater responsibility in providing liquidity 
in the system. The flow of funds provided by 
central banks consists of both collateralized 
and uncollateralized current account over-
drafts and central bank credit, either in the 
form of a loan or a repo. As the next section 
shows, the shift toward real-time gross settle-
ment systems has increased the responsibili-
ties of central banks in providing liquidity 
for better management of counterparty risks, 
particularly in times of crisis, when credit 
lines between banks may dry up. 
Figure 5.6 traces the rapid adoption of 
real-time settlement systems around the 
world over the time period between 1990 and 
2010. Developed economies were the early 
adopters; for example, most European coun-
tries adopted RTGS systems by the late 1990s 
(Bech and Hobijn 2007). Many developing 
FiguRe 5.6 The Adoption of Real-Time gross Settlement Systems 
over Time, 1990–2010
Sources: world bank 2011b, global payment systems survey 2010, and bech and Hobijn 2007.
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BOX 5.6 Reforming Large-Value Payment Systems to Mitigate Systemic Risk
PAKiSTAN
The national payment system (NPS) in Pakistan has 
undergone major reforms during the past five years 
under the strong leadership of the State Bank of Pak-
istan (SBP). This has been a complex project com-
prising the modernization of the infrastructure for 
wholesale and retail payments, the modernization of 
the legal and regulatory framework for payment sys-
tems and instruments, and the introduction of inno-
vative solutions in the provision of payment services 
for the underserved banking population.
This box first describes the new features the SBP 
introduced in the large-value payment system as a 
result of the reform and then highlights various roles 
the SBP performs to ensure the smooth and secure 
functioning of the country’s national payment 
system.
Launch of PRISM
In July 2008, the SBP launched the Pakistan Real 
Time Interbank Settlement Mechanism (PRISM) to 
better cope with systemic risk associated with large-
value payment systems. PRISM is a real-time gross 
settlement (RTGS) system. Before the introduction 
of PRISM, financial market transactions and large-
value government payments used to be processed 
through checks and settled on a multilateral net 
basis once a day. In such a system, if multilateral 
credit exposures are not managed properly, the sys-
tem’s participants can be exposed to considerable 
credit risk.
The shift from end-of-day to intraday settlement 
and the gradual introduction of time-critical pay-
ments has considerably increased liquidity needs in 
PRISM. Opening balances and funds received from 
other participants during the operational day are the 
main sources of liquidity for participants in PRISM. 
In addition, the participants can use the cash reserve 
requirements and statutory liquidity requirements 
they hold in accounts with the SBP to make pay-
ments during the day in the RTGS system. These 
funds are available free of charge.
Several mechanisms have been put in place to 
better manage liquidity risks in PRISM. The sys-
tem offers centralized queuing whereby payments 
that cannot be settled immediately because of lack 
of sufficient funds in the settlement accounts of par-
ticipants are placed in a central queue. A gridlock 
resolution mechanism is another tool used in the sys-
tem to facilitate timely settlement of payments and 
mitigate liquidity risk. In addition, PRISM generates 
and sends participants liquidity alerts, followed up 
by phone calls to the banks to arrange the required 
funds from the interbank market. In the second year 
of PRISM, the SBP introduced intraday liquidity 
facilities, a credit from the SBP to participants in 
PRISM for the settlement of payments. It is available 
only on a fully collateralized basis against approved 
government securities as specified by the SBP. 
As an operator of the large-value system, the SBP, 
during the reform process, paid increasing atten-
tion to the operational reliability and security of 
PRISM, fixing the security policies and operational 
procedures in a number of normative documents and 
instructions. Business continuity–related activities 
for PRISM have been established and documented 
as well. Procedures are in place for periodic back-
ing-up and storing of data. A secondary processing 
site has been established, and full system recovery is 
expected in 30 minutes to four hours with no data 
loss. In addition, the SBP has developed require-
ments and recommendations for system participants 
to have in place the necessary business resumption 
and recovery tools. 
Various roles of the SBP
Clearly, the SBP played a vital role in reforming the 
national payment system and continues to play vari-
ous roles to support the system’s functioning. First, 
the SBP is the operator and owner of the RTGS sys-
tem. It also operates the securities settlement system 
and the central depository for government securities 
(which is part of PRISM). Second, the SBP provides 
safe settlement assets for all interbank payments set-
tled through the RTGS system by maintaining and 
managing settlement accounts for all participants in 
PRISM. 
Third, the SBP is responsible for the regulation 
and oversight of all recognized payment systems and 
payment instruments in the country. As part of its 
oversight role, the SBP has been working continu-
ously to ensure that the overseen systems comply 
with international standards and best practices, such 
as the Committee on Payment and Settlement Sys-
tems’ “Core Principles for Systemically Important 
Payment Systems” and the Committee on Payment 
and Settlement Systems, and International Organi-
zation of Securities Commissions’ “Recommenda-
tions for Securities Settlement Systems.” In addition, 
the SBP supported the government in establishing 
the Pakistan Remittance Initiative, and played a 
(Box continues next page)
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BOX 5.6 Reforming Large-Value Payment Systems to Mitigate Systemic 
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catalyst role by encouraging the commercial banks 
to leverage the PRISM system to support faster pro-
cessing of international remittances.
Fourth, the SBP has been playing a leading role in 
establishing a sound legal and regulatory framework 
for payments to reduce legal risk. The SBP had initi-
ated the drafting of the Payment System and Elec-
tronic Fund Transfer Act (PSEFT Act), which was 
introduced in 2007 and deals with a broad range of 
risk-related issues such as irrevocability of payments 
and settlement finality, validity and enforceability of 
netting arrangements, and finality of settlement of 
government securities. The act empowers the SBP to 
issue rules, guidance, circulars, bylaws, standards, 
or directions with respect to such systems or instru-
ments in pursuing its objectives to promote mone-
tary stability and a sound financial structure. 
BRAZiL
In 2002, the Banco Central do Brasil (BCB) launched 
the new Brazilian Payment System (Sistema de Paga-
mento). Brazil had a fairly sophisticated payment 
system even prior to the launching of the reform pro-
gram. However, to better manage systemic risk, the 
Reserves Transfer System (Sistema de Transferência 
de Reservas—STR) was launched. With this system, 
interbank fund transfers can be settled irrevocably 
and unconditionally, that is, with finality, on a real-
time basis. This allows for settlement risk reduc-
tion for interbank transactions and, consequently, 
systemic risk reduction. As of 2010, the STR had 
151 participants, including the BCB, the National 
Treasury Secretariat, three clearinghouses, and 137 
banks. In 2010, the STR processed 12.7 million 
transactions for a total value of R$132,318.9 billion.
With the launch of the new central bank pay-
ment system, a direct link was established between 
the STR and the central depository for federal pub-
lic securities (Sistema Especial de Liquidação e de 
Custódia—SELIC). The link made it possible for 
SELIC to settle all transactions in real time on a 
gross basis, that is, according to model 1 of deliv-
ery versus payment, with the STR processing the 
cash leg of the securities transactions. As defined 
by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Sys-
tems, delivery versus payment is a link between a 
securities transfer system and a funds transfer sys-
tem that ensures that delivery occurs if, and only if, 
payment occurs. Currently, delivery versus payment 
is observed in all securities settlement systems,a and 
almost all securities are dematerialized.
The Brazilian payment system reform, however, 
went beyond the launch of the STR and the SELIC’s 
modus operandi changes. To reduce the systemic risk 
and vulnerability to shocks, changes to the legal and 
regulatory framework were also necessary, in terms 
of clarifying the rights and obligations of partici-
pants in payment transactions. Prior to the reform, 
Brazil was lacking legal validation of multilateral 
netting, protection of assets pledged as collateral in 
case of failure of a participant, and a sound legal 
basis for the central bank’s oversight function.
In this complex process of reform, the BCB 
assumed a leading role. In particular, the reform 
of the Brazilian payment system had three impor-
tant outcomes: (a) the reduction of systemic risk in 
the settlement of financial transactions; (b) a more 
appropriate sharing of the risks associated with set-
tlement of payment transactions between the central 
bank and private market players; and (c) the compli-
ance of the systemically important payment systems 
of the country with international standards and best 
practices.
In particular, two elements of the Brazilian 
reform process have been notable, contributing to 
its breadth, scope, and complexity. First, the central 
bank conducted a comprehensive diagnostic study 
before defining the reform, which sought to identify 
all forms of risks present in the system. Second, the 
central bank consistently involved key stakeholders 
(banks, other financial institutions, clearinghouses, 
other regulators, and so forth) in the reform debate.
a. Federal government bonds are traded by telephone (in the traditional OTC market) or on a BM&FBOVESPA-operated 
electronic trading platform (SISBEX). In this market, repurchase agreements predominate over outright transactions. 
Traditional OTC is also the main trading method for corporate bonds, state government bonds, non-standard derivatives 
and most securities relating to the National Treasury’s special responsibilities. Some of the National Treasury’s securities 
can also be traded at organized OTC markets operated by CETIP and BM&FBOVESPA. Stocks, standardized deriva-
tives, and commodities are traded at BM&FBOVESPA, the only Brazilian stock and derivatives exchange. Two electronic 
trading platforms are used: MEGABOLSA for equities and equity derivatives, and Global Trading System (GTS) for com-
modities and other derivatives.
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have a stronger effect on the uncollateralized 
or unsecured segment of the money market. 
In secured (or repo) transactions, such con-
cerns are mitigated to some extent by the 
presence of collateral.20 Therefore, an impor-
tant policy measure that has been proposed 
to stabilize interbank markets—especially 
in emerging economies—is to collateralize 
transactions in the interbank market.
To illustrate the rationale behind this 
proposition, figures 5.8 and 5.9 compare 
the volatility of interbank money market 
rates around the collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers in economies with secured and unse-
cured interbank money markets. Figure 
5.8 shows the high volatility of interbank 
money market rates in the United States and 
the United Kingdom, two of the economies 
most severely affected by the financial crisis 
that use an unsecured interbank market. Fig-
ure 5.9 compares the volatility of interbank 
money market rates in the Russian Federa-
tion and Ukraine,21 where interbank money 
markets are largely unsecured, and Brazil 
and Mexico, where for historical reasons the 
interbank money market operates mainly on 
a secured basis. Although these economies 
The section then turns to the performance 
of securities settlement systems, an area in 
which the crisis highlighted a number of 
challenges and possibilities for reform and 
improvement.
Management of liquidity risk15
In most countries, the primary source of 
intraday liquidity for financial institutions 
having access to real-time gross settlement 
systems is funds received from other partici-
pating institutions (see figure 5.7).16 How-
ever, during times of stress it can become 
difficult for banks to obtain sufficient funds 
from banks holding excess reserves. As mar-
ket participants become more cautious, they 
tend to hold onto liquid assets or target them 
toward investments perceived to be less risky, 
rather than extending loans in the interbank 
market.17 Significant shocks to the willing-
ness of financial institutions to lend to each 
other—for example, in the form of a default 
or bank run—can result in a liquidity crunch 
in interbank markets that is potentially 
severe enough to trigger a payment system 
crisis. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
the United States is a prominent example of a 
recent event that triggered a liquidity crisis in 
interbank markets.18
To revive interbank markets and to stop 
a contagion spreading through the payment 
system,19 central banks worldwide actively 
provided liquidity to interbank markets, for 
example, by extending access to their liquid-
ity facilities to a wider set of payment system 
participants, by widening the range of col-
lateral accepted in their operations (both the 
Federal Reserve and the Bank of England 
extended their list of eligible collateral), and 
by lending at longer maturities (the European 
Central Bank used the open market opera-
tions, and the Federal Reserve used the term 
auction facility). These proactive interven-
tions in interbank markets were by and large 
successful, and they highlighted the impor-
tant, and possibly increased, role of central 
banks in liquidity management.
Liquidity crises ensuing from deterioration 
in the perceived creditworthiness of coun-
terparties in the interbank market generally 
FiguRe 5.7 Sources of intraday Liquidity for Participants of  
Real-Time gross Settlement Systems
Sources: world bank 2011b and global payment systems survey 2010.
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were arguably affected by different shocks, 
the stylized evidence suggests that collateral-
izing transactions in interbank markets can 
reduce volatility during times of financial 
crisis.
The potential benefits of encouraging col-
lateralization in interbank markets can be 
illustrated by some recent country experi-
ences. In Italy, for example, in an effort to 
help restart activity in the interbank market 
during the peak of the crisis, the Bank of 
Italy introduced an innovative collateral-
ized interbank market (MIC) segment that 
takes advantage of existing infrastructure, 
and proved to be successful in reviving Ita-
ly’s interbank market. The case of Italy is 
reviewed in box 5.7.
Although collateralized interbank markets 
can improve financial stability, introducing 
collateralized transactions also comes with 
a number of legal and technological require-
ments, which can be challenging to achieve, 
particularly in low- and middle-income 
countries. In terms of legal requirements, the 
introduction of collateralized interbank mar-
ket necessitates (a) a sound legal framework 
that ensures finality of funds and securities 
transfers; (b) the legal protection to pledged 
collateral from third-party claims; (c) the 
possibility of seizing the pledged collateral 
efficiently in case of a default by the debtor; 
and (d) reliable, universally accepted, and 
enforceable accounting standards for valuing 
collateral. In terms of technology, a collat-
eralized interbank market relies on the exis-
tence of a large-value payment system that is 
fully integrated with an electronic book-entry 
system that enables the recording of pledges 
on securities and changes in their ownership.
Integrating payment systems and collat-
eral registries and securities depositories can 
also make sense in view of some of the steps 
central banks took to stabilize the interbank 
markets during the recent financial crisis. 
For example, central banks began to accept 
a broader range of collateral in all classes of 
lending operations (accepting private sec-
tor collateral and allowing counterparties to 
economize on the use of government securi-
ties, which is often the only collateral that 
counterparties can still use in secured, or 
repo, markets). Expanding the pool of eligible 
collateral would generally mean that central 
banks are willing to accept securities other 
than those issued by the government or by 
itself as collateral in lending operations. In 
practice, this can be done quickly, safely, and 
efficiently only if the funds transfer system is 
interconnected with the securities depository 
that holds such other, newly eligible securities.
Although many RTGS systems have some 
interface with securities depositories and the 
related settlement systems, in many cases 
(especially in the case of private securities 
FiguRe 5.8 interbank Money Market Rates in the united States  
and united Kingdom
Sources: federal Reserve bank of new york and bank of england.
Note: u.s. and u.k. interbank money market rates are shown for the periods august 13–septem-
ber 12, 2008 (before failure of lehman brothers), and september 15–october 14, 2008 (increased 
volatility). liboR = london interbank offered rate
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depositories) this interface is available solely 
for the final settlement of securities trades 
and is not operational for any other purpose, 
such as for collateralization in interbank 
markets (World Bank 2011b). Also, typically, 
though not in all cases, when an RTGS sys-
tem is interconnected with a securities depos-
itory, the latter holds the records for govern-
ment and central bank securities only. This 
type of securities depository is usually owned 
and operated by the central bank, just as in 
the case of RTGS systems. Central banks can 
therefore support better integration of funds 
transfer systems with securities settlement 
systems in their country. 
Securities settlement systems
Financial transactions can take place either 
through organized exchanges or as “over-
the-counter” (OTC) transactions. Exchanges, 
such as the stock market, offer a centralized 
way of transacting, where one party facili-
tates transactions by connecting buyers and 
sellers. They also offer greater regulatory 
oversight and transparency, since only mem-
bers of the exchange can trade the products 
that are listed on the exchange. There is no 
counterparty risk in transactions settled 
through exchanges, because the exchange 
acts as the regulator and the counterparty to 
each transaction. By contrast, OTC markets 
are generally decentralized, with numerous 
mediators trying to connect buyers and sell-
ers. Until recently, the majority of these mar-
kets remained largely unregulated and hence 
were not very transparent. OTC markets are 
prone to counterparty risk because there is 
no centralized exchange and the parties deal 
directly with each other.22 As a result, the 
stability of OTC markets, especially in times 
of financial crisis, depends strongly on the 
legal and regulatory framework that governs 
their operation.
The global financial crisis emphasized 
the risks to financial stability that may arise 
from the lack of transparency and the sig-
nificant counterparty risk that characterizes 
many OTC markets. The crisis made appar-
ent that risks emanating from OTC transac-
tion—the value of which dwarfs exchange 
Sources: national bank of ukraine, bank of Russia, banco central do brasil, and banco de mexico.
Note: interbank money market rates in emerging countries are shown for the periods august 13– 
september 12, 2008 (before failure of lehman brothers), and september 15–october 14, 2008 
(increased volatility). banco de mexico increased its target interest rate to 25 basis points on 
august 18. miboR = moscow interbank offered rate.
FiguRe 5.9 interbank Money Market Rates in emerging Markets
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BOX 5.7 italy: Reviving interbank Money Markets through Collateralized 
Transactions
As a consequence of the Lehman Brothers collapse 
in September 2008, the Italian segment of the euro 
money market was particularly severely disrupted. 
Before the crisis the Italian market—an electronic 
market called the e-MID—accounted for 17 per-
cent of interbank transactions within the euro area. 
Between August 2007 and October 2008, the daily 
volume of activity transiting from the e-MID almost 
halved, dropping from €24 billion to €14 billion. 
The reason why the e-MID was more affected 
than other parts of the euro money market may be 
traced to a specificity whereby the e-MID offers a 
more transparent trading model than other parts of 
the euro money market. In the e-MID, bid and ask 
volumes are known by other participants in the mar-
ket (Vento and La Ganga 2010). Indeed, in this mar-
ket banks publish the liquidity amounts they want to 
lend or borrow, indicating different maturities and 
interest rates. 
The move toward collateralized operations and 
less transparent transactions (OTC) has prompted 
the Bank of Italy to introduce a temporary inno-
vation within the e-MID in order to meet this new 
demand and revive interbank activity. The MIC, 
the collateralized interbank market segment of the 
e-MID, was started in February 2009. 
The Bank of Italy has played a chief role in ensur-
ing the success of this innovation. The trading on 
the MIC was characterized by a guarantee from the 
Bank of Italy on the obligations of market partici-
pants and by an active role of the central bank in the 
custody, administration, and evaluation of the col-
lateral, as well as by complete anonymity of the par-
ticipants and management of any payment failures.a 
Owing to the central guarantor and facilitator role 
played by the Bank of Italy, the MIC made it pos-
sible to eliminate the credit, liquidity, and reputa-
tional risks that caused the collapse of activity in the 
e-MID. 
This innovation effectively allowed the system 
to overcome obstacles that hampered the smooth 
functioning of activity in the unsecured market, as 
reflected in a large increase in the volumes of activity 
migrating to the MIC and the narrow spreads rela-
tive to other segments of the euro market. Besides 
the recovery of market activity, the market wit-
nessed a move toward greater diversification of con-
tract maturities (figures B5.7.1 and B5.7.2). 
FiguRe B5.7.1 interbank Rates in the italian Collateralized Money Market (MiC) and Other Segments 
of the euro Money Market
Sources: mic, european banking federation, and e-mid.
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traded markets23—can create substantial 
systemic risks and can significantly exacer-
bate financial distress. The crisis highlighted 
that, in particular, OTC derivatives markets 
proved to be deficient in risk management 
and transparency. As the crisis unfolded, 
regulators became particularly concerned 
about the buildup of large nontransparent 
counterparty exposures that were not subject 
to appropriate risk management; contagion 
risk arising from the interconnectedness of 
market participants; and the limited trans-
parency of overall counterparty exposures 
in OTC markets, which precipitated a loss 
of confidence and market liquidity in time of 
stress (FSB 2010c). 
Several proposals have been made to better 
address the risks to financial stability arising 
in OTC derivatives markets. First, the G-20, 
in its September 2009 communiqué, proposed 
that all standardized OTC derivatives con-
tracts should be centrally cleared and traded 
on exchanges or electronic platforms, where 
appropriate, by the end of 2012. In addition, 
transactions in OTC derivatives should be 
reported to trade repositories to enhance the 
transparency of the market.24 
Another proposal for increasing stability in 
OTC derivatives transactions is to strengthen 
the role of so-called central counterparties 
(CCPs).25 Clearing transactions through 
institutions acting as CCPs can contribute 
 
BOX 5.7 italy: Reviving interbank Money Markets through Collateralized 
Transactions (continued)
The Bank of Italy had set the expiration date of 
the MIC initiative on December 31, 2010. However, 
the MIC initiative proved to be so useful that before 
its expiration, banks ended up creating their own 
New MIC. On October 11, 2010, the New MIC 
started as the continuation of the MIC. It is a perma-
nent market, fully based on private infrastructures. 
a. Bank of Italy website http://www.bancaditalia.it/sispaga/MIC.
FiguRe B5.7.2 Outstanding Volumes and Average Maturity Trend on the MiC
Sources: vento and la ganga 2010; e-mid.
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to financial stability and standardization 
of OTC derivatives contracts by mitigating 
counterparty risk, using multilateral netting, 
requiring daily or intraday margin calls and 
clearing fund contributions, and enhancing 
transparency. Should a counterparty of a 
CCP that is involved in OTC trading become 
insolvent, it would not create the chain reac-
tion that, for example, the default of Lehman 
Brothers triggered, because a properly man-
aged and supervised CCP should be able to 
act as a firewall between the defaulter and 
other counterparties. 
Finally, promoting the use of trade reposi-
tories in OTC derivatives transactions could 
further enhance market transparency and 
reduce counterparty risks. A trade repository 
for OTC derivatives is a centralized regis-
try that maintains an electronic database of 
open OTC derivatives transaction records. In 
the absence of a trade repository, transaction 
data are maintained by individual counter-
parties and possibly other institutions provid-
ing services to market participants (for exam-
ple, prime brokers, CCPs, trading platforms, 
and custodians), often stored in proprietary 
systems in various formats with different data 
fields. An important benefit of a trade reposi-
tory is that it helps promote standardization 
and provides a level of consistency in the 
quality of transaction data. Enhanced mar-
ket transparency through trade repositories 
helps public authorities and market partici-
pants monitor the buildup of exposures in rel-
evant markets, thereby supporting sound risk 
management; market discipline; and effective 
oversight, regulation, and supervision.
To better manage risks in the future, the 
state has to ensure regulatory reforms in OTC 
markets to increase transparency and encour-
age supervisors and overseers to effectively 
monitor the buildup of systemic risk. Mov-
ing toward increased use of CCPs and trade 
repositories for OTC derivatives markets is an 
important step in the right direction. How-
ever, despite the stated benefits, CCPs are 
no panacea for all products and all markets. 
A CCP is typically attractive for a market 
with highly liquid, standardized contracts. 
Also, greater use of CCPs for OTC deriva-
tives transactions and the conditions under 
which market participants can obtain access 
will increase their systemic importance (BIS 
2011). Accordingly, it is critical that the risk 
management at these CCPs be robust and 
comprehensive. A CCP would need to com-
ply with high risk management standards and 
require counterparties to post appropriate 
collateral in a timely manner. The state has 
to ensure supervision, oversight, and regula-
tion of CCPs. The same applies to the trade 
repositories. An increased reliance of users, 
public authorities, interoperable infrastruc-
tures, service providers, and other market 
participants on trade repositories means that 
adequate measures are needed to ensure the 
availability, timeliness, and accuracy of the 
data stored in trade repositories. The new 
Principles for Financial Market Infrastruc-
tures, released by the Committee on Payment 
and Settlement Systems and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions in 
April 2012, covers the CCPs and trade reposi-
tory issues discussed above. 
Finally, CCPs may not be a viable solution 
for all OTC derivatives markets, because their 
risk management systems are not necessar-
ily equipped to clear all types of derivatives 
contracts. Given that, as a result, a certain 
share of OTC derivatives trades will remain 
bilaterally cleared, enhancing the safety and 
transparency of bilateral clearing also merits 
attention.26 Given the international character 
of OTC derivatives markets, it will be critical 
to ensure consistency of initiatives to prevent 
regulatory arbitrage.
noteS
 1. This definition of financial infrastructure fol-
lows that in previous publications, such as 
World Bank (2009).
 2. The introduction of credit information can 
have both screening and incentive effects. 
Luoto, McIntosh, and Wydick (2007) present 
a theoretical model that highlights this point.
 3. The literature on relationship banking sug-
gests that decentralized banks are better able 
to lend to informationally opaque borrowers, 
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and settlement systems (European Central 
Bank 2010b). 
 11. Credit risk is the risk that a participant will 
fail to meet an obligation when due or any-
time thereafter. Liquidity risk is the risk that 
participant will fail to meet an obligation 
when due, but at an unspecified time there-
after. The European Central Bank (2010b) 
provides a discussion of risks associated with 
large-value payment systems. 
 12. The World Bank has supported several client 
countries with the adoption of RTGS sys-
tems (for example, the Dominican Republic). 
Since 2007, implementation of 19 new RTGS 
systems has taken place; such systems are 
currently being implemented in Honduras; 
Macao SAR, China; Papua New Guinea; and 
Paraguay (World Bank 2011b). According to 
the survey a relatively small number of coun-
tries indicate that large-value payments are 
being processed, exclusively or in parallel with 
the RTGS system, through check-clearing 
systems (23 percent) or other non-RTGS large- 
value systems (17 percent).
 13. An additional case study on the West Bank 
and Gaza is available at http://worldbank.
org/financialdevelopment. 
 14. Financial stability reports from the Bank of 
England (2010, 2011) provide evidence of the 
resilience of CHAPS and CREST, the United 
Kingdom’s large-value and securities settle-
ment systems. 
 15. This section draws on Cirasino, García, and 
Guadamillas (2009).
 16. Banks typically hold low volumes of cash and 
reserves and rely on incoming funds to make 
payments. For example, before the financial 
crisis, many banks in the United States held 
cash and reserve holdings equivalent to only 
about 1 percent of their total daily payment 
volume (Afonso and Shin 2009).
 17. Information asymmetries and adverse selec-
tion problems can explain why market par-
ticipants prefer to hoard liquidity in times of 
stress. For further reading refer to Vento and 
La Ganga (2010). 
 18. There are similar examples from the past (for 
example, disruptions in payment systems 
after September 11, 2001). McAndrews and 
Potter (2002) examine the classic example of 
Herstatt Bank (in 1974) that resulted in pay-
ment system problems. 
because they can make better use of “soft” 
relationship-specific information. Better 
credit reporting can improve access to credit 
by making part of this proprietary informa-
tion accessible to the market.
 4. See Olegario (2003) for a detailed discussion 
of the historical development of credit report-
ing institutions.
 5. Many countries have included anti-discrim-
ination provisions in their data protection 
laws. In the United States, for example, the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits using 
data on a borrower’s gender, race, age, or 
marital status to determine creditworthiness. 
Many credit bureaus also refrain from using 
this data due to public relations concerns 
(Bostic and Calem 2003; OECD 2010).
 6. Securities systems and large-value payment 
systems are mutually dependent. To achieve 
delivery versus payment, settlement of secu-
rities in the securities settlement system is 
conditional on settlement of cash, normally 
in a large-value payment system. In parallel, 
credit extensions in large-value payment sys-
tems are often dependent on the provision of 
collateral through a securities system.
 7. In 2001, the Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commis-
sions (IOSCO) published the “Core Principles 
for Systemically Important Payment Systems” 
(CPSIPS) and the “Recommendations for 
Securities Settlement Systems” (RSSS). In 
2004, CPSS-IOSCO also published the “Rec-
ommendations for Central Counterparties” 
(RCCP). These documents are used as stan-
dards for assessment by the FSAP. The CPSS 
and IOSCO recently reviewed these standards 
and published in April 2012 the “Principles 
for Financial Market Infrastructures,” which 
will replace the CPSIPS, RSSS, and RCCP. 
 8. In particular, the World Bank contributes to 
the work done by the CPSS and IOSCO.
 9. CPSS (2005, 2006) provide information on 
new developments in large-value payment 
systems and general guidelines for payment 
system development, respectively.
 10. Central bank money is issued in the form of 
banknotes and deposits held by commercial 
banks. The majority of payment systems, 
especially those transferring large-value 
funds, use central bank money, which greatly 
reduces credit and liquidity risks in payment 
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 24. In line with the G-20 requests, the Commit-
tee on Payment and Settlement Systems and 
the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions have initiated a review of their 
existing principles and recommendations in 
order to address issues specific to OTC deriv-
atives (see, for example CPSS-IOSCO 2010a, 
2010b). In addition, various attempts have 
been made by individual country legislators 
to meet the obligations, for example, by the 
United States and the European Union. 
 25. A CCP is an entity that interposes itself 
between counterparties to contracts traded in 
one or more financial markets, becoming the 
buyer to every seller and the seller to every 
buyer. 
 26. In October 2011, the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) noted delays in the implementa-
tion of OTC derivatives reforms, urged juris-
dictions to achieve the end-2012 deadline, 
and stressed the importance of coordination 
between national supervisors and regulators. 
 19. Davis (2009) gives an overview of the chro-
nology of the crisis and the steps central 
banks took to revive the markets. 
 20. IMF (2010b) and Hördahl and King (2008) 
provide an overview of the impact of the 
financial crisis on various funding markets. 
 21. Ukraine had been facing severe difficulties in 
its banking sector for several months. This 
may explain why the money market was 
highly volatile even before the aggravation of 
the global financial crisis in mid-September 
2008. However, the volatility of interest rates 
kept on increasing for the rest of 2008 (with 
standard deviation increasing to approxi-
mately 10.6 for the period from September 
15 to December 31, 2008).
 22. The upside of OTC derivatives markets is that 
they can improve the pricing of risk, add to 
liquidity in the market, and help market par-
ticipants manage their respective risks (FSB 
2010c).
 23. According to BIS estimates, the notional value 
of outstanding OTC contracts exceeded the 
staggering amount of US$700 trillion in June 
2011.
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 Financial institutions Financial markets
Private 
credit to 
GDP (%)
Accounts 
per thousand 
adults, 
commercial 
banks
Lending- 
deposit 
spread (%)
Z-score– 
weighted  
average, 
commercial 
banks
(Stock market 
capitalization 
+ outstanding 
domestic 
private debt 
securities)/ 
GDP (%)
Market capital-
ization out of  
the top 10 largest 
companies (%)
Stock 
market 
turnover 
ratio (%)
Asset 
price 
volatility
Afghanistan 7.9 71.1 9.7     
Albania 33.8  6.2 22.4     
Algeria 13.7 343.3 6.3 15.5     
Andorra   21.7     
Angola 15.0 114.5 8.0 12.0     
Antigua and Barbuda 70.8  7.0     
Argentina 12.3 667.2 4.6 5.3 20.5 27.8 13.5 43.0
Armenia 19.8 524.1 10.3 16.3 1.3  0.4  
Aruba 57.1  7.7     
Australia 124.4  3.4 34.7 172.6 56.9 97.5 38.6
Austria 120.5 1,401.2 12.8 79.5 36.1 68.0  
Azerbaijan 16.0 38.0 8.1 10.0     
Bahamas, The 82.2  1.8 23.6     
Bahrain 74.0  6.3 48.6 97.7  6.6 11.7
Bangladesh 38.3 365.5 6.3 8.3 9.1  216.1  
Barbados 96.0  6.0 37.8 127.7  1.7  
Belarus 29.8  0.4 30.7     
Belgium 94.4  6.7 100.1  63.6 34.8
Belize 62.8 995.6 5.8 20.4     
Benin 20.8  20.5     
Bermuda   11.1     
Bhutan 30.8  17.8     
Bolivia 32.0  9.0 24.0 15.7  1.6  
Bosnia and Herzegovina 56.1 911.2 4.2 17.3    22.1
Botswana 22.0 477.2 6.7 10.0 32.2  4.4 16.4
Brazil 45.6  34.0 15.9 82.5 45.8 83.0 49.1
Brunei Darussalam 39.8  4.8 5.9     
Bulgaria 63.7 1,988.7 6.2 12.3 20.9  7.9 33.1
Burkina Faso 17.0   7.5     
Burundi 18.5   13.0     
Cambodia 23.3 91.6  15.2     
Cameroon 10.4 58.4  19.3     
Statistical appendix
TABLe A.1 Countries and Their Financial System Characteristics, Averages, 2008–2010
(appendix continues on next page)
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TABLe A.1 Countries and Their Financial System Characteristics, Averages, 2008–2010 (continued)
 Financial institutions Financial markets
Private 
credit to 
GDP (%)
Accounts 
per thousand 
adults, 
commercial 
banks
Lending- 
deposit 
spread (%)
Z-score– 
weighted  
average, 
commercial 
banks
(Stock market 
capitalization 
+ outstanding 
domestic 
private debt 
securities)/ 
GDP (%)
Market capital-
ization out of  
the top 10 largest 
companies (%)
Stock 
market 
turnover 
ratio (%)
Asset 
price 
volatility
Canada 126.6  2.7 19.3 139.1 74.2 97.0 35.0
Cape Verde 57.0  7.4 38.1     
Cayman Islands   28.8     
Central African Republic 6.9 2.4 7.7     
Chad 4.1 19.0 10.0     
Chile 75.9 2,015.2 4.7 8.9 125.5 53.7 20.9 30.0
China 111.1  3.1 34.8 109.9 71.6 187.8 41.3
Colombia 31.1  6.7 15.2 49.9 24.6 15.2 31.7
Comoros 10.8 61.8 8.5     
Congo, Dem. Rep. 4.9  41.5 9.7     
Congo, Rep. 3.2 16.1 4.4     
Costa Rica 46.0  12.1 20.7 5.4  3.5 21.8
Côte d’Ivoire 16.4  10.7 30.4  3.0  
Croatia 65.6  8.1 39.8 51.0  6.3 36.0
Cuba   8.0     
Cyprus 265.6  7.7 47.3 21.3 13.9 45.3
Czech Republic 50.2  4.7 27.1 38.2  50.3 39.8
Denmark 208.1  15.1 229.1  95.2 33.2
Djibouti 24.2 77.4 9.5 11.6     
Dominica 50.2  6.3 9.2     
Dominican Republic 19.9  9.1 23.6     
Ecuador 25.7  22.8 8.3  9.2  
Egypt, Arab Rep. 37.2  5.3 23.1 54.4 56.0 81.4 32.0
El Salvador 41.6  31.8 23.2  0.7  
Equatorial Guinea 3.3 121.8 16.3     
Eritrea   9.2     
Estonia 101.8 1,925.4 4.7 5.7 14.2  19.9 29.1
Ethiopia 17.2 91.7 3.3 10.3     
Fiji 46.9  3.4 32.7  0.8  
Finland 89.6  18.9 90.4  114.5 38.6
France 109.7  14.4 126.4  107.7 34.4
Gabon 9.3 91.1 14.8     
Gambia, The 16.8  12.7 7.4     
Georgia 30.5 653.1 13.7 6.7 6.6  0.7  
Germany 109.1   10.5 75.4 51.7 142.9 33.3
Ghana 14.0 298.8  15.4 9.8  5.9  
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Greece 98.6 3,799.7 12.0 48.6 39.8 64.0 41.7
Grenada 75.6  7.2 12.0     
Guatemala 24.9  8.2 27.6     
Guinea   2.8     
Guinea-Bissau 4.9      
Guyana 27.2  12.2 18.9 14.3  0.3  
Haiti 12.8 329.4 16.2 20.5     
Honduras 49.8  8.7 29.8     
Hong Kong SAR, China 152.9  4.8 33.1 532.5 58.1 155.8 30.6
Hungary 65.2 1,027.5 2.7 14.4 27.8 4.4 123.8 51.0
Iceland 137.5  9.1 152.8  46.6 67.3
India 44.1 747.3 27.8 84.7 72.1 131.4 39.8
Indonesia 23.8  5.5 18.3 33.1 53.2 93.7 39.4
Iran, Islamic Rep. 33.9  0.1 15.3 54.0 55.6  
Iraq 5.5  21.9     
Ireland 228.2  3.7 129.6 21.3 50.6 46.0
Israel 93.9 1,055.7 2.8 26.3 91.1 42.6 65.4 20.9
Italy 108.9 1,221.2 27.3 73.5 38.9 133.0 34.9
Jamaica 26.3  10.9 23.5 56.4  4.8 15.0
Japan 103.7 7,185.2 1.2 32.9 114.3 60.7 124.9 28.6
Jordan 71.8  4.5 48.2 148.3 30.6 60.3 22.8
Kazakhstan 45.8 902.7 4.3 34.7  11.3 44.2
Kenya 29.0 328.4 9.1 19.2 38.1  13.9 26.9
Korea, Rep. 101.6 4,374.1 1.7 13.4 147.8 67.1 229.4 42.2
Kosovo 30.3 728.9     
Kuwait 65.6  2.9 24.6 98.2  92.8 15.4
Kyrgyz Republic  162.5 20.8 17.2 1.8  100.8  
Lao PDR 10.4 44.3 20.2 11.2     
Latvia 88.1 1,230.7 7.1 3.0 6.9  2.1 31.5
Lebanon 66.7 873.0 2.2 33.0 32.1  12.5 20.5
Lesotho 11.2 245.3 8.1 19.4     
Liberia 12.3  10.2 7.2     
Libya 8.0  3.5 77.3     
Lithuania 66.4  2.2 4.3 13.5  8.4 29.7
Luxembourg 184.0  24.6 189.6 3.7 0.7 35.0
Macao SAR, China 51.7  4.9 22.6     
TABLe A.1 Countries and Their Financial System Characteristics, Averages, 2008–2010 (continued)
 Financial institutions Financial markets
Private 
credit to 
GDP (%)
Accounts 
per thousand 
adults, 
commercial 
banks
Lending- 
deposit 
spread (%)
Z-score– 
weighted  
average, 
commercial 
banks
(Stock market 
capitalization 
+ outstanding 
domestic 
private debt 
securities)/ 
GDP (%)
Market capital-
ization out of  
the top 10 largest 
companies (%)
Stock 
market 
turnover 
ratio (%)
Asset 
price 
volatility
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Macedonia, FYR 41.1  3.1 10.8 15.9  6.6 34.3
Madagascar 10.7 36.1 35.2 19.1     
Malawi 11.7  21.5 18.9 29.7  2.1  
Malaysia 106.3 1,570.3 2.8 19.6 173.2 62.5 34.4 21.1
Maldives 66.1 1,130.0 6.4 7.8     
Mali 17.1  12.0     
Malta 127.6 3,561.8 12.6 50.1 5.8 1.3 17.4
Mauritania 25.5  10.9 23.1     
Mauritius 80.8  11.0 23.5 51.4 41.8 10.1 28.1
Mexico 17.5 1,161.2 4.9 9.9 48.0 33.8 35.6 36.9
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.   13.4 24.9     
Moldova 34.3 1,132.0 5.8 16.1     
Mongolia 38.8 1,283.3 8.6 24.4 10.3  10.1 35.0
Montenegro 77.5  5.5 84.9  5.3  
Morocco 71.8 584.2 33.0 74.6 26.8 34.1 21.0
Mozambique 19.5  6.7 22.5     
Myanmar 3.3  5.0 3.2     
Namibia 44.5 635.3 5.0 41.1 8.2  3.4 48.1
Nepal 44.7  5.2 16.3 37.2  6.2  
Netherlands 201.9 1,762.5 0.2 12.2 146.0  138.7 32.8
New Zealand 145.0  1.9 19.3 35.1 43.9 60.0 30.9
Nicaragua 34.4  8.3 17.9     
Niger 10.9  30.0     
Nigeria 31.1  6.5 13.3 26.1  24.3 24.6
Norway  513.6 1.9 22.4 81.8 32.2 138.9 48.0
Oman 38.4 1,011.5 3.1 23.3 33.2  49.7 25.1
Pakistan 24.3 219.5 5.9 10.7 22.1  121.3 31.5
Panama 78.7  4.7 22.6 31.4  2.6 11.3
Papua New Guinea 24.5 176.4 8.2 37.2 136.5  0.4  
Paraguay 27.0  24.8 19.8     
Peru 23.0 395.8 18.6 14.2 61.4 36.2 5.8 43.7
Philippines 27.2 431.6 4.8 36.8 49.7 51.2 28.8 31.3
Poland 43.2  24.4 31.5 43.8 52.9 44.2
Portugal 179.0 2,774.9 29.9 89.8  61.0 29.6
Qatar  725.3 3.7 32.4    31.4
Romania 37.7  5.8 10.3 16.6  10.5 45.1
TABLe A.1 Countries and Their Financial System Characteristics, Averages, 2008–2010 (continued)
 Financial institutions Financial markets
Private 
credit to 
GDP (%)
Accounts 
per thousand 
adults, 
commercial 
banks
Lending- 
deposit 
spread (%)
Z-score– 
weighted  
average, 
commercial 
banks
(Stock market 
capitalization 
+ outstanding 
domestic 
private debt 
securities)/ 
GDP (%)
Market capital-
ization out of  
the top 10 largest 
companies (%)
Stock 
market 
turnover 
ratio (%)
Asset 
price 
volatility
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Russian Federation 41.3  6.0 18.1 58.2 34.3 129.0 52.8
Rwanda  204.2 9.7 8.9     
Samoa 42.7  7.3 54.9     
San Marino 361.7  24.6     
São Tomé and Príncipe 29.5  18.9     
Saudi Arabia 45.3 744.6 17.2 77.6 39.6 126.8 30.5
Senegal 23.6  20.2     
Serbia 41.5  7.2 10.2 31.1  6.6 28.8
Seychelles 23.6 1,132.0 7.8 19.6     
Sierra Leone 7.6 131.1 13.4 7.9     
Singapore 97.4 2,070.3 5.1 46.4 169.9 65.0 104.2 30.8
Slovak Republic 44.7  2.0 9.7 10.9  3.1 23.3
Slovenia 88.6  3.6 15.8 34.0 23.7 6.8 28.1
Solomon Islands 23.7  11.9     
South Africa 75.8 882.9 3.4 27.1 245.6 67.6 69.9 39.5
Spain 203.7 801.1 57.3 144.8 59.7 159.1 36.2
Sri Lanka 26.2  5.5 19.3 19.4 55.3 29.8 25.3
St. Kitts and Nevis 64.0  4.1 18.8 83.5  1.4  
St. Lucia 112.0  7.1 24.3     
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 48.9  6.4 10.2     
Sudan 11.0  16.8     
Suriname 24.9  5.5 16.5     
Swaziland 22.8 443.1 6.2 11.9     
Sweden 124.3  19.6 149.6  124.8 41.7
Switzerland 169.6  2.8 15.4 244.0 35.5 100.0 26.3
Syrian Arab Republic 17.4 190.3 3.1 13.6     
Tajikistan   17.2 13.0     
Tanzania 14.4 126.6 7.3 19.9    27.0
Thailand 93.7 1,082.7 4.8 4.5 75.2 52.4 109.1 33.4
Timor-Leste 17.8  11.0     
Togo 18.8 175.5 7.9     
Tonga 49.2  6.9     
Trinidad and Tobago 29.7  7.1 29.6 55.9  2.6  
Tunisia 56.5   29.2 17.3  23.3 13.4
Turkey 34.0 1,263.1  32.4 30.7 49.0 201.9 46.6
Turkmenistan    8.0     
TABLe A.1 Countries and Their Financial System Characteristics, Averages, 2008–2010 (continued)
 Financial institutions Financial markets
Private 
credit to 
GDP (%)
Accounts 
per thousand 
adults, 
commercial 
banks
Lending- 
deposit 
spread (%)
Z-score– 
weighted  
average, 
commercial 
banks
(Stock market 
capitalization 
+ outstanding 
domestic 
private debt 
securities)/ 
GDP (%)
Market capital-
ization out of  
the top 10 largest 
companies (%)
Stock 
market 
turnover 
ratio (%)
Asset 
price 
volatility
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Tuvalu   21.0     
Uganda 12.3 169.5 11.2 10.6 18.0  0.5  
Ukraine 66.0 3,176.4 6.7 6.3 25.0  8.8 58.8
United Arab Emirates   21.4    35.5
United Kingdom 205.3  18.1 126.6 62.2 183.1 33.1
United States 60.0  24.0 219.7 72.6 342.7 28.8
Uruguay 22.9 551.0 8.8 4.7 0.4  4.8  
Uzbekistan  909.2 65.8     
Vanuatu 56.6  4.1 39.2     
Venezuela, RB 18.2  4.4 8.4 1.7  1.4 57.0
Vietnam 96.8  2.4 23.2 17.1  141.6 43.7
West Bank and Gaza  543.3 6.1     
Yemen, Rep. 7.1 89.9 5.8 18.0     
Zambia 11.8  13.7 7.6 17.9  14.8  
TABLe A.1 Countries and Their Financial System Characteristics, Averages, 2008–2010 (continued)
 Financial institutions Financial markets
Private 
credit to 
GDP (%)
Accounts 
per thousand 
adults, 
commercial 
banks
Lending- 
deposit 
spread (%)
Z-score– 
weighted  
average, 
commercial 
banks
(Stock market 
capitalization 
+ outstanding 
domestic 
private debt 
securities)/ 
GDP (%)
Market capital-
ization out of  
the top 10 largest 
companies (%)
Stock 
market 
turnover 
ratio (%)
Asset 
price 
volatility
Source: data from and calculations based on the global financial development database.
Note: the four blue bars summarize where the country’s observation is vis-à-vis the global statistical distribution of the variable in the global financial development database. 
each blue bar corresponds to one quartile of the statistical distribution. so, values below the 25th percentile show only one full bar, values equal or greater than the 25th and less 
than the 50th percentile show two full bars, values equal or greater than the 50th and less than the 75th percentile show three full bars, and values greater than the 75th percentile 
show four full bars. the blue bars on the far left are based on a simple (unweighted) average of the eight financial characteristics, each converted to a 0–100 scale. for details, see 
cˇihák, demirgüç-kunt, feyen, and levine (2012).
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map a.1 Depth—Financial inStitUtionS
To approximate financial institutions’ depth, this 
map uses domestic private credit to the real sector 
by deposit money banks as a percentage of local cur-
rency GDP. Data on domestic private credit to the 
real sector by deposit money banks are from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS), line 22D, 
published by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Local currency GDP is also from IFS. Missing 
observations are imputed by using GDP growth rates 
from World Development Indicators (WDI), instead 
of substituting the levels. This approach ensures a 
smoother GDP series. The four shades of blue in the 
map are based on the average value of the variable in 
2008–10: the darker the blue, the higher the quartile 
of the statistical distribution of the variable. 
Private credit to GDP (%)                        
Number of 
countries Average Median
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
Weighted 
averagea
World 173 56.3 38.8 54.6 3.2 361.7 89.9
By developed/developing economies         
Developed economies 48 113.3 100.1 68.6 3.3 361.7 103.0
Developing economies 125 34.5 26.3 24.9 3.2 112.0 60.5
By income level         
High income 48 113.3 100.1 68.6 3.3 361.7 103.0
Upper middle income 49 48.6 44.5 28.0 8.0 112.0 67.8
Lower middle income 49 30.8 27.0 18.7 3.2 96.8 36.6
Low income 27 15.4 12.8 9.8 3.3 44.7 24.9
By region         
High income: OECD 30 124.0 109.4 52.2 43.2 228.2 103.7
High income: non-OECD 17 97.3 65.6 90.7 3.3 361.7 80.7
East Asia & Pacific 17 46.8 38.8 34.6 3.3 111.1 100.1
Europe & Central Asia 19 44.9 41.1 19.6 16.0 88.1 40.4
Latin America & Caribbean 29 41.5 32.0 24.2 12.3 112.0 33.4
Middle East & North Africa 12 34.5 29.1 26.0 5.5 71.8 32.1
South Asia 8 35.3 34.6 17.3 7.9 66.1 41.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 41 20.1 16.4 16.9 3.2 80.8 38.7
Source: global financial development database, 2008–10 data.
Note: oecd = organisation for economic co-operation and development.
a. weighted average by current gdp.
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map a.2 acceSS—Financial inStitUtionS
To approximate access to financial institutions, this 
map uses the number of depositors with commercial 
banks per 1,000 adults. For each type of institution 
the calculation follows: (reported number of deposi-
tors)*1,000/adult population in the reporting coun-
try. Number of depositors from commercial banks 
is from the Financial Access Survey reported by the 
IMF. Adult population data are from WDI. The four 
shades of blue in the map are based on the average 
value of the variable in 2008–10: the darker the blue, 
the higher the quartile of the statistical distribution 
of the variable.
Accounts per thousand adults from 
commercial banks                        
Number of 
countries Average Median
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
Weighted 
averagea
World 79 904.7 584.2 1,147.3 2.4 7,185.2 1,339.0
By developed/developing economies         
Developed economies 18 2,004.3 1,311.2 1,766.1 121.8 7,185.2 3,761.8
Developing economies 61 580.2 395.8 598.2 2.4 3,176.4 691.5
By income level         
High income 18 2,004.3 1,311.2 1,766.1 121.8 7,185.2 3,761.8
Upper middle income 21 921.1 902.7 534.1 38.0 2,015.2 997.9
Lower middle income 24 570.1 437.3 664.1 16.1 3,176.4 725.9
Low income 16 147.9 128.9 112.0 2.4 365.5 222.5
By region         
High income: OECD 12 2,320.2 1,581.8 1,945.7 513.6 7,185.2 3,933.9
High income: non-OECD 6 1,372.5 878.1 1,248.0 121.8 3,561.8 1,082.9
East Asia & Pacific 7 668.6 431.6 630.3 44.3 1,570.3 799.3
Europe & Central Asia 13 1,047.8 909.2 811.2 38.0 3,176.4 1,645.5
Latin America & Caribbean 7 873.6 667.2 587.6 329.4 2,015.2 967.0
Middle East & North Africa 7 385.9 343.3 295.6 77.4 873.0 384.7
South Asia 5 506.7 365.5 429.7 71.1 1,130.0 531.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 22 261.0 150.3 294.5 2.4 1,132.0 281.1
Source: global financial development database, 2008–10 data.
Note: oecd = organisation for economic co-operation and development.
a. weighted average by total adult population.
GLOBAL finAnciAL DEVELOPMEnT REPORT 2013 s t a t i s t i c a l  a p p e n d i x   169
map a.3 eFFiciency—Financial inStitUtionS
To approximate efficiency of financial institutions, 
this map uses the spread (difference) between lending 
rate and deposit rate. Lending rate is the rate charged 
by banks on loans to the private sector, and deposit 
interest rate is the rate offered by commercial or simi-
lar banks on three-month deposits. The lending and 
deposit rates are from IFS line 60P and 60L, respec-
tively. The four shades of blue in the map are based 
on the average value of the variable in 2008–10: the 
darker the blue, the higher the quartile of the statisti-
cal distribution of the variable.
Lending-deposit spread (%)                        
Number of 
countries Average Median
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
Weighted 
averagea
World 129 7.7 6.3 6.4 0.1 41.5 6.9
By developed/developing economies         
Developed economies 28 3.8 3.5 2.0 0.2 8.1 2.2
Developing economies 101 8.8 6.9 6.7 0.1 41.5 7.3
By income level         
High income 28 3.8 3.5 2.0 0.2 8.1 2.2
Upper middle income 43 6.7 6.2 5.3 0.1 34.0 6.5
Lower middle income 39 8.8 8.0 4.7 2.4 24.8 6.0
Low income 19 13.7 10.2 10.1 3.3 41.5 13.0
By region         
High income: OECD 14 2.6 2.7 1.2 0.2 4.7 1.9
High income: non-OECD 13 5.1 4.9 1.9 1.8 8.1 5.1
East Asia & Pacific 17 7.3 5.5 4.7 2.4 20.2 3.6
Europe & Central Asia 17 7.7 6.2 5.2 0.4 20.8 6.7
Latin America & Caribbean 27 9.6 7.2 6.8 4.1 34.0 16.9
Middle East & North Africa 10 4.6 4.9 2.6 0.1 9.5 4.6
South Asia 5 5.9 5.9 0.5 5.2 6.4 6.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 26 11.7 8.8 8.9 3.3 41.5 12.8
Source: global financial development database, 2008–10 data.
Note: oecd = organisation for economic co-operation and development.
a. weighted average by total population.
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map a.4 Stability—Financial inStitUtionS
To approximate stability of financial institutions, this 
map uses the average weighted z-score for commer-
cial banks. The indicator for each commercial bank 
is estimated as follows: (ROA + Equity / Assets)/ 
(Standard Deviation of ROA). Return on assets 
(ROA), equity, and assets are from Bankscope. Market 
share in terms of total assets is used to calculate the 
country aggregate. The four shades of blue in the map 
are based on the average value of the variable in 
2008–10: the darker the blue, the higher the quartile 
of the statistical distribution of the variable.
Source: global financial development database, 2008–10 data.
Note: oecd = organisation for economic co-operation and development.
a. weighted average by total population.
Z-score weighted average from 
commercial banks             
Number of 
countries Average Median
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
Weighted 
averagea
World 178 19.2 17.9 11.8 2.8 77.3 23.4
By developed/developing economies         
Developed economies 53 21.6 19.6 11.2 3.7 57.3 23.4
Developing economies 125 18.1 16.3 11.9 2.8 77.3 23.4
By income level         
High income 53 21.6 19.6 11.2 3.7 57.3 23.4
Upper middle income 48 18.2 15.3 13.5 3.0 77.3 26.8
Lower middle income 47 21.5 19.3 12.0 4.4 65.8 23.6
Low income 30 12.8 10.5 6.3 2.8 30.0 12.1
By region         
High income: OECD 31 19.3 18.1 10.6 3.7 57.3 23.3
High income: non-OECD 21 25.2 23.6 11.7 5.9 48.6 25.0
East Asia & Pacific 15 24.6 23.2 14.0 3.2 54.9 30.0
Europe & Central Asia 22 15.5 11.5 13.7 3.0 65.8 20.9
Latin America & Caribbean 29 17.4 18.8 7.3 4.7 31.8 14.5
Middle East & North Africa 11 29.5 23.1 19.1 11.6 77.3 24.3
South Asia 8 14.7 13.5 6.9 7.8 27.8 23.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 41 15.4 13.0 8.4 2.8 41.1 14.9
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map a.5 Depth—Financial maRketS
To approximate depth of financial markets, this map 
uses market capitalization plus the amount of out-
standing domestic private debt securities as percent-
age of GDP. Market capitalization (also known as 
market value) is the share price times the number of 
shares outstanding. Listed domestic companies are 
the domestically incorporated companies listed on 
the country’s stock exchanges at the end of the year. 
Listed companies do not include investment compa-
nies, mutual funds, or other collective investment 
vehicles. Data are from Standard & Poor’s Global 
Stock Markets Factbook and supplemental S&P 
data, and are compiled and reported by the WDI. 
Amount of outstanding domestic private debt secu-
rities is from table 16A (domestic debt amount) of 
the Securities Statistics by the Bank for International 
Settlements. The amount includes all issuers except 
governments. The four shades of blue in the map are 
based on the average value of the variable in 2008–
10: the darker the blue, the higher the quartile of the 
statistical distribution of the variable.
Stock market capitalization plus outstanding 
domestic private debt securities to GDP (%)            
Number of 
countries Average Median
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
Weighted 
averagea
World 103 71.2 48.6 74.7 0.4 532.5 130.6
By developed/developing economies         
Developed economies 43 111.1 91.1 88.0 10.9 532.5 152.1
Developing economies 60 42.5 30.0 46.1 0.4 245.6 76.4
By income level         
High income 43 111.1 91.1 88.0 10.9 532.5 152.1
Upper middle income 33 51.9 32.1 55.1 0.4 245.6 82.0
Lower middle income 21 33.6 23.2 31.8 1.3 136.5 56.7
Low income 6 22.3 23.9 15.1 1.8 38.1 18.4
By region         
High income: OECD 31 108.2 100.1 63.6 10.9 244.0 151.3
High income: non-OECD 11 121.9 77.6 142.1 33.2 532.5 180.4
East Asia & Pacific 9 70.9 49.7 57.2 10.3 173.2 100.0
Europe & Central Asia 14 24.9 18.8 23.1 1.3 84.9 43.7
Latin America & Caribbean 16 39.3 27.3 35.7 0.4 125.5 59.6
Middle East & North Africa 6 57.0 43.3 50.2 15.3 148.3 42.3
South Asia 5 34.5 22.1 29.8 9.1 84.7 72.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 11 46.1 29.7 67.3 8.2 245.6 133.7
Source: global financial development database, 2008–10 data.
Note: oecd = organisation for economic co-operation and development.
a. weighted average by current gdp.
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map a.6 acceSS—Financial maRketS
To approximate access to financial markets, this 
map uses the ratio of market capitalization outside 
of the top 10 largest companies to total market capi-
talization. The World Federation of Exchanges pro-
vides data on the exchange level. This variable is 
aggregated up to the country level by taking a simple 
average over exchanges. The four shades of blue in 
the map are based on the average value of the vari-
able in 2008–10: the darker the blue, the higher the 
quartile of the statistical distribution of the variable.
Source: global financial development database, 2008–10 data.
Note: oecd = organisation for economic co-operation and development.
a. weighted average by stock market capitalization.
Market capitalization out of top  
10 largest companies (%)                       
Number of 
countries Average Median
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
Weighted 
averagea
World 46 44.8 44.8 18.2 3.7 74.2 63.6
By developed/developing economies         
Developed economies 25 42.4 42.6 20.8 3.7 74.2 64.4
Developing economies 21 47.6 51.2 14.6 24.6 72.1 60.9
By income level         
High income 25 42.4 42.6 20.8 3.7 74.2 64.4
Upper middle income 15 45.7 45.8 14.6 24.6 71.6 59.9
Lower middle income 6 52.4 54.3 14.6 26.8 72.1 66.7
Low income 0
By region         
High income: OECD 20 43.5 43.2 20.2 3.7 74.2 64.9
High income: non-OECD 5 38.0 39.6 24.8 5.8 65.0 55.2
East Asia & Pacific 5 58.2 53.2 8.8 51.2 71.6 69.6
Europe & Central Asia 2 41.6 41.6 10.4 34.3 49.0 37.4
Latin America & Caribbean 6 37.0 35.0 11.0 24.6 53.7 42.1
Middle East & North Africa 4 41.8 42.3 15.3 26.8 56.0 44.8
South Asia 2 63.7 63.7 11.9 55.3 72.1 72.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 2 54.7 54.7 18.3 41.8 67.6 68.4
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map a.7 eFFiciency—Financial maRketS
To approximate efficiency of financial markets, this 
map uses the total value of shares traded during the 
period divided by the average market capitalization 
for the period. Average market capitalization is cal-
culated as the average of the end-of-period values 
for the current period and the previous period. Data 
are from Standard & Poor’s Global Stock Markets 
Factbook and supplemental  Standard & Poor’s data, 
and are compiled and reported by the WDI. The four 
shades of blue in the map are based on the average 
value of the variable in 2008–10: the darker the blue, 
the higher the quartile of the statistical distribution 
of the variable.
Stock market turnover ratio (%)                        
Number of 
countries Average Median
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
Weighted 
averagea
World 103 56.9 28.8 65.3 0.3 342.7 197.5
By developed/developing economies         
Developed economies 43 84.4 68.0 70.0 0.7 342.7 218.5
Developing economies 60 37.2 10.3 54.2 0.3 216.1 127.0
By income level         
High income 43 84.4 68.0 70.0 0.7 342.7 218.5
Upper middle income 33 35.2 10.5 52.2 1.4 201.9 131.8
Lower middle income 21 35.0 10.1 47.8 0.3 141.6 103.6
Low income 6 56.6 10.1 87.0 0.5 216.1 69.5
By region         
High income: OECD 31 98.9 97.0 69.9 0.7 342.7 223.4
High income: non-OECD 11 51.1 13.9 58.2 1.3 155.8 131.9
East Asia & Pacific 9 67.4 34.4 68.2 0.4 187.8 166.6
Europe & Central Asia 14 35.7 8.2 62.2 0.4 201.9 121.5
Latin America & Caribbean 16 12.8 4.8 21.0 0.3 83.0 56.9
Middle East & North Africa 6 44.6 44.9 25.7 12.5 81.4 58.6
South Asia 5 101.0 121.3 84.6 6.2 216.1 126.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 11 13.9 5.9 19.9 0.5 69.9 62.1
Source: global financial development database, 2008–10 data.
Note: oecd = organisation for economic co-operation and development.
a. weighted average by stock market capitalization.
174  s t a t i s t i c a l  a p p e n d i x  GLOBAL finAnciAL DEVELOPMEnT REPORT 2013
map a.8 Stability—Financial maRketS
To approximate stability of financial markets, this 
map uses the annual standard deviation of the price 
of a 1-year sovereign bond divided by the annual 
average price of the 1-year sovereign bond (both 
based on month-end data). The underlying data are 
based on Bloomberg. The four shades of blue in the 
map are based on the average value of the variable in 
2008–10: the darker the blue, the higher the quartile 
of the statistical distribution of the variable.
Source: global financial development database, 2008–10 data.
Note: oecd = organisation for economic co-operation and development.
a. weighted average by total population.
Asset price volatility                     
Number of 
countries Average Median
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
Weighted 
averagea
World 84 33.6 33.1 10.8 11.3 67.3 38.0
By developed/developing economies         
Developed economies 41 34.1 33.3 10.0 11.7 67.3 32.8
Developing economies 43 33.2 31.7 11.6 11.3 58.8 39.3
By income level         
High income 41 34.1 33.3 10.0 11.7 67.3 32.8
Upper middle income 30 33.1 32.4 12.3 11.3 57.0 41.5
Lower middle income 11 34.8 32.0 10.6 21.0 58.8 37.3
Low income 2 26.9 26.9 0.1 26.9 27.0 27.1
By region         
High income: OECD 30 36.3 34.9 9.2 20.9 67.3 33.0
High income: non-OECD 11 28.2 30.6 10.0 11.7 45.3 30.5
East Asia & Pacific 7 35.0 35.0 7.6 21.1 43.7 40.1
Europe & Central Asia 11 38.8 34.3 11.4 22.1 58.8 49.0
Latin America & Caribbean 10 34.0 34.3 14.9 11.3 57.0 42.3
Middle East & North Africa 5 21.9 21.0 6.7 13.4 32.0 27.1
South Asia 3 32.2 31.5 7.3 25.3 39.8 38.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 7 30.1 27.0 10.5 16.4 48.1 28.0
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